МАКЕДОНИЈА И МАКЕДОНСКИОТ ИДЕНТИТЕТ ВО БРИТАНСКАТА И ВО АМЕРИКАНСКАТА ДИПЛОМАТСКА КОРЕСПОНДЕНЦИЈА (1941– 1945)
MACEDONIA AND MACEDONIAN IDENTITY IN BRITISH AND DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE (1941-1945)

Summary/Abstract: Until 1943, the United Kingdom, and by the middle of 1944 the United States, did not show any interest in the Macedonian issue. Since the beginning of the war, Britain has not at all calculated the possibility of Macedonia being a united, independent state or independent and independent within the Balkan Federation. The middle of 1943 is a turning point in the Great Britain interest in Macedonia. The military actions taken by the National Liberation Army and Partisan detechment of Macedonia against the occupiers did not remain unnoticed by the members of the British military missions arriving on the territory of Macedonia since October 1943. In their reports to the headquarters in Cairo they reported „the appearance of Macedonian armed partisan groups.“ Churchill, as an experienced politician with а very refined sense and assessment of the political situation, immediately asked the various departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make a full analysis for what was, what is and where the Macedonian question may arise. The shock of the resurrection of the Macedonian question in the political circles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as Churchill himself, was great, having in mind that it was already settled for them. But the information about the existence of Macedonian partisans already basically hindered plans for the future arrangement of the Balkans. This information left no doubt that the „Macedonian syndrome“ was reactivated and could bring disruptions to the already defined line for post-war regulation in the Balkans. Therefore, after receiving the information Winston Churchill and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they set the policy towards Macedonia: against the idea of forming a South Slavic federation and against the establishment of an independent and united Macedonia.

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