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Izvještaj o govoru mržnje zasnovanom na seksualnoj orijentaciji i rodnom identitetu u BiH. Slučajevi iz 2012. i 2013. godine.

Author(s): Vladana Vasić / Language(s): Bosnian

Govor mržnje u BiH, usmjeren prema LGBT osobama, je u porastu zbog sve veće vidljivosti LGBT osoba. Postojeća zakonodavna regulacija govora mržnje je nedovoljna, iako medijima zabranjuje korištenje govora mržnje, ne dotiče se pojedinaca koji ovaj govor svakodnevno izražavaju u javnosti, najčešće na web portalima i facebook stranicama. Iako uglavnom izbjegavaju direktno izražavanje i prenošenje govora mržnje, i sami mediji naizgled neutralnim izvještavanjem i navođenjem, te davanjem medijskog prostora homofobičnim i transfobičnim stručnjacima_ kinjama i pojedincima_kama da izražavaju svoje mišljenje, pomažu širenju govora mržnje i njegovoj dostupnosti široj javnosti. Ovim načinom izvještavanja mediji izbjegavaju vlastitu odgovornost za preneseni sadržaj, a istovremeno privlače pozornost javnosti i prenose pogrešnu sliku o LGBT osobama, kojom se obično pokušavaju poduprijeti već postojeći stereotipi i predrasude. Iako postoje mehanizmi sankcionisanja i uklanjanja govora mržnje preko Regulatorne agencije za komunikacije, koja je nadležna za elektronske medije, i Vijeća za štampu u BiH, koje je samoregulatorno tijelo štampanih medija, oni sami za sebe, bez krivičnog gonjenja odgovornih, ne dovode do željenih rezultata niti do uklanjanja neetičke prakse medijskog izvještavanja. Govor mržnje usmjeren prema LGBT osobama se izražava od netačnih tvrdnji i proglašavanja LGBT osoba bolesnim i devijantnim, do pozivanja na diskriminaciju i nasilje, u najgorim slučajevima do prijetnji smrću, te doprinosi netolerantnom stavu bh. društva i marginalizaciji LGBT osoba. Ispoljavanjem govora mržnje, također se dovodi i do težih incidenata, pa čak i počinjavanja krivičnih djela i zločina iz mržnje, a koristi se i da bi se podržali počinitelji tih djela, te opravdala njihova djela, čime se šalje poruka LGBT osobama i ostalim marginaliziranim grupama da nisu poželjni_e u bh. društvu. Da bi obezbijedila poštivanje prava i sloboda, kao i dostojanstvo svih svojih građana, između ostalih i LGBT osoba, te pružila adekvatnu podršku marginaliziranim grupama koje su najčešće žrtve govora mržnje, i u potpunosti dokazala da osuđuje netoleranciju, mržnju, diskriminaciju i nasilje, Bosna i Hercegovina bi trebala: - ustanoviti i javno diseminirati odgovarajuću i sveobuhvatnu definiciju govora mržnje koja, između ostalog, uključuje i seksualnu orijentaciju i rodni identitet kao zabranjene osnove za govor mržnje; - adekvatnu zabranu govora mržnje propisati krivičnim zakonima oba entiteta tj. Federacije BiH i Republike Srpske i Krivičnim zakonom Brčko distrikta; - zabranom govora mržnje obuhvatiti ne samo medije kao moguće počinioce, nego i državne institucije i sve ostale pravne i fizičke osobe.

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Медиите между гражданското общество и държавата

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Bulgarian

The present sociological analysis is based on empirical data from a survey of public opinion conducted by Vitosha Research in May 1998. It aims to determine the extent of the mass media impact on Bulgarian society. The focus is on the way in which relations between the Fourth Power and the State are being built and regulated.

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Доклад върху резултатите от социологическо проучване сред журналисти на тема: "Корпоративно управление и медии"

Author(s): Plamen Chipev / Language(s): Bulgarian

The survey was conducted among a wide range of journalists (77), electronic, print and internet editions, including a wide range of media from the capital and about 20% of provincial publications. More than 70% of respondents are from specialized economic publications with a very high level of education, predominantly humanitarian, but not a small part - more than 1/3 are economically educated, with an even larger proportion (43%) attending economic courses and specializations.

