Redemptive Family Narratives: Olga Lengyel and the Textuality of the Holocaust

Author(s): Marius Turda / Language(s): English Issue: 8/2016

Memoirs written by Holocaust survivors and (in some cases) their testimonies retain a salience unmatched by other historical sources. This article discusses one such memoir, Olga Lengyel’s Five Chimneys, alongside her 1998 testimony, aiming to engage with broader methodological issues relating to the history of the Holocaust, particularly those about memory, narrative and textuality. Through a detailed discussion of certain moments shaping Olga Lengyel’s personal experience, both pre-and post-arrival in Auschwitz, the article captures the tensions and contradictions characterizing the harrowing story of one woman’s loss of family in the Holocaust.

Everybody Likes History, But What About the Historian?

Author(s): Vangelis Kechriotis / Language(s): English Issue: 04/2015

While some journals elected to print or reprint Vangelis’ academic history articles in commemoration of him, Südosteuropa has decided to arrange for one of the discussions Vangelis led to be translated. The subject was the role of history in the public sphere, and we chose it because on the one hand, Vangelis had placed great importance on the subject of public history in recent years, and on the other hand because it reveals another side of his character as much as of his work, and we felt it worth commemorating. For Vangelis, history was social interaction, a discussion, a process of give-and-take, something, we believe is best illustrated by that subject, in that format. Our special thanks go to Malte Fuhrmann for selecting this particular text and for adding contextual information to the original footnotes that will be useful to an international readership. We are grateful to Ceyda Arslan Kechriotis for her permission to publish the text in this English translation.

Történelmi kiegyezés a XX. század küszöbén; A harmadik évezred történelme

Author(s): Shimon Peres,János Kőbányai / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 4/2016

Átértékelések. Egy fogalom historiográfiai útvesztői a 20. században

Author(s): György Kövér / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 4/2016

In the autumn of 2010, a history conference entitled “Történelmi átértékelés” (Historical Transvaluation) was organized in Székesfehérvár. Timed to coincide with the 125th anniversary of the birth of Bálint Hóman, the symposium aimed at paving the way for the rehabilitation of the historian and politician. The conference title was borrowed from a lecture written by Hóman in 1930, in which keeping his ideological motives hidden in the background he identified two possible reasons for transvaluation: “There are two sorts of reasons that may justify the transvaluation of historical phenomena: either an expansion in the availability of historical sources, an emergence of new data and a new interpretation of the old ones, or the emergence of new points of view in research that arise from the application of new methods of inquiry either unknown to, or ignored by, the historians of the past.” The concept of transvaluation provoked a lively discussion and played a key role in Hungarian historiography on several occasions until the change of the political regime in 1990. The article follows the practice of Hungarian historiography related to the conceptual construct of “transvaluation” throughout the 20th century

Menekülés a hallgatásba… és a szellemtörténetbe. Domanovszky Sándor történeti és történetpolitikai nézeteiről az 1930–1940-es évek fordulóján

Author(s): Vilmos Erős / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 4/2016

The paper discusses Sándor Domanovszky’s historical and historical political views. After briefly summarizing the literature on Domanovszky, the author focuses on two main problems in his treatment of the subject: on the one hand, Domanovszky’s debate with Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga, and his clearance procedure in 1945, in which the so called Tibor Baráth case and the involvement related to the grand prize awarded by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to Gyula Szekfű in 1943 played a decisive part. According to the author’s conclusion, contrary to previous views, it was not positivism but rather a historicism centering on the national problematics as well as intellectual history that primarily influenced Domanovszky’s work in the last period of his life.

Eastern Star káptalan Magyarországon

Author(s): László Vári / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 4/2016

La Bataille de Verdun: un mythe mémoriel contemporain porteur de signification et d’espoir

