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Србија под Немачком окупацијом у Другом светском рату

Author(s): Dragan Aleksić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

One of the main features of the German administration in Serbia in WWII was the fact that the occupation policy wasn’t directed from one center. Since the agencies of the military administration were not under unitary command in Serbia, nor did they have clearly delimitated spheres of action, their influence on occupation policy depended on the authority of their positions, i.e. on the place of the superimposed agencies in the complex pecking order of power in the Third Reich. Internal relations between individual occupation factors and the power of their influence were of importance for concrete implementation of the occupation policy and its consequences for the population. The spheres of activity of the occupation administration were divided among four agencies which fulfilled occupation tasks parallely without mutual coordination and often with conflicting interests. Each agency had its main office in Berlin and each had to fulfill its tasks directly, sidestepping the military administration in Serbia. Since security of the troops was endangered by a strong resistance movement and since due to the long protracted war the needs of German war economy steadily increased, the police and economic administration played the leading role in the hierarchy of German occupation agencies.

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Однос немачког окупатора према домаћим сарадницима у Србији 1941–1944.

Author(s): Ljubinka Škodrić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The defeat in the April War, the break-up of the Yugoslav state and the genocide against the Serbian people were the facts the occupied Serbian society had to face already in the first months of occupation. Realizing the difficulty of the situation, the collaborationists strove to improve it by aiding and supporting the occupiers, believing they would by and by recognize that cooperativeness and reward it by improving the situation of the Serbian people in the German system of the „New Order”. However, in the plans of the Third Reich, there was no place for such opinions. The occupied territory was interesting for them only inasmuch it needed as small forces as possible to keep peace and order in it, with the aim of exploiting it as thoroughly as possible. In that context, although local government was set up to help them run the administration, a complex occupying apparatus was also put in place which interfered drastically with the functioning of the local organs, exercising strict surveillance and control over them. Mistrust of local population, regardless of the degree of collaboration remained the lasting trait of the German occupying apparatus in Serbia.

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Отношение Вашингтона к участию Красной армии в освобождении Югославии

Author(s): Aleksej A. Kostin / Language(s): Russian Publication Year: 0

The participation of the Red Army in the liberation of Yugoslavia is one of the topics from WWII which have a political flip-side. The news about Red Army's advance into the Yugoslav territory came as no surprise to the White House. The Americans were informed by the British and by their own intelligence service about the trip of the leader of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito to Moscow. In the State Department there were no doubts about the consequences of Tito's visit to Moscow, and already on September 20, 1944 the possibility of scaling down the len-lease aid for Yugoslavia was discussed. The Americans considered the possibility of the Soviet participation in the liberation of the Balkans already in late 1943. President's position voiced at the conferences in Kairo and Teheran prove that Roosevelt, believing in complete success of the Red Army in Romania, deemed its advance in Yugoslavia very likely. The Western Allies could prevent the Red Army's advance only at the cost of the break-up of the Anti-Hitler coalition. Taking into account the complexity of the military actions in the Balkans, a delay of the Allied armies in the case of operations in Istria and Dalmatia, could lead to the Red Army's turning toward Holland, Belgium and France after the fall of Berlin. The information of the US intelligence service say Yugoslavia was liberated largely thanks to the Red Army. American agents claimed the Yugoslav partisans had no heavy armament necessary for larger military actions, which directly caused low military efficiency of the People's Liberation Army. The information of the American intelligence service directed the Washington analysts to better understand the mutual interest of Moscow and the Yugoslav partisans in each other. Relying on the Soviet military and political support Tito conquered power, and the Soviet leadership strove to spread Communist influence through the victory of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. After all, the State Department considered the presence of the Soviet military forces in Yugoslavia as an „important factor” which had to be taken into account in the process of making US policy toward Yugoslavia.

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Совјетски савез и формирање југословенских снага безбедности (1944–1945)

Author(s): Dmitar Tasić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Parallel with the „wartime“ formation of the „New“ or Tito’s Yugoslavia and its armed forces, the process of founding of the security apparatus was also going on. The fact that the war against the occupiers was at the same time a civil war and a thoroughgoing socialist revolution, additionally stressed the importance of well organized and well trained security and intelligence agencies. No doubt, ties established with USSR during the war as well as the known experiences of the October Revolution, civil wars in USSR and in Spain, had a strong impact on the way the Yugoslav security apparatus was formed and used. The split with USSR which came about in 1948 and which influenced this sphere too, would entail stressing autochthonous development or unconscious neglect or total omission of the foreign (speak: Soviet) influence in subsequent research.