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REDEFINING EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES: RUSSIA`S MANIPULATIVE TECHNIQUE

Author(s): Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili / Language(s): English

Since November 2013, when the uprising of the Ukrainian nation set in motion a wide spectrum of events and political process, researchers and policy makers have been questioning the reasoning, consequences, and international implications of those political processes, as well as their impact on the future of the international political environment. This study, Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values: Russia`s Manipulative Techniques, is not one of the many investigations published in recent months focusing on Russian information warfare in Ukraine. It is not a study about them. This is a study about us, namely, the ‘transatlantic community’—a community we consider to be based on democratic values. This study seeks to answer an essential question: how can it be that countries, which enjoy leading positions in terms of prosperity, freedom, solidarity, innovation, economic competitiveness, and seemingly unlimited normative power based on the long-standing democratic traditions have neglected or ignored (intentionally and unintentionally) the manipulative redefinition of their core democratic values. By allowing our core democratic values to be deconstructed and reconstituted by values derived from an authoritarian regime makes Western society vulnerable to influence. Russia’s international ambitions are not based on conquering new territories, but on creating mental landscapes susceptible to political manipulation. Russia’s foreign policy goals with regard to the West are clear: ‘to weaken the West economically, to split it politically, and to establish Russia as the hegemonic power on the European continent’1 . Extensive material resources are unnecessary; individuals and societies that question themselves are decisive ‘weapons’ in the battle for influence. Transitioning out of the international relationships that dominated during the Cold War was an eye- and mind-opening exercise for both governments and societies. Most of the countries that left the Soviet bloc, including the Baltic States, joined those that are based on democratic values; however some keep their old values, fashionably redressed in a style called ‘sovereign democracy’.

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THE KREMLIN AND DAESH INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

Author(s): Antti Sillanpää / Language(s): English

The paper summarizes discussions held on 24 May 2016 in Riga, Latvia, which focused on exploring the Kremlin and DAESH information activities in order to improve our understanding of the nature of these communications and their effect on Western societies. The questions discussed were: How are the communications and messages of DAESH and the Kremlin constructed and disseminated? Are their methods changing? Why do such messages appeal to youth, even if they are familiar with Western values and consumerism? What are the weakest aspects of our information environment and what can we do to improve? Six items emerged from the discussion as most relevant to the investigation of these issues. 1) Identity and Values Identity and values are in constant flux across time and space. It is easier to attack the values and identity of the other, rather than offering something different and better than the opponent. However, the West should be clear that it cannot simply assume the moral high ground. One of the weakness of the West is that we have allowed some members of society to become isolated and/or marginalised; they are now the ones who are more open and susceptible to the messaging of DAESH and the Kremlin, especially messages that project a sense of pride and/or a feeling of inclusiveness because they appear to offer the opportunity to participate meaningfully in some sort of utopian society. 2) Strategic Communications and the National Narrative There is a distinct need to create and maintain a positive national narrative in which words and deeds align, and to communicate that effectively. A narrative should not be static, but responsive to the environment in which it is based. One idea that came up in discussion was to task a specific governmental entity with coordinating messages concerning the national narrative and the strategic communication approach. This entity should be situated close to the Presidential Administration or the Prime Minister’s Office and have clear operating procedures, goals, and resources that address the identified risks and threats. The highest political backing would ensure sufficient clout to function adequately and carry out the mission. This body should oversee national narrative and strategic communication efforts, and act as an advisory and educational hub for other parts of government. A whole government approach, spanning both civil and military spheres, is required. The increase in the number of stakeholders reduces chances to create and manage coherent but relevant international narratives 3) Messaging and Counter-Messaging There is a continuing discussion as to whether the West should concentrate on counter-messaging or should focus on messaging instead. An argument for engaging in counter-messaging is that lies and harmful messages should not go unchallenged, otherwise falsehoods and partial truths may become accepted as facts and be assimilated into a society’s ‘knowledge base’. An argument against engaging in countermessaging is that this practice is likely to ensure that the West remains in a defensive and reactive posture in the current information confrontation, and adversaries’ harmful messages get unintentionally repeated. However, by actively messaging there is a chance to dictate the informational agenda, thereby forcing the opponent into a reactive position. Irrespective of the focus on messaging or countermessaging, information activities should not be done in isolation, but as an integrated part of a political or policy programme. 4) Perception and Legitimacy Emotional resonance holds greater sway than logical argument as a political or social relationship is formed between an audience and a communicator. Some individuals and groups are more susceptible to messaging than others, often as the result of an unfulfilled need. The motivation to join and/or support DAESH is largely based upon the perception that what is being offered is legitimate and will fulfil some psychological or physical need of the individual recruit. The messenger that communicates a believable response to such needs may well be able to influence that particular individual or group. However, when an individual personally experiences the dissonance between the projected utopia and reality, their trust in the utopian vision soon disappears, and along with it any sense of motivation or commitment to the cause. 5) Measuring Activity and Effect Both DAESH and Russia have adopted Western technologies and understood the audience appetite for infotainment and quick satisfaction. DAESH and the Kremlin employ the tactic of shifting focus and attention away from areas where they are losing or vulnerable. They have the ability to affect our news agenda and our focus through big event news. Even if the Kremlin or DAESH are engaged in harmful or disruptive communication, the activity does not necessarily translate into influence that would weaken the national security of the target state. The measure of an activity, i.e. communicating, does not automatically neatly translate into the measure of its effect, i.e. influence and change of behaviour. There are many variables that can either obstruct or facilitate the level of influence and persuasion that actually takes place when an actor communicates. These differences put pressure on us to achieve a better understanding of human behaviour and develop more meaningful ways of measuring. Observing, let alone measuring, the effectiveness of ‘hybrid warfare’ is particularly challenging. 6) Analytical Tools and Frameworks In addition to traditional historical area studies and social science perspectives, there are a variety of promising frameworks that can be used to investigate the information activities of DAESH and the Kremlin. The potentially fruitful approaches discussed included political and obstruction marketing and psychology.