Author(s): Christophe Midan / Language(s): French Issue: 3-4/2016

The Battle of Verdun, which lasted between February 21st and December 18th, 1916, is emblematic to World War 1, just as the Battle of Sedan is to the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) or the Battle of Stalingrad to World War 2. The study focuses on the unfolding and consequences of the Battle of Verdun and especially on the elements that turned it into a symbol not only for the French, but also for other combatants. The first such element is the impressive number of troops that took part in the battle, numbering over 2.5 million, and for whom the confrontation represented an inferno. Second, for tacticians and doctrinaires alike, Verdun represented the paralysis of manoeuvre, the role of the artillery as the queen of the battle, the supremacy of in-depth preparation of the terrain and the important role of stocks and fluxes of supplies. Third, for the politicians, journalists and opinion leaders from the two belligerent sides, the battle on the river Meuse signifies the affirmation of military and political power. Fourth, at least in what the strategists are concerned, Verdun continues to be an enigma, an open book that is difficult to analyse. Fifth, this time from the point of view of the antimilitarists, the enormous number of casualties (700 000 dead) from both sides represents a terrible illustration of the destructive nature of war. For the supporters of European unity of today, Verdun – with its ossuary that contains the remains of 130 000 soldiers who died in battle – demonstrates the viability of the Franco-German reconciliation in the post-war period, a binomial that laid the foundation of what was to become the European Union. In conclusion, the Battle of Verdun was total and was fought with paroxysm, unleashing all the horrors that war is capable of.

Bătălia de la Verdun. Tenacitate germană, rezistență franceză

Author(s): Petre Otu / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 3-4/2016

The study analyses the preparation, unfolding and consequences of the Battle of Verdun (February 21st – December 18th 1916). The initiative belonged to the German High Command, which, with regards to the year of 1916, changed its strategic priorities. Erich von Falkenhayn considered that, in order to take France out of the war, a severe blow was needed on the Western Front. With this purpose in mind, he chose Verdun for its historical symbolism and value. The German concentration of forces was enormous, but with moderate success, as the French resistance fared much better than expected. The Battle of Verdun went through four major phases. The first, which unfolded between February 21st and March 1st, consisted in a swift and concentrated German offensive, which involved impressive forces, totalling 17 divisions. This massive attack failed and, from March 2nd to April 15th, 1916, there was a generalized offensive on both banks of the River Meuse, which again failed to reach its goals. This was followed by the attrition phase, between April 15th and July 1st. From July 1st until December, in the context of the Battle of Somme, of the Brusilov offensive, of the Italian counteroffensive and of Romania’s entry into the war, the confrontation entered in its last phase, that of recoil and stabilization. To a large extent, it was the Battle of Verdun that prompted Romania to enter the war alongside the Entente. Confronted with the huge pressure at Verdun, France took the initiative to negotiate with Bucharest, something that was, until that moment, left to the Russian Empire, by accepting its requests and persuading it to enter the war.

Bătălia de la Verdun şi intrarea României în Marele Război. Pe marginea unor izvoare

Author(s): Sergiu Iosipescu / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 3-4/2016

L’etude analyse premièrement les adnotations du président de la Republique francaise, Raymond Poincaré dans ses mémoires Au service de la France concernant les négociations de l’Entente avec la Roumanie pour aboutir au traité de 17 août 1916 et à l’entrée du royaume dans la Grande Guerre, dix jours après, dans les conditions de la meurtrière bataille de Verdun et des maigres résultats l’offensive sur la Somme. Avec les mémoires du président français on met également en valeur sa lettre de 5 août 1916 au tsar Nicolas II, – comprise dans les infra-pages des La Russie des Tsars de Maurice Paléologue – pour parachever les négociations avec la Roumanie. Le président Poincaré résume les décisions du Conseil de Défense de la France au lendemain de l’entrée de l’armée roumaine en guerre, ou on trouve la mention, ignoré, d’un accord Briand-Lloyd George pour une aide militaire substantiel russe pour la défense roumaine de Dobroudja. En utilisant aussi les télégrammes envoyées par le Grand Quartier General français au général Sarrail à Salonique, l’auteur prouve que le généralissime Joffre, d’accord avec le général Alexeiev, et d’autant avec le général Sarrail n’ont pas envisagé une offensive contre la Bulgarie, quoique cette offensive était prévue dans la Convention militaire avec la Roumanie de 17 août 1916. Les pertinentes observations du roi des Belges, Albert Ier sur les espérances nourries par les Alliés au momment de l’entrée de l’armée roumaine en lutte, en flagrante contradiction avec le veritable rapport des forces dans le sud-est européen, closent l’étude.

Reflectarea Bătăliei de la Verdun în presa bucureşteană

Author(s): Alexandru Madgearu / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 3-4/2016

The battle of Verdun was reflected in the Romanian newspapers by news coming from the press agencies, but also by their own comments written by editors or by military or civilian collaborators. In this study I utilized articles from „Universul”, „Adevărul”, „Minerva”, and from „Săptămâna războiului”, a weekly supplement of „Adevărul”. The news were usually presented and commented according to the general political direction of the publication („Minerva” was Germanophile, and its biased view increased as the Germans were loosing). The manner in which the information was desired to be receipted by readers is reflected in the composition of the titles and subtitles, and also by the increasing number of articles on the front-page. The comments emphasized the importance of the fulfilling battle for the fate of the war, but also for the issue of the entrance in action of Romania. The most expert were those of general Grigore Crăiniceanu from „Universul”. The news about the resistance of the French army confirmed the expectations of the majority of the public opinion, contributing perhaps to convince some Germanophiles that the Entente has a chance to win.

