NEW WORLD ORDER: THE BALANCE OF SOFT POWER AND THE RISE OF HERBIVOROUS POWERS
Author(s): Ivan Yotov Krastev,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English
Keywords: EU Soft Power;
The largest survey of public opinion in the world shows support for a more multipolar world and a greater role for ‘herbivorous powers’ – countries not widely perceived as military superpowers. // There is mistrust of the Cold War powers as well as Islamist-inspired Iranian autocracy. More people want to see a decline rather than an increase in the power of Russia (29% decline, 23% increase), of China (32% decline, 24% increase), of the United States (37% decline, 26% increase), and of Iran (39% decline, 14% increase). On the other hand, there is strong support for an increase in the power of fast-developing powers such as South Africa, India and Brazil.
The European Union is the most popular great power. Uniquely among great powers, more people across all continents want to see its power increase than decrease. This demand for more European power extends to many former European colonies. // Whilst American soft power has declined, the rise of China has led to the resurgence in support for American power in Asia. Increasing Russian influence in Eastern Europe is paralleled by a demand for a greater American role. Outside Europe, ‘the West’ is still seen to some extent as a single actor: countries suspicious of American power tend also to be against EU power.
Donald Tusk, the new Polish Prime Minister, wants to bring Poland back to the heart of Europe, rebuilding ties with Germany and France to create a ‘Weimar Triangle’, lessening tensions with Russia, and trying to make the country a genuine player in European foreign policy. The new Government will try to rebalance ist relationship with the United States, slowing down the move towards missile defence and withdrawing its troops from Iraq. Although there will be a change of style on contentious issues like Russia, the new government will still be an ‘assertive partner’ opting out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; unlikely to join the euro; and likely to put up a fi ght against reform of the EU budget.Co-habitation with President Lech Kaczyński will create tensions but the government has the constitutional powers and the moral clout to set the agenda.
The gas relationship with Russia has become an extremely contentious issue among EU Member States. It is a major reason for the EU’s failure to develop the common policy approach towards Moscow it so badly needs. Yet the relationship is often misunderstood. Russia is the largest external gas supplier to the EU, but it is far from a monopoly provider. Since 1980, Europe’s diversification of its gas supply has seen Russia’s share of EU gas imports roughly halve, from 80% to 40%. Russian gas represents just 6.5% of the EU primary energy supply, a figure that has remained essentially unchanged over 20 years. And contrary to widely held belief, Russian gas exports to Europe are unlikely to increase significantly in the foreseeable future. So calls for Europe to diversify its energy supply even further miss the point. The problem is divisiveness, not dependence. Russian gas is divisive because Europe’s gas market is dysfunctional and segmented. Most of the EU’s imports of Russian gas go to a few countries in western Europe, where supply is diversified, while several Member States in central and eastern Europe consume relatively little Russian gas but have no other external suppliers. Only the emergence of a single competitive European gas market can create real solidarity between consumers and ‘Europeanise’ the current large bilateral contracts between European importers and Gazprom.To address the specific concerns of central and eastern European Member States, the EU should build on the 2004 directive on security of supply in natural gas, and help these Member States devise and implement national action plans for gas security.
Author(s): Richard Gowan,Franziska Brantner / Language(s): English
Keywords: Human Rights policy;
Last September, the European Council on Foreign Relations published a report warning that the European Union faced a “slow-motion crisis” at the United Nations, as a growing number of its former allies were beginning to oppose its vision of multilateralism and human rights. While the EU had grown increasingly internally cohesive on human rights votes, its reluctance to use ist leverage and its failure to reach out to moderate states were handing the initiative to defenders of traditional sovereignty like China, Russia and their allies. // This is the first in an ongoing series of annual updates on the EU’s performance in human rights debates at the UN, published in the run-up to the opening of the UN General Assembly. It covers the most recent Assembly session, from September 2008 to July 2009.
TOWARDS AN EU HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR A POST-WESTERN WORLD
Author(s): Susi Dennison,Anthony Dworkin / Language(s): English
The shift of global power away from the West threatens to undermine the EU’s hopes of supporting human rights, democracy and the rule of law beyond its borders. The success of authoritarian states like China and the problems of some new democracies have cast doubt on the benefits of liberal democracy. The EU has lost influence to emerging powers that emphasize sovereignty over human rights, and there is resistance to any idea of the West exporting its model to the rest of the world.
