New Remarks on the Concept in Logical Use
New Remarks on the Concept in Logical Use

Summary/Abstract: The main thesis of this paper is directed against the traditional (cognitive theoretical) definition of the concept which claims that the concept is the '' thought about the essence of the object being thought'', i.e. that it is “a set of essential features or essential characteristics of an object''. But the '' set of essential features or essential characteristics of an object of thought'' is a '' content’’ of the thought. The thought about the essence of an object is definition and the concept is not definition but the part of definition! Besides as the part of formal structure of thought, the concept possesses calculative logical properties that in formal logic (be it syllogistics, or the logic of propositions, or the logic of predicates) come to the front place of formal logical computation. Without the calculative properties of the concept, there would be no calculative properties of propositions which express the thought (thought structures). The calculative properties of a concept include the (1) degree of its logical generality (degree of variability), the (2) logical relations it can establish within the whole of the conceptual content, the (3) operability of the concept in structure of affirmation and negation, the (4) deducibility of either axiomatic or probabilistic systems. Therefore, I believe that, from the logical point of view, the definition of a concept should be applied in favor of its calculative properties that it possesses.

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