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INTERNET TROLLING AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE: THE CASE OF LATVIA

Author(s): Alexander Fokin / Language(s): English

Social media has been used increasingly to support military actions. Recent conflicts have demonstrated that the fight for hearts and minds is as important as kinetic activity, and social media plays a crucial role in this process. Both state and non-state actors effectively exploit social media to gain support for their actions, recruit new members, deceive and intimidate the adversary, and even use it for traditional military activities such as intelligence collection or command and control. Given these conditions, the NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) was tasked to conduct a study on how social media can be used as a weapon of hybrid warfare. The recent Russian-Ukrainian conflict demonstrated how fake identities and accounts were used to disseminate narratives through social media, blogs, and web commentaries in order to manipulate, harass, or deceive opponents. Several reports by investigative journalists have reported about the existence of so called troll farms in Russian cities, employing people to spread disinformation, rumours, or falsified facts, enter into discussions and flood topic-related web spaces with their own messages or abuse. Nevertheless, trolling is still a relatively unexplored phenomenon. Although such activities have been widely identified, their effects have not been measured, particularly due to the fact that is it difficult to distinguish between the paid trolls and people who are simply expressing their opinions. In order to analyse how pro-Russian trolling is used to influence the public opinion in NATOmember countries the NATO StratCom COE commissioned the study Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: the Case of Latvia. The study was conducted by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with Riga Stradins University, and was aimed at analysing organised proRussian trolling in internet media to measure its impact on public opinion in Latvia. Latvia was chosen for the case study due to the specifics of its information environment (a strong division between the Latvian and Russian language information spaces), as well as the country’s historical background and potentially vulnerability to Russian hybrid warfare tactics. Communication science, social anthropology, political science, and information technology expertise was employed to gain a better understanding of the trolling phenomenon, and to develop methods to identify trolling and evaluate its impact on public opinion. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used. This research provides an opportunity to evaluate the risk potential of trolling, and it offers recommendations on how to mitigate the effects of trolling when used as a tool in hybrid warfare, beyond the specific case study.