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Совјетски савез и Југославија на крају Другог светског рата 1944–1945.

Author(s): Kosta Nikolić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The fate of Yugoslavia was decided within the triangle of the „Great Allies”, and the global agreement between USA and the Soviet Union was of major importance. It is needles to ask if the Yugoslav Communists understood the nature of this agreement – they were just consequently following the instructions from Moscow. Revolutionary logic proved very effective in contact with American officers too: they reported that the partisans were fighting. The estimate as to against whom, in what degree and with which goal depended on experience and sagacity of individual officers, but the partisans always fulfilled the first requirement of the Allied coalition: they fought or they made an impression they were fighting. The American government created on purpose an illusion that Yugoslavia wasn’t handed over to the Soviets, but to an autonomous resistance movement of unclear political orientation. Later reports which testified to the Communist character of the People’s Liberation Movement, about the clear intention of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to gain power by all means, about outright inimical attitude toward USA, about the reign of terror, about existence of aggressive mix of nationalism and Communism, about proofs that the new Yugoslav regime was a carbon copy of the Soviet system and that Tito was Moscow’s best pupil, didn’t cause any reaction on the part of the American administration. Yugoslavia was in the Soviet sphere of influence. Comparative analysis of British and American influence on the denouement of the civil war and the post-war social system of Yugoslavia shows that apparent disinterest is more nefarious and more important than excessive engagement. The American military establishment decided that the second front in Europe wouldn’t be opened in the Balkans, and Roosevelt drew political conclusions from this decision and left Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union. Churchill’s endeavors to exercise his own influence on Tito and to retain a modicum of political influence, must be seen in this context. USA had both military and political means of influencing the fate of Yugoslavia, whereas Britain hadn’t. USA cared exclusively about its interests and not about the proclaimed principles of foreign policy. Only the facade of democracy was to be preserved.

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Совјетски поглед на Балкан и југословенску доминацију у Албанији (1943–1947)

Author(s): Aleksandar Životić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The Soviet Union kept a watchful eye on the Yugoslav presence in Albania immediately after the end of WWII. Yugoslavia was helping Albania in every way during WWII and it continued its aid after the war. In the beginning the Soviet Union wasn’t present in that country to any significant degree. The Soviet influence was confined to symbolic military and diplomatic presence. However, over time the Soviet presence in Albania began to be more perceptible and clearer. The Soviet presence didn’t push back the Yugoslav influence and it didn’t limit the level of the Yugoslav-Albanian relations, but it strictly determined the reach of the mutual cooperation. The Soviets left to the Yugoslavs the organizatorial activities in the Albanian Communist Party, economy and culture. One gets the impression the Yugoslav presence in Albania was a downsized copy of the Soviet influence in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Yugoslavia was a powerful mediator between Albania and the Soviet Union, a country the Soviet top-brass entrusted with the tutelage over Albania, seeing it as the guarantor of Albanian independence and security.

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20. октобар: Од ослобођења до окупације Београда (радикална трансформација једног политичког симбола)

Author(s): Miroslav Jovanović / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

When October 20, 1944 is in question, it is necessary to keep in mind the »overlapping« of two histories – the history of the event and the history of the interpretation of the event. The Belgrade operation was an important, but not the decisive operation in the South-Western advance of the Red Army on the vast front stratching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. On the other hand, the events in October 1944 introduced a fundamental change in the processes in Yugoslavia itself. It follows from the comparision of the forces of the German army group »Serbia« and those of the partizans that the liberation of Belgrade couldn't have been possible without the units of the Red Army. Over the past 65 years three historiographical discourses clearly featured in the interpretation of the events from October 1944: „common past”, „our past” and „occupation“. The history of WWII in Yugoslavia is interwowen and intersected by different contexts and levels of understanding and interpretation. The general context of the war is the world clash between the Anti-Hitlerite coalition and the Tripartite Pact. The occupation of Europe by the Third Reich and operating of occupation systems in these countries is on the second level. Mutual relations of allies within the Anti-Hitlerite coalition is on the third level. The context of the civil war in Yugoslavia comes only on the fourth level, having several different dimensions. Each of them represented a different historical context: religious war in the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, struggle between the two resistence movements, war between the Quisling forces and the resistence movements... The visit of the Russian preisdent on the 65th anniversary of liberation of Belgrade (proposed by the president of Serbia) re-historicized the whole event and relativized the paradigm of October 20, as the „day of the new occupation“.

