Joseph Bocheński: Nove lezioni di logica simbolica
Review of: Joseph Bocheński: Nove lezioni di logica simbolica, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna 1995, 141 s.
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Review of: Joseph Bocheński: Nove lezioni di logica simbolica, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna 1995, 141 s.
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The author tries to outline Fregeś semantics for indexical expressions. The task is rather problematic because there seems to be some inconsistency between general principles of Fregeś semantics and requirements posed by him for semantics of indexicals. The main problem arises when we ask which kind of sense ought to be expressed by an indexical expression. Two proposals as possible answers are discussed, one suggested by John Perry, the other by Pavel Tichý. Both proposals are in part right but there are some arguments against their general validity. Then the author sketches another suggestion which preserves the main contributions of the above proposals but nullifies their mistakes.
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Though Frege's second semantical theory is worked out excellently, he did not precisely and explicitly answer the question, which of the two semantical notions he used in his semantics - sense and reference -, could be taken as proper explication of an intuitive notion of meaning. Intuitively, meaning of a word can be connected with an understanding of the word: if we understand the word, we know its meaning. Our problem seems to be accute in connection with present tendency to render words "meaning" and "význam" as proper translations of German word "Bedeutung", used by Frege to refer to named or signed objects (i. e. wordś referent or denotation). Fregeś basic concepts of both periods of developing of his thinking - Inhalt, Sinn and Bedeutung -, having been outlined, the author tries to explicate this intuitive notion of meaning as wordś content, or wordś sense and reference, respectively. This attempt is aimed to give a possible Fregeś answer to the above question. Then the discussion about a few counter-arguments follows and its main profit is in illumination of some less clear aspects of our interpretation of Fregeś conceptual apparatus. In the end the author argues that the word "meaning" as translation of "Bedeutung" does not cohere with Fregeś possible intentions, and defends the words like e. g. "denotation" as much better and clearer translations than the above one.
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The author tries to show that if we indentify properties with their extensions (sets) and accept the assumption that universe of discourse is the same at all world-time couples, we can simplify the Gödel´s ontological proof of the existence of God: the necessary existence of God follows from the first three axioms and Gödel´s definition of God (translated into the language of set theory).
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In the first part of this paper, the author analyzes several unacceptable views of properties of physical objects (particulars) and justifies the familiar explication, according to which properties of physical objects are certain functions defined on the set of all couples w,t, where w is a possible world and t is a moment of time (it is assumed that the universe of discourse is the same at all couples w,t). On the background of the indicated understanding of properties, the author demonstrates that there exist empirical essential properties. An empirical property is understood as a property, the extension of which cannot be identified without applying experience. He distinguishes two kinds of essential properties: (i) purely essential and (ii) partially essential. A purely essential property has the same extension at every world-time couple. The extension of a partially essential properties changes in the logical space, but there exists a non-empty set of objects which is a subset of their extension at every world-time couple. Every partially essential property is empirical. The author pays special attention to the essential properties expressible by means of expressions of the form (λx)(P(x) ∨ Q(x)) where P, Q are non-essential empirical properties that are allied through some objects X1, ..., Xn - i.e., the property (λx)(P(x) ∨ Q(x)) belongs to the objects X1, ..., Xn at every world-time couple. In the last part of the paper, the author demonstrates that every empirical property of the type (λx)(x < I) where ”<” denotes the relation of being a part of, and ”I” stands for any physical object, is purely essential. The assumption that the extensions of these properties are changeable, entails unacceptable consequences.
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The problem of the meaning of a reasonable natural language expression is solved. First, traditional ”denotational” approach is criticized. The meaning of a sentence is not its truth value, similarly the meaning of, eg, ”The president of U.S.A.” is not Bill Clinton, etc. Frege met this problem when analyzing the so called propositional attitudes in which ”denotational” approach has lead to the paradox of analysis. His well-known solution consists in splitting the meaning into sense and reference. But this is rejected in the paper as well, for its radical contextualism. In the first attempt, meaning is defined as an intension — mapping from possible worlds and time points — (empirical expressions) or extension (analytical expressions), respectively. The problem of the propositional attitudes is seemingly solved. The proposition that Morning Star = Evening Star is different than that of Morning Star = Morning Star. But, alas, in the case of analytical expressions we get the paradox of omniscience. A fine-grained solution is, therefore, proposed: the meaning is a closed construction denoted by the respective expression. Yet this solution is still not precise enough. Eventually the meaning is a concept which is the equivalence class of quasi-identical constructions indiscernible from the conceptual point of view. Finally, homonymous, synonymous and (analytically and empirically) equivalent expressions are precisely defined. Concluding we state that only synonymous expressions, having exactly the same meaning, ie. representing one and the same concept, can be mutually substituted in propositional attitudes without lea_ding to paradoxes.
