Foreign Policy and National Security in the Context of Bulgaria`s Accession to the European Union
The text includes the conference proceedings of the event held on 29 June 1995.
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The text includes the conference proceedings of the event held on 29 June 1995.
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Since the end of 1999 Vitosha Research with the Center for the Study of Democracy and Freedom House foundation, has been working on an international project entitled Accountable Government: Self and Public Perception. Activities under this initiative included the conducting of sociological surveys in Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Fieldwork was conducted in the period March 23 - April 15, 2000. The present paper outlines the findings of the surveys conducted in Bulgaria among the general population and MPs from the 38th National Assembly.
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Član 5 Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine regulira instituciju Predsjedništva BiH. Predsjedništvo Bosne i Hercegovine se sastoji od tri člana: jednog Bošnjaka i jednog Hrvata, koji se svaki biraju neposredno sa teritorije Federacije, i jednog Srbina, koji se bira neposredno sa teritorije Republike Srpske. Članovi Predsjedništva biraju se neposredno u svakom entitetu, tako da svaki glasač glasa za popunjavanje jednog mjesta u Predsjedništvu Bosne i Hercegovine. Najupadljivija karakteristika Predsjedništva BiH je da je to institucija sastavljena od tri člana, a ne jedinstvena izvršna funkcija. Tročlano Predsjedništvo, kao i druge državne institucije u BiH, kreirane su tako da se dijeli moć između tri konstitutivna naroda, da ni u jednom državnom organu predstavnik bilo kojeg konstitutivnog naroda nema prevlast. Ovaj dio Ustava izražava etničku dimenziju unutrašnjeg uređenja države Bosne i Hercegovine i gotovo isključivo se bavi postojanjem i djelovanjem tri „konstitutivna naroda“, ili tri etničkovjerske skupine, Bošnjaka, Hrvata i Srba. U tom dijelu „Ostali“ narodi, kao i „građani“, mada se spominju u Preambuli Ustava BiH, praktično su ostali izvan domašaja ustavne regulacije. Dakle, dva su glavna problema današnjih izbora članova Predsjedništva BiH: 1. U Predsjedništvo mogu biti izabrani samo pripadnici konstitutivnih naroda i na taj način se isključuju (diskriminiraju) „Ostali“. Znači, „Ostali“ nemaju pasivno biračko pravo, kao jedno od osnovnih političkih prava građana u savremenim demokracijama. Dok je aktivno biračko pravo opšte, pasivno biračko pravo je ograničeno. 2. Kombinacija teritorijalnih i etničkih propisa isključuje (diskriminira) Bošnjake i Hrvate iz Republike Srpske i Srbe u Federaciji BiH da budu izabrani u Predsjedništvo BiH, ali i da glasaju za člana Predsjedništva svoje etničke grupe, tako da se aktivno i pasivno biračko pravo uskraćuje za oko 45% građana BiH. Takvim pravilom se samo pripadnici određene etničke grupe mogu smatrati potpuno lojalnim građanima entiteta, koji mogu braniti njegove interese. Prema tome, postoji diskriminacija u oba entiteta sva tri konstitutivna naroda: Bošnjaka, Srba i Hrvata, kao i nacionalnih manjina, a posebno se diskriminiraju građani Bosne i Hercegovine, jer nemaju ista politička prava u izbornom procesu na cijeloj teritoriji BiH. Slijedi da je ugrožen princip jednakosti građana u pogledu pristupa najvažnijim državnim funkcijama. Na osnovu toga se može zaključiti da izbori za Predsjedništvo BiH nisu u potpunosti slobodni izbori i da ograničavaju aktivno i pasivno biračko pravo, kao i neke od osnovnih principa demokratskih izbora, jednake mogućnosti i puno učešće građana u političkim procesima. Presudom Evropskog suda za ljudska prava u predmetu Sejdić i Finci