Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina (ICG Bosnia Report No. 16)

Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina (ICG Bosnia Report No. 16)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Analysis of the preliminary results from the elections suggests that there was a serious discrepancy between the overall voter population and the number of ballots cast. It would seem that there was a turnout of over 100%. This calls in question the validity of the results. On the basis of this failure to achieve the required conditions for holding the elections, disenfranchisement, electoral engineering, and the preliminary vote count results, the 14 September elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be considered free and fair as required by the DPA. This report describes the recent historical context and analyses the campaign, the conduct and the outcome of the elections.

Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation (ICG Bosnia Report No. 17)

Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation (ICG Bosnia Report No. 17)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Dayton Agreement;

The states most involved in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), the European Union and the states of the Contact Group (France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) must do all in their power to pressure the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska, Croatia and the authorities of Croat-controlled Federation territory to arrest immediately all indictees in their jurisdiction and surrender them to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Tribunal). If these authorities fail to comply, and if key indictees remain at liberty by the time of the London Peace Implementation Conference, the North Atlantic Council must issue a directive instructing the Implementation Force (IFOR) to make the arrests. All states must make additional resources available to the Tribunal, including funds, equipment and seconded staff with appropriate qualifications, to ensure that justice prevails.

Brčko Arbitration: Proposal for Peace (ICG Bosnia Report No. 18)

Brčko Arbitration: Proposal for Peace (ICG Bosnia Report No. 18)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Brčko-District;

The Dayton Peace Agreement postponed a decision on the fate of the Brcko area, one of the peace talks’ most contentious and potentially explosive issues, until arbitration could take place. A decision is expected by 15 February. The arbitration award could have serious consequences. If Brcko were awarded to the Federation, Bosnian Serbs may lose faith in the DPA, strengthening hard-liners and potentially causing tens of thousands of refugees from western Republika Srpska to flee. If Brcko were awarded to Republika Srpska, heightened tension and brinkmanship would result in the short term, and renewed armed conflict in the long term. As a contribution to the arbitration process and in order to address the goals, needs and fears of all sides, thus preserving the precarious peace, the International Crisis Group offers some recommendations in this report.

Grave Situation in Mostar: Robust Response required (ICG Bosnia Report No. 19)

Grave Situation in Mostar: Robust Response required (ICG Bosnia Report No. 19)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Mostar;

The violent events in Mostar on 10 February -- and the failure of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) to either anticipate or control them -- constitute a mortal threat to the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the continued existence of the Bosniac-Croat Federation.

THE WAGES OF SIN: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska (Balkans Report N° 118)

THE WAGES OF SIN: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska (Balkans Report N° 118)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

By recognising Republika Srpska (RS) as a legitimate polity and constituent entity of the new Bosnia, the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement embraced a contradiction. For the RS was founded as a stepping stone to a Greater Serbia. and forged in atrocities against - and mass expulsions of non-Serbs. … Almost six years after Dayton, these hopes lie unfulfilled and partly forgotten. … Converted to Dayton constitutionalism, and fortified by the election of a respectable nationalist to the Yugoslav presidency in Belgrade, the rebranded SDS remains as unwilling as ever to define „its state“ as the rightful home of Bosnians of all faiths. The riots organised in May 2001 to prevent the reconstruction of historic mosques razed during the war and the government‘s continuing refusal, even after Milosevic.s transfer to the ICTY in June, to cooperate with The Hague ought to have made plain that the RS remains true to its wartime self. Vague international threats to punish the RS on both scores led only to token concessions by the authorities.

