NEW WORLD ORDER: THE BALANCE OF SOFT POWER AND THE RISE OF HERBIVOROUS POWERS
Author(s): Ivan Yotov Krastev,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English
Keywords: EU Soft Power;
The largest survey of public opinion in the world shows support for a more multipolar world and a greater role for ‘herbivorous powers’ – countries not widely perceived as military superpowers. // There is mistrust of the Cold War powers as well as Islamist-inspired Iranian autocracy. More people want to see a decline rather than an increase in the power of Russia (29% decline, 23% increase), of China (32% decline, 24% increase), of the United States (37% decline, 26% increase), and of Iran (39% decline, 14% increase). On the other hand, there is strong support for an increase in the power of fast-developing powers such as South Africa, India and Brazil.
The European Union is the most popular great power. Uniquely among great powers, more people across all continents want to see its power increase than decrease. This demand for more European power extends to many former European colonies. // Whilst American soft power has declined, the rise of China has led to the resurgence in support for American power in Asia. Increasing Russian influence in Eastern Europe is paralleled by a demand for a greater American role. Outside Europe, ‘the West’ is still seen to some extent as a single actor: countries suspicious of American power tend also to be against EU power.
Donald Tusk, the new Polish Prime Minister, wants to bring Poland back to the heart of Europe, rebuilding ties with Germany and France to create a ‘Weimar Triangle’, lessening tensions with Russia, and trying to make the country a genuine player in European foreign policy. The new Government will try to rebalance ist relationship with the United States, slowing down the move towards missile defence and withdrawing its troops from Iraq. Although there will be a change of style on contentious issues like Russia, the new government will still be an ‘assertive partner’ opting out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; unlikely to join the euro; and likely to put up a fi ght against reform of the EU budget.Co-habitation with President Lech Kaczyński will create tensions but the government has the constitutional powers and the moral clout to set the agenda.
The gas relationship with Russia has become an extremely contentious issue among EU Member States. It is a major reason for the EU’s failure to develop the common policy approach towards Moscow it so badly needs. Yet the relationship is often misunderstood. Russia is the largest external gas supplier to the EU, but it is far from a monopoly provider. Since 1980, Europe’s diversification of its gas supply has seen Russia’s share of EU gas imports roughly halve, from 80% to 40%. Russian gas represents just 6.5% of the EU primary energy supply, a figure that has remained essentially unchanged over 20 years. And contrary to widely held belief, Russian gas exports to Europe are unlikely to increase significantly in the foreseeable future. So calls for Europe to diversify its energy supply even further miss the point. The problem is divisiveness, not dependence. Russian gas is divisive because Europe’s gas market is dysfunctional and segmented. Most of the EU’s imports of Russian gas go to a few countries in western Europe, where supply is diversified, while several Member States in central and eastern Europe consume relatively little Russian gas but have no other external suppliers. Only the emergence of a single competitive European gas market can create real solidarity between consumers and ‘Europeanise’ the current large bilateral contracts between European importers and Gazprom.To address the specific concerns of central and eastern European Member States, the EU should build on the 2004 directive on security of supply in natural gas, and help these Member States devise and implement national action plans for gas security.
Author(s): Richard Gowan,Franziska Brantner / Language(s): English
Keywords: Human Rights policy;
Last September, the European Council on Foreign Relations published a report warning that the European Union faced a “slow-motion crisis” at the United Nations, as a growing number of its former allies were beginning to oppose its vision of multilateralism and human rights. While the EU had grown increasingly internally cohesive on human rights votes, its reluctance to use ist leverage and its failure to reach out to moderate states were handing the initiative to defenders of traditional sovereignty like China, Russia and their allies. // This is the first in an ongoing series of annual updates on the EU’s performance in human rights debates at the UN, published in the run-up to the opening of the UN General Assembly. It covers the most recent Assembly session, from September 2008 to July 2009.
TOWARDS AN EU HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR A POST-WESTERN WORLD
Author(s): Susi Dennison,Anthony Dworkin / Language(s): English
The shift of global power away from the West threatens to undermine the EU’s hopes of supporting human rights, democracy and the rule of law beyond its borders. The success of authoritarian states like China and the problems of some new democracies have cast doubt on the benefits of liberal democracy. The EU has lost influence to emerging powers that emphasize sovereignty over human rights, and there is resistance to any idea of the West exporting its model to the rest of the world.