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Проблема признания новой Югославии на завершающем этапе войны в освещении российской историографии

Author(s): Aleksandar Kulagin / Language(s): Russian Publication Year: 0

Recently, reduced interest in the diplomatic struggle for the recognizing of the new Yugoslav state in the Russian historiography. The reason is that in Soviet times the topic of relations AVNOJ and the USSR in this period has been given sufficient attention. And despite some discussion, the topic is fairly investigated. However, the problem of international recognizing of the new Yugoslavia is beyond the scope of relations between the USSR and the partisan commanders. It includes a set of international issues related to the struggle between the great powers for the organization of the postwar European order. In the Soviet historiography begins researching of this topic in a short time after the Second World War end. But the majority of researcher studied the soviet struggle for new Yugoslavia recognizing only. Moreover owing to peculiarity of the soviet archive system were almost all of the soviet sources without attention. Besides were not well-known the British sources. Consequently there are some questions, which are some discussion and now there about. The Soviet-Partisans relations in November–December 1943 connected with the summit in Jajce The Change of the British-American strategy towards Yugoslavia and their Michailovich give up The Tito summits with Churchill and Shubashich in the summer of 1944 The Tito secret visit to Moscow in September 1944 and the contents of his speaking to Stalin The British-Soviet negotiations in autumn of 1944 and the „procent agreement”. Consequently is this topic of present interest. But its researching isn’t possible without renovating of source base, especially without using the sources of the soviet foreign policy on the end of the Second World war. Moreover is also necessary to change the methodology and examine this problem in the context of relations between the great powers.

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Делатност М. П. Чубинског и В. Д. Плетњова у Петрограду везана за уједињење словенских народа Балкана

Author(s): Aleksej Arsenjev,Michael Ordovsky / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

In Russian and international circles, two lawyers, professors at Saint-Petersburg University – Michael Pavlovich Tchubinskij (1871 – 1943) and Vladimir Dmitrievich Pletnev (1878 – 1954), who emigrated to Belgrade in 1920, gave certain contribution to the later realization of the “Yugoslav principle of uniting”. In 1912, “Slavic Committee” in Petrograd (founded in 1909) was transformed into “Association of Slavic Scientific Society”, which in 1913, because of the war in the Balkans turned to politics. Their activities were met with immediate condemnation of the Government. Then, another “group of progressive scientists, professors and public workers interested in Slavic questions” was formed. Professor M. Tchubinskij was a regular chairman at these meetings. Both M. Tchubinskij and V. Pletnev published their texts in “Interests in Balkans and Government Report” collections of articles (1913). Prof. M. Tchubinskij’s report titled “History of Serbo-Croatian Relations and Intended Union” was published in “Collection of Articles Proceeding Dedicated to A. Shakhmatov” (1916). Yugoslav Committee reissued it in French (“L’Union serbo-croate”, Paris, 1917). For this work, prof. Tchubinskij was awarded St. Sava decoration of the 3rd order by H.R.H. Crown Prince – Regent of the Kingdom of Serbia.

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Фебруарска револуција 1917. у Русији, Никола Пашић и Крфска декларација

Author(s): Andrey L. Shemyakin / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The adoption of the joint declaration of the Government of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Yugoslav Committee in Corfu in July 1917 is closely related to the February revolution in Russia which strongly influenced the policy changes between the coalitions of the powers in spring and summer of 1917. These changes also created favourable conditions for declaration signing, the most significant being: the collapse of the tsarist regime, which had supported Serbia; the need to review the war objectives, taking into account the possible peace negotiations (the Sixtus Affair); relative liberalization in Cisleithania after the death of Franz Josef (in November 1916) and the adoption of the “trialistic” May Declaration (1917); instability of the general military situation with the tendency to deteriorate for the Entente. When drafting the text of the declaration, Nikola Pašić took all these facts into account. So, we can say that the Corfu Declaration was a forced document, as well as the Nish Declaration (December 1914) which appeared earlier and was also motivated only by the utilitarian causes.