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ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE

Author(s): Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili,Jānis Bērziņš,Aivar Jaeski,Mark Laity,Nerijus Maliukevičius,Aurimas Navys,Gerry Osborne,Robert Pszczel,Stephen Tatham / Language(s): English

The report analyses Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, covering the period from the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) until the annexation of Crimea (16 March 2014). It refers also to some more recent, important examples of the information campaign relating to events such as the MH17 air tragedy. Over the years, Russia has been drawing lessons from different Allied operations and has worked on adapting its military planning to the realities of a modern conflict. It tested these lessons in the recent August 2008 war with Georgia which marked the first use of cyber warfare and information operations in conjunction with a conventional military operation. Russia has also shown a willingness to modernize Soviet-era tools and adapt them to today’s complex information environment. Critically, it has been willing to afford informationbased activities primacy in operations, using more conventional military forces in a supporting role. Russia’s information campaign has to be analysed in the context of the strategic narrative of the Russian government, reflected in policy documents like the Foreign Policy Review of 2007 and the State Security Review of 2009, and supported by legislative initiatives like the Federal Law on the Russian Federation’s State Policy on Compatriots Living Abroad. The notion of compatriots deserves particular attention as it allows Russia to legitimize the state’s duty to defend its compatriots abroad from any kind of threat to their rights or physical well-being. It also leads to the explanation of the need to sustain the so-called Russian World which implies maintenance of a unified Russian-language information sphere beyond the borders of the Russian Federation (mainly targeting the territory of the former USSR). The Russian government’s long-developed control over the mass media has been an important factor in the effective implementation of the information campaign against Ukraine. Russia’s narrative was instrumentalized with the help of concurrent messaging. For example, the main Russian TV channels were actively involved in framing opinions about the situation in Ukraine from the very beginning of the crisis. Control is exerted directly by the Presidential Administration, including also government-controlled internet ‘trolling’ which is a growing, under-researched phenomenon used to support the Russian government’s narrative. This control over the media has made it difficult for democratic states with free media to compete with the forceful, synchronized messaging of the Russian government. The Russian narrative includes several dominant themes: positioning Russian Slavic Orthodox Civilization in opposition to “decadent” Europe; positioning Ukraine as integral to Eurasianism and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union; promoting the Russian World which unites Eastern Slavs, implies that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation, and recognizes the natural supremacy of Russia; portraying Ukrainians as a pseudo-nation who are unable to administer their own country and sustain their statehood; referring to the Great Patriotic War thus bringing out the hatred of Nazism and relating it to the Euromaidan protesters who are labelled as nationalists, Nazis and fascists posing a threat to the ethnically Russian part of Ukraine’s population; dividing the West by utilising the differing interests of EU member states and positioning the USA in opposition to the EU; and using legal and historic justifications to legitimize Russia’s actions in Ukraine (including the Crimea Referendum). The report identifies that Russia’s information campaign was central to Russia’s operations in Ukraine. The information campaign and related military action by Russia corresponds to the characteristics of a new form of warfare where the lines between peace and war, foreign military force and local self-defence groups are blurred and the main battle space has moved from physical ground to the hearts and minds of the populations in question. Crimea may be considered a test-case for Russia in trying out this new form of warfare where hybrid, asymmetric warfare, combining an intensive information campaign, cyber warfare and the use of highly trained Special Operation Forces, play a key role. The crisis in Ukraine has provided valuable lessons for the Ukrainian government, the countries neighbouring Russia (whose Russian-speaking communities were enlarged as a result of Soviet-era policy), and NATO and the EU as organisations. The following are the general conclusions of the report: • Russia was prepared to conduct a new form of warfare in Ukraine where an information campaign played a central role. The characteristics of the new form of warfare which were implemented in Crimea were outlined by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, nearly a year before the crisis in Ukraine. Analysis of the Ukraine conflict suggests that NATO and the EU must adapt to the new reality where information superiority, as opposed to military power, is becoming increasingly important. • Russia’s narrative is largely based on historical memory. Russia’s thorough understanding of its own audiences – including compatriots abroad – was able to leverage historical memory: the Great Russian Empire, World War II and Nazi atrocities, and the might and collapse of the USSR. • Crisis in Ukraine is a result of Russia’s long term strategy. Learning from the Russian information campaign in Ukraine, it is clear that early detection and analysis of those elements within the Russian narrative signalling potential aggressive behaviour is critical. The report also demonstrates that Russia’s state policy documents contain such indications. • The role of Compatriots Abroad is critical and should be considered carefully in the future. The security implications for countries neighbouring Russia are particularly serious. The kind of strategy that Russia has employed in Ukraine is likely to work best in areas where there are larger communities of Russia’s Compatriots Abroad. They are the targets of Russia’s information campaign and potentially may be ready to provide local support in cases of Russian aggression. The Ukraine and Georgian cases demonstrate that such information campaigns, backed by military means, are easier to carry out in territories bordering Russia – in particular, in those countries which are not members of NATO and therefore not party to the Washington Treaty. • Audience Analysis is critical to operational success. Russia has demonstrated that understanding audiences and what motivates them is critical to operational success that is enduring. • There is “another side of the coin” to Russia’s information campaign. Although Russia’s information campaign has been successful in influencing its audiences (the Russian population and compatriots abroad), it also bears a degree of counter-productivity as it has radicalized and alienated other audiences – West Ukraine and Kyiv, the populations of NATO and EU countries and the USA. • Deception is used by Russia as a tactic to distract and delay. Investigating and disproving the false information, different versions of events and even conspiracy theories rapidly disseminated by Russia requires a lot of time, effort and resources on the part of international organisations like NATO, the Ukrainian government, independent media, experts and even ordinary citizens. • Disinformation campaigns erode over time. The evolution of the crisis in Ukraine beyond Crimea demonstrates that disinformation campaigns erode over time as more and more factual evidence is revealed to negate lies and falsification.

