Testiség az észlelésben és a fogalomalkotásban
Embodiment in Perception and Conceptualization

Summary/Abstract: The paper offers a review of current theories about embodied perception and conceptualization, with the aim to address the problem of the relation between on-line and off-line embodied cognition. In on-line embodied cognition the body plays a signifi cant role only in actual sensorimotor (and emotional) interaction with the environment. For example, classical and current theories of active perception (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Hurley, Noë) hold that perception and action (or kinaesthetic experience) are constitutively interdependent: perception is a form of action and perceptual experience acquires content thanks to the implicit knowledge of sensorimotor correlations between movement and perception. According to the view of off-line embodied cognition, embodied experience grounds higher-level, abstract cognitive processes: thus, both concrete and abstract concepts are grounded in multimodal sensory-motor patterns, like perceptual symbols (Barsalou) or image schemas (Lakoff and Johnson); conceptualization consists in off-line re-enactments of these patterns through simulations or metaphorical projections. The paper ends with the suggestion that embodied accounts of perception and conceptualization should also address the challenge posed by different philosophical accounts which are highlighting the creative and openended nature of perceptual and conceptual experience.

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