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СФРЈ – Италија: последњи Титов допринос билатералној сарадњи

Author(s): Petar Dragišić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The resolution of the territorial dispute between Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia, as a result of the London and Osimo agreements in 1954 and 1975 respectively, paved the way for improving the Yugoslav-Italian relations. The process of normalization encouraged close political and economic cooperation between the two countries as well as considerable Italian cultural influence in Yugoslavia. Besides, the Yugoslav-Italian rapprochement was reflected in frequent high-level contacts between the political elites of Yugoslavia and Italy during the 1960s and 1970s. During his visit to Yugoslavia, in October 1979, the Italian president Sandro Pertini discussed with the Yugoslav party and state leader, Josip Broz Tito, the most important aspects of the Yugoslav-Italian relations as well as the burning global issues, such as the situation in the Middle East and Indochina, the détente, the non-alignment as well as the Italian role in the European Economic Community. The transcripts of the conversations between the two veteran politicians and their teams, which took place on 11 and 12 October 1979, indicate the highest level of mutual cooperation as well as their similar attitudes towards a broad spectrum of global topics, such as the détente, the Non-Aligned Movement, the situation in the Middle East and Indochina. The two presidents signaled their readiness to sett le the remaining disputes between the two countries, in particular concerning the rights of the Italian minority in Yugoslavia as well as the Croatian and Slovenian communities in Italy. Pertini and Tito expressed satisfaction with the improvement of the relations between Yugoslavia and Italy despite their opposite ideological preferences and their participation in the different global coalitions – the North Atlantic Alliance and the Non-Aligned Movement respectively.

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Бакшиш и државна интервенција. Чиновничка корупција у Краљевини СХС

Author(s): Aleksandar R. Miletić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

A general increase in corruption in public administration was one of the “legacies” left after the Great War. The unprecedented hardships of daily life and the general impoverishment affected all strata of European societies during the war. This was particularly true for the territories under the control of the Central Powers which were cut off from their traditional sources of raw materials and food during the war. The misery of malnutrition and disease reduced human preoccupations to concerns for essential biological needs and mere survival. In many ways, this led to the erosion of basic presumptions of honesty and morality among the general public level, and state personnel were not immune from this general trend. On the contrary, their position became complicated because of the new roles assumed by the state for the control over the wartime economy and society. The numerous new responsibilities and areas of influence demanded that state officials at all echelons of the administration be entrusted with expanded powers. On the other hand, their average real income was declining ever more from its prewar level. The low–paid national bureaucracies deviated greatly from the ideal rational bureaucracy imagined by Max Weber. According to the research of Yugoslav/Croatian economist Mijo Mirković, during the period between 1913 and 1925, the Yugoslav state employees’ earnings were reduced by more than 50 percent. To what extent did this war-related and prolonged degradation affect the “moral infrastructure” of Yugoslav state personnel? What was the level of the administrative performance and efficiency that might have been expected from low–paid personnel? This article attempts to answer these questions by examining administrative performance of Yugoslav state personnel while it was engaged in state interventionist policies in domains of control over housing relations, over foreign trade and emigration process. In each of these domains of public affairs the state agenda was compromised by the general system of misconduct and corruption that occurred in the state administration. Low-level corruption and abuses started to appear as state officials gained the right to make arbitrary decisions on each individual problem or application. In the field of housing policy, the requisitioning practices proved to be nothing more than a cover-up for extortion and different schemes of misuse and corruption by state officials. In domain of the trade controls, the license trade regime became notorious for the wide-spread corruption involved in its procedures and conduct. The control over emigration affairs ended up in an elaborated system of extortion of applicants. Instead of serving and protecting the interests of citizens, the poorly paid administrative personnel in Belgrade tried to improve their own material position by abusing their powers. State competencies were not only violated but they also ended up serving the private interests of state employees. In view of this outcome, one wonders whether citizens might not have been better off if the state had not intervened in these affairs at all. Study of corruption in the Yugoslav public administration provides a good insight into the basic administrative limits of its “human infrastructure”. This should be taken into account when considering (possible) outcomes and concrete results of the Yugoslav state policy in the interwar period.

