Meeting Medvedev: The Politics of the Putin Succession

Meeting Medvedev: The Politics of the Putin Succession

Author(s): Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: governance of Russia; Dmitry Medvedev;

Dmitry Medvedev’s election on 2 March 2008 offers EU leaders a new chance to overcome their disunity and put their uncertain Russia policy on a better foundation. Whatever his personal inclinations, Medvedev will be unable to behave like a democrat in his first years in office. EU leaders should cautiously welcome the new president’s election, but must wait and see whether Medvedev proves a willing interlocutor who can deliver. They should refrain from the foolish enthusiasm they displayed when the sober and coherent Putin succeeded the ailing Yeltsin in 2000. Instead they should test Medvedev with specific demands over energy policy, Kosovo, and Iran.Medvedev, a lawyer by training, has often been depicted as a “liberal”. Considering the alternatives and his own record, he may well be one of the better options to succeed Vladimir Putin, the outgoing autocratic president. Yet Putin will be looking over Medvedev’s shoulder as prime minister. In the cut-throat world of Russia’s clan politics, Medvedev needs Putin to “protect” him from the “siloviki” -- past and present members of the KGB/FSB. The new president starts in a position of weakness, as he lacks a strong clan of his own. // A Putin-Medvedev double act would not be Russia’s first “cohabitation”. A similar deal was done when power passed from Yeltsin to Putin in 2000. Putin eventually broke free and became his own man when the siloviki triumphed over the former Yeltsinites during the Yukos affair in 2003. In time, Medvedev may do the same. Russia’s real power transition is likely to happen sometime after the election, if and when the new president puts his mark on the system. The time to assess Medvedev will be then.

Can the EU win the Peace in Georgia?

Can the EU win the Peace in Georgia?

Author(s): Nicu Popescu,Mark Leonard,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia-Georgia-Conflict;

The EU has established itself as the main diplomatic broker in the conflict between Russia and Georgia. It should use this position to help forge a positive peace from a war which threatens the foundations of the European security order. Russia has used its conflict with Georgia to display its military power, reclaim a sphere of influence and frighten its neighbours. Rather than looking for punitive measures, the EU should respond to Russia’s demonstration of force with much stronger engagement for democracy, prosperity and security in the broader region - keeping tough measures towards Moscow on the table if Russia resists.This war was caused in part by the dysfunctionality of the previous ‘peace-keeping’ process in Georgia. The EU must work hard towards ensuring that any new arrangements are not unilateral and do not merely legitimate Russia’s de facto control. The EU should promote an international peace-keeping mission and offer to deploy a civilian reconstruction mission dealing with development, building confidence and security between both sides, and tackling wider political issues. It should also encourage the United Nations to set up a commission of enquiry to help establish the truth on the causes and conduct of the war.Instead of focusing on short-term sanctions against Russia, the EU should move quickly to raise its profile in the Eastern Neighbourhood and to help stabilise other conflict regions - paying attention both to old ‘frozen’ conflicts and potential new flashpoints. The EU should also make a special commitment to Ukraine: It should recognise its right to EU membership in the future, agree to a more liberal visa regime, offer a solidarity clause backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and move to integrate Ukraine into the EU’s energy market.

Shaping Europe’s Afghan Surge

Shaping Europe’s Afghan Surge

Author(s): Daniel Korski / Language(s): English

Keywords: ISAF; NATO;

Unnoticed by many, the last few years have seen something of a European military surge in Afghanistan. Since late 2006, 18 of the 25 EU countries participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO’s Afghan mission, have increased their troop contributions, and as a result EU member states now account for 43% of ISAF’s total deployment. This military surge has been accompanied by a steady growth in European efforts to contribute to Afghanistan’s reconstruction, from development aid to police training – although not every EU member state is pulling its weight. // These measures have made the EU a major stakeholder in Afghanistan. Yet the EU’s real impact on the country has been limited. In the face of a likely request from the Obama administration to do more, European governments should now formulate a hard-headed political strategy as a complement to the coming US military surge. // The overall aim of this strategy should be to begin systematic outreach to Afghanistan’s insurgency groups. To prepare the ground, the 2009 presidential elections will have to be safeguarded from insurgent attack and fraud. After the election, EU governments should push for the twin processes of reconciliation and constitutional change. But European governments cannot revert to a purely civilian role. They should continue improving their training of the Afghan army and police, and assist US and local forces in emphasising “human security” in military operations. This should be backed up by well-funded and long-term aid commitments, the launch of a European provincial reconstruction team in Kabul, a developmentbased approach to counter-narcotics, and a revived Pakistan strategy.

