Keywords: USA; Bernie Sanders; Donald Trump; Hillary Clinton; Marco Rubio; Ted Cruz; elections
Traditionally, there is a partisan split on foreign policy in the United States: Republican candidates and voters worry more about terrorism, defence and national security than Democratic candidates and voters, thereby putting more stock in foreign policy issues, which manifests itself in the aggressiveness—of lack thereof—of each party’s foreign policy platform. But the candidates in the 2016 U.S. presidential election can be categorised by more than just party: a line can also be drawn between conventional candidates—Hillary Clinton, a Democrat, and Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, Republicans—and unconventional candidates—Donald Trump, a Republican, and Bernie Sanders, a Democrat. Should a conventional candidate be elected president, U.S. foreign policy would be based on predictable adaptation to the changing international environment. An unconventional candidate, however, would be a wild card, whose actions would be difficult to predict.
More...
Keywords: Ukraine; security; Eastern Europe; Russia; conflicts
For the first time since the outbreak of the war in Donbass, the situation on the frontline is nearly aproper cease-fire. This is the outcome of the interplay of three factors: the political-military balance inDonbass, sanctions and Russia’s military intervention in Syria. Nevertheless, it is premature to assumethat military options in Donbass are no longer in the cards. Russia is likely to use force if needed torepel a Ukrainian attempt to retake parts of the area, to obstruct the Minsk process if it goes in adisadvantageous direction for Moscow, or to seize more territory if there is further political and socialturmoil in Ukraine. To minimise the risks of an eruption of violence in Donbass, the EU and U.S.should prolong the sanctions, fine-tune the diplomatic pressure on both sides to implement and upholdthe Minsk Protocols, and pay more attention to the political and economic transformations in the restof Ukraine.
More...
Keywords: Hidden Economy; Sshadow economy;
The Center for the Study of Democracy, in collaboration with the Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM) elaborated a series of policy briefs analyzing the hidden economy in Macedonia. The topics encompass the issues of countering undeclared labour, tax evasion and fraud, media reporting on hidden economy and corruption, etc. The current policy brief underlines that undeclared work, being one of the main manifestations of hidden economy, becomes the bull’s-eye for many countries focusing on reshaping their social and economic policies in order to tackle this issue, especially since the onset of the economic crisis that hit Europe and the World in 2008. The most recent economic indicators coming from Europe show that this crisis has not concluded and European economies are yet to deal with its mid and long-term consequences. Macedonia and other Western Balkan countries are not exempt from this process, with job creation and policies targeting unemployment (28.2% as of Q2 2014) being a major concern and a focal point of political activity. Low growth prospects in the EU and sluggish economic conditions forecasted in 2014 are also limiting Macedonia’s growth prospects, which at this point are still positive at around 4% GDP growth annually (4.3% as of Q2 2014). The authors highlight several key points: According to results from the population survey, the proportion of employees with a primary employment receiving ‘envelope’ payments or temporary service contracts in addition to their salary is about one-third of the employed population; Almost 7% of employees work without a contract and are not being paid social security contributions. Combined with the abovementioned fact, this indicates the salary of about 40% of employees with a primary employment is partially or completely undeclared; More than half of employers confirm that signing contracts with ‘hidden clauses’ happens in their sector; Macedonia’s main focus in tackling undeclared work, just as most Eastern European Countries, is on Labor Law violations). Repressive measures and others aimed at improving detection are the dominant policy approach.
More...
Keywords: Greek Civil War;
Based on archival research, this paper is part of a larger study focusing on the migration into Bulgaria of Slav-speaking refugees from the Greek Civil War. The study analyzes the measures taken by the Bulgarian Communist Party and state leadership to homogenize this new Macedonian diaspora. The members of this refugee community are labeled for the most part “Aegean Macedonians”. This designation seems to be the most common selfidentifi cation of Slav-speaking political emigrants originating from Greek or Aegean Macedonia1, who otherwise share diverse national identities – “Macedonians”, “Greeks” or “Bulgarians”. This study offers an analytical approach to the problem of national identity in relation to political activism and refugee experience. It also provides an overview of competing identity politics – those of communist Bulgaria, of the Greek Communist Party and of Tito’s Yugoslavia, and analyzes their function in the construction of the national identity of refugees and their identity as refugees. Parallel research on Macedonian diaspora communities from Aegean/Greek Macedonia that reside in Australia, Canada and elsewhere, will document the birth of a transnational political activism. Even today, this activism demands recognition of collective minority rights and infl uences the identity formation of former refugees from Greece in other parts of the world. In this way, this paper sheds light on the complex development of Macedonian nationalism outside the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, though in a direct or indirect relation with it. The paper is also based on a study completed on Aegean Macedonians residing mostly in the Republic of Macedonia, who were participants in the Third meeting of child-refugees (Florina, 2003). I compare the study to similar narratives of Slav-speaking “Greek political emigrants” residing in Bulgaria.