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Параде победе

Author(s): Olga Manojlović-Pintar / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Four Victory Parades were organized in the socialist Yugoslavia on May 9th (1965, 1970, 1975, 1985). Although during the first postwar decades public parades were organized on May 1 – the International Workers Day, the practice was changed when twentieth anniversary of the Victory over Fascism was celebrated in 1965. The main purpose of the military parades was to promote the importance and strength of the Yugoslav People’s Army in the public, but in the same time to constitute the main principle on which Yugoslav collective identity was based. Furthermore, the military parades represented important element strengthening the position of Yugoslavia inside the Non-Alignment movement and in the world politics in general. The article analyses the ways in which the parades were organized and traces their reception and the influence they had on Yugoslav society.

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Од војне до политичке дипломатије (Ратни почеци дипломатије „друге“ Југославије)

Author(s): Milan Terzić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The foundations of the diplomacy of the ,,second“ Yugoslavia were laid on the experience and pragmatism of the older generations and by creating the new one that could learn. This enabled the diplomacy of a military movement to gain access to the political sphere through military missions and to achieve international recognition already in the final phase of WWII. Military missions of the People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia were harnessed to the goal of international recognition of the „second" Yugoslavia. The largest name of the partisan diplomacy was Vladimir Velebit. However, Josip Broz Tito was its real instigator and leader who skillfully held all strings of foreign policy of the movement he led in his hands. The Allies recognized the temporary Yugoslav government before the end of the war: on March 12, 1945 the British ambassador Ralf Stevenson arrived in Belgrade, followed by the Soviet ambassador Ivan Sadchikov on March 24 and in late March the USA appointed their ambassador Richard Paterson.

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Југословенска самит-дипломатија 1944-1961.

Author(s): Vladimir P. Petrović / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The paper explores the dynamics of Yugoslav summit diplomacy from the end of WWII to the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries in 1961. Particular attention is devoted to the role of Josip Broz Tito in the development of this segment of Yugoslav foreign policy.

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Југословенски представници у Чехословачкој 1945-1949.

Author(s): Slobodan Selinić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The most important Yugoslav representations in Czechoslovakia after WWII were the Embassy in Prague, Consulate in Bratislava, Military Mission, Commercial Delegation and the Department of the Social Attache. Due to the developed cooperation with Czechoslovakia in all spheres of life (politics, culture, economy, education of Yugoslav apprentices and students), there were several hundred Yugoslav representatives in that country. The most important persons in these missions were ambassadors Darko Čemej and Marijan Stilinović, attache Zdenko Štambuk, social attache Jovan Petrović, coimnercial delegate Ivan Barbalić, consul Ivan Mahulja, chairman of the Investment Commission Milan Bulja and the military delegate Miladin Ivanović. Apart from them a number of delegates of Yugoslav companies and agencies should be mentioned, particularly Milena Spasojević, the delegate of the Main Administration of the Federal Motor Industry and Oldrih Strelecki, the delegate of the Motor Industry Rakovica.

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Дипломатске мисије ФНРЈ у Софији, Букурешту и Тирани 1953-1954: повратак амбасадора, услови рада и инциденти

Author(s): Vladimir Lj. Cvetković / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

After the conflict with the Informbureau in 1948 Yugoslavia’s relations with all countries of „people’s democracy", including the neighboring Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, deteriorated rapidly. The staff of the diplomatic missions in Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana was subject to police surveillance, isolation, coldshouldering in the local ministries and other institutions, as well as to constant incidents in public places. After Stalin’s death, during 1953 and 1954 as Yugoslavia’s normalization of relations with the countries of „people’s democracy" was in its „formal" phase, i.e., in the phase of reestablishing of severed ties in the field of diplomatic relations and communication, the situation of Yugoslav diplomats in Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana was a good indication of Bulgaria’s, Romania’s and Albania’s governments’ true intentions regarding the normalization of relations with Belgrade. Gradual improvement of living and working conditions of members of Yugoslav diplomatic missions in Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana was proportionate to „warming up" of the policies of these countries toward Yugoslavia, but also in correlation with the decisive foreign player - Moscow - and its policy toward Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia the gradual improvement of the situation of its diplomats in these neighboring countries or unexpected incidents were perceived exactly as hints of new - sometimes good, sometimes bad - measures of the official Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana.