protiv Bosne i Hercegovine, sistem izbora članova Predsjedništva BiH i Doma naroda Parlamentarne skupštine BiH proglašen je diskriminirajućim u odnosu na „Ostale“. Problem diskriminacije Srba u Federaciji i Bošnjaka i Hrvata u Republici Srpskoj nije odlučen u pomenutoj presudi. Iako u Katalogu ljudskih prava koja sadrži Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine nije izričito nominirana lista političkih prava, s obzirom na međunarodne standarde koji su sadržani u Ustavu, može se zaključiti da su garancijama političkih prava obuhvaćena prvenstveno: prava koja uključuju slobodu mišljenja, savjesti i vjere; slobodu izražavanja i štampe; aktivno i pasivno biračko pravo, kao i pravo na demokratske izbore; zabrana diskriminacije u skladu sa članom 2 (4) Ustava BiH. To znači da građani pod uvjetima opće jednakosti i bez diskriminacije po bilo kojem osnovu, imaju pravo da biraju i da budu birani, te da bez ikakve diskriminacije upravljaju javnim poslovima i da im bude, pod jednakim uslovima, dostupno vršenje javne službe. Iako bi se iz ovoga moglo zaključiti da izborno pravo, kao i druga politička prava, pripadaju građanima u Bosni i Hercegovini na cijelom njenom teritoriju i bez bilo kakve diskriminacije, ipak postoji nesklad i kolizija ovih ustavnih odredbi u odnosu na ustavne norme koje uređuju pitanja izbora, između ostalog, i Predsjedništva BiH.
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Usljed uočenih nedostataka, nedosljednosti i relativno niskog sveukupnog kvaliteta usvojenih propisa na svim nivoima vlasti u BiH, Parlamentarna skupština BiH, kao najviši zakonodavni organ vlasti BiH, usvojila je u martu 2004. godine Zaključak o potrebi unapređenja stanja u oblasti izrade propisa u institucijama BiH, unificiranjem i modernizacijom metoda i tehnika njihove izrade, s ciljem što efikasnijeg ispunjavanja uslova i obaveza vezanih za pristupanje BiH Evropskoj uniji, kao i obaveza koje su preuzete drugim međunarodnim dokumentima. Također, temeljem spomenutog Zaključka, Parlamentarna skupština BiH je u januaru 2005. godine usvojila “Jedinstvena pravila za izradu propisa u institucijama Bosne i Hercegovine” (“Službeni glasnik BiH”, broj 11/05) koja, po uzoru na slična rješenja u zemljama Evropske unije i regiona, uvodi u proces izrade propisa niz inovativnih, lex artis, metoda i tehnika, do sada relativno malo poznatih u normativnoj praksi i tradiciji u BiH, poput obaveze izrade teza (dokumenta o javnoj politici, prije pristupanja izradi teksta propisa), procjeni troškova i koristi (tzv. ex ante analiza mogućih učinaka). Po modelu “Jedinstvenih pravila za izradu propisa u BiH”, Vlade RS-a i Brčko Distrikta BiH su usvojile gotovo identična pravila, dok je Vlada FBiH usvojila Uredbu o načinu pripreme, procjeni utjecaja i odabiru politike u postupku izrade akata, koje predlažu i donose Vlada FBiH i federalna ministarstva (“Službene novine FBiH”, broj 35/11). Ipak, kako to pokazuju izvještaji relevantnih međunarodnih organizacija poput SIGMA-e, ali i sami izvještaji Ureda koordinatora za reformu javne uprave u BiH o stepenu realizacije Akcionog plana Strategije reforme javne uprave u BiH, a što potvrđuje i ova analiza, u praksi je i dalje uočljiv izuzetno nizak kvalitet primjene odredbi Jedinstvenih pravila, koja se odnose na pitanja izrade javnih politika i ex ante procjene utjecaja. Institucije sektora pravde u BiH dijele gotovo identičnu sudbinu ostalih institucija u BiH po pitanju krajnje ograničenih kapaciteta i vještina za razvoj javnih politika, uključujući procjenu utjecaja javnih politika i propisa, koja se neminovno odrazila na efikasnost i učinkovitost pri realizaciji Akcionog plana Strategije reforme sektora pravde u BiH (AP SRSP), i čija izgradnja tek predstoji. Iz tog