Poznawać czy myśleć – spór o rozumienie poznania filozoficznego w świetle studiów Mieczysława A. Krąpca
To Cognize or to Think – the Dispute over Philosophical Cognition in the Light of Mieczyslaw A. Krapiec

Summary/Abstract: The article concentrates on the specificity of philosophical cognition. Referring to M. A. Krapiec’s studies, the author proves that the process of thinking is not to be neces-sarily identified with the process of cognition, as in fact the former is merely a secon-dary phase of the latter. When identified with thinking, the philosophical cognition would undermine the very sense of cognition, which means the understanding of real-ity. While based on thinking only, philosophy does not grasp real things, but operates on abstracts of being and being’s representations (concepts). As for the correctness of philosophical thinking laws of logic, with ensuring non-contradictory operations, are sufficient. Any cognition, however, which aspires to be philosophical has to come from really existing beings. In next phases of cognition, such beings are grasped more and more particularly and precisely – from their transcendental properties and principles, through their structure and categorical properties, until their individual characteristics and actions. The very first act of cognition is directed to real beings, which are imme-diately grasped in respect of their existence and real essence. The second act of cogni-tion deals with signs. The precedence of beings in human cognition makes philosophy charged not with the task of thinking about the world, but cognizing and understanding it within possible and verifiable limits. Therefore, according to Krapiec, the very first philosophical discipline is metaphysics, which has got real being as its object. Thus, philosophical cognition should preserve its objective character, as it is the only way to guarantee its realism.

• Details
• Contents