But the EU can still make a difference on global values if it follows a three-part strategy. It should join the battle of ideas, making a case for human rights and democracy that is not rooted in Western politics but recognizes that all societies should determine their own development in a fair and inclusive way. It should focus in its engagement with other countries on key ‘pressure points’ – achievable goals that will unlock further progress on human rights and create greater political space. And it should reach out to new partners, seeking common ground to support universal values in practice. To show it is not backing down on core beliefs, the EU should also set out a series of red lines on which it will not compromise. // If Europe projects confidence in the values with which it is associated and at the same time pursues a realistic approach to supporting them, it is most likely to strengthen its global standing and help bring about an international order that matches its interests.
Author(s): Richard Gowan,Franziska Brantner / Language(s): English
Keywords: human rights policy; human rights in UN;
Over the last year, the EU has struggled to make an impact on human rights at the UN, despite working more closely with the Obama administration than it was able to do with the previous administration. As a result, it is now clear that deepening divisions over human rights at the UN were not just a by-product of Bushism. The EU’s ‘voting coincidence score’ – reflecting the level of support from other countries for its positions on human rights in the General Assembly – has fallen from 52% last year to 42% this year. There have also been splits within the EU on votes in the Human Rights Council on Israeli actions in the Middle East, which has weakened the EU’s reputation for coherence on fundamental values at the UN. // This update – the second annual update to ECFR’s 2008 report on the EU and human rights at the UN – underlines important longterm trends. The Obama administration’s policy of engagement at the UN has only persuaded a few countries to shift their stances on human rights and big non-Western democracies – especially Brazil – continue to drift away from the EU’s positions. Attempts to reverse this trend through technical reforms in the UN’s human rights system will likely fail. A European drive for broader UN reforms such as expanding the Security Council would be a gamble but could persuade rising powers to rethink their positions on human rights.
Author(s): Thomas Klau,François Godement,José Ignacio Torreblanca / Language(s): English
Keywords: EURO-Zone;
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union has been an extraordinary achievement. But the events of 2010 have made it apparent that its political governance was designed for fair weather. Having reluctantly taken the first steps this year, European leaders must now make it storm-proof. The move to an agreement to establish a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to replace the EFSF in 2013 represents a fundamental and encouraging change in the approach of European leaders to the future of the eurozone. But the new model of eurozone governance currently envisaged by the EU, which is based once more on the Maastricht Treaty, will be vulnerable to failure for the same reasons as its predecessors. // If Europe wants to remain a serious player and help shape the twenty-first century, it should instead go beyond Maastricht and finally build a monetary and economic system strong enough to last. There are at least three other solutions – Eurobonds, a euro-TARP and an expansion of the federal budget. Yet each of them is opposed above all by Germany, the eurozone’s dominant power, which feels its robust growth vindicates its own economic model even though its political model for a rule- and sanctions-based governance of the eurozone looks to have failed. // Europe now faces a choice between a future of permanent tensions within the EU and a new grand bargain. Europe needs clearheaded, forward-looking German leadership that would anchor a European Germany in a more German Europe.
THE NEW GERMAN QUESTION: HOW EUROPE CAN GET THE GERMANY IT NEEDS
Author(s): Ulrike Guerot,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English
Since the beginning of the euro crisis last year, there has been a kind of “unipolar moment” within the eurozone: no solution to the crisis was possible without Germany or against Germany. Although Germany has now signalled it will do what it takes to save the euro, much of Europe is worried about the way this will be done and even resentful about where Germany seems to be heading. Germans, on the other hand, feel betrayed by the European project with which they once identified perhaps more than any other member state. In fact, whereas Germans once saw the EU as the embodiment of post-war German virtues such as fiscal rectitude, stability and consensus, they now see it as a threat to those same virtues.###This brief aims to move beyond this dialogue of the deaf and outline what a new deal between Germany and the rest of Europe might look like. It shows how an increasingly eurosceptic Germany is tempted to “go global alone”. Meanwhile other member states are responding to the new Germany with a mixture of “hugging Germany close” and forming coalitions that could one day be used to balance German power if Berlin fails to recreate a legitimate basis for its role in the EU. It argues that Germany needs to recast its approach to economic governance to avoid the creation of a two-speed Europe; work with other big states to reinvent the European security architecture; and put its economic might at the heart of a push to develop a global Europe.