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Doprinos Vladimira Velebita jugoslavenskoj diplomaciji

Author(s): Lidija Bencetić / Language(s): Croatian Publication Year: 0

The article analyzes the contribution to the Yugoslav diplomacy of one of the most important Yugoslav diplomats, Dr. Vladimir Velebit. Dr. Velebit spent 18 years in Yugoslav diplomacy, out of that two in partisan diplomacy. He was one of trailblazers and organizers of the diplomacy of the ,,new“ Yugoslavia. He entered diplomacy during WWII in 1943 when he was appointed chief of the mission of the People’s Liberation Movement in Egypt. During the negotiations in Egypt he acquitted himself excellently so he became the pennanent representative of the People’s Liberation Movement with the Western allies. He played one of the key roles during the negotiations with the emigre Yugoslav government in London concerning the formation of the postwar government and the idea of introducing a regency as a transitional government originated with him He was the man in whom Tito had special confidence, the person who broke through the international isolation of the People’s Liberation Movement, Tito’s personal aide acting on his orders. During the first six months of the Tito-Šubašić government he was the sole aide foreign minister. Considering his intimacy with Tito it is likely that Velebit was then the most important person in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more important than the minister Šubašić himself. He took part in resolving the most important Yugoslav postwar matters - the Trieste crisis, negotiations about a loan from the World Bank, negotiations with USA on aid in food and annament, organization of Tito’s visit to Great Britain. He served as ambassador in Rome and in London. The list of his achievements and contributions to the Yugoslav diplomacy would perhaps have been even larger but for two factors: firstly, Velebit wasn’t a high ranking Party official but just an ordinary Party member, and secondly he was accused of being a British spy in the Informbureau resolution. He spent the last 14 years of his career serving on international bodies (secretary of the European Economic Commission of the UN in Geneva, director for planning in the International Labor Organization, he chaired the project of reconciliation between the Jews and the Arabs within the framework of the Carnegie Endowment, he organized a round table on Cyprus in Rome between 18 and 22 November 1973). Velebit was one of the best known Yugoslav diplomats in international circles, respected in the diplomacy of the United Nations and of other international organizations.

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Спољнополитичка делатност Милована Ђиласа 1944-1953.

Author(s): Aleksandar V. Miletić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

In many respects the first ten years of socialist Yugoslavia’s existence were an important, dynamic and decisive period. Yugoslavia was transformed from an ally of the USSR and an enemy of the West into the enemy no. 1 of the USSR and an ally of the West. As a member of the innermost circle of the Yugoslav State and Party leadership Milovan Đilas took active part in all these developments - from meetings and negotiations with Stalin and state delegations to foreign countries to the representative of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and one of the first Yugoslav delegates to the so-called Third World countries.

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Сабори на југословенско-бугарској граници 1956–1958.

Author(s): Vladimir Lj. Cvetković / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The tradition of organizing border gatherings (trade shows) on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border existed in the twenties of the 20th century and represented a form of cross-border cooperation between the two countries. Being rebuilt after the Second World War, it was rapidly re- suspended after the Yugoslav conflict with Stalin and long-term blockade conducted by the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, including Bulgaria. On the initiative of Bulgaria, the tradition was renewed in 1956, but with the clear intentions of Bulgaria to use gatherings for propaganda and political influence on the Yugoslav citizens, which Yugoslavia after the initial disorientations, was trying to parry. Gatherings that were organized on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border in the mid-fifties of the 20th century were a true expression of the Cold War atmosphere and the Cold War mindset. They show how a relatively small and clearly limited geographical area which by definition should be a place of separation, not meeting or connecting, with the presence of a large number of people, became a training ground for ideological competition between the two ideologically and politically opposing parties. Although Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were on the way of full normalization of bilateral relations, at the time when the practice of maintaining gatherings was rebuilt, all the circumstances surrounding the organization of these meetings showed, however, how the normalization was fragile and largely superficial and insincere and how the roots of the conflict (not just ideological, but also many others, inherited from the past) were deep and lasting.

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