More...
Keywords: Albanian National Movement; Albanian Communist Regime; King Zogu I;Faik bej Konitz;
Faik bej Konitza was an important figure of the Albanian National Movement. During the communist regime in Albania he was labelled a „reactionary,“ and therefore no studies could be undertaken on him. His main sin was to have served as minister in Washington, for King Zog I (1928–1939). With the end of isolationism and fall of the communist regime in 1990, the road for thousands of Albanians to leave the country and for Konitza to come back home, once and forever , was opened. His remnants were brought to Albania in 1995. His simple tomb in the park of the capital Tirana has thus fulfilled his last wish, to be interred in his „fatherland’s soil.“ I present him here as the subject of a case study for three main reasons. Firstly, he was one of the main figures of the second phase of the Albanian National Movement (1878–1912). This allows for some comparative approaches in relation to the „fathers,“ or the first generation of Albanian nationalist intellectuals, one of the most important among them being Shemseddin Sami Frashëri (1850–1904). Secondly, considering the discursive articulation and political instrumentalization of the concepts of folk, people, nation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it should be noted that Konitza, more than anyone else among Albanian nationalist intellectuals of his time, stressed the importance of an Albanian literary language in forging an Albanian nation.
More...
The first changes (after the most important political change on November 10, 1989) toward a pluralistic society and market economy appeared in 1990. In that year for the first time Bulgaria began its fiscal year (which coincided with the calendar year) without a budget prepared and approved by Parliament - due to the complicated economic and political situation. In 1990 alone. Parliament voted the state budget twice (the second budget was an updated version of the earlier one and its basic indicators were even worse). The actual implementation, in turn, was a less successful version of the second budget. This tradition was followed throughout 1991 and will obviously prevail as well in 1992.
More...
Keywords: transition; minorities; rights and freedoms; Balkans; EU integrations; nationalism; multiculturalism; discrimination; cultural autonomy; refugees;
Referring to minority rights, we refer to an endeavor to establish equality. What minorities want is what all of us want. It is promotion and development of minority rights that indicate to aspirations to bring about social equality so that each individual has same rights as the other. Minority rights are not something one should be afraid of, they are no threat whatsoever to a society's indivisibility, its integrity. Minority rights are, as I've said, an endeavor to establish equality, for there is no indivisibility unless there is equality. We are anxious to safeguard our society, we care for law and order, and that what equality is about. Unfortunately, we have social inequality in terms of human rights. We have weak, divided societies that - politically unstable as they are - might threaten international piece and security. So, by encouraging minority rights we, in a way, encourage peace and security. It is the European Commission's generosity that made this conference possible. Therefore, let me remind you, that funds supporting activities such is this one are provided by citizens of the European Union. These public funds, therefore, reflect their aspirations and the wish to uphold minority rights in this region. This conference also reflects cooperation between the Helsinki Federation and the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. I take pride in working together with the Helsinki Committee in Serbia. I see it as a most reliable organization that overdid itself at extremely hard times of this country's history. I think the Committee in Serbia has always had the right stuff and deserves to be both commended on and recognized for its courage, integrity and dedication to key principles. This prompts me to tackle the issue of civil society. Usually, whenever there is a political overturn civil societies have to cope with a special tension. Such was the tension ensuing Czechoslovakian velvet revolution. As you know, new people came to power, the people that used to advocate human rights. So, once elected, they thought there was no longer need for the Chapter 77 or the Helsinki Charter. However, people from the Helsinki Committee said, "Stop for a moment, there is such need and very much so”. For, who should protect rights of those that were hurt? Who should watch out for the way the government and people in power behave? Who should keep an eye on the respect of human rights and the government's attitude towards international standards? There certainly are problems in Yugoslavia and Serbia. They are many, and can only be settled if there are intellectual and moral resources, through support and assistance of various non-governmental organizations that keep a sharp lookout at steps taken by the state and attitudes of people in power, and watch out for respect of commitments the state took upon itself by signing international documents. No state that lacks a strong civil society can plume itself when it comes to the situation in the domain of human and minority rights.