A CHANCE TO REFORM: HOW THE EU CAN SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN MOROCCO
Author(s): Susi Dennison,Nicu Popescu,José Ignacio Torreblanca / Language(s): English
Keywords: Maghreb; EU and Morocco; Arab Spring;
While Morocco is usually seen as more stable, more advanced and more democratic than many other countries in North Africa, it too has potential for unrest. Although there is no immediate prospect of a revolution as in Egypt or Tunisia, Moroccans are increasingly frustrated with the country’s veneer of democracy. They are now demanding more limits on royal power and an end to corruption and clientelism. In short, they want a king who, as a slogan of the 20th February protest movement puts it, “reigns, but does not govern”. This situation presents the EU with a different kind of challenge than those it faces in Egypt or Tunisia. // With its European outlook and its close economic and commercial ties with EU states, Morocco highly values its privileged status within the EU’s southern neighbourhood. This brief, based on a research visit by the authors to Rabat in April, argues that the EU should now use the considerable leverage it has to put greater pressure on Morocco to create real democracy. The EU should put its weight behind a more inclusive constitutional commission, engage with youth movements, including Islamists, and offer better trade terms. It is in the EU’s interest to push for political reform now rather than react to a Syrian-style crackdown and instability in a few months’ time.
CHINA’S JANUS-FACED RESPONSE TO THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS
Author(s): Jonas Parello-Plesner,Raffaelo Pantucci / Language(s): English
Keywords: Arab spring; Muammar Gaddafi; Ai Weiwei;
China’s response to the revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa was two-faced like the Roman god Janus. In a pragmatic break with its sovereigntist approach to international relations, China inter-vened to protect thousands of its citizens and its growing commercial interests in North Africa and sup-ported UN sanctions against Muammar Gaddafi. However, since February there has also been a wi-despread crackdown to prevent the wave of protests that had engulfed the Middle East and North Africa spreading to China. The arrest of artist Ai Weiwei at the beginning of April brought this crack-down to the attention of the world. // This Janus-faced response presents a dilemma for the European Union. On the one hand, it suggests that China could in the future become a partner for the EU in crisis management and that it is moving towards a more proactive foreign policy. On the other hand, China’s response to protests at home represents a clear challenge to the EU’s newfound commitment to de-mocracy promotion. The EU should therefore seek to do more crisis-management planning together with China while remaining vocal and consistent on China’s human rights and internal reform process, even if it incites Chinese anger and results in a reaction in other fields.
Author(s): Richard Gowan,Franziska Brantner / Language(s): English
Over the last year, three major crises – Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Syria – tested Europe’s ability to shape decision-making at the UN. The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire showed that China could be persuaded to support democracy and that Russia by itself lacked the leverage to hold up the Security Council indefinitely. The Libyan debate demonstrated the persistence of Western power in the UN system, even though the EU split over how to act. Ironically, although Europe was more united over Syria, this failed to translate into action as the non-Western powers reasserted themselves. Support for European positions on hu-man rights votes in the General Assembly stayed roughly level, but the EU also won important votes about gay rights and its own status as a bloc at the UN. // The picture of the UN that emerges from these events is one of an institution in flux. While the UN has recently seemed to be drifting into bloc politics, this year coalitions formed on a crisis-by-crisis basis. This may foreshadow the emergence of an increasingly multipolar UN dominated by fluid diplomatic alliances. Although it sometimes struggles to maintain its own unity, the EU now has opportunities to build coalitions of states that can deliver action on human rights and crisis management – if it can overcome its own internal divisions.
Discounting threats of armed attack and disillusioned with liberal interventionism, Europeans are shrin-king their militaries and banking on “soft” power. But this betrays a failure to understand the nature of the new, multiplayer global environment that will determine Europe’s future security and prosperity. The value of Europe’s armed forces is less in countering specific “threats” than as necessary instruments of power and influence in a rapidly changing world, where militaries still matter. Unless it gets over its discomfort with hard power, Europe’s half-hearted efforts to improve the efficiency of its defence spending will continue to fail. // This Policy Brief argues that Europeans now need to reassess their strategic environment, reconsider the role that hard power should play in it and relaunch their efforts to combine their defence efforts and resources. The Weimar Triangle – Germany, France and Poland – should jointly press for a heavyweight commission to conduct a European Defence Review, which would examine member states’ defence policies, much as the budget plans of eurozone members are now reviewed in a “European semester”; rewrite the European Security Strategy; and present to Euro-pean leaders a menu of big, bold proposals for decisive further defence integration. The alternative will be not just the end of the common defence policy but the steady erosion of Europe’s ability to defend its interests and values in the twenty-first century.