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NETWORK OF TERROR: HOW DAESH USES ADAPTIVE SOCIAL NETWORKS TO SPREAD ITS MESSAGE

Author(s): Joseph Shaheen / Language(s): English

We conducted research aimed at understanding the process by which DAESH disseminates propaganda online. Our focus was not the content that is distributed but the method by which it is distributed. We did so using a number of qualitative, statistical, and numerical analysis techniques in hopes of gaining a deeper insight into their operations and making recommendations for NATO and NATO member states on how to combat them effectively. We discovered a number of important findings the most salient of which is on how individual level decisions made by many of their members have contributed to the survival of their propaganda capabilities, and in some instances an advanced ability to thwart efforts to eliminate their message and their outreach to both locals as well as westerners. We can summarize our findings as follows: • Popular social media platforms such as, and especially, Twitter forms the core of DAESH’s propaganda and information dissemination efforts. They use these mediums as the core of a web of content that is spread in many parts of the ungoverned internet. • DAESH (perhaps unknowingly) uses and an adaptive network structure on Twitter to combat outside influences and to react to external operations seeking to curb their operations. This network adapts at high speed and with limited central organization. • DAESH makes innovative use of platform vulnerabilities that allows them to evade detection, suspension and deletion by state and non-state actors through both automated and manual methods of detection. • DAESH has amassed a strong following supported by an internal dedicated human infrastructure allowing them to affect a substantial impact on the information environment. • Through the use of a core-periphery network structure and a high number of networkcentral actors DAESH created a redundancy factor that can withstand repeated efforts to disrupt their information supply chain. • Through the use of account inflation, signaling, and closure methods, DAESH has been able to successfully create friend/ follow networks that feed into their ability to build sustainable adaptive networks, evade detection, and maintain their level of online activity. • DAESH has built a network structure that utilizes the flexibility of small communal networks and allows for the large scale interactions commonly associated with large diverse-use networks. This adds to the challenge of combating them in the traditional information warfare environment. • We create an explanatory process to simplify the reader’s understanding of the group’s usage of social media. We call it the DEER process. The DEER process begins with dissemination and ends with replenishment. We recommend this model as a way to build more effective strategies in combating the group. Our findings lead us to a more detailed understanding of the DAESH propaganda machine which has gained them notoriety throughout the world and especially on traditional media platforms; and though our conclusions are technical in nature, they have far reaching policy implications. To begin, these conclusions illustrate the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies of a distributed response to DAESH propaganda. DAESH uses limited centralization from a network perspective in order to evade detection while maintaining some control over method and content of their messages—a hybrid model—where flexibility and potency are both achievable. This means that substantial resources must be dedicated in order to combat their ideology effectively. These resources (human and otherwise) are, at the moment, non-aligned, ineffective, and unsustainable over the long term. This is not because the resources and methods used are by nature ineffective, but because the adversary is using strategies and tactics which have never been encountered on this scale ever before. For example, in this report we show that the targeting of highly visible active accounts on Twitter for deletion or suspension, though can eliminate short terms gains by the group, also provides them with the time and knowledge to build more adaptive, responsive networks. While, if account targeting is based on a community/clustering method, we can increase the transaction costs of our adversary’s recovery substantially—gaining invaluable time pinned on lower levels of propaganda diffusion— and simultaneously building more strategic operational tactics. We propose and recommend that in addition to the adjustments of technical methods used in the targeting of DAESH network infrastructure, that more emphasis should be placed on disrupting the supply chain of propaganda, rather on providing contrasting messages. This implies that permanent investments not only in new technology, but in human resources should be made, and coordinated labor division among NATO members as well as allies in the region should be instituted. Our discoveries rely on a number of assumptions to produce our recommendations—the most important of which—is that this information battle is based on concepts of adaptive networks and complex systems. This is a direct result of DAESH’s approach of relating loose policies to its members and allowing them to make individual level behavioral decisions on how best to conduct an information war. In turn, this means that traditional methods as have been adopted by various agencies, state, and non-state actors alike simply will and do not suffice, as has been evident from the group’s continual ability to conduct a propaganda war while facing insurmountable opposition, both physical and electronic. We also recommend that more effort must be made to remove the value proposition which DAESH uses to attract recruits to begin with. Though, our research did not engage the socioeconomic and geo-political environment under which potential recruits are subjected, we hypothesize that innovative efforts in this space can produce substantial declines in DAESH’s ability to disseminate propaganda and ultimately to recruit westerners to their cause. Finally, we make recommendations for future and ongoing research, some of which is much needed to understand and produce effective strategies to combat the group.