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The aim of the paper is to attack some prejudices against contemporary analytical philosophy spread among Slovak philosophers. The author tries to show that 1. the analytical philosophy is philosophy and not logic or logical analysis of language, that 2. this philosophy is not purely analytical and 3. it is not a system of assertions accepted by all analytical philosophers but rather a philosophical movement unified by the conviction that philosophical problems cannot be put and solved properly without knowledge of language and its logic. In authorś opinion the analytical way of doing philosophy is deeply rooted in the history of philosophy. Contemporary analytical philosophy conspicuously resembles the ancient Greek philosophy in the period of its bloom.
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The paper considers one of the most enigmatic problems of Wittgenstein`s Tractatus - the problem of solipsism. The authorś task is to reveal how the discussion of solipsism illuminates Wittgenstein`s metaphysical view in this treatise. Wittgenstein`s method is considered as one through which the status of what cannot be said is demonstrated. Wittgenstein has not embrased solipsism or idealism in the Tractatus, and neither has he rejected metaphysics as a whole. His attack has been directed against dogmatic philosophy and ethics, against the effort to say what cannot be said in true/false propositions. The discussion of solipsism brings into philosophy the importance of metaphysical "I" as a transcendental limit of the world and language. Wittgenstein`s aim in the Tractatus has been twofold: a) to show the nonsensicality of philosophical, ethical, aesthetical propositions (based on truth function theory), b) to emphasize, that the inexpresibility of the higher (in language) is the most important thing in our lives.
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Všeobecne prijímané učenia, aby získali súhlas, často používajú mytologické motívy. Tak napr. D. Hilbert neváhal nazvať Cantorovu transfínitnú teóriu množín rajom, z ktorého nás už nikto nemôže vyhnať ([9], 170).
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Touto štúdiou sa chcem vyjadriť k niektorým aspektom diskusie o vývine pojmov, ktorá prebiehala medzi V.Cerníkom a J.Viceníkom (ďalej ako ČcrníkViceník) a P.Cmorejom. Pokúsim sa ukázať východiská každej z diskutujúcich strán, ako aj to, že bázou diskusie je vzťah logickej sémantiky k teórii poznania.
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Po J. Viceníkovi [6] na dialóg [5] nadviazal aj D. Kamhal, ktorý v článku [4] s vtipným, ironickosebaironickým titulom Nepresnosti v diskusii o presnosti najprv koriguje niektoré zo svojich výrokov vyslovených v [5] a potom podrobnejšie vysvetľuje svoje názory na presnosť jazykových výrazov, pričom polemizuje s tou časťou môjho druhého vstupu do dialógu, v ktorom som sa zaoberal jeho príspevkom (pozri [5], 64-66).
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The article is diverse on two parts. In the first part, the author refers assumptions of Bohdan Chwedenczuk book, “Przekonania religijne” [Religious Beliefs] that was devoted to justify the thesis according to which religious statements are meaningless. He emphasizes a role of so called Hume Requirement that was postulated as a demarcation line between meaningful and meaningless words in Chwedenczuk argumentation chain. Next he indicates main objections against the Requirement which were considered by Chwedenczuk. The second part of the article is a discussion with critiques that were emerging after publishing of “Przekonania”. Such philosophers as J. J. Jadacki, M. Przełęcki, K. Kondrat, M. Pawliśzyn, W. Wolanczyk and I. Zieminśki formulated a number of arguments against the thesis about meaninglessness of religious statements. Author shows that Jadacki, Przełęcki and Zieminśki presented compelling arguments which cannot be undermine basing on the “Przekonania” text, thus these objections must be included if the Chwedenczuk’ś theory could be considered as justified. Arguments formulated by Kondrat and Wolanczyk are possible to refute and Pawliśzyn’ś critique is pointless.
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Pod „označujúcim zvratom" rozumiem taký zvrat, akým j e ktorýkoľvek z nasledujúcich: nejaký človek,0 niektorý človek, akýkoľvek človek, každý človek, všetci ľudia, súčasný kráľ Anglicka,b súčasný kráľ Francúzska, ťažisko slnečnej sústavy v prvom okamihu dvadsiateho storočia, obeh Zeme okolo Slnka, obeh Slnka okolo Zeme.
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No-free-lunch theorems are important theoretical result in the fields of machine learning and artificial intelligence. Researchers in this fields often claim that the theorems are based on Hume’s argument about induction and represent a formalisation of the argument. This paper argues that this is erroneous but that the theorems correspond to and formalise Goodman’s new riddle of induction. To demonstrate the correspondence among the theorems and Goodman’s argument, a formalisation of the latter in the spirit of the former is sketched.