EUROPE AND THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS: A NEW VISION FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Author(s): Susi Dennison,Anthony Dworkin / Language(s): English
Keywords: Arab Revolutions;
In the aftermath of this year’s revolutions, the EU has rightly recommitted itself to the support of de-mocracy and human rights in the Middle East and North Africa. However, although protesters across the southern Mediterranean share some of the EU’s values, they do not see Europe as a political model and democracy in the region is likely to produce some results with which Europeans are not comfortab-le. This brief argues that, in response, the EU should focus above all on the development of legitimate and accountable governments in post-revolutionary countries in the Arab world. Rather than backing specific political groups in countries that are in transition, the EU should work to create the building blocks and background conditions for fair and inclusive politics. // The EU should also try to support human rights through transparent diplomacy and support for civil society. In countries such as Moroc-co that remain undemocratic, the EU should develop a more political approach that pushes harder for incremental reform in return for credible benefits, while continuing to engage on other EU interests. The use of violence against civilians in countries like Syria should be a red line for limiting cooperation, dra-wing condemnation and sanctions in severe cases. EU proposals on conditionality and a new European Endowment for Democracy will be most effective if they are focused on the support of accountable and legitimate government.
Europe’s leaders see the need for “more Europe” to deal with the euro crisis but do not know how to persuade their citizens, markets, parliaments or courts to accept it. This is the root of Europe’s political crisis: the necessity and impossibility of integration. European integration has been defined by two contradictory but mutually reinforcing forces that operate on both the European and national level: technocracy and populism. But the more technocratic the EU has become, the more it has provoked a populist backlash. European leaders are now unable to solve the euro crisis because they can only force inadequate solutions through loopholes in the Lisbon Treaty. // Four routes towards solving Europe’s institutional crisis are now emerging: asymmetric integration by working around the existing treaties; a smaller, more integrated eurozone based on the existing treaties; political union through treaty chan-ge; and a deal among a new vanguard through a Schengen-style treaty. There are also calls to strengthen each of the three traditional channels for democratic participation in order to restore legi-timacy: European elections, referendums and national opt-outs. Whichever of these options Europe ultimately chooses, the challenge will be to solve the acute euro crisis without at the same time exacer-bating the chronic crisis of declining European power.
Author(s): François Godement / Language(s): English
Although Europe needs external lending and the show of confidence it brings, its attempt to persuade China and other emerging economies to enlarge the resources of the EFSF is likely to bring only limited results. However, there are various other scenarios under which China and other investors may lend to Europe. The best case scenario from Europe’s point of view is that it would increase the lending capacity of the EFSF or the ECB and turn them into a super borrower and lender. But this scenario is unlikely to become a reality because it requires a “big bang”-like reinvention of European public finance for which there is no commitment.
More likely is that the ECB will underwrite a new IMF fund dedicated to the support or rescue of European member states. This would mean a larger Chinese contribution in IMF decisionmaking. Alternatively, China could seek to lend to Europe in renminbi, thus transferring the exchange risk to the European borrower. Such a deal would also offer China an unprecedented guaran-tee against any depreciation of the euro. Finally, the euro could collapse altogether and the IMF could be called in – the worst case scenario. In any case, Europe should acknowledge the interdependence between it and China and therefore its need for external capital.
A “RESET” WITH ALGERIA: THE RUSSIA TO THE EU’S SOUTH
Author(s): Hakim Darbouche ,Susi Dennison / Language(s): English
Keywords: EU–Algerian relations; energy supplier; Algeria;
There are striking similarities between the ways that Algeria and Russia have handled the EU, particularly since Abdelaziz Bouteflika came to power 12 years ago. Like Russia, Algeria is an important supplier of energy – in particular, natural gas – to Europe. As a result, it has traditionally enjoyed stronger relations with key member states, especially its energy clients, than with the EU as such. But Algeria’s current sense of vulnerability in a dramatically changing region presents a potential opening for increased European engagement and, over the long term, influence. It is important that the EU’s attention does not remain focused only on the other countries in the region that have been affected by the Arab revolutions in more obvious ways. // The EU is currently revising its European Neighbourhood Policy. But if Algeria does not engage fully with it, there is a risk that it could be isolated. However, the shifts currently taking place in Algeria and its neighbourhood create an opportunity for a “reset” in EU–Algerian relations. Such a reset could increase the EU’s ability to influence the course of domestic events in Algeria by using engagement to support economic modernisation and spread the rule of law. Over the longer term, as confidence builds on both sides, the EU could use a more functional relationship to increase its voice on the need for political reform.