Dealing with Yanukovych’s Ukraine

Dealing with Yanukovych’s Ukraine

Author(s): Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Yuliya Tymoshenko; Viktor Yanukovych;

Over the last few years, the European Union’s relationship with Ukraine has been undermined by a split on both sides. On the European side, some wanted a reform-minded, western-leaning Ukraine, either as a good thing in itself, or in order to eventually transform or at least contain Russia. Others, meanwhile, were quite happy to allow Ukraine to stagnate in order to keep the thorny question of enlargement off the table. On the Ukrainian side, some saw their future lying in Europe, while others wanted to move closer to Russia. This double split has left Ukraine adrift. However, the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in 2010 creates a new situation. The political crisis of recent years may not be over – even after the replacement of his rival, Yuliya Tymoshenko, as prime minister, Yanukovych doesn’t yet fully control the government, let alone Ukraine’s powerful ‘oligarchs’ – but his return to power may represent a real opportunity for Europe.

BEYOND WAIT-AND-SEE: The Way forward for EU Balkan Policy

BEYOND WAIT-AND-SEE: The Way forward for EU Balkan Policy

Author(s): Heather Grabbe,Gerald Knaus,Daniel Korski / Language(s): English

Keywords: 2008 Economic Crisis; EU and the Balkans;

In the midst of a huge economic crisis, European Union leaders may be tempted to put off any further decisions on enlargement. However, now that some of the Western Balkan countries have tested the EU’s commitment by formally applying for membership, the wait-and-see approach is unsustainable. The EU has kept six of the countries of the Western Balkans – Albania, BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia – waiting for a decade. The EU has asked them to take on difficult and ambitious reforms to prepare them for membership.However, Balkan leaders are no longer even sure that the EU members really want them in the club. As a result, the EU’s credibility is fading in the region. If it continues to hesitate about the next step, its leverage could fade too. The EU should respond to these membership applications in a positive way while reinforcing ist accession conditionality. The most realistic way to do this is to employ the EU’s existing tools more fully and more effectively, and to better sequence the next steps towards accession. This would support reformers in the region without imposing any additional costs on the EU. The aim is to set out a clear, realistic and motivational programme to help the Balkan countries to get in shape for membership – which could take many years to achieve. This will strengthen governance and provide political momentum to help the region get through the current economic crisis and ist political fallout.

The EU and Belarus after the Election

The EU and Belarus after the Election

Author(s): Balázs Jarábik,Jana Kobzova,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Belarus and EU;

The crackdown that followed the presidential election in Belarus on 19 December 2010 reversed pre-election signals that had promised a relatively liberal atmosphere. After a rigged election result that gave President Alyaksandr Lukashenka an implausible 79 percent of the vote, more than 600 Belarusian citizens were arrested, including eight of Lukashenka’s nine opponents in the election. However, although he was able to survive the election, Lukashenka now faces economic pressures and a forthcoming struggle over the privatisation of state assets, which will be the most important test of his ability to keep both the elite and society under control. In that context, the post-election crackdown was a sign not of the regime’s strength but of its internal weakness. As the country’s internal struggles intensify, it would be a bad time for the European Union to isolate Belarus. // At the same time, however, the EU must react in order to regain credibility in its neighbourhood. In the past, the EU and the United States tried both isolating and engaging the regime. Although neither policy was a complete failure, neither was particularly effective. In addition to expressing solidarity with those still in prison, the EU must now devise a proactive strategy that changes Lukashenka’s options. Lukashenka is a great survivor who has shown skill in balancing between Russia and the West, but his position has been weakened. While Russia is also increasingly frustrated with its ally, the interruption of EU dialogue with Minsk increases the chances that Moscow will gain control of its neighbour’s economy. The EU now has an opportunity to regain the initiative in its relationship with Belarus. It should raise the stakes for both the regime and Russia through a combination of targeted and ‘smart’ isolation, selective sanctions and engagement.