Imaginea Bătăliei de La Verdun în memorialistica și istoriografia românească

Author(s): Serban Liviu Pavelescu / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 3-4/2016

The battle of Verdun detains a prominent place in the memory and the historiography of the First World War. The present article analyze the manner in which the Romanian historiography analyzes and reflects the impact of the battle on the general course of the World War and on particular evolution of the Romanian front during the campaigns of the years 1916-1917.

Acțiuni de luptă ale batalioanelor de miliții în campania din 1916

Author(s): Lucian Drăghici / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 3-4/2016

The study below analyses a subject that was insufficiently covered by the Romanian historiography, namely the participation of the militias troops to the campaign of 1916. The militias represented a reminiscence of the military organization of the second half of the 19th century. According to the law of 1913, they incorporated the persons deemed able for military service, but with ages between 40 and 45. They were poorly equipped and poorly trained, the same being valid for the officers. At the start of the hostilities, the effectives of the militias totaled 160 000 men. They were organized in battalions and entered the composition of the four Romanian armies. Despite being unprepared for combat, the battalions of militias were used in major operations, such as those from Turtucaia, Câmpulung, Văile Topologului, Olt and Jiu valleys, etc. In most situations, they weren’t very efficient, with the exception of the first battle on Jiu River (October 1916), when their intervention was salutary. The participation of the militias in the confrontations during the fall of 1916 represented a necessity, as the fighting on two fronts required very large effectives. At the same time, their use into combat represented an error, as they were not as efficient as expected.

România şi decizia de a intra în Război în august 1916. Balansare, sub-balansare, aliniere

Author(s): Șerban Filip Cioculescu / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 3-4/2016

The Great War from 1914-1918 has clearly been first a hegemonic war, if one uses the words of Neorealist author Robert Gilpin: the great powers prepared for it and fought it in order to get new spheres of influences and territories, resources, populations, and also to prevent the rival ones to become too strong in the near future. On the other side, small and medium-sized states like Romania prepared for war and entered into it with the aim of receiving those territories and populations inhabited by their ethnic-kin populations and belonging to multinational empires like the Austro-Hungarian and the Tsarist ones. The author asks the question if Romania entered the war after two years of neutrality aiming at balancing against the enemies, against the most threatening state (Russia), or to align with the likely victors, as both the Triple Entente and the Central Powers coalition promised it to offer territories from the defeated enemy empires. But in August 1916 no likely victorious coalition had emerged and Romania finally did chose to ally with the Entente, thus also with Russia, which had been previously seen as the biggest danger for its national security. The collective desire to get the rich and beautiful Transylvania, the Bukovina and the Banat (or at least part of it) prevailed against the fear of Russia (and the alternative scenario of receiving Bessarabia), but the decision was not a bandwagon-like calculus as Russia was not at all superior in military forces, technology and economy to Germany, the leading state of the Central Powers.

Izbucnirea Primului Război Mondial şi neutralitatea Greciei, în lumina relațiilor diplomatice cu Antanta şi Puterile Centrale (iulie 1914 – martie 1915)

Author(s): Daniel Focșa / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 3-4/2016

Once with the outbreak of World War 1, the system of alliances that resulted following the Balkan Wars proved its futility. The Greek-Serbian alliance of 1913 did not compel Greece to enter the war when Serbia was attacked by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in 1914. The Balkan stage became polarized and the desire to maintain neutrality proved to be illusory. In Greece, the pro-Entente political forces, coagulated around the charismatic liberal prime-minister Eleftherios Venizelos, opposed the forces who favoured the Central Powers, represented first and foremost by King Constantine I. The ambassadors to Athens of the states from the two major alliances played an important role, as they exerted their influence on the decision makers of the Greek state: the Crown, the Government, the General Staff, the Parliament, the political parties and, secondary, the public opinion, the Orthodox Church, the press. The present article analyses in detail the first phase of the events, from the start of the war to the operation in the Dardanelles.