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One of the important questions discussed by philosophers of technology has to do with the moral significance of artifacts in human life. While many philosophers agree that artifacts do have moral significance attached to them, opinions vary as to how it is to be construed. In this paper we deal with the approach of the influential Dutch philosopher of technology Peter Paul Verbeek. He criticizes traditional ethical theories for assuming that whatever relevancy artifacts have for morality is entirely dependent on human beings, since artifacts are mere passive instruments of human agency. In contrast, he develops a view of moral agency that includes artifacts and that ascribes moral agency to human-technology hybrids rather than to humans as such. The goal of this paper is to elucidate Verbeek’s account of moral agency and evaluate it. We also deal with his views on post phenomenology and mediation underlying this account. Although the general gist of our paper is expository, we point out to several problems for Verbeek’s account.
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Ethics is a philosophical discipline through its tradition and history, through its foundations, its object and its approach. One of the ethical functions is the normative one. Moral rules are prescriptive statements that indicate what is to be done or not in order to make the agent conscious in repeated situations, so that they are judged to be good or bad. The moral agent is the genuine subject of the moral manifestation, a subject acting in a specific way and whose consequences are appreciated as good or bad. The critique of the normative function of ethics, the state of moral norms has been triggered since the beginnings of the Analytical Philosophy. Among the authors of this critique is L. Wittgenstein, whose semantic theories of Philosophy of Language have influenced and generated a distinct discourse on moral norms and on the normativity of ethics. In this paper I shall analyze the following issues: 1. What is meant by the concept of "moral norm"?; 2. The relationship between moral norms and moral agents; 3. Wittgenstein II's Perspective on moral norms.
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The study The Religious Discourse of God (Munich 1981), conducted by Ingolf Ulrich Dalferth, still remains one of the most significant contributions to the linguistic-philosophical reflection of fundamental-theological questions. Dalferth, through a distinction between general linguistic-analytical aspects of „discourse“ and specific „religious“ aspects of discourse (of God), is confronted with the key question regarding the „intelligibility of the discourse of God“. Thus „religiosity“ is not a question of linguistic competence, but rather of a reference to a situation, which may be characterized as „God’s address“ and „man’s answer“. The experience of this „address“ (or „challenge“) creates the foundational situation of faith. In light of the challenge of speaking of „God“, Dalferth takes up the topos of „eschatological verification“ (John Hick). He does not interpret it as a „transitory hereafter“, but as a verification, which is possible only through God. According to Dalferth, the challenge of truth, as maintained by the Christian discourse of God, is philosophicallly possible, justified by witnessed experience of faith, and, in terms of eschatological verification, well-founded.
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The study The Religious Discourse of God (Munich 1981), conducted by Ingolf Ulrich Dalferth, still remains one of the most significant contributions to the linguistic-philosophical reflection of fundamental-theological questions. Dalferth, through a distinction between general linguistic-analytical aspects of „discourse“ and specific „religious“ aspects of discourse (of God), is confronted with the key question regarding the „intelligibility of the discourse of God“. Thus „religiosity“ is not a question of linguistic competence, but rather of a reference to a situation, which may be characterized as „God’s address“ and „man’s answer“. The experience of this „address“ (or „challenge“) creates the foundational situation of faith. In light of the challenge of speaking of „God“, Dalferth takes up the topos of „eschatological verification“ (John Hick). He does not interpret it as a „transitory hereafter“, but as a verification, which is possible only through God. According to Dalferth, the challenge of truth, as maintained by the Christian discourse of God, is philosophicallly possible, justified by witnessed experience of faith, and, in terms of eschatological verification, well-founded.
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Book Review - Willard Van Orman Quine: The Significance of the New Logic Translated and edited by Walter Carnielli, Frederique Janssen-Lauret, and William Pickering Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, xlvii + 168 pages. Reviewed by Ádám Tamas Tuboly.
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When talking on Philosophy of Self, the philosophical vision thought on the subject by centring the essence of the “Self” that is the subject, comes to mind. The expression that philosophy is a reflexive attitude shows us that philosophy is an activity of reflection on itself. Thinking is always to think of something. When thinking about a subject, this sometimes can be a table, sometimes a desk, sometimes a soul or a God, as well as it can be even a thinking of Self. From this point of view, thinking also means to think itself. Namely, it means to think thinking itself or to think on the person who thinks. This is literally Philosophy of Self. Especially German philosophers have created a philosophical tradition on German Idealism and the Philosophy of Self.
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