Therapeutic Overzealousness. A Debate on Criteria for Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatmen

Author(s): Marian Machinek / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2015

Greater human longevity is one of the biggest achievements of medicine. Timely medical interventions save countless human lives. But some of them, especially those undertaken in the face of imminent death, often generate serious ethical dilemmas. After reaching a certain critical point, the otherwise welcomed and blessed possibilities of prolonging life sometimes degenerate into a painful prolongation of dying. A spontaneous moral intuition, as well as a more balanced, careful ethical reflection – for which human life constitutes the highest value – permits withdrawal of ineffective therapy. But just what are the criteria for making that crucial decision to terminate a medical therapy? How does one define them? The article opens with the overview of terminology applied to medical interventions that fall into the category of inadequate treatment, both from the perspective of medical futility (futile treatment), the standpoint of the physician (overzealous treatment) and the actual suffering of the patient (burdensome treatment). It then examines the criteria for the termination of treatment, among which the prognosis of imminent death and disagreements over the extent of the basic medical care play crucial roles. The final parts of the article focus on some additional, though by no means less important, issues relating to end of life, like the truth at the sickbed, patient’s advance decision concerning the extent of medical interventions he is willing to accept and the physician’s conscience clause.

Novac i zajednica: mjerenje nemjerljivog. Novac kao pravda, vrijeme i lihvarenje

Author(s): Zoran Janković / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 4/2016

Levinas confirms: a reflection about a money as a social and economical reality is not possible without a serious analysis of empirical data. On the other hand, this reflection always involves something else, so a money is never a merely economical category. In that sense, Levinas proposes an intriguing meditation about some “dimensions” of a money in the western tradition. Contrary to the traditional moral condemnation of a money – which however remains unquestionable because of the fact that a man always carries a risk of becoming a merchandise – Levinas suggests that money never simply means a reification, but always implies some positive dimensions. Levinas suggests that a money is not something morally bad or simply neutral covering human relationships, but rather a condition of human community. Furthermore, he claims that a money is a fundament of the justice. A money makes possible a community, he explains, because it opens up the dimension of the future, and implies the existence of human beings who give themselves a credit; a credit understood as a time and a confidence. We shall try to address some problems implied by this thesis, particularly the problem of the relationship between time, money and credit. Finally, we are going to ask whether this credit – inseparable from the very essence of the money – is not always already a sort of usury.

Navigare necesse est. O terapeutycznym wymiarze refleksji filozoficznej w sytuacji kryzysu orientacji

Author(s): Tomasz Siwiec / Language(s): Polish Issue: 17/2016

W pierwszej części artykułu autor wyjaśnia istotę współczesnego kryzysu orientacji i omawia jego przyczyny. W drugiej z kolei odpowiada na pytanie, w jakim sensie myślenie filozoficzne może stanowić remedium na zagrożenie omówione w części pierwszej. W ostatniej zaś, trzeciej odsłonie artykułu ogólnie przedstawia model filozofii, do którego winniśmy dążyć, jeśli terapeutyczny wymiar refleksji filozoficznej ma zostać urzeczywistniony.

The Game You Are in: Misleading through Social Norms and What’s Wrong with It

Author(s): Lisa Herzog / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2017

This paper discusses the phenomenon of misleading about “the game you are in.” Individuals who mislead others in this way draw on the fact that we rely on social norms for regulating the levels of alertness, openness, and trust we use in different epistemic situations. By pretending to be in a certain game with a certain epistemic situation, they can entice others to reveal information or to exhibit low levels of alertness, thereby acting against their own interests. I delineate this phenomenon from direct lies and acts of misleading by implication, and discuss some variations of it. I then ask why and under what conditions it is morally wrong to mislead others about the game they are in. I distinguish three normative angles for understanding the phenomenon: deontological constraints, free-riding on a shared cultural infrastructure, and implicit discrimination against outsiders and atypical candidates. I conclude by briefly discussing some practical implications.

The Footholds of an Integrative Bioethics in the Work of Van Rensselaer Potter

Author(s): Hrvoje Jurić / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2017

Regardless of the still persistent tendencies to narrow the concept of bioethics down to (bio)medical or even clinical bioethics, it is clear that today’s bioethics integrates discussions of a much wider range of issues – from bio-medical to global-ecological. The broadening of the field of bioethics is the result of the insight that the issues of the techno-scientific era humanity faces are interwoven with the issues that regard other living beings and nature as a whole. This insight into the interweavement of the issues involved (and the interweavement of the relationships themselves within the living world) has brought about the networking of various sciences, professions and non-scientific views, which we know under the names of multi-, inter- and trans-disciplinarity, and pluriperspectivism. However, bioethics should not be satisfied with a mere mechanical gathering of various disciplinal views and worldviews, but should aspire after real integration, the shaping of a unified platform for discussion of the ethical problems regarding life in all its forms, shapes, degrees, stages and manifestations. Developing the starting premises of this platform is the task of “integrative bioethics”. In order to do so, taking account of the work of Van Rensselaer Potter cannot be avoided, since his idea of bioethics and the development of his bioethical thought extensively coincide with what bioethics generally means, as well as with its historical transformations: from the moment he coined the term ‘bioethics’, through having founded so-called “bridge bioethics” to the reformulation and expansion of the contents of bioethics into so-called “global bioethics”. The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which Potter’s work can serve as a stimulus and be the foothold of the goal to establish bioethics as integrative bioethics.