Primii ofițeri români la NATO. Anul 1998, anul când au fost selecționați și numiți în funcții la comandamentele NATO (II)

Author(s): Constantin-Dumitru Moisa / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 3-4/2016

After the Madrid Summit in 1997, regarded as a politico-military failure, or at least a semi-failure, if we take into account that at least in the military domain, the three invited countries to join NATO – the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary – did not have achievements well above our country, NATO has initiated the Partnership for Peace Enhanced Programme for Education and Training, has started to developing the Persistent Partner Simulation Network Capability and has begun to implement the concept of Partnership Staff Elements (PSE) Development of a Persistent Partner Simulation Network Capability, as one of the main vehicles necessary to ensure the participation of staff officers from PfP countries to “NATO-led PSO operations with the participation of partners”. Also within this concept, NATO has intended to offer various positions in some of its commands, subject for selection and appointment of partner officers and NCOs, both as an opening of the Alliance and as a method of enhancing military training in the armed forces of these countries. In this context, in the summer of 1997, NATO has sent to Romania a significant and consistent dossier with positions that will be assigned to Romanian staff officers and NCOs. The article highlights some of the unknown details regarding the first Romanian officers selected and appointed in various positions to NATO HQs, national and the Alliances’ efforts and difficulties they have to manage to implement the PSE concept, as well as duties, responsibilities and the activities performed by the first Romanian Staff Officer for Operations and exercises, officer selected and assigned to Commander In Chief Iberian – Atlantic Area. Some of personal thoughts, visions and points of view are also highlighted.

Reuniunea ştiințifică cu tema: „Românii şi bătălia de La Verdun”

Author(s): Cerasela Moldoveanu / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 3-4/2016

Aspecte economice ale pregătirii și ducerii Războiului României

Author(s): Camelia Brîncoveanu,Marin Badea / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 5-6/2016

This presentation tackles a very important issue for any conflict – the economic dimension. Starting from this generally valid principle, the authors analyse the economic policy of the liberal government led by Ion I.C. Brătianu, focusing especially on the years of neutrality. The emphasis is on ensuring the needs of the army, a pressing and thorny problem, as the access to the sources of supply and funding was difficult because of the ongoing war. The belligerents focused especially on covering their own needs, while the loans and transfers of armament and equipment were conditioned on political alignment.

Falkenhayn și traversarea Carpaților în toamna anului 1916. Analiza strategiei germane

Author(s): Manuel Stănescu / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 5-6/2016

In autumn 1916, German-Austro-Hungarian troops triggered one of the most successful campaigns of the Central Powers in WWI. Under the energetic General Erich von Falkenhayn, German 9th Army and the Austro-Hungarian units were able to pass Carpathians, occupy Bucharest and thus occupy three quarters of the country in less than four months. This article analyses the strategic concept behind this campaign, biographies of important military leaders and the organization of the German Army in 1916.

Antanta şi politica forţei faţă de Grecia (octombrie 1915 – decembrie 1916)

Author(s): Daniel Focșa / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 5-6/2016

During the period between the outbreak of the Great War and the forced abdication of King Constantine I of Greece in June 1917, Entente’s constraints towards Greece grew constantly. The Greek neutrality was far from being adhered to, not only by the Germans and the Bulgarians, but especially – and this might seem surprising at first glance – by those powers who called themselves “protectors” and “guarantors”. In the country in which Lord Byron had died a century before, General Maurice Sarrail, admiral Louis Dartige du Fournet, special envoy Charles Jonnart and others imposed their will behind the threat of military force. It all went according to the so-called “snowball” scenario. The number of allied soldiers in Macedonia increased, their positions were reinforced, the requests of war materials multiplied – and so did the requisitions and the political and military pressures. If, in November 1915, the British and French landed in Thessaloniki without being asked to by anyone (in fact, Eleftherios Venizelos did called them, in secret, over King’s word), two years later Greece will be forced to enter the war on their side.

Schimbările majore în diplomația modernă a Chinei: momentul 2012-2015

Author(s): Carola FREY / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 5-6/2016

If one is to understand why Chinese foreign policy has changed in a particular direction, one has to understand first of all how the world seen by China has changed. In addition, it is mandatory to follow the subtle thread of Chinese diplomacy in all movements. Chinese diplomacy can be compared to an elaborate Go game. As Kissinger said: „chess has only two outcomes: draw and checkmate. The objective of the game... is total victory or defeat – and the battle is conducted head-on, in the center of the board. The aim of Go is relative advantage; the game is played all over the board, and the objective is to increase one’s options and reduce those of the adversary. The goal is less victory than persistent strategic progress”.