Awersja do nierówności w modelowaniu użytkowania dóbr wspólnych
Inequality aversion in modeling the use of common pool resources

Summary/Abstract: During the second half of the XXth century many scientists believed that with-out outer regulations the use of common-pool resources inevitably led to the degradation of the resource. Today many factors are raised that could promote avoiding this so-called “tragedy of the commons”. Among these factors there is inequality aversion. If we assume that individuals do not tend to unlimitedly increase the amount of their goods but rather re-late own wealth to the wealth of the others, than the speed of draining the resource may be lower. In particular, it may be as low as to allow natural regeneration processes to replenish the resource, thus avoiding degradation. The paper presents the model as well as computer simulations, demonstrating the influence of inequality aversion on the common-pool re-source use.

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