razloga, fokus institucija sektora pravde u BiH u narednom periodu, pored intenziviranja aktivnosti izgradnje kapaciteta i vještina za strateško planiranje, treba usmjeriti i na izgradnju kapaciteta i vještina za razvoj javnih politika i procjenu utjecaja. Smisao postojanja ljudskog kapaciteta sa specifičnim znanjima i sposobnostima za analitički pristup u kreiranju javnih politika, bio bi prelazak sa zastarjelog koncepta kreiranja zakona (kreiranje zakona na način prepisivanja i pozivanja na već postojeće zakone i propise, bez urađene detaljne analize problema) na znatno moderniji koncept, utemeljen na inovativnosti službenika i novim idejama za prevazilaženje određenog problema. Te ideje se mogu zasnivati na dobrim praksama iz zemalja u okruženju, članicama Evropske unije, ali mogu biti i sasvim nove ideje, koje nisu nigdje do sada primjenjene, ali bi bile u kontekstu rješavanja tog problema detaljno testirane na situaciju u Bosni i Hercegovini, od uzroka problema, do predviđanja svih posljedica tj. pozitivnih i negativnih efekata. S tim u vezi, a sukladno zahtjevima Strategije reforme javne uprave u BiH, potrebno je da Ministarstvo pravde BiH, Federalno ministarstvo pravde, Ministarstvo pravde RS-a, kantonalna ministarstva pravde I Pravosudna komisija Brčko Distrikta BiH, izvrše analizu postojećih organizacionih i kadrovskih kapaciteta za vršenje poslova razvoja javnih politika, te na osnovu takve analize, osiguraju uspostavu najprikladnije organizacione strukture za kvalitetno vršenje ove funkcije (ovisno od obima posla i raspoloživih kadrova za obavljanje navedenih funkcija). Također, na osnovu izvršene analize, potrebno je da svako od pomenutih ministarstava izmjeni/dopuni svoj pravilnik o unutrašnjoj organizaciji i sistematizaciji poslova kako bi uspostavili odgovarajuću unutrašnju organizacijsku strukturu ili pojedinačna radna mjesta za vršenje ove funkcije, uz utvrđivanje odgovarajućih opisa poslova. Imajući u vidu sve veća budžetska ograničenja u smislu nemogućnosti upošljavanja novih državnih službenika, i s ciljem izbjegavanja mogućeg dodatnog “gomilanja” administracije, preporučuje se da se popunjavanje ovih pozicija, prije svega, pokuša izvršiti internim premještajima i/ili izmjenama i dopunama opisa poslova postojećih državnih službenika, koji već djelimično obavljaju ove poslove u sklopu (uporedo) sa svojim redovnim radnim zadacima. U slučajevima kada provedene analize argumentovano ukažu na nemogućnost primjene ovog rješenja, ministarstva bi trebala pokrenuti inicijativu za upošljavanjem novih službenika. Paralelno s ovim aktivnostima trebala bi se pripremiti i metodologija razvoja javnih politika i procjene utjecaja politika i propisa. U cilju koherentnosti rješenja na nivou sektora pravde, optimalno rješenje bi predstavljala jedinstvena metodologija, koja bi se zatim internim aktom (npr. pravilnikom) mogla transponirati u okviru svake institucije sektora pravde, dok bi kao model pri izradi ove metodologije mogla poslužiti Uredba Vlade Federacije o načinu pripreme, procjeni utjecaja i odabiru politike u postupku izrade akata koje predlažu i donose Vlada FBiH i federalna ministarstva (“Službene novine FBiH”, broj 35/11). Također, s obzirom na složenost procesa razvoja javnih politika i procjene utjecaja, preporučljivo je da uz metodologiju bude izrađen i odgovarajući priručnik, kao i da se imenovanim službenicima ministarstava pravde osigura dodatna specijalistička obuka i mentorska potpora, s ciljem izgradnje i produbljivanja njihovih tehničkih znanja i vještina neophodnih za vršenje ovih poslova. Iz svega navedenog, evidentno je da institucije sektora pravde u BiH neće biti u mogućnosti same provesti sve predložene aktivnosti, pa se čini opravdanim da im se, u tom smislu, osigura