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ROBOTROLLING 2018/1

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Generational change in malicious activity on social media seems to be at hand. Primitive bots indiscriminately promoting links to news sites are on the decline. They are being replaced by coordinated accounts that target conversations centred upon individual media outlets or members of different elites. In recent months on Twitter, the volume of automated content about NATO activity in the Baltics and Poland has declined at an increasingly rapid pace. The number of bottweets dropped by 15 percentage points for Russian and 20 percentage points for English. We infer that this reduction is best explained by changes introduced by the platform. Our findings are verified by drawing on thirty times more data than for previous Robotrolling issues. For the first time we include messages from VKontakte as a control. We see a marked rise in organised trolling activity conducted by humans using fake accounts compared to early 2017. As of January 2018, 50% of all Russian-language messages are directed at other Twitter users. As social media companies intervene to clean up automation, they should take care that changes they introduce may enable new forms of manipulation. Russian language bot activity is in decline in absolute terms, but Twitter in Russian remains more polluted than Twitter in English.

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ROBOTROLLING 2017/2

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Robotic activity is highly dynamic. The online discussion about the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltics shows sharp changes in focus and intensity. The current reporting period August–October has been comparatively free of large-scale, politically motivated robotic interventions. In contrast, the period March–July stands out as one in which content was heavily promoted online. Political actors use bot accounts in the social media space to manipulate public opinion about regional geopolitics. According to our estimate, such accounts produced 5–15% of the activity about the NATO presence in Latvia and Estonia in the period March–July 2017. Bot-generated messages differ depending on the target audience. Messages aimed at the West suggested that Russian exercises pale in comparison with NATO operations. Messages targeted to the domestic audience rarely mentioned the Russian exercises. Russian-language bots create roughly 70% of all Russian messages about NATO in the Baltic States and Poland. Overall, 60% of active Russian-language accounts seem to be automated. In comparison, 39% of accounts tweeting in English are bots. They created 52% of all English-language messages in the period August–October. Our data suggest Twitter is less effective at removing automatically generated Russian content than it is for English material. Nonetheless, we have seen improvement in social media policing by the platform. A ‘cleaner’ social media is good not only for individual users, but also for businesses. Pressure should continue in order to ensure further improvements.

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RUSSIA'S FOOTPRINT IN THE NORDIC-BALTIC INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The ongoing project covering Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden monitors Russia’s information activities in the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8) and analyses their impact. The report covering the period of 2016/2017 looks at the aims of Russia’s information activities and the narratives used; discusses the compatriot policy as a tool of influence; provides an insight into the use and varying level of trust in the information provided by Russian state-funded media and the public opinion on particular narrative themes promoted by Russia. The main findings are structured around the following research questions.

