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This lexicon offers a deeper understanding of global processes and the forces of globalization. It also includes a database of resources on globalization research, as well as a brief dictionary. Contributions by Fred W. Riggs and Henry Teune.
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“The subject of my interest in this book are the ideological and political functions of memories of the Battle of Kosovo, from the first stories about them to the present day. I have displayed the documents that make up the examples of animating this story, and I have also organized them according to geopolitical criteria. I have divided the oldest documents on this theme into three groups: first, the documents of the Serbian church about Kosovo, then Ottoman, Byzantine, Italian and Western European documents, as well as documents from Dubrovnik. I have grouped the documents related to Kosovo from the 19th and 20th centuries according to the same principle, with unique presentations of Serbian, Montenegrin, Croatian, Slovenian, Bosnian, Yugoslav and Albanian examples. The panorama that is produced of political references to the Battle of Kosovo and the ideological messages contained in these stories demonstrate for how long, and with what intensity, the memory of Kosovo is present in the history of several Balkan nations and states, when and why it has operated in the function of their rapproachment and unity, and when and why it has served for their division and for the encouragement of mutual hatred and conflict (…)The Kosovo myth first appears in its fully developed form in the 19th century, when old stories about the Battle of Kosovo are revised and expanded in order to put into the service of the principal political-religious cult of the time, the cult of the nation, which will be the object of evocation of Kosovo in the 20th century and the first decades of the 21st century. That means that the examples of the Kosovo narrative from before the 19th century, that is before the appearance of nationalism, are different from the later ones and belong to the prehistory of the Kosovo myth. But since I have not been able to identify with precision the moment when that prehistory ends and history begins – just as historians of nationalism are not certain when it begins – I have not divided this book into two parts, prehistorical and historical, but have rather left it to the readers to use the examples I have analysed to follow the process of constituting nationalistic mythic narratives about Kosovo on the first half of the 19th century and their reactivation and political use after that.” (from the Introduction)
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This book can, I hope, be read as a story. The plot develops during the first decades of the nineteenth century, when schiolars began to take interest in the Montenegrin oral tradition and when the first transcriptions and anthologies appeared. The story has its heroes: a bishop, Petar Petrović Njegoš, who was also the ruler and creator of Montenegrin statehood; a professional gusle singer, Đura Milutinović, who was also literate, educated, with a great respect for books and education, a fiery nationalist close to Serbian and Montenegrin political leaders; and of course Vuk Karadžić, the central figure in establishing the oral tradition as the foundation of national culture, and in many respects the central figure of Serbian culture in general.Thanks to the by now classic work of Smith, Gellner and Hobsbawm, we are familiar with the decisive role of cultural and political elites in „the invention of tradition“ and the genesis of national-romantic ideas and movements in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century, and the significance of folk epics in this process amoing the South Slavs has long been noted. Although we are all familiar with the results, in this case the establishment of the Montenegrin and Herzegovinian epic as a national tradition, it seemed to me that the whole story, involving the growth and establishment of a new paradigm and its connection to the oral tradition, had not been told. In that context I recalled Sartre’s observation that Foucault wonderfully demonstrates that paradigms change, but tells us nothing about how they change and who are its agents (Sartre 1966: 87). Oral poetry may not offer the most gratifying grounds for such analysis because it is, in contrast with written text, a fluid, collective creation which is, from a methodological point of view, lacking in authors, beginnings, history. But that does not mean that the oral tradition is immune to change or influence from written culture and „politically influential figures,“ as we would now call them. This book represents an effort to identify those changes and influences through the example of a Montenegrin epic published in one of Karadžić’s anthologies.Some readers will, I hope, find the theoretical and methodological framework used in this research and its conclusions persuasive. Others might observe that neither I nor my predecessors in this field, after all, have indisputable evidence that Bishop Petar I or Đura Milutinović personally introduced new poems or rewrote old ones, and in that way reconfigured the oral tradition. Those readers might approach this book as a work comprised of an assortment of documentary and scientific facts in which concrete personages are not necessary, and possibly represent the fruit of the author’s romantic imagination. Maybe other readers, who remain committed to positivistic convictions on scientific rigour reliability, if such readers still exist, might save some time and effort and choose something else to read.***This book is based on the text of the doctoral dissertation, titled “From Traditional to Transitional Texts: Montenegrin Oral Tradition and Vuk Karadžić’s Narodne srpske pjesme,” which I defended at the University of Nottingham in 2012. In the preparation of the thesis I received great help from my supervisors David Norris and Vladimir Zorić, and also from the examiners Vladislava Ribnikar and Zoran Milutinović. My debt to Vladimir Zorić is especially great. He was my amicus certus, my source of support in the long process of applying for admission, seeking fellowships, writing the thesis and all of the challenges that involves. I also owe great thanks to my friends and colleagues (now scattered around the world), Stijn Vervaet, Alexander Dunst, Ivana Đurić, Stefanie Petschick, Adity Singh and Teodora Todorova for their perceptive comments and suggestions, and also for their help in confronting the linguistic, theoretical and existential dilemmas faced during my stay in England. My long friendship with Saša Ćirić has also left its traces in this book. But above all I owe thanks to Jelena, Ksenija and Ljiljana for the support they offer me in life, and Sofija, who brought into it a pleasure greater than any books or research.A.P., July 2014