BIN LADEN AND THE BALKANS: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism (ICG Balkans Report N° 119)

BIN LADEN AND THE BALKANS: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism (ICG Balkans Report N° 119)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: mujahidin;

Given the presence of ex-mujahidin in Bosnia, the tens of thousands of former military and paramilitary fighters in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia who are Muslims by tradition, if not for the most part by observance, and the large deployments of U.S. and other troops in the region, some (though by no means all) senior Western sources describe the potential terrorist threat as significant. In this context, international officials and organisations in parts of the region, as well as certain governments, have taken extra security precautions, and clamped down on individuals and groups suspected of possible links to terrorist networks. In this context, it is important that the international community should not be distracted by the wave of anti-Muslim opinion and propaganda that has washed through Serbia, Macedonia, and the Serbcontrolled parts of Bosnia. In these countries, and also in Albania, Western capitals must reward governments. overall democratic performance, not the volume of their denunciations of terrorism.

KOSOVO: Landmark Election (Balkans Report N° 120)

KOSOVO: Landmark Election (Balkans Report N° 120)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

On 17 November 2001, people from Kosovo turned a page in their history by voting in multiparty elections for new self-government institutions. The conduct of the election was generally judged to have been a clear improvement on the municipal elections of October 2000. Levels of violence were much lower, even though more voters took part. In the run-up to the election, a key issue was whether or not Serbs would participate. The SRSG engaged in a round of frenetic negotiations with Belgrade leaders that eventually bore fruit just a fortnight before the vote. While an agreement was reached which enabled Belgrade to claim that they had won concessions, but without UNMIK compromising the principles contained in UNSCR 1244 or the Constitutional Framework, Albanian leaders were incensed by the agreement and by the key involvement of Belgrade in the process.

BOSNIA: Reshaping the International Machinery (ICG Balkans Report No. 121)

BOSNIA: Reshaping the International Machinery (ICG Balkans Report No. 121)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

After six years and billions of dollars spent, peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains far from complete. Reshaping (‚recalibrating‘, in local jargon) the international community (IC) presence is vital if the peace process is to have a successful outcome. Above all, however, the reform must acknowledge that if Bosnia cannot be put on its feet by evolution, nudged along by the High Representative, or by some negotiated constitutional settlement, then the IC must be ready to impose a more workable and democratic model than Dayton envisaged. This could involve creating a strong but fully representative central government, clearing away the counterproductive entity and cantonal structures, devolving substantial powers to the municipalities, and designing largely depoliticised structures for regional administration. It is not too soon for the PIC Steering Board to start consultations on post-Dayton structures.

MACEDONIA’S NAME: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve it (ICG Balkans Report No. 122)

MACEDONIA’S NAME: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve it (ICG Balkans Report No. 122)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

On 16 November 2001, Macedonia’s parliament passed a set of constitutional amendments that were agreed in August, when Macedonian and Albanian minority leaders signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Later that day, President Trajkovski clarified the terms of an amnesty for Albanian rebels, in line with international requests. So far as Macedonians are concerned, the Agreement contains a double weakness. First, it redresses long-standing minority grievances mainly by reducing the privileges of the majority. Secondly, its purpose of turning Macedonia into a ‘civic state’ – while admirable and necessary – makes Macedonia an anomaly in a region of emphatically ‘ethnic’ states, three of which uphold fundamental challenges to the Macedonian identity. Greece vetoes international acceptance of Macedonia’s name, Serbia denies the autonomy of its church, and Bulgaria (while accepting Macedonia as a state) denies the existence of a Macedonian language and a Macedonian nation.

KOSOVO: A Strategy for Economic Development (ICG Balkans Report No. 123)

KOSOVO: A Strategy for Economic Development (ICG Balkans Report No. 123)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Kosovo cannot have a stable future without sustainable economic development. This report considers the task of promoting such development. After surveying the present state of the economy, it assesses the international efforts so far to lay the groundwork for future prosperity. It also considers the prospects for the former socially owned sector, including plans for privatisation and prospects for restructuring and investment. These economic issues have a directly political dimension, one that affects all aspects of structural and institutional development in Kosovo. Potential investors have been deterred by the fact that they do not know which jurisdiction will finally apply. They need to have confidence that a future change in political status would not put their investment in question or fundamentally alter the environment where they would be doing business. Controversies over ownership have a similar deterrent effect.