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DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The terrorist organization, Daesh, also known as so-called Islamic State/IS/ISIS/ISIL, has launched an extremely sophisticated information campaign at various target audiences in order to gain support for its expansion in the Middle East. Daesh’s first strategic achievement, drawing considerable attention from various governments and mainstream Muslim groups, was the first public speech given by self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It was devoted entirely to the proclamation of the so-called Caliphate. In order to find out how this campaign is managed, and to propose practical solutions to existing challenges concerning situation on the Middle East, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) conducted research into Daesh’s information strategy. The methodology for analysing Daesh’s information strategy included a number of techniques such as social psychology, the psychology of communication, and social media analysis. The work was done in consultation with social media experts and advisors from NATO member states in order to achieve the best result. This executive summary summarizes three reports - “Type of applied persuasive strategy and its influence on message effectiveness” (Ph. D. T. Grzyb), „Visual framing in the Islamic State” (Ph. D. Shahira Fahmy) and “Network of Terror: How Daesh Uses Adaptive Social Networks to Spread its Message” (Mr. Joseph Shaheen).

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INTERNET TROLLING AS A HYBRID WARFARE TOOL: THE CASE OF LATVIA

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The executive summary outlines the main conclusions of the study Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: Case of Latvia, commissioned by the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence. The study was conducted by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with Riga Stradins University and the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory of the Institute of Mathematics and Informatics (University of Latvia)1 and was aimed at analysing organised pro-Russian trolling in internet media and measuring its influence on public opinion, using Latvia as a case study. The research provides an opportunity to evaluate the risk potential of trolling, and offers recommendations on how to mitigate its effects when used as a tool in hybrid warfare. A multidisciplinary approach – including communication science, social anthropology, political science and information technology expertise – was applied in order to understand the trolling phenomenon, develop a method for its identification and evaluate its impact on public opinion. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE - EXAMINING NON-MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE FROM A STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVES

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The report analyses Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, covering the period from the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) until the annexation of Crimea (16 March 2014). It refers also to some more recent, important examples of the information campaign relating to events such as the MH17 air tragedy.

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Stan badań nad prawnoustrojową i retoryczną odmianą komunikacji politycznej w I Rzeczpospolitej

Author(s): Małgorzata Dawidziak-Kładoczna / Language(s): Polish Publication Year: 0

The aim of this article is to identify the literature on political communication in Poland by the year 1795. The result of research on the legal notion variety of political communication are devoted to the development of lexis codes and statutes, the semantics of selected terms of political and constitutions and statutes. Linguists study the history and origins of the rhetorical style, the language of individual orators and the effectiveness of speech or politeness language.

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The Future of Public Service Broadcasting in Croatia