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Muharem Bazdulj was born 1977 in Travnik, where he completed his high school education. He graduated from Sarajevo University with a major in English (English and American literature). He regularly writes cultural and general interest articles for the Sarajevo weekly ”Dani” (Days) and for the Belgrade weekly ”Vreme” (Time), and occasionally for the Zagreb-based “Zarez” (Comma), the web site http://www.pescanik.net, Skopje-based “Forum” and for other publications within the space of former Yugoslavia. He has published nine books of prose fiction, poetry, and essays. The most recent of them, a collection of short stories, entitled “Magic” was published in 2008 by the publishing house Gradac from Čačak (Serbia). His books have been translated into English, German, and Polish. He is an editor at the Zagreb-based magazine for culture ”Tvrđa” (Fortress) as well as at the Sarajevo daily newspaper ”Oslobođenje”(Liberation). Filigree Pavements consist of fifty articles published in Bazdulj’s column of the same title in the Sarajevo weekly ”Dani” (Days).
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The slackening pace of important economic reforms, as well as the stimulus measures taken in response to the 2008 crisis to boost investments, have all led to a huge build-up of debt and created imbalances in the Chinese economy, including in the financial markets and the industrial sector. The new generation of Chinese leadership has previously shown a strong ambition to overcome the status quo and resume reforms, setting out a new economic reform agenda in 2013. // Vested interests, which grew out of state owned enterprises and the bureaucracy, have been regarded as the main line of resistance to further reforms. President Xi Jinping has centralised the decision-making over economic reform by expanding the structures of the Communist Party of China. The new tools for implementing reform turned out to be marred by several defects, which contributed to further stagnation of key reforms. Moreover, the slowing down of China’s economic growth has sparked a debate among the country’s top decision makers on the ultimate shape of economic policy, and the pace of subsequent reforms.
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Contact network building and political lobbying, development co-operation programmes and foreign cultural and science policy are vital for supporting the German economy – which relies heavily on exports – and for the country’s ambition to gain the status of a European centre of technology and innovation, and to have a stronger influence on the EU’s external activity.
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Ukraine is deeply divided internally, although as a result of the changes that have taken place since its independence, the country’s internal divisions now have less and less to do with territorial divides, and the split into historical ‘sub-Ukraines’ has become less pronounced, especially for the younger generation. Ukraine is not a country of two competing regional identities, one in the west, the other in the east. The western identity, in which the unity of Ukraine is a key value, coexists with the multiple and diverse local patriotisms of the different regions in the east and the south of the country. The present protest movement has consolidated the country’s sense of unity. Its opponents have also been championing the indivisibility of Ukraine, even while they demanded a thorough decentralisation of the country, which was often mistaken for separatism. Russia has been stirring up separatist tendencies in Ukraine, but with little success. Crimea is an exception here, because in most respects it has remained unaffected by the dynamics of the social processes transforming mainland Ukraine – separatist tendencies are indeed deeply rooted in the peninsula.
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Most participants in the Russian public debate seem to agree in their evaluation of the present condition of Russian-Chinese relations. There is awareness of increasing inequality between these two powers and Russia’s weakening position as compared to China.Those who share the optimistic view see co-operation with China as an opportunity for the Russian economy and a key element of Russia’s multi-directional foreign policy, an opportunity for Russia to avoid unilateral dependence on the West. The pessimists view the deepening co-operation with China through the prism of threats resulting from the increasing imbalance in bilateral relations. The greatest source of concern is the model of economic relations, which is often referred to as neo-colonial, where Russia’s role is reduced to that of a supplier of raw materials to China. The possible consequences are evaluated in different ways, ranging from the political subordination of Russian interests the Chinese ones to real loss of control over the Russian Far East. Those who share such views believe that Moscow should slow down its rapprochement with China and search for other partners in Eastern Asia, relations with whom could counterbalance the Chinese influence.