A KOSOVO ROADMAP (I). Addressing Final Status (ICG Balkans Report No. 124)

A KOSOVO ROADMAP (I). Addressing Final Status (ICG Balkans Report No. 124)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

In order to move towards a resolution of Kosovo’s final status, two distinct aspects need to be considered: an ‘external’ and an ‘internal’ dimension. The ‘external’ dimension involves devising a process to address final status, including all of the different actors with a stake in Kosovo’s future. The ‘internal’ dimension concerns the development of Kosovo’s own democratic institutions, the rule of law and human rights, so as to prepare Kosovo for whatever final status may eventually be agreed. These dimensions are duly treated in a pair of reports sharing a common title, A Kosovo Roadmap, issued simultaneously and subtitled I. Addressing Final Status and II. Internal Benchmarks.

A KOSOVO ROADMAP (II). Internal Benchmarks (ICG Balkans Report N° 125)

A KOSOVO ROADMAP (II). Internal Benchmarks (ICG Balkans Report N° 125)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

In examining Kosovo’s final status, the International Crisis Group argues that the issue has two aspects, inseparable and overlapping but nevertheless distinct. The ‘external’ dimension involves the interests of, and relationships between, the different actors with a stake in Kosovo’s future, while the ‘internal’ dimension concerns the development of Kosovo’s own democratic institutions, laws and standards. These dimensions are duly treated in a pair of reports sharing a common title, A Kosovo Roadmap, issued simultaneously and subtitled I. Addressing Final Status and II. Internal Benchmarks. Together, these reports show two, parallel paths which need be negotiated simultaneously in order to reach the desired destination: a stable, democratic Kosovo, standing on its own feet, peacefully integrated in its region, and with a clearly defined place in the international community.

BELGRADE’S LAGGING REFORM: Cause for international Concern (ICG Balkans Report N° 126)

BELGRADE’S LAGGING REFORM: Cause for international Concern (ICG Balkans Report N° 126)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

For more than a decade Serbia was the driving force behind much of the instability in the Balkans. Following the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic on 5 October 2000, it was hoped that Serbia would promptly reform the external policies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) that had caused such disruption. To date, these hopes have been substantially disappointed. Nevertheless, the FRY has set its sights on catching up with its neighbours by integrating into Euro-Atlantic institutions and political processes. In particular, it wants to make significant progress during 2002 towards three major foreign policy goals: accession to the Council of Europe (CoE); membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP); and negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union (EU).

COURTING DISASTER: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia & Herzegovina (ICG Balkans Report No. 127)

COURTING DISASTER: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia & Herzegovina (ICG Balkans Report No. 127)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

If Bosnia is to be ruled by laws and not by wilful men, let alone to progress towards European Union membership, then the responsible international agencies (above all OHR and the IJC) and Bosnian jurists and politicians should consider the recommendations given in this report and undertake reforms in a coordinated, coherent and consistent manner, applying the lessons drawn from Brcko. The recent decision of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) to scrap peer review of judges and the priority now being accorded to rule of law issues by the High Representative, his designated successor and at least some Bosnian leaders are encouraging signs that the challenge may finally be confronted.

IMPLEMENTING EQUALITY: The “Constituent Peoples” decision in Bosnia & Herzegovina (ICG Balkans Report No. 128)

IMPLEMENTING EQUALITY: The “Constituent Peoples” decision in Bosnia & Herzegovina (ICG Balkans Report No. 128)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

This report recounts the origins of the “constituent peoples” case and the scope of the Court’s decision. It then describes the unprecedented debate on fundamental aspects of the DPA that has occurred in both entities since December 2001. It analyses the Sarajevo Agreement, the amendments enacted by the RSNA and the draft amendments awaiting debate in the Federation parliament in terms of the guarantees needed to ensure equal rights for Bosnia’s “constituent peoples” and “others”. Finally, it analyses changes not specifically regulated by the Sarajevo Agreement, but mandated by the decision of the Constitutional Court.