TURNING PRESENCE INTO POWER: Lessons from the Eastern Neighbourhood

TURNING PRESENCE INTO POWER: Lessons from the Eastern Neighbourhood

Author(s): Nicu Popescu,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: European Neighbourhood Policy;

Since the launch of its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003, the European Union has become the biggest trading partner of most of the states in the region, embarked on association and free-trade talks, deployed crisis management operations, and offered visa facilitation and visa-free dialogues. But the EU has not succeeded in turning this presence into power. In fact, as the EU has become more involved in the eastern neighbourhood, its ability to influence political developments in the region has stagnated at best. With the exception of Moldova, all of the EU’s eastern neighbours have gone in the wrong direction in the last few years. // Behind the EU’s failure to turn presence into power in the eastern neighbourhood lie three structural trends: the increasingly authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in most of the neighbourhood states; the emergence of a multi-polar world that allows countries in the eastern neighbourhood to play “neo-Titoist” games of balancing between external actors; and the EU’s own limited commitment to the ENP. The EU should continue to increase its own visibility and outreach with the public, business interests and state institutions in the eastern neighbourhood. However, it should not rely on soft power alone. Instead, it should also aim to develop a more transactional relationship with its eastern neighbours – in other words, to decide what its interests are, be less diplomatic with interlocutors and set tough conditions on issues such as visa liberalisation.

EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A bolder EU Approach

EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A bolder EU Approach

Author(s): Anthony Dworkin,Daniel Korski,Nick Witney / Language(s): English

Keywords: Egypt Revolution, Arab Spring;

The success or failure of Egypt’s transition to democracy will have huge consequences for the Middle East and for Europe. If the country overcomes the obstacles to political reform, it would set a powerful example for the region. But although the ruling Military Council appears committed to hand over power, it is governing in an opaque way and has resorted to summary justice to deal with protest and criticism. Some liberals also worry that the quick timetable for elections will favour the remnants of the old regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. The revolution has also exacerbated the precarious state of the country’s economy. // Despite Egypt’s importance, however, the EU has struggled to achieve influence in the country. In March Ashton and Barroso proposed a new policy framework, which is a good start but should be strengthened, for example by cancelling Egyptian debt. In the longer term, the EU should take a more political approach and behave more like a regional power. For example, Europeans should say clearly that military leaders who resort to summary justice to deal with protest and criticism are violating fundamental political rights. EU officials must also be ready to engage with all Egypt’s political groups, including former NDP members and the Muslim Brotherhood. Europe needs to move beyond fear about migration to see the potential for longer-term economic benefits for both sides of the Mediterranean.

CHINA’S JANUS-FACED RESPONSE TO THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS

CHINA’S JANUS-FACED RESPONSE TO THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS

Author(s): Jonas Parello-Plesner,Raffaelo Pantucci / Language(s): English

Keywords: Arab spring; Muammar Gaddafi; Ai Weiwei;

China’s response to the revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa was two-faced like the Roman god Janus. In a pragmatic break with its sovereigntist approach to international relations, China inter-vened to protect thousands of its citizens and its growing commercial interests in North Africa and sup-ported UN sanctions against Muammar Gaddafi. However, since February there has also been a wi-despread crackdown to prevent the wave of protests that had engulfed the Middle East and North Africa spreading to China. The arrest of artist Ai Weiwei at the beginning of April brought this crack-down to the attention of the world. // This Janus-faced response presents a dilemma for the European Union. On the one hand, it suggests that China could in the future become a partner for the EU in crisis management and that it is moving towards a more proactive foreign policy. On the other hand, China’s response to protests at home represents a clear challenge to the EU’s newfound commitment to de-mocracy promotion. The EU should therefore seek to do more crisis-management planning together with China while remaining vocal and consistent on China’s human rights and internal reform process, even if it incites Chinese anger and results in a reaction in other fields.

THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN: 2011 REVIEW

THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN: 2011 REVIEW

Author(s): Richard Gowan,Franziska Brantner / Language(s): English

Over the last year, three major crises – Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Syria – tested Europe’s ability to shape decision-making at the UN. The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire showed that China could be persuaded to support democracy and that Russia by itself lacked the leverage to hold up the Security Council indefinitely. The Libyan debate demonstrated the persistence of Western power in the UN system, even though the EU split over how to act. Ironically, although Europe was more united over Syria, this failed to translate into action as the non-Western powers reasserted themselves. Support for European positions on hu-man rights votes in the General Assembly stayed roughly level, but the EU also won important votes about gay rights and its own status as a bloc at the UN. // The picture of the UN that emerges from these events is one of an institution in flux. While the UN has recently seemed to be drifting into bloc politics, this year coalitions formed on a crisis-by-crisis basis. This may foreshadow the emergence of an increasingly multipolar UN dominated by fluid diplomatic alliances. Although it sometimes struggles to maintain its own unity, the EU now has opportunities to build coalitions of states that can deliver action on human rights and crisis management – if it can overcome its own internal divisions.

EUROPE AND THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS: A NEW VISION FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

EUROPE AND THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS: A NEW VISION FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Author(s): Susi Dennison,Anthony Dworkin / Language(s): English

Keywords: Arab Revolutions;

In the aftermath of this year’s revolutions, the EU has rightly recommitted itself to the support of de-mocracy and human rights in the Middle East and North Africa. However, although protesters across the southern Mediterranean share some of the EU’s values, they do not see Europe as a political model and democracy in the region is likely to produce some results with which Europeans are not comfortab-le. This brief argues that, in response, the EU should focus above all on the development of legitimate and accountable governments in post-revolutionary countries in the Arab world. Rather than backing specific political groups in countries that are in transition, the EU should work to create the building blocks and background conditions for fair and inclusive politics. // The EU should also try to support human rights through transparent diplomacy and support for civil society. In countries such as Moroc-co that remain undemocratic, the EU should develop a more political approach that pushes harder for incremental reform in return for credible benefits, while continuing to engage on other EU interests. The use of violence against civilians in countries like Syria should be a red line for limiting cooperation, dra-wing condemnation and sanctions in severe cases. EU proposals on conditionality and a new European Endowment for Democracy will be most effective if they are focused on the support of accountable and legitimate government.

FOUR SCENARIOS FOR THE REINVENTION OF EUROPE

FOUR SCENARIOS FOR THE REINVENTION OF EUROPE

Author(s): Mark Leonard / Language(s): English

Europe’s leaders see the need for “more Europe” to deal with the euro crisis but do not know how to persuade their citizens, markets, parliaments or courts to accept it. This is the root of Europe’s political crisis: the necessity and impossibility of integration. European integration has been defined by two contradictory but mutually reinforcing forces that operate on both the European and national level: technocracy and populism. But the more technocratic the EU has become, the more it has provoked a populist backlash. European leaders are now unable to solve the euro crisis because they can only force inadequate solutions through loopholes in the Lisbon Treaty. // Four routes towards solving Europe’s institutional crisis are now emerging: asymmetric integration by working around the existing treaties; a smaller, more integrated eurozone based on the existing treaties; political union through treaty chan-ge; and a deal among a new vanguard through a Schengen-style treaty. There are also calls to strengthen each of the three traditional channels for democratic participation in order to restore legi-timacy: European elections, referendums and national opt-outs. Whichever of these options Europe ultimately chooses, the challenge will be to solve the acute euro crisis without at the same time exacer-bating the chronic crisis of declining European power.

SAVING THE EURO: WHAT’S CHINA’S PRICE?

SAVING THE EURO: WHAT’S CHINA’S PRICE?

Author(s): François Godement / Language(s): English

Although Europe needs external lending and the show of confidence it brings, its attempt to persuade China and other emerging economies to enlarge the resources of the EFSF is likely to bring only limited results. However, there are various other scenarios under which China and other investors may lend to Europe. The best case scenario from Europe’s point of view is that it would increase the lending capacity of the EFSF or the ECB and turn them into a super borrower and lender. But this scenario is unlikely to become a reality because it requires a “big bang”-like reinvention of European public finance for which there is no commitment. More likely is that the ECB will underwrite a new IMF fund dedicated to the support or rescue of European member states. This would mean a larger Chinese contribution in IMF decisionmaking. Alternatively, China could seek to lend to Europe in renminbi, thus transferring the exchange risk to the European borrower. Such a deal would also offer China an unprecedented guaran-tee against any depreciation of the euro. Finally, the euro could collapse altogether and the IMF could be called in – the worst case scenario. In any case, Europe should acknowledge the interdependence between it and China and therefore its need for external capital.