But the EU can still make a difference on global values if it follows a three-part strategy. It should join the battle of ideas, making a case for human rights and democracy that is not rooted in Western politics but recognizes that all societies should determine their own development in a fair and inclusive way. It should focus in its engagement with other countries on key ‘pressure points’ – achievable goals that will unlock further progress on human rights and create greater political space. And it should reach out to new partners, seeking common ground to support universal values in practice. To show it is not backing down on core beliefs, the EU should also set out a series of red lines on which it will not compromise. // If Europe projects confidence in the values with which it is associated and at the same time pursues a realistic approach to supporting them, it is most likely to strengthen its global standing and help bring about an international order that matches its interests.
Author(s): Richard Gowan,Franziska Brantner / Language(s): English
Keywords: human rights policy; human rights in UN;
Over the last year, the EU has struggled to make an impact on human rights at the UN, despite working more closely with the Obama administration than it was able to do with the previous administration. As a result, it is now clear that deepening divisions over human rights at the UN were not just a by-product of Bushism. The EU’s ‘voting coincidence score’ – reflecting the level of support from other countries for its positions on human rights in the General Assembly – has fallen from 52% last year to 42% this year. There have also been splits within the EU on votes in the Human Rights Council on Israeli actions in the Middle East, which has weakened the EU’s reputation for coherence on fundamental values at the UN. // This update – the second annual update to ECFR’s 2008 report on the EU and human rights at the UN – underlines important longterm trends. The Obama administration’s policy of engagement at the UN has only persuaded a few countries to shift their stances on human rights and big non-Western democracies – especially Brazil – continue to drift away from the EU’s positions. Attempts to reverse this trend through technical reforms in the UN’s human rights system will likely fail. A European drive for broader UN reforms such as expanding the Security Council would be a gamble but could persuade rising powers to rethink their positions on human rights.
Author(s): Thomas Klau,François Godement,José Ignacio Torreblanca / Language(s): English
Keywords: EURO-Zone;
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union has been an extraordinary achievement. But the events of 2010 have made it apparent that its political governance was designed for fair weather. Having reluctantly taken the first steps this year, European leaders must now make it storm-proof. The move to an agreement to establish a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to replace the EFSF in 2013 represents a fundamental and encouraging change in the approach of European leaders to the future of the eurozone. But the new model of eurozone governance currently envisaged by the EU, which is based once more on the Maastricht Treaty, will be vulnerable to failure for the same reasons as its predecessors. // If Europe wants to remain a serious player and help shape the twenty-first century, it should instead go beyond Maastricht and finally build a monetary and economic system strong enough to last. There are at least three other solutions – Eurobonds, a euro-TARP and an expansion of the federal budget. Yet each of them is opposed above all by Germany, the eurozone’s dominant power, which feels its robust growth vindicates its own economic model even though its political model for a rule- and sanctions-based governance of the eurozone looks to have failed. // Europe now faces a choice between a future of permanent tensions within the EU and a new grand bargain. Europe needs clearheaded, forward-looking German leadership that would anchor a European Germany in a more German Europe.
THE NEW GERMAN QUESTION: HOW EUROPE CAN GET THE GERMANY IT NEEDS
Author(s): Ulrike Guerot,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English
Since the beginning of the euro crisis last year, there has been a kind of “unipolar moment” within the eurozone: no solution to the crisis was possible without Germany or against Germany. Although Germany has now signalled it will do what it takes to save the euro, much of Europe is worried about the way this will be done and even resentful about where Germany seems to be heading. Germans, on the other hand, feel betrayed by the European project with which they once identified perhaps more than any other member state. In fact, whereas Germans once saw the EU as the embodiment of post-war German virtues such as fiscal rectitude, stability and consensus, they now see it as a threat to those same virtues.###This brief aims to move beyond this dialogue of the deaf and outline what a new deal between Germany and the rest of Europe might look like. It shows how an increasingly eurosceptic Germany is tempted to “go global alone”. Meanwhile other member states are responding to the new Germany with a mixture of “hugging Germany close” and forming coalitions that could one day be used to balance German power if Berlin fails to recreate a legitimate basis for its role in the EU. It argues that Germany needs to recast its approach to economic governance to avoid the creation of a two-speed Europe; work with other big states to reinvent the European security architecture; and put its economic might at the heart of a push to develop a global Europe.