More...
The Anti-Corruption Action Plan has been developed within the framework of the Coalition 2000 process with the purpose of becoming part of the social agenda as a broadly approved system of measures and actions for curbing the extremely dangerous social phenomenon of corruption. The Anti-Corruption Action Plan gained credit as a document, which was often referred to in Bulgaria and used in other countries as a model for mapping out national anti-corruption priorities. In the words of George Soros, the Bulgarian anti-corruption plan is the most comprehensive and ambitious document of its kind.
More...
Keywords: Germany; Russia; international relations
Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and its propaganda actions targeting Germany have resulted in an increase in German society’s distrust of Russia and to more assertive political reactions. They have also translated into unprecedented, increased support for eastern allies within NATO. Posing as an architect of the peace process in Ukraine, Germany has indirectly become a hostage to the success of this process (or the lack of it). However, the involvement of both Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in working out and implementing the Minsk agreement has not brought the results Berlin had expected. This has amplified Germany’s disappointment with both Russia and Ukraine. However, withdrawing from this involvement would scarcely be imaginable due to the significant political capital invested in these actions so far. Hence the attempts to save face and the efforts to ensure the implementation of the agreement, as well as the temptation to devise its subsequent variants (which would be increasingly less favourable for Ukraine).
More...
Keywords: Ukraine; nationalism
The Euromaidan revolution and the war in Donbas that followed it have brought about deep changes in the way Ukrainian citizens think and have led to a rapid transformation of how people view the concept of national community. It began to be increasingly common for proponents of nationalism to refer to solidarity with the state instead of referring to the nation understood as an ethnic community, as they had previously done. This is due to the fact that an entire young generation has matured which takes the Ukrainian state for granted, but also because in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict most Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine have opted for Ukraine.The war with Russia, which has now been ongoing for over a year, has led to a significant radicalisation of society’s attitudes and to attempts to seek models of military actions from the past that could serve as reference points in contemporary thinking. In Ukraine, the main, if not the only clear-cut model of this type of action, has been the story taught in schools involving fighting carried out by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in 1943–1952 (the narrative omits the crimes perpetrated by this formation—not only those against ethnic Poles). One consequence of this has been the currently observed wide-scale adoption of OUN-UPA symbols including by groups dominated by Russian-speaking residents of central and eastern Ukraine. This, however, is not accompanied by the adoption of the ideology of these historical organisations. Even when activists and columnists refer directly to Stepan Bandera, his actual views remain largely unknown. A new phenomenon has emerged which so far has been of marginal importance, but which has large potential to develop: neo-Nazism which refers to contemporary European neo-Nazism instead of Banderite traditions.
More...
Keywords: Gazprom; CNPC; China
The CEOs of Gazprom and China’s CNPC signed a contract concerning Russian gas supplies to China on 21 May 2014 in Shanghai. The contract had been under negotiation for many years and was signed in the presence of the two countries’ presidents. Under this 30-year deal, ultimately 38 billion m3 of natural gas will be exported annually from eastern Siberian fields (Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye) via the Power of Siberia pipeline planned for construction in 2015–2019. The lengthy negotiation process (initial talks regarding this issue began back in the 1990s), the circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract (it was signed only on the second day of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Shanghai, and the Russian president’s personal engagement in the final phase of the talks turned out to be a key element) and information concerning the provisions of the contract (the clause determining the contract price has not been revealed) all indicate that the terms of the compromise are more favourable for China than for Russia. This contract is at present important to Russia mainly for political reasons (it will use the future diversification of gas export routes as an instrument in negotiations with the EU). However, the impact of this instrument seems to be limited since supplies cannot be redirected from Europe to Asia. It is unclear whether the contract will bring the anticipated long-term economic benefits to Gazprom. The gas price is likely to remain at a level of between US$350 and US$390 per 1000 m3. Given the high costs of gas field operation and production and transport infrastructure development, this may mean that supplies will be carried out at the margin of profitability. The Shanghai contract does not conclude the negotiation process since a legally binding agreement on gas pipeline construction has not been signed and not all of the financial aspects of the project have been agreed upon as yet (such as the issue of possible Chinese prepayments for gas supplies).
More...