THE LONG SHADOW OF ORDOLIBERALISM: GERMANY’S APPROACH TO THE EURO CRISIS
Author(s): Sebastian Dullien,Ulrike Guerot / Language(s): English
Keywords: ordo-liberalism; Walter Eucken; Franz Böhm; Leonhard Miksch; Hans Großmann-Doerth; Euro-zone;
The new treaty agreed by European leaders in January reflects Germany’s distinctive approach to the euro crisis rather than collective compromise. Much to the frustration of many other eurozone count-ries, Germany has imposed its own approach – centred on austerity and price stability at the expense of economic growth – on others without considering whether the institutional flaws of monetary union beyond a lack of fiscal control may be the cause of some of the distortions and problems that the cur-rent euro crisis has exposed or whether its approach could have a negative impact on other eurozone countries. German economic orthodoxy has been widely criticised elsewhere in Europe. // This brief explores the historical and ideological foundations of German economic thinking and discusses how it differs from mainstream international economic discourse. It argues that there is more to Germany’s distinctive approach to the euro crisis than the much-discussed historical experience of the hyperinflati-on in the Weimar Republic on the one hand and simple national interest on the other. Rather, there is an ideological edifice behind German economic orthodoxy with which Germany’s partners must enga-ge. While a change in the government after the next general election, in 2013, would lead to a change in German economic policy, it is unlikely to dramatically change the country’s approach to the euro crisis.
Stability, sustainability and success in the Sahel: the next steps for the Czech engagement
Author(s): Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň,Jan Daniel,Ondřej Ditrych / Language(s): English
Keywords: relations of the Czech Republic with Africa; Sahel; stability and security; UN; peacekeeping mission; sustainability and economy; poverty;
As a follow-up up to the military involvement of the Czech Republic in the region since 2013 and the consequent rural development projects there, the whole-of-government strategy towards the Sahel (G5) is an expression of responsibility and responsiveness to the related security challenges for the European Union and its African partners. By subscribing to the security-development nexus, Czechia recently reinforced its diplomatic presence in the Sahel and spread its activities to the areas of health, migration and civil society. To make its contribution to the Coalition for the Sahel sustainable and complementary to the EU’s efforts, Czechia should update its national strategy to build the Sahel’s forward resilience, expand the governance and development pillars and mainstream human rights and gender. It should also improve the financial planning and mainstream the Sahel in the current budget lines to mobilise domestic expertise, gain public support for the Strategy’s long-term implementation and give credence to the Sahel as a priority during the upcoming Czech presidency of the EU in 2022.
We are a group of women who, in Black and Silence, express our protest against war. Th is type of protest was by Israeli woman pacifist in January 1988, protesting against the occupation of the Palestinian people, supported by Palestinian and American women. In this manner, the women have demonstrated that women s solidarity confronts us and divides us with well defined aims. In February of this year, Italian woman pacifists in the same way protested their opposition to the war in the Persian Gulf. The same was done by woman pacifists in Germany and Britain. Some weeks ago, Women in Black in Italy protested against the war in Yugoslavia. Women in Black of Belgrade each Wednesday gather in public places to protest, in black and silence, against the war.
SO FAR FROM GOD, SO CLOSE TO RUSSIA: Belarus and the Zapad military Exercises
Author(s): Fredrik Wesslau,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English
Keywords: Belarus;
Fears that Russia may use Zapad 2017 as cover to carry out a hybrid operation in Belarus are overblown. Moscow has other levers with which it can coerce Minsk, and it neither needs nor is interested in another military adventure at the moment. // President Lukashenka realises that relying solely on Moscow is dangerous and wants instead to diversify his strategic options by inching closer to Europe. But there are limits to how much Lukashenka can, or even wants to, approach the West. His survival depends fundamentally on maintaining an economic lifeline to Moscow. He knows that taking significant amounts of Western money comes with requirements of structural reforms that would undermine the basis for his rule. // The European Union should support the gradual strengthening of Belarusian sovereignty, build further links, and step up engagement. This will bring Belarus closer to the West, as well as create more opportunities to influence Minsk on human rights and democracy. A policy of isolation would only push Belarus further into Russia’s tight embrace.
Please note that there is a planned full infrastructure maintenance and database upgrade of the CEEOL repository.
The search is temporarily unavailable.
We apologize in advance for the inconvenience and thank you for your kind understanding.
There are validation problems in the fields. Please check the fields again and enter the correct data. (The fields with a red outline are required. The fields with correct data are with a green outline and "" symbol, fields with incorrect data are with a red outline and "" symbol. Pointing at the question mark "" placed at the end of fields displays additional information for the correct way of completing.)