A CHANCE TO REFORM: HOW THE EU CAN SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN MOROCCO
Author(s): Susi Dennison,Nicu Popescu,José Ignacio Torreblanca / Language(s): English
Keywords: Maghreb; EU and Morocco; Arab Spring;
While Morocco is usually seen as more stable, more advanced and more democratic than many other countries in North Africa, it too has potential for unrest. Although there is no immediate prospect of a revolution as in Egypt or Tunisia, Moroccans are increasingly frustrated with the country’s veneer of democracy. They are now demanding more limits on royal power and an end to corruption and clientelism. In short, they want a king who, as a slogan of the 20th February protest movement puts it, “reigns, but does not govern”. This situation presents the EU with a different kind of challenge than those it faces in Egypt or Tunisia. // With its European outlook and its close economic and commercial ties with EU states, Morocco highly values its privileged status within the EU’s southern neighbourhood. This brief, based on a research visit by the authors to Rabat in April, argues that the EU should now use the considerable leverage it has to put greater pressure on Morocco to create real democracy. The EU should put its weight behind a more inclusive constitutional commission, engage with youth movements, including Islamists, and offer better trade terms. It is in the EU’s interest to push for political reform now rather than react to a Syrian-style crackdown and instability in a few months’ time.
Discounting threats of armed attack and disillusioned with liberal interventionism, Europeans are shrin-king their militaries and banking on “soft” power. But this betrays a failure to understand the nature of the new, multiplayer global environment that will determine Europe’s future security and prosperity. The value of Europe’s armed forces is less in countering specific “threats” than as necessary instruments of power and influence in a rapidly changing world, where militaries still matter. Unless it gets over its discomfort with hard power, Europe’s half-hearted efforts to improve the efficiency of its defence spending will continue to fail. // This Policy Brief argues that Europeans now need to reassess their strategic environment, reconsider the role that hard power should play in it and relaunch their efforts to combine their defence efforts and resources. The Weimar Triangle – Germany, France and Poland – should jointly press for a heavyweight commission to conduct a European Defence Review, which would examine member states’ defence policies, much as the budget plans of eurozone members are now reviewed in a “European semester”; rewrite the European Security Strategy; and present to Euro-pean leaders a menu of big, bold proposals for decisive further defence integration. The alternative will be not just the end of the common defence policy but the steady erosion of Europe’s ability to defend its interests and values in the twenty-first century.
Stability, sustainability and success in the Sahel: the next steps for the Czech engagement
Author(s): Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň,Jan Daniel,Ondřej Ditrych / Language(s): English
Keywords: relations of the Czech Republic with Africa; Sahel; stability and security; UN; peacekeeping mission; sustainability and economy; poverty;
As a follow-up up to the military involvement of the Czech Republic in the region since 2013 and the consequent rural development projects there, the whole-of-government strategy towards the Sahel (G5) is an expression of responsibility and responsiveness to the related security challenges for the European Union and its African partners. By subscribing to the security-development nexus, Czechia recently reinforced its diplomatic presence in the Sahel and spread its activities to the areas of health, migration and civil society. To make its contribution to the Coalition for the Sahel sustainable and complementary to the EU’s efforts, Czechia should update its national strategy to build the Sahel’s forward resilience, expand the governance and development pillars and mainstream human rights and gender. It should also improve the financial planning and mainstream the Sahel in the current budget lines to mobilise domestic expertise, gain public support for the Strategy’s long-term implementation and give credence to the Sahel as a priority during the upcoming Czech presidency of the EU in 2022.
One of the criticisms that has been leveled at the Iran nuclear agreement officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached with the world powers in 2015 is that it failed to address Iran’s ballistic missiles. The ballistic missile programme provides the means for nuclear delivery should Iran decide to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran’s missile proliferation is particularly destabilizing for the region with detrimental knock-on consequences for Europe. Europe should maintain its pressure on Iran to stop testing missiles that exceed the limits of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and transferring missiles to regional proxies. Where Iran continues with its provocations, the EU should impose sanctions on Iranian and third-party organizations involved in the missile programme, reflecting actions it has taken to counter Iran’s human rights abuses. The E3 countries (Britain, France and Germany) should exert their influence to reinforce the EU’s efforts to strengthen coordination with the United States in using diplomatic channels with countries supporting Iran, such as Russia and China, to foster a more robust international response to the missile threat. The EU should also play a leading role in formalizing constraints on the range of Iran’s missiles. In the short-term, such an agreement would seek to prevent Iran from developing missiles that could strike Europe, with the ultimate objective of broadening restrictions on Iran’s missiles as part of a wider regional arrangement.