Author(s): Davor Marko / Language(s): English

The transformation of the former state-controlled Radio-television Zagreb into a broadcaster serving the public interest in Croatia, and its subsequent reform to comply with the European standards and principles is the main focus of this paper. Croatian-Radio Television (Hrvatska radiotelevizija, or HRT) - as the reformed broadcaster was named after the first multi-party elections in 1990 - underwent several developing stages. The analysis provided within the study reflects on the process of its evolution against the backdrop of specific political, social and economic factors, also taking into account challenges of a substantial and technological nature. In recent years, as Croatia moved towards full membership of the EU, the status and operation of the PSB, as well as its broadcasting regulatory mechanisms and media policies, were reviewed to bring them in line with the new EU regulations. Croatia’s case seems somewhat unique compared to other countries that were once part of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, but it also shares some similar contextual characteristics. First and foremost, the funding model is what sets apart the Croatia’s PSB from other Western Balkan post-socialist states. Considered one of the most successful models, HRTs license fee collection system has been continuously and systematically improved since the 1960s when it was first introduced. Albeit the level of editorial independence and financial sustainability has seen frequent oscillations at different points in time, HRT maintains its financial sustainability, and manages to drive its internal development. Like the other countries, Croatian PSB is under permanent political pressures, while its program has been commercialized, becoming less distinctive from content provided by commercial competitions. In order to assess the transformation of HRT into a public service, considering the challenges to its current operation and further development, the paper intends to answer the following questions. The first is related to the development of regulation and media policies in regard to PSB, including the various actors involved, the political setting, and internally or externally driven reforms. The second question targets the current regulation, status and role of the PSB in Croatia, with special attention to the PSB remit, funding model, formal and de-facto independence, market share, and the progress regarding technological innovations and digitalization. Finally, the paper deals with the challenges to the PSB operation in Croatia, taking into account ongoing debates on the global level, and country-specific discussions. This research draws upon the ongoing debates on the status and operation of PSB in a changing media environment. Technology developments, commercialization processes and the growing role of the market in defining media roles and audience tastes, information abundance, and audience fragmentation significantly define what we know today as ‘media ecology’. In such a context, the status and role, funding model and social role of PSB, and its relation with the audience, are contested. To evolve into a genuine public media, Croatian Radio-Television has to face these challenges both internally and externally. This study follows recent and ongoing debates on the future of PSM, and builds its analytical framework on concepts and ideas developed by contemporary PSM scholars such as Donders, Lowe, Moe and Van den Bulck, also taking into account theoretical accounts of media and PSB developments in the post-socialist area, including Jakubowicz, Sukosd, Splichal, and others. This research paper is divided in four main sections. The following section outlines the main theoretical concepts and the key debates in regard to the future of PSB. The third section reflects on the country background including political and economic factors, the development of the media system in Croatia and its PSB. The final section summarizes the main findings and discusses them in relation to the socio-political context and contemporary trends related to regulation, funding and the technological developments related to PSB in general. A discussion of the main trends and dilemmas on the European and regional level is presented within the final section.

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Montenegro - Between reform leader and reform simulacrum

Author(s): Not Specified Author / Language(s): English

Six years since the start of accession negotiations, Montenegro is still a showcase of state capture. In the same manner it has been exhausting domestic democratic public for decades, Montenegrin Government masterfully applies the exhaustion strategy to the process of European integration, abusing the EU’s need for a new integration optimism.

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№123: Breaking Down Russian and Chinese Disinformation and Propaganda About the War in Ukraine

Author(s): Agnieszka Legucka,Justyna Szczudlik / Language(s): English

Russia and China use a convergent narrative about the reasons for the war in Ukraine. Both accuse the West, mainly the United States, of provoking Russia, and as a result, the indivisibility of European security has been undermined. Despite the similarities, the Chinese narrative is not entirely the same as Russia’s. China formats its messages about the war in such a way that it attempts to create the perception of it as a still-neutral partner, restraining Russia’s actions. The European Union should pay more attention to Chinese disinformation, which can more effectively reach people and groups not susceptible to Russian narratives.

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Societas Classica. Култури и религии на Балканите, в Средиземноморието и Изтока. Том 11

Author(s): / Language(s): English,Bulgarian,Macedonian,Greek, Modern (1453-)

𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑠 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎 is a multilingual collection of papers presented at the international scientific conference that has been organized by the Department of Classical and Eastern Languages ​​and Cultures of St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo (Bulgaria) since 2002. Until 2015, the conference was held annually. Since 2018, it is held once every two years. St Cyril and St Methodius University Press issues the collection within the Dr. Nicola Piccolo series. The wide range of topics and the opportunity for authors to submit their academic publications in the original language attracts researchers from all over the world.

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COVID-19 tracing app in Serbia: How to pave the road with trust, transparency and inclusion

Author(s): Milena Lazarević,Dragana Bajić / Language(s): English

Governments across the globe are increasingly using digital tools to accelerate the tracking of people infected with COVID-19 and their contacts as a key measure to prevent the pandemic’s spread. Among potential solutions, contact tracing mobile applications have emerged as the most used and discussed, and it is likely that many governments, including Serbia’s, will include them in national public health efforts. Nevertheless, issues of privacy and data protection, and low public trust and user acceptance can prevent these apps from being used, which is why Serbia’s government needs to ensure a good understanding and respect of citizens’ concerns before proceeding with the implementation of one. Given the comprehensive EU-level discussions towards finding the best possible common solution aligned with the Union’s robust personal data protection policies, little can go wrong if Serbia follows European approaches. This can also help rea rm the country’s pro-European orientation.

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