odgovarajuća tehnička potpora od strane bilateralnih ili multilateralnih donatora aktivnih u sektoru pravde u BiH. Kako djelovanje u području javnih politika podrazumijeva širi aspekt djelovanja od samog kreiranja javne politike, mora se imati na umu da je neophodno da se pored kreatora javnih politika u procesu osigura i sudjelovanje drugih segmenata društva, kao što su predstavnici akademske zajednice, praktičari i predstavnici civilnog društva u BiH. Imajući u vidu da se sve javne politike moraju zasnivati na relevantnim činjenicama i analizama, budući kreatori politika moraju imaju razumijevanja o vrijednostima podataka i resursa, koji su im na raspolaganju, te je neophodno da se kroz uspostavu odnosa suradnje između svih spomenutih aktera, osigura razmjena podataka i naučnih istraživanja. Na kraju,posebno naglašavamo potrebu da se na razini sektora treba napraviti opis poslova i profila ljudi, koji treba da rade na poslovima razvoja javnih politika i ex ante i ex post procjene utjecaja.
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Since November 2013, when the uprising of the Ukrainian nation set in motion a wide spectrum of events and political process, researchers and policy makers have been questioning the reasoning, consequences, and international implications of those political processes, as well as their impact on the future of the international political environment. This study, Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values: Russia`s Manipulative Techniques, is not one of the many investigations published in recent months focusing on Russian information warfare in Ukraine. It is not a study about them. This is a study about us, namely, the ‘transatlantic community’—a community we consider to be based on democratic values. This study seeks to answer an essential question: how can it be that countries, which enjoy leading positions in terms of prosperity, freedom, solidarity, innovation, economic competitiveness, and seemingly unlimited normative power based on the long-standing democratic traditions have neglected or ignored (intentionally and unintentionally) the manipulative redefinition of their core democratic values. By allowing our core democratic values to be deconstructed and reconstituted by values derived from an authoritarian regime makes Western society vulnerable to influence. Russia’s international ambitions are not based on conquering new territories, but on creating mental landscapes susceptible to political manipulation. Russia’s foreign policy goals with regard to the West are clear: ‘to weaken the West economically, to split it politically, and to establish Russia as the hegemonic power on the European continent’1 . Extensive material resources are unnecessary; individuals and societies that question themselves are decisive ‘weapons’ in the battle for influence. Transitioning out of the international relationships that dominated during the Cold War was an eye- and mind-opening exercise for both governments and societies. Most of the countries that left the Soviet bloc, including the Baltic States, joined those that are based on democratic values; however some keep their old values, fashionably redressed in a style called ‘sovereign democracy’.
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Dodatak trećem alternativnom izvještaju je nastao kao rezultat zajedničkih napora grupe aktivistkinja i aktivista iz nevladinih organizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini sa dugogodišnjim iskustvom u direktnom radu sa ženama čija su prava ugrožena ili direktno povrijeđena, kao i aktivnostima zalaganja za usvajanje rodno osjetljivih i odgovornih zakona i javnih politika u oblasti zaštite ženskih ljudskih prava i ravnopravnosti polova.