Keywords: Kaliningrad; Russia
Due to the integration to the European Union Poland and Lithuania intend to introduce overall visa obligation for the Russian citizens. Currently the Russians entering Poland may present at the border a voucher, an invitation, or an AB stamp, which entitles them to business travels. Lithuania maintains visa reliefs for the inhabitants of Kaliningrad and the Russians travelling from and to the enclave. The decisions encounter an opposition on the Russian side, which is of the opinion that the activities will result in the isolation of the enclave. This is why Moscow insists on the maintaining of a visa free movement between the enclave and the rest of Russia. The recent statements made by President Putin on the EU-Russia summit meeting in Moscow (May 29) and the Council of Baltic Sea States summit meeting in Petersburg (June 10-11) show a significant hardening of the Russian position on this matter. President Putin has even made the whole of the Russian relations with the European Union conditional on the resolving of the Kaliningrad problem according to the plans of Moscow. During the last few weeks not only the Russian politicians were making statements on the Kaliningrad issue but also representatives of the Polish, Lithuanian and Western authorities, as well as the EU officials. So far, the last ones have definitely rejected the possibility of adopting any rules going beyond the framework of the Schengen provisions towards Kaliningrad. The debate that has sparked off around the issue of Kaliningrad is mostly based on a series of unfounded assumptions, which are commonly regarded as obvious. Undoubtedly they make the rational resolving of the enclave problem even more difficult. In this text the author has attempted to identify and straighten out these "mythical" elements of the discussion, and next to set a possible course of further action.
More...
Keywords: Free State of Bavaria; CSU
The Christian Social Union (CSU) has ruled Bavaria continuously for sixty years. The CSU’s domination of the province’s political scene, together with its influence on federal policies through its partnership with the CDU in the Bundestag, has made the party one of the most effective groups in Europe. In the medium term Bavaria will have to face challenges connected with the transformation and digitisation of industry, which could undermine the province’s current economic model. In addition, the CSU is being confronted on the political scene by Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a grouping which has a similar profile to the CSU in several aspects. The elections on 14 October 2018 could permanently change the balance of power in Bavaria’s Landtag, lead to a serious weakening of the CSU’s dominance in Bavaria, and affect Germany’s federal politics.The CSU owes its electoral success to a conservative profile combined with the province’s economic achievements, as well as the ability to adapt its programme to changing social trends. Voters see the party as both a guarantor of Bavaria’s economic success and the advocate of the interests of vulnerable social groups. However, the CSU is undergoing a transformation which may result in it losing its status as a mass party appealing to all social groups. These changes are structural in nature; they result primarily from the aging of its traditional electorate and the inflow into Bavaria of residents from other German provinces. This process is overlapping with a strong polarisation within German society (including Bavaria) regarding its approach to the migration crisis. The biggest beneficiary of these changes has been the AfD. A good result for this party in the elections to the Bavarian parliament could permanently change the balance of political forces there. The CSU would be unable to defend an absolute majority, and it would have to seek coalition partners in order to form further governments.
More...
Political campaign began long before the Central Election Commission announced its official start. Party leaders and public officials started the rush in fall 2008, making generous social and economic promises to the public. However, at the moment the battle is given for the hesitant voters which according to social polls account for 40% of the population able to vote. Obviously, the ruling party possesses sufficient communication, administrative and budgetary tools to gain most of these votes. For this purpose the ruling party is considering many tactics,including the economic manipulation of the electoral behavior.
More...
UCEPS SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY // UKRAINE ON THE ROAD OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION // PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF UKRAINE'S INTEGRATION INTO THE EU // EXPANSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EASTWARD: CONSEQUENCES FOR UKRAINE // EASTERN EUROPE REFORMS: WHY THE OUTCOMES HAVE DIFFERED SO SHARPLY? // MACRO ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINE'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS // THE SCHENGEN AGREEMENT, EU ENLARGEMENT & EUROPEAN SECURITY // UKRAINE ON GEO-ECONOMIC CROSSROADS // UKRAINE'S ENTRY INTO WESTERN MARKETS: MAIN ISSUES // UKRAINE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST // LIST OF PUBLICATIONS BY UCEPS EXPERTS IN 2000
More...
