DIRE CE QUI NE PEUT PAS ETRE DIT. LA PHENOMENOLOGIE DU LANGAGE DE LEVINAS DANS AUTREMENT QU’ETRE OU AU-DELA DE L’ESSENCE
SAYING WHAT CAN’T BE SAID. THE LEVINASIAN PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE IN OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR BEYOND THE ESSENCE

Summary/Abstract: Saying what can’t be Said. The Levinasian Phenomenology of Language in Otherwise than Being or Beyond the Essence. The article analyzes the phenomenology of language developed by Levinas in his second major work, Otherwise than Being, where language is described not as the opposition of two different kind of languages, but as the original ambiguity of the two dimensions of the same language: the phenomenological/ ontological Said and the ethical Saying. Levinas criticize the phenomenological Said, identified with the designative function of language, for acting, by the sense-giving of an originally linguistic intentionality, as a logical-eidetical idealization of the phenomena. To the ambiguity of the predicative proposition (the ontological Said) corresponds, on the one hand, the Heideggerian ontological difference between being and entities, reinterpreted by Levinas as the amphibology of the verb and the name, and on the other hand, the fact that the ethical difference is revealed through the ontological. Finally, the response of the responsibility (the ethical Saying), is analyzed both as the inversion of the husserlian egology of the meaning by a responsive heterology, and – from the aspect of the diachronical temporality – as a passive response to an an-archic appeal coming from a past who was never present, response which also accomplish the linguistic singularisation of the subject.

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