„Metaetyczny status” etyki inżynierskiej

Author(s): Krzysztof Serafin / Language(s): Polish Issue: 1/2016

The article refers to the meta-theoretical aspects of contemporary reflection about so-called ethics engineering in the context of ethics division be-tween: meta-ethics, normative ethics and sociology of morality. Analyses are based on the context of meta-ethical general principles attributable to the con-temporary discourse of engineering ethics, such as: cognitivism in naturalistic and anti-naturalistic version. Ethics engineering in its present form does not constitute a single conceptually self-mainstream ethical or philosophical discipline, but its nature of the idea reflects in “applied ethics”.

Potrzeba opracowania polskiego tezaurusa teologii moralnej i etyki

Author(s): Dorota SZUMILAS / Language(s): Polish Issue: 18-19/2004

W dobie powszechnego stosowania systemów komputerowych służących do gromadzenia i systematyzowania informacji, języki informacyjno-wyszukiwawcze (dalej JIW) wykorzystywane do te-matowania dokumentów opisanych w bazach danych bibliograficz-nych czy katalogach, spełniają swoją rolę metainformacyjną.

Human good, virtues and practice: Macintyre’s account of a Thomistic-Aristotelian practical rationality

Author(s): Joel C. Sagut / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2015

The article is an attempt to articulate MacIntyre’s characterization of the Thomistic-Aristotelian moral theory, which he defends as being a superior ac- count of moral philosophy. MacIntyre argues that we could not possibly come up with a neutral moral standard to guide our actions, that is, that our practical decisions and actions are largely influenced by our adherence to a particular tradition, and that our moral choices are always a product of our upbringing that has oriented us towards a particular understanding of the good. He then takes upon himself the task of articulating the core of a Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition, particularly its understanding of the human good, with the hope of showing the superiority of its narrative over its rivals. Moreover, this article argues that given MacIntyre’s emphasis on Thomistic-Aristotelian theory, moral philosophy could not and should not ignore the contribution of moral formation as an important component of moral philosophy, which should be concerned not only with the search for the legitimate foundations of moral theories, but also with an account of how ordinary people actually make their moral choices.

Како се одржати изнад амбиса

Author(s): Ana Selić / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 146/2014

Ребека Вест, Значење издаје, Алгоритам, Београд 2013

Macintyre, Rawls and Cavell on Games, Rules and Practices

Author(s): Rastislav Dinić / Language(s): English Issue: 02/2017

John Rawls and Alasdair Macintyre are usually portrayed as opponents in the liberal-communitarian debate. However, Stanley Cavell’s critique of Rawls’ early paper “Two Concepts of Rules”, helps us recognize a similarity between their accounts of rules, games and practices and the role that these play in moral life. This paper shows that both authors pay insufficient attention to personal relationships, the flexibility of our moral life, and the need to take responsibility for our moral positions. A scene from Thomas Hardy’s “Jude the Obscure” is used to show how this presents a serious problem for Macintyre’s model of tradition-based moral reasoning.

A gyűlölet biztonsága

Author(s): Ákos Szilágyi / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 06/2017

За једно виђење философије економије

Author(s): Branko Balj / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 27/2017

There are many reasons for a vision of the philosophy of economics, but the main cause/reason rests in the neoliberal way of production of life which reaches its peak in schizoid capitalism (Deleuze-Guattari). Considering that the neoliberal economy was conceptualized by Hayek and Friedman in the manner of repression of the social justice by the “market justice” with unforeseeable socio-economic and social consequences, here arises a question/problem of the reactualization of Marx’s thought in dimensions of reification and exploitation in contemporary conditions. Harmonization of the social and market justice requires reactualization of the relation between economics, morality, politics and right, with the purpose of searching for a more humane way of production of human life in community/society.

Dobro v etike Josepha de Finance

Author(s): Oľga Gavendová / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 2/2011

Joseph de Finance investigates the notion of goodness in the relation to the activities of human being. Goodness presents itself to a man or a woman as a goal and as a value. In human life, there are different kinds of values, which have an important role to play, but for a human being the key value is a moral value, which characterizes a human being as a person and in acting in harmony with this value a person constitutes itself, and this is how he or she makes human life meaningful. Nevertheless, nowadays people are often blind and deaf in regard to the values, and thus they impoverish their own lives.