Keywords: BIH; media; media system; public service; identity of collective; pluralism;
When dictators fall, the rhetoric of ‘revolution’, ‘liberalisation’ or ‘new era’ often disguises the enormous difficulties that lie ahead. Beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall that marked the end of the Cold War, democracy has spread around the world in breath-taking speed. However, as the ‘third wave’ comes of age, it becomes ever more evident that bringing down dictatorships is one thing, but building sustainable democratic institutions and media systems is quite another. The working papers produced within the project “Development of Functional Media Institutions in Western Balkans – A Comparative Study” provide vivid evidence of the many obstacles, errors and set-backs – but also of the achievements – that accompany the attempt of transforming media systems that hitherto have served the needs of an authoritarian regime into democratic institutions. Each of the working papers covering one of the five successor states of former Yugoslavia describes in much detail the policies that have been implemented to rebuild media institutions and journalistic practices in an environment that is marred not only by the legacy of socialism, but also by the trauma of war, deep societal divisions and economic decline. Given the importance of the Western Balkans for the stability and prosperity of Europe, considerable efforts have been made by the international community to build democracy in the region. Thus, besides describing the problems of transforming media systems in post-authoritarian countries, the working papers of this project also provide unique insights into the mechanisms and consequences of international media assistance in emerging democracies. In spite of the undeniable progress that has been made, the accounts given here are also rather sobering. The policies pursued by international donors often lack long-term sustainability and in some cases exacerbate rather than ameliorate existing problems. Taken together, the significance of this working paper series goes far beyond the region of the Western Balkans. The outstanding scholarship and in-depth knowledge brought together in these working papers also help to better understand the dynamics of media transformation in other emerging democracies around the globe. While some of the problems the media in the countries of former Yugoslavia are struggling with are unique for the region – for example the extremely small media markets of countries whose populations range between less than two million (Kosovo) and some seven million (Serbia), many others show striking similarities with developments in other new democracies. For example, issues of persistent political interference into journalistic decision-making, low levels of journalistic professionalism, political parallelism and sharp polarisation of public communication are common features around the globe. Moreover, the emphasis on the work of media assistance organisation described in these working papers further highlights the difficulties that arise when transplanting the institutions and norms of democracy as practiced in established (mainly western) countries to contexts that either do not have any, or only little, experience with democratic governance or are part of cultural and historical traditions that have little in common with western traditions. These apparent discrepancies between the established democracies of the West and the fledgling semi-, partial or defective democracies of the ‘third wave’ have provoked the question whether democracy and its essential ingredient of a free press can be exported to other contexts. As elsewhere in the post-communist world of Eastern Europe, policy makers in the countries of former Yugoslavia have looked out for role models in established democracies as guidance for the reconstruction of their media systems. Hallin and Mancini’s models of media systems have become an influential framework not only for academic research, but also for policy choices to design media systems in emerging democracies. The three models proposed by Hallin and Mancini identify the key dimensions of media systems of the regulatory arrangements and behavioural patterns that organise state-media relationships, media markets, journalistic professionalism and the relationship between the media and the main cleavages in a society (‘political parallelism’). The resulting ‘ideal types’ are the ‘liberal model’ that is characterised by low levels of state regulation, commercialism and objectivity and neutrality as key journalistic norm; the ‘democratic corporatist model’ that includes a strong public service element and the attempt to accommodate different interest and groups; and the ‘polarized pluralist model’ that is dominated by partisan journalism and a close relationship between politics and the media. Hallin and Mancini’s analysis, which focuses exclusively on Western media systems, reveals that the ‘liberal model’ is predominant in Anglo-Saxon countries, the ‘democratic corporatist model’ can be mainly found in the welfare states of Northern Europe and the ‘polarized pluralist model’ covers mainly the Mediterranean countries. Even though Hallin and Mancini emphasise that these models are empirical descriptions that do not imply any evaluation of the quality and adequacy of the kind of public communication each of the models provides, the ‘polarized pluralist’ model is widely seen as deficient and least desirable. Recent studies that have applied Hallin and Mancini’s models to non-western countries and in particular the new democracies of the ‘third wave’ have come to the conclusion that it is the ‘polarized pluralist’ model that best characterises cases outside the Western world. However, it appears implausible that eighteen Western media systems are diversified across three different models, whereas the rest of the world is lumped together into just one. Besides the conceptual problems this lack of variance throws up, the classification as ‘polarized pluralist’ usually also implies a normative judgment that marks these non-western and emerging media systems as immature and flawed. In this concluding working paper I want to explore in some more detail the empirical and normative underpinnings of democratic media systems, in particular the ‘polarized pluralist’ model. The paper aims to address some of the theoretical and normative issues involved in transforming post-authoritarian media systems, which have been described and analysed in the country studies of this working paper series. The discussion starts by introducing the concept of ‘social constructivism’ as an effective theoretical tool to understand processes of institutional change in processes of democratic transition. Two key elements of media systems serve as examples to demonstrate the ‘social construction’ of norms and practices in different social and political contexts: partisanship and pluralism. While partisanship is seen as a deficiency of media systems, albeit widely practiced, pluralism is valued as an indispensible norm of democratic media, yet difficult to achieve.