Planetary defense is a well-established scientific program which is currently reaching its milestone through a demonstration of a kinetic impactor deflection method by the DART space craft. Besides this deflection demonstration mission, planetary defense depends on astronomical observations. However, the threat of being hit by an asteroid is a low probability but high impact natural phenomenon which requires a multigenerational, financially sustainable, and scientifically beneficial program. While the scientists might be interested in discovering asteroids, they might not be interested in following up on them for generations; nor are they experts in building global planetary defense governance. Moreover, planetary defense capabilities, which are successively being developed, will sooner or later be considered as dual-use technologies. Given this dynamic, and to continue the development of planetary defense capabilities, not only spacefaring states need a regime under which they can act if others are under threat. This paper argues that given the milestone of DART and the follow-up HERA mission, the time has come to open a serious discussion over establishing global planetary defense governance in the shape of a planetary defense security community following multilateral principles similar to those of NATO but in a significantly smaller form. Small states have capacities to contribute to such a community (the principle of diffuse responsibility); they do it already in the current scientific planetary defense programs but in case of an imminent threat non-space-faring states need assurance that the existing planetary defense capabilities will be used for their benefit (the principle of indivisibility) and not misused. The answer is to establish a security community. These communities have proved to be surprisingly successful in the past, and the current planetary defense scientific community has almost everything that is needed to begin the discussions over the governance model of how we will defend Earth as humankind if scientists can already demonstrate it.
The EU’s mission to rebuild Ukraine: problems and priorities
Author(s): Artur KOLDOMASOV,Taras Prodaniuk / Language(s): English
Keywords: EU; Ukraine; Russian invasion of Ukraine; democracy; economy; European solidarity;
Since February 24 of this year, as Russia invaded Ukraine, the economic and political stability in Europe has been disturbed. The continued destruction of Ukraineʼs economy and infrastructure is exacerbating the world crisis and putting parts of the world on the brink of a food crisis. The Ukrainian Recovery Plan presented in Lugano proposes the reconstruction of Ukraine. Since receiving a candidate status, Ukraine is also one step further on its course to membership in the European Union. All this places the EU into the role of the main guardian of the countryʼs post-war reconstruction. This paper recommendsthat the EU and, in particular, the Czech Presidency should organize a comprehensive assistance in this regard and identifies its main priorities. First, besides assisting in upgrading the institutional capacities and efficiency of the central government, the EU should support the local actors and civil society partners in the post-war governance. Second, the post-war recovery should connect Ukraineʼs immediate reconstruction and reform needs and the EUʼs long-term digital and green priorities rather than prioritizing one over the other.
What can we expect from the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey?
Author(s): Pelin Ayan Musil / Language(s): English
Keywords: presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey; People’s Alliance; Labor and Freedom Alliance; Table of Six;
Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for 18 June 2023. These elections constitute a critical juncture for Turkey’s future. They will either put an end to or consolidate the 20 years of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule in the country. Due to a worsening economic crisis and a deepening refugee question, the government policies have lost significant levels of public support in the last two years. Yet, the elections in Turkey are held under unfair conditions due to the government control of the media, misuse of state resources and the vast powers that the executive has over the judicial authorities. The amendments introduced in the election law in April 2022 and the disinformation bill that passed in October 2022 create further advantages for the government in terms of increasing its control over the electoral process. Under these conditions, the success of the oppositional alliances depends on two criteria. First, the alliances must become unified in terms of supporting a joint candidate in the presidential elections both among and within themselves. Second, they must spend extraordinary effort to mobilize the undecided and protest voters, which would give a strong message of their determination to win the elections. If the opposition wins the elections, there will be a new window of opportunity for the EU and the new Turkish administration to prepare the grounds for a positive, stable relationship. Yet, the EU should not expect a speedy recovery in the relations due to mixed stances within the opposition and the recurrent societal perceptions that ‘the EU is biased towards Turkey. ’If the current government is re-elected, the EU should prepare itself for an increased frequency of escalated political tensions with Turkey. The EU should aim to develop a new interest-based framework to cooperate with Turkey in the areas of trade, migration, border protection and energy.
The Abraham Accords: a game changer for the region and Europe’s role in it?