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Hamas, an Islamist militant group and the de facto governing authority of the Gaza Strip, has been using human shields in conflicts with Israel since 2007. According to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the war crime of using human shields encompasses “utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas, or military forces immune from military operations.” Hamas has launched rockets, positioned military-related infrastructure-hubs and routes, and engaged the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from, or in proximity to, residential and commercial areas. The strategic logic of human shields has two components. It is based on an awareness of Israel’s desire to minimise collateral damage, and of Western public opinion’s sensitivity towards civilian casualties. If the IDF uses lethal force and causes an increase in civilian casualties, Hamas can utilise that as a lawfare tool: it can accuse Israel of committing war crimes, which could result in the imposition of a wide array of sanctions. Alternatively, if the IDF limits its use of military force in Gaza to avoid collateral damage, Hamas will be less susceptible to Israeli attacks, and thereby able to protect its assets while continuing to fight. Moreover, despite the Israeli public’s high level of support for the Israeli political and military leadership during operations, civilian casualties are one of the friction points between Israeli left-wing and right-wing supporters, with the former questioning the outcomes of the operation.
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Participation of politically engaged women in political processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a subject of discussion in the public sphere of Bosnia and Herzegovina for many years. This issue is most frequently addressed by civil society representatives, both men and women, relevant institutions and individual female defenders of women’s human rights. The current situation regarding representation of women in politics is not satisfactory. Yet, it is quite rarely in focus of discussions among representatives of political parties who are held responsible, informally and formally, for the lack of women’s participation in government.
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My journey of business peacemaking began in 1973. At that time, we had a private company despite never being members of the Communist Party. During that era, lacking party endorsement meant nearly all the doors were closed, and business opportunities were exclusively granted to companies whose leaders held party membership. Consequently, our generations-old clergy family found itself destined for failure, left with no option but to survive and prosper. My father served as a peacemaker, reconciler, a mediator among feuding families in Kosovo - a role that extends through my grandfather and ancestors. As a family of priests, we were always there for all neighbors and fellow citizens grappling with problems, such as, for example, blood feuds. In such situations, both Serbs and Albanians would always reach out to us. My ancestors consistently played a role in mediation and reconciliation, passing down this gift to me. Thus, by respecting and cherishing my family and continuing its traditions, I am committed to actively fostering reconciliation among Serbian families in Kosovo, Albanian families in Kosovo, and, most challenging of all, reconciliation between Serbian and Albanian families. I believe that the ability for successful mediation is a gift from God, inherited from my family.
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Crime in Kosovo has its roots in the period of Kosovo’s government-in-exile. The epicenter of crime includes the former commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK-OVK) and (para)intelligence services (ShIK), who acted in cooperation with political structures. Although the ShIK was officially dissolved in 2008 for the purposes of establishment of the official Kosovo Intelligence Agency, it still operates unofficially. There are strong connections between the current official and unofficial opposition political leaders and the enormous amounts of money, which has been collected through various funds. The Vendlindja thrret (Homeland Calling) fund was used to collect money in Europe and is controlled by the leaders of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). The Kosovo People’s Movement Levizja Popullore e Kosoves was established in 1997-98 and it collected money from the diaspora. In 1999 the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) was established from it. In 1991, the 3% Fund was created under the control of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Dubious activities are affiliated with the closest family members of former Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi (PDK). In fact, a member of his family had a special role in the Kosovo Insurance Bureau (BKS) and controlled the overall financial system through the Central Bank of Kosovo (BQK). Kurti’s government abolished the popularly called “Thaci’s tax.”
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The early parliamentary elections, scheduled to take place on 11 June 2023, will be the twelfth parliamentary elections since the introduction of a multi-party system and the sixth since Montenegro gained its independence. There are around 542 thousand eligible voters registered in the central electoral roll. Montenegro has a proportional electoral system in which the entire country constitutes one electoral unit. At the elections a total of 81 representatives will be elected to the Montenegro’s Parliament. The election threshold is 3%.
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In the Republic of Bulgaria early parliamentary elections will be held on 2 April 2023. At the elections 240 representatives/deputies of the Bulgarian National Assembly will be elected according to the proportional closed-list system. There is a total of 31 electoral constituencies from which, depending on the size of the constituency from 4 to 16 representatives/deputies will be elected. The election threshold is 4%. These are the fifth elections in the past two years, as it was not possible to establish a government on the basis of the results of the previous elections.