More...
Keywords: BIH; labour relations; employment; policy; active policies;
Aktivne politike zapošljavanja u Bosni i Hercegovini uglavnom su orijentirane ka izravnom zapošljavanju i pokušaju saniranja posljedica aktuelnog socioekonomskog konteksta, dok se zanemaruju potencijali strateškog i dugoročnog osnaživanja konkurentnosti nezaposlenih osoba. Osnovni je cilj ovoga teksta predstaviti međunarodne trendove u domenu aktivacijskih politika u kojima je u posljednjim godinama došlo do paradigmatskog zaokreta od zapošljavanja ka jačanju zapošljivosti te, shodno tome, analizirati postojeće stanje i institucionalni okvir aktivnih politika zapošljavanja u BiH. Na osnovu identificiranih nedostataka postojećeg dizajna aktivnih mjera formulirano je nekoliko preporuka za unapređenje postojećeg stanja u oblasti politika zapošljavanja u smjeru jačanja njihove aktivne dimenzije i izgradnje dugoročnog pristupa unapređenju funkcioniranja tržišta rada.
More...
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 pushed Europe into a new era of instability. The fundamentals of the continent’s political and economic order are shifting as Russia’s brutal methods of war undermine the prospects of the slightest cooperation between Moscow and European states. Decades-old trade links have been severed, transport corridors rerouted, and people to people contacts have become more scarce than ever. Europe is reshaping its security architecture around Russia as the main threat, while Moscow frames its aggression against Ukraine as an existential defensive war with a duplicitous West. The only European region that stands out in this process of growing mutual alienation is the Western Balkans. More than a year into the war, Russia’s relations with several Balkan states appear to have undergone little change. Serbia is eagerly continuing with energy deals with Gazprom, Bosnian Serb leaders frequent Moscow on official visits, and some leading Montenegrin parties are sticking to pro-Russian slogans. It would appear that time stands still in the Western Balkans, with petty local grievance sover riding major global developments. Yet the veneer of continuity conceals mounting challenges to the status quo that has served local elites so well for so long. Russia’s attack on Ukraine under the pretext of protecting the self-proclaimed Donbas republics alerted Europe to the reality that even a frozen conflict may quickly spiral out of control if manipulated by a hostile external power. This gave an extra impulse to the EU’s determination to put an end to the long standing disputes in the Balkans. New sticks and carrots are in use to push local leaders toward mutual accommodation. The EU has also become more assertive in insisting that European integration is incompatible with preserving close ties to Russia. In the Balkans, meanwhile, the war is diminishing the benefits of cooperation with Russia. With a vast part of its resources and international clout consumed by the aggression, Moscow can hardly remain as attractive a partner for the Balkan states as it was prior to 2022.Russia’s deepening economic rift with the EU countries is driving it out from the Balkan markets. Even the region’s traditional dependence on Russian hydrocarbons is on its last legs, and the reluctance of several Balkan states to join anti-Russian sanctions does little to change that. Moscow’s shocking brutality in Ukraine and flagrant denial of its own aggression have put an end to its role as a co-mediator in the settlement of the Balkan conflicts. Now, even pro-Russian forces in the region refrain from pleading for the Kremlin’s diplomatic assistance, striving instead to diversify their ties in favor of other international allies. The only sphere in which Russia-Balkan cooperation continues to thrive is propaganda. Moscow needs its Balkan allies in order to claim that its isolation in Europe is far from complete and that there are places where it is still welсomed as a partner. A number of Balkan politicians, for their part, have invested too much in cultivating and manipulating pro-Russian sentiment in the region to be able to wean themselves off this PR-dependency without sustaining any losses themselves. The propaganda cooperation is asymmetrical, with Moscow having little control over its Balkan partners and the ways they exploit Russia’s image to advance their own agenda. Nevertheless, the Kremlin appears to have no issue with that, viewing other options as too risky and costly. As a result, Russia is likely to retain a semblance of presence in the Western Balkans for years to come, even if it is confined to pronouncements in the local media. The PR interdependency between the Kremlin and Balkan leaders may prove too elusive to be curbed by sanctions or other formal commitments.
More...