A “RESET” WITH ALGERIA: THE RUSSIA TO THE EU’S SOUTH

A “RESET” WITH ALGERIA: THE RUSSIA TO THE EU’S SOUTH

Author(s): Hakim Darbouche ,Susi Dennison / Language(s): English

Keywords: EU–Algerian relations; energy supplier; Algeria;

There are striking similarities between the ways that Algeria and Russia have handled the EU, particularly since Abdelaziz Bouteflika came to power 12 years ago. Like Russia, Algeria is an important supplier of energy – in particular, natural gas – to Europe. As a result, it has traditionally enjoyed stronger relations with key member states, especially its energy clients, than with the EU as such. But Algeria’s current sense of vulnerability in a dramatically changing region presents a potential opening for increased European engagement and, over the long term, influence. It is important that the EU’s attention does not remain focused only on the other countries in the region that have been affected by the Arab revolutions in more obvious ways. // The EU is currently revising its European Neighbourhood Policy. But if Algeria does not engage fully with it, there is a risk that it could be isolated. However, the shifts currently taking place in Algeria and its neighbourhood create an opportunity for a “reset” in EU–Algerian relations. Such a reset could increase the EU’s ability to influence the course of domestic events in Algeria by using engagement to support economic modernisation and spread the rule of law. Over the longer term, as confidence builds on both sides, the EU could use a more functional relationship to increase its voice on the need for political reform.

THE LONG SHADOW OF ORDOLIBERALISM: GERMANY’S APPROACH TO THE EURO CRISIS

THE LONG SHADOW OF ORDOLIBERALISM: GERMANY’S APPROACH TO THE EURO CRISIS

Author(s): Sebastian Dullien,Ulrike Guerot / Language(s): English

Keywords: ordo-liberalism; Walter Eucken; Franz Böhm; Leonhard Miksch; Hans Großmann-Doerth; Euro-zone;

The new treaty agreed by European leaders in January reflects Germany’s distinctive approach to the euro crisis rather than collective compromise. Much to the frustration of many other eurozone count-ries, Germany has imposed its own approach – centred on austerity and price stability at the expense of economic growth – on others without considering whether the institutional flaws of monetary union beyond a lack of fiscal control may be the cause of some of the distortions and problems that the cur-rent euro crisis has exposed or whether its approach could have a negative impact on other eurozone countries. German economic orthodoxy has been widely criticised elsewhere in Europe. // This brief explores the historical and ideological foundations of German economic thinking and discusses how it differs from mainstream international economic discourse. It argues that there is more to Germany’s distinctive approach to the euro crisis than the much-discussed historical experience of the hyperinflati-on in the Weimar Republic on the one hand and simple national interest on the other. Rather, there is an ideological edifice behind German economic orthodoxy with which Germany’s partners must enga-ge. While a change in the government after the next general election, in 2013, would lead to a change in German economic policy, it is unlikely to dramatically change the country’s approach to the euro crisis.

THE END OF THE PUTIN CONSENSUS

THE END OF THE PUTIN CONSENSUS

Author(s): Ben Judah / Language(s): English

Keywords: EU and Russia; Vladimir Putin;

The “Putin consensus” of the 2000s is over. Although Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is certain to win a hollow victory in the Russian presidential elections in March, the current electoral cycle has weakened his authority and shown the fragility of his regime. Russia is undergoing a process of re-politicisation and is entering a phase of “late Putinism” that is likely to be characterised by elite divisions, continued protests and a gradual ebbing away of popular support. The protest movement that erupted after the falsified vote in the parliamentary election in December has not yet challenged Putin’s grip on power but is nevertheless a symptom of an increasingly unstable Russia. The European Union should see the current crisis as a clear signal that the Putin system will not last forever. Since December, the Kremlin has already faked counter-demonstrations, harassed the media, indulged in ritualistic but corrosive anti-Westernism, and splurged on social spending to try to re-consolidate support. Putin has also talked of reform, but his weakness will more likely make him more dependent on his oligarchic allies. The EU should begin a long-term dialogue with the Russian opposition focusing on improving anti-corruption practices inside the EU and take measures such as passing a pan-EU “Magnitsky List” to threaten those involved in egregious human rights abuses and corruption with visa bans and asset freezes.