Author(s): AZRIEL BERMANT / Language(s): English
Keywords: Abraham Accords; normalization agreements; regional cooperations; Israel; Arab states; EU; Palestine;
The normalization agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, that were signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan in 2020, have the potential to strengthen economic integration while also fostering wider regional security partnerships. The deepening of regional ties could pave the way for broader cooperation propelling joint efforts in addressing issues such as energy security and climate change. The normalization agreements present new opportunities for cooperation not only for the region but also beyond it, including for the European Union. Yet the Abraham Accords are facing a number of challenges which could constrain the expansion of the normalization process. There is a disparity in how the political elites and the broader Arab public view the Abraham Accords. Furthermore, the new Israeli government led by prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu includes several members that hold extreme positions on issues such as the Palestinian question and the status of holy sites in Jerusalem. The new government is liable to take actions that could heighten regional tensions and damage the normalization process. The Abraham Accords are popular in Israel. The UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan and other countries in the region have a unique opportunity to influence the new Netanyahu government and the wider Israeli public by linking progress on normalization to Israel stopping harmful policies that damage the long-term prospects of peace with the Palestinians. The EU has expressed measured support for the Abraham Accords, but it should actively encourage these states and potential new signatories to the accords to condition progress on Israel stopping counter-productive policies which could lead to a serious escalation in the region.
Food security in the context of the war in Ukraine
Author(s): Pernille Rieker,CLÉMENT STEUER / Language(s): English
Keywords: War in Ukraine; Russia; Food security; price hike; Norway; Czechia;
The Russian war in Ukraine has revealed the fragilities of the global food system. For European countries, this is both a domestic and an international issue. At the domestic level, the shortage of grains from the Black Sea region has contributed to inflation. At the international level, it threatens the stability of several countries in the Southern neighborhood and offers an opportunity for Russia to strengthen its soft power. In a world more fragmented and impacted by the consequences of climate change, it is vital to develop a more resilient food system. In the shorter term, European countries should strengthen their ability to produce fertilizers, and pursue their efforts to allow the transit of Ukrainian grains to the Middle East and Africa. In the longer term, they should include the Global South in the transition toward a green economy.
Czech and Norwegian perspectives on resilience in a post-invasion-of-Ukraine context
Author(s): Pernille Rieker,Eskil JAKOBSEN,Jan Daniel / Language(s): English
Keywords: Czech Republic; Norway; Russian invasion of Ukraine; NATO; Defence; Baseline Requirements for National Resilience;
The resilience thinking in the Czech Republic and Norway has been significantly influenced by the membership of both countries in NATO; however, a closer inspection reveals some significant differences between them and opens a space for their mutual learning. Norway should pay attention to which aspects of national security resilience are strengthened by the membership in the EU as well as the longer debate on the resilience to disinformation in the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic could learn from the Norwegian thinking about the coordination of civil and military efforts in addressing security and military threats.
Czech and Norwegian perspectives on new security threats concerning Russian war on Ukraine. Energy security
Author(s): Jan Mazač,Jakub M. Godzimirski,Lukáš Tichý,Martin Laryš,Zbyněk Dubský / Language(s): English
Keywords: Czech Republic; Norway; security threats; Russian war on Ukraine; energy system; energy-related risks;
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has disrupted the world’s energy system. The most urgent need was to phase out the EU’s dependence on Russian energy imports and find a quick replacement. In this joint paper, we approach the issue from two different perspectives of the Czech Republic and Norway, looking for intersections and identifying opportunities to strengthen cooperation and facilitate the accelerated energy transition and diversification. We conclude that both countries have taken immediate action in addressing the most pressing energy-related risks. The potential for closer cooperation is obvious. Both countries should maximise the level of collaboration by taking advantage of existing institutional frameworks (NATO and EU/EEA). In the energy dimension, the key to cooperation in the short term is gas (investment in production in Norway, development of export pipelines or protecting critical sub-sea infrastructure). In the longer term, both countries should jointly cooperate on developing of hydrogen market, including production and transportation.
We are a group of women who, in Black and Silence, express our protest against war. Th is type of protest was by Israeli woman pacifist in January 1988, protesting against the occupation of the Palestinian people, supported by Palestinian and American women. In this manner, the women have demonstrated that women s solidarity confronts us and divides us with well defined aims. In February of this year, Italian woman pacifists in the same way protested their opposition to the war in the Persian Gulf. The same was done by woman pacifists in Germany and Britain. Some weeks ago, Women in Black in Italy protested against the war in Yugoslavia. Women in Black of Belgrade each Wednesday gather in public places to protest, in black and silence, against the war.
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