STILL BUYING TIME: Montenegro, Serbia and the European Union (ICG Balkans Report No. 129)

STILL BUYING TIME: Montenegro, Serbia and the European Union (ICG Balkans Report No. 129)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

On 14 March 2002 the leaders of Serbia, Montenegro and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) signed an agreement in Belgrade to replace FRY with a new “state community”: a “union of states” to be called “Serbia and Montenegro”. If the agreement can be implemented, it will establish a loose association in which the two “member-states” enjoy virtually all the prerogatives of independence except those that depend on international personality (e.g. UN membership). The republics will control their borders – including customs – and become fully responsible for their economies and internal security. The union will depend on the republics to fund its institutions: an assembly, president, council of ministers, court, and the armed forces.

POLICING THE POLICE IN BOSNIA: A further Reform Agenda (ICG Balkans Report N°130)

POLICING THE POLICE IN BOSNIA: A further Reform Agenda (ICG Balkans Report N°130)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

If Bosnia & Herzegovina is eventually to have affordable and competent police forces that serve and protect all citizens, regardless of nationality or place of residence, from politically and ethnically motivated violence, persecution and ‘justice’ – as well as from rampant organised crime – then there must be no diminution of either oversight or reform. To make this happen, EUPM and the Office of the High Representative (OHR, to which EUPM will be subordinate) should consider the following, general recommendations. The full set of detailed recommendations is given in the Conclusion of this report.

UNMIK’s KOSOVO ALBATROSS: Tackling Division in Mitrovica (ICG Balkans Report No. 131)

UNMIK’s KOSOVO ALBATROSS: Tackling Division in Mitrovica (ICG Balkans Report No. 131)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The international community must demonstrate that it has a clear strategy for overcoming Mitrovica’s division, and above all that it has the will to solve the problem. This report proposes that it adopt a multi-track approach that combines pressure on Belgrade to honour its obligations in Kosovo with vigorous action to ensure the rule of law in Mitrovica and an innovative offer to the city’s Serbs of integration into local government structures.

BOSNIA'S ALLIANCE FOR (smallish) CHANGE (ICG Balkans Report N°132)

BOSNIA'S ALLIANCE FOR (smallish) CHANGE (ICG Balkans Report N°132)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Although it is too late now to remedy this lack in practice, Bosnia's political parties - and especially the Alliance parties - should use the current campaign for more than slinging mud, revelling in scandals and glorifying their leaders. They need to think and plan ahead, offering voters positive manifestos as well as negative attacks on their rivals. The issues and challenges that will confront the governments formed after 5 October are already apparent. The formation of a new alliance will prove easier - and its chances of delivering on its member-parties' promises will be greater - if a measure of programmatic clarity and, perhaps, even concord can be offered to and endorsed by Bosnian citizens over the months ahead. To help focus the election campaign on fundamental issues of economic development and reforms of the social, fiscal and governance sectors and, thereby, to enhance the chances that the coalition governments which emerge will be both committed and equipped to pursue a clearly defined reform agenda, ICG makes the recommendations that follow.

MACEDONIA’S PUBLIC SECRET: How Corruption drags the Country down. (ICG Balkans Report N°133)

MACEDONIA’S PUBLIC SECRET: How Corruption drags the Country down. (ICG Balkans Report N°133)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Although this report contains specific examples, it has been written with care to respect the rights of individuals. ICG is prepared, however, to discuss a number of these matters in greater detail if requested to do so by appropriate, duly authorised governmental and legislative bodies. Also, while this report deals with the present and recent past and so may seem to concentrate on the parties now in power, corruption is an aspect of the country’s political culture, not the exclusive preserve of any particular group. For an attack on it to be effective, all political parties need to join in the effort, along with civil society and the international donor community. Corruption is emphatically not an issue that belongs to or should be misused for partisan political purposes, and it would be a major mistake to believe that a change of government after the September 2002 elections will automatically sweep away the problem.