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Turkish officials, headed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, assure the public that there will be no early elections and that the elections will be organized as planned in June 2023. Furthermore, the Turkish Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdağ stated on 19 August 2022 that the presidential and parliamentary elections will be held as envisaged by the Turkish Constitution, that is on 18 June 2023. In Türkiye, there are suspicions that Erdoğan could surprise the opposition and call early general and presidential elections.
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The ninth general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina will take place on 2 October 2022. At the elections, members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, representatives in the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, representatives in the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, President of the Republika Srpska, two vice-presidents of Republika Srpska, representatives in the Republika Srpska National Assembly (NSRS), and representative in the assemblies of 10 cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be elected.
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In the Republic of Serbia, regular presidential, extraordinary parliamentarian and regular local elections for the capital of Belgrade and 12 municipalities are scheduled to take place on 3 April 2022. At the parliamentary elections, 250 representatives will be elected for the Republic of Serbia National Assembly using the system of proportional-representation. There are 6,501,689 registered voters who will be able to vote at 8,255 polling stations.
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Parliamentary elections in Montenegro are scheduled to take place on 30 August 2020. The electoral roll contains the names of 541,232 eligible voters. The ballots include 12 election lists (six coalitions and six parties). Montenegro has a proportional system in which the entire country is one electoral unit. At the elections the voters shall elect 81 representatives in the Montenegrin Parliament. The election threshold is 3%. Simultaneously with parliamentary elections, local elections will be held in the Kotor, Budva, Andrijevica and Gusinje municipalities.
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In the Republic of Belarus, presidential elections are to take place on 9 August 2020. The elections will take place in a rather tense atmosphere. The developments in Belarus over the past years are a consequence of not just internal political relations in the country, but also significant foreign influence, which has been particularly prominent in the election year. Although the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko is in the focus of current happenings, they are a result of much deeper and more complex developments than it may seem at a first glance. Particularly if one is looking at the developments in the country through the prism of relations between President Lukashenko and the opposition and the opposition presidential candidates.
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The celebration of the National Day of the Kingdom of Morocco marks the date of the accession of His Majesty King Mohammed VI on 30 th July 1999 to the throne of the Alaouite Monarchy. It is a celebration anchored in the common history of the people and the Kings of Morocco, and which represents a solemn occasion to renew the links of unwavering loyalty of the Moroccan people to the Alaouite dynasty. Morocco celebrates this year, the 21 years of the reign of his Majesty King Mohamed VI, highlighted by an ongoing process, under His leadership and guidance, of continuous reforms and restructuring of Morocco’s political, economic and social fields, for ensuring the prosperity and welfare of Moroccan citizens.
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The early parliamentary elections in the Republic of North Macedonia will be held on 15 July 2020. Based on the system of proportionality, a little less than 1.8 million voters will have the right to vote for the Macedonian parliament (Sobranie), which has 120 seats. The leading parties at the upcoming elections will be the SDSM (the ruling social-democrat party), VMRO-DPMNE (conservative opposition), the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI – ethnic Albanian party in the ruling coalition), the Alliance for Albanians (ASH – ethnic Albanian opposition party), and political parties of ethnic minorities such as Turks, Roma, Bosniaks, Serbs and others, which are traditionally represented in the Macedonian parliament.
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On the occasion of the 10th (early) parliamentary elections in the Republic of Croatia, since its declaration of independence, which are scheduled to take place on 5 July 2020, the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) prepared an analysis of the pre-election developments. The last regular parliamentary elections were held on 8 November 2016. Representatives in the Croatian Parliament are elected directly, by secret ballot and application of the proportional system according to which each party or candidate, get a number of parliamentary mandates that is proportionate to the number of votes won. The election threshold is 5%. A total of 140 members of the Parliament will be elected from the territory of the Republic of Croatia, which is divided into 10 geographical electoral districts, which means that 14 representatives are elected from each electoral district. These are the third parliamentary elections at which the preferential voting can be applied. So far, little has been done on promotion of preferential voting.
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