Odluka Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske U-II6111/2013 – jurisdikcijski voluntarizam?
The Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia U-II-6111/2013 – jurisdictional voluntarism?

Author(s): Frane Staničić
Subject(s): Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, Governance, Public Law, Evaluation research, Present Times (2010 - today)
Published by: Fondacija Centar za javno pravo
Keywords: Croatia; Constitutional Court; decision; 2013; jurisdictional voluntarism; Miroslav Šumanović; governance;
Summary/Abstract: In this paper the author analyzes the decision U-II-6111/2013 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia. In this decision, the Constitutional Court annulled the decision of the Municipality Council renaming a street in Slatinski Drenovac after the date of the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia in 1941. The Constitutional Court based its jurisdiction, contrary to its earlier jurisprudence, according to the Article 2/1 of the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, establishing, thus, a general constitutional supervision. One of the judges had a dissenting opinion and the author analyzed the decision and the dissenting opinion. From the analysis the author concluded the following: the Constitutional Court was not in the right assuming jurisdiction in this case as it does not evolve from the Constitution or the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia. The author argues that, in assuming jurisdiction in the manner the Constitutional Court has done in this particular case, the Court created legal uncertainty and acted directly contrary to its established practice and the Constitution, constitutional Law and other laws. The author argues that the explained situation is the consequence of the narrow practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia in defining “other norms” which excluded general acts from the jurisdiction of the Court. Consequently, whenever a need for inspection of general acts arises, the Court has no alternative but to alter its practice. The author argues for a broader definition of “other norms” which would include general acts.

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