Utilitarianism and the Idea of University

Author(s): Nenad N. Cekić / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2018

The standard objection to the utilitarian vision of morality is that utilitarian so-called “Greatest-Happiness Principle” could justify counter-intuitive practices such as punishing and sacrifice of innocents, breaking of promises and manipulation. The underlying presumption is that the greatest cause (general utility, “happiness”) must be capable of justifying causing suffering of the few. The fact is that, in the upbringing and education of humans (children), some degree of manipulation is needed. Instead, in that process, we use concepts which belong to deontological prescriptions (“obligations,” “duties”) such as “Do not lie” or “Do not steal.” Our question is: Can we imagine the University guided by the simple utility principle. We must remember that a University is for adults, not for children. Why now not be open and at the University say that everything we do we do for the sake of hedonistic “happiness,” not for the sake of duty. That seems suspicious for several reasons. Maybe the most noteworthy objection is that Mill’s version of the utilitarianism tends to divide humanity into two classes: moral aristocracy, which seeks “higher pleasures,” and others who do not. Does that mean that utilitarians must organize secret utilitarian universities for moral aristocracy? Does it mean that moral aristocracy, according to the utility principle, should organize “deontological,” manipulative public universities for lower classes?

Suicide, Euthanasia and the Duty to Die

Author(s): Marina Budić / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2018

The paper addresses the issues of euthanasia and thoroughly analyses Kantian response to the practice in question. In reference to Kant’s views on many related issues, such as murder, suicide, autonomy, rationality, honor and the value of human life, the main goal of this paper is to offer an explanation for one probable Kantian view on euthanasia in general, as well as an explanation for a specific form of euthanasia with regard to those patients suffering from dementia. The author’s arguments, according to which Kant could even argue that those persons who have begun suffering from dementia have a duty to die, have all been given special importance in this paper. The question is could and should this specific moral ever be allowed to become universal when considering the patients’ willingness to commit suicide once they start suffering from dementia or perhaps once they start experiencing a loss of rationality? Should suicide even become a patient’s duty? Furthermore, if a patient shows absolutely no intention or willingness of taking her/his own life, ‘should’ the doctor perform a non-voluntary euthanasia over the patient? This paper analyses the author’s arguments which are actually in favor of aforementioned questions, and aims to examine the plausibility of the act as well as to criticize it. The issue of euthanasia is very important, because the key question is what in fact constitutes the fundamental value of human life, which lies at the heart of this problem.

Politika és erkölcs

Author(s): Sándor Kónya-Hamar / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 06/2018

Aniszi Kálmán: Kényszerű társbérlet, Székely Ház Alapítvány kiadó, Bp.,2017.

Normatywność etyki cnót środowiskowych na przykładzie etyki Ronalda Sandlera. Komentarz

Author(s): Dominika Dzwonkowska / Language(s): Polish Issue: 3/2017

The aim of my article is to prove that environmental virtue ethics (EVE) can be a normative ethics. First I will present the arguments that virtue ethics can be a normative ethics (§1). Second I will demonstrate that the norms of virtue ethics are different than the norms of a utilitarian or deontological ethics (§ 2). Third I will propose the general maxim and premises stating what is the right action according to Ronald Sandler’s EVE (§ 3).

Emotion, Intentionality and Appropriateness of Emotion: In Defense of a Response Dependence Theory

Author(s): Sunny Yang / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2009

In explaining emotion, there are strong cognitive views, which reduce emotion to belief/thought or judgment. Misgivings about assimilating emotion to belief/thought/judgment have been a main reason for moving towards perceptual accounts for many authors. My aim in this paper is to defend a perceptual theory. To this end, I first argue against a crude version of cognitivism that views emotion essentially in terms of thought or belief. I then argue that doubts about the assimilation of emotion to belief explain the appeal of ‘perception’ as the ‘cognitive element’ most appropriate to the analysis of emotion. Then I shall discuss why perception is the right category to fit emotional responses into by contrasting some considerations adduced by Sabine Döring and by Jesse Prinz. I shall show that Prinz ignores the perspective aspect of perception, while Döring fails to explain the indiscriminability in perceptual experience. For these reasons, both Prinz’s and Döring’s views are insufficient to explain emotional recalcitrance or unmerited emotional response. To explain emotional recalcitrance, I argue that we must appeal to a disjunctivist theory of visual experience. I shall demonstrate why we should prefer the explanation in terms of indiscriminability over one which appeals to a common element, such as a thought or representation of something as dangerous, for example. The present critical examination will afford an alternative view of the appropriateness of emotions.

Emotional conflict and social context

Author(s): Chloë FitzGerald / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2009

This paper aims to move the debate over the status of the conflict between emotion and judgement forward by refuting three implicit claims: that conflict between emotion and judgement is always to be avoided; that any conflict should always be resolved and, moreover, that it should be resolved immediately; that judgement should usually take priority in any resolution. Refutation of these three claims leads to recognition of the wide variety of different cases of conflict between emotion and judgement; examination of these cases is aided by consideration of the social context in which the conflicts occur.

Přednáška o etice

Author(s): Ludwig Wittgenstein / Language(s): Czech Issue: 1/2005

Než začnu mluvit o vlastním tématu, dovolte mi několik úvodních poznámek. Cítím, že budu mít veiké obtíže sdělit vám své myšlenky, a myslím, že část těch obtíží lze umenšit, zmíním-li se vám o nich předem. První, kterou skoro ani zmiňovat nemusím, j e ta, že angličtina není můj rodný jazyk a mému výrazivu tudíž často schází přesnost a jemnost, jež by při řeči o obtížném tématu byla žádoucí.