SO FAR FROM GOD, SO CLOSE TO RUSSIA: Belarus and the Zapad military Exercises

SO FAR FROM GOD, SO CLOSE TO RUSSIA: Belarus and the Zapad military Exercises

Author(s): Fredrik Wesslau,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Belarus;

Fears that Russia may use Zapad 2017 as cover to carry out a hybrid operation in Belarus are overblown. Moscow has other levers with which it can coerce Minsk, and it neither needs nor is interested in another military adventure at the moment. // President Lukashenka realises that relying solely on Moscow is dangerous and wants instead to diversify his strategic options by inching closer to Europe. But there are limits to how much Lukashenka can, or even wants to, approach the West. His survival depends fundamentally on maintaining an economic lifeline to Moscow. He knows that taking significant amounts of Western money comes with requirements of structural reforms that would undermine the basis for his rule. // The European Union should support the gradual strengthening of Belarusian sovereignty, build further links, and step up engagement. This will bring Belarus closer to the West, as well as create more opportunities to influence Minsk on human rights and democracy. A policy of isolation would only push Belarus further into Russia’s tight embrace.

DON’T CLOSE BORDERS, MANAGE THEM: How to improve EU Policy on Migration through Libya

DON’T CLOSE BORDERS, MANAGE THEM: How to improve EU Policy on Migration through Libya

Author(s): Mattia Toaldo / Language(s): English

Keywords: migration Africa-Europe;

Two years after the start of the refugee cri s i s , migrat ion flows via Libya to Europe are increasing, while deaths in the Mediterranean have skyrocketed. Current policies have failed to reduce the number of migrants reaching Europe’s shores. // The EU and its member states need to rethink their basic assumptions about migration and break popular taboos about the movement of people if they are going to reduce flows. The first step is to cast away the idea that borders can be completely closed to economic migrants. // The EU and its member states need to manage flows, rather than aiming to cut them to zero. To do this, legal migration channels should be opened so that illegal channels can be shut via a series of readmission agreements. // Through a coalition of the willing, EU member states can implement this policy, which should also involve establishing safe and quick procedures to guarantee asylum to refugees; reinforcing the Libyan economy and its local communities; building respect for the rule of law and human rights; and finally, broadening the scope of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Libya.

Spain after the Elections: The “Germany of the South”?

Spain after the Elections: The “Germany of the South”?

Author(s): José Ignacio Torreblanca,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English

As Spain votes, it finds itself at the centre of the two major crises with which the European Union (EU) is currently struggling: the euro crisis and the Arab Spring. Should it fail to resolve the euro crisis, the European project will be politically and economically paralysed for a long time. Should Europe fail to support the Arab revolutions, on the other hand, the EU will be faced with a series of drifting countries on its southern rim. Yet the collapse of the eurozone and failure on the Mediterranean are not inevitable. Spain could play an important role in solving both crises – if the rest of Europe helps it to do so. // First, through Mariano Rajoy’s plan to turn Spain into the “Germany of the South”, Spain can help to heal the divisions between northern and southern Europe. This will in turn give Spain credibility to make sure that, as Germany and others take necessary steps towards political union, they do so in a way that is open and fair and benefits the whole of Europe. Second, by taking the lead on European foreign policy in the Mediterranean and by associating itself with the Weimar Triangle’s defence agenda, Spain can make a contribution to European foreign policy. Such a proactive strategy would be good for both the EU and Spain.

Ukraine after the Tymoshenko Verdict

Ukraine after the Tymoshenko Verdict

Author(s): Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Yuliya Tymoshenko;

The trial and sentencing of the former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko in 2011 is a double challenge to the European Union – testing both its credibility and the transformative capacity of its soft power. Kiev ignored clear warnings from Brussels and key member states, and then failed to deliver on promises of compromise. // The EU-Ukraine summit on Monday 19th December offers the chance to stop the rot in relations with Kyiv. // In a new policy memo published by ECFR, ‘Ukraine after the Tymoshenko verdict’, Andrew Wilson argues that instead of lecturing Ukraine on human rights the EU needs to show that it means business.