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Despite the conflicts and frictions in their bilateral relations, Russia has for years regularly invested in Belarus. Moscow’s support has become an important factor allowing the Belarusian economic model to continue, which in turn helps maintain the stability of the Belarusian political system. Russia's continued readiness to offer assistance to its neighbour reflects the importance Moscow attaches to Belarus.Belarus also features prominently in Moscow’s current policy objectives – especially with regard to the expansion of the Customs Union. The implementation of this project is seen as crucial in Russia, particularly in relation to Ukraine. For this reason, since 2011 we have been witnessing a rise in Russian aid for Belarus. In 2012, the support intensified and moved beyond purely financial help to include political assistance also. // Russia’s support, however, has come at a price. Moscow’s long-term goal is to establish control over the Belarusian economy, which would also, in effect, allow the Kremlin to influence the way other areas of the Belarusian state are governed. As Minsk’s dependence on Russian support deepens, Alexander Lukashenko will ultimately have no choice but to gradually accede to Russia’s demands.
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Despite a rise in anti-EU rhetoric and a growing assertiveness in Ankara’s relations with Brussels, Turkey will continue to seek closer integration with the European Union in the coming years. The current stalemate in the accession process has been a source of irritation to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government. Nonetheless, a complete collapse of accession talks would be a much worse scenario for the ruling AKP party. Currently, the government is primarily interested in keeping the negotiation process alive, rather than hoping to gain full membership any time soon. // Erdoğan’s government will likely seek to continue the accession talks because the AKP is acutely aware of their importance for the country’s domestic politics, for its the economy, and – although to a lesser extent – for Turkey’s international standing. The opportunity to capitalise on this process will encourage the Turkish government to avoid crises in its relations with the EU, or to at least mitigate the impact of any potential diplomatic fallouts.
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Turcja, mimo coraz częstszego stosowania nieprzyjaznej wobec Unii Europejskiej retoryki i coraz wyraźniejszej asertywności w relacjach z Brukselą, w perspektywie najbliższych lat będzie się opowiadała za kontynuacją procesu integracji z UE. Impas w procesie akcesyjnym jest dla rządu Recepa Tayyipa Erdoğana powodem głębokiej irytacji. Niemniej dla rządzącej partii AKP znacznie mniej korzystnym scenariuszem byłoby ewentualne zerwanie rozmów akcesyjnych. Władze liczą przede wszystkim na podtrzymanie procesu negocjacyjnego, a nie na pełne członkostwo. // Za działaniami rządu Erdoğana na rzecz utrzymania procesu akcesyjnego przemawiać będzie świadomość, że ma on dla AKP ważne znaczenie w polityce wewnętrznej i gospodarczej, a także – choć w znacznie mniejszym stopniu – w polityce zagranicznej. Przydatność procesu integracji do celów polityki wewnętrznej będzie skłaniała władze Turcji, by unikać kryzysów w relacjach z UE, a jeśli się pojawią, łagodzić je.
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W ostatnich latach Turcja szybko przemienia się z sojusznika Zachodu w coraz bardziej problematycznego partnera. Dla tureckich władz sojusz z Unią Europejską oraz w ramach NATO nie ma już charakteru wspólnoty wartości, ale traktowanej wybiórczo, chwiejnej wspólnoty interesów. Pogłębia się też polityczna alienacja Turcji na Bliskim Wschodzie. W następstwie arabskiej wiosny i procesów przez nią uruchomionych Ankara utraciła wpływy, które w poprzednich latach intensywnie budowała w tym regionie. // Narastające osamotnienie Turcji na arenie międzynarodowej wynika z coraz pełniejszego podporządkowywania tureckiej polityki zagranicznej ideologii partii rządzącej, AKP. Wizja świata oferowana przez tę ideologię rozmija się z diagnozami partnerów, a cele, jakie stawia tureckiej polityce zagranicznej, są sprzeczne z ich oczekiwaniami. Dodatkowo oparcie polityki zagranicznej na ideologii odbiera jej elastyczność i dopasowywanie do bieżącej dynamiki międzynarodowej.
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Aktywność polityczna i rosnąca niezależność przywódcy Czeczenii Ramzana Kadyrowa rodzą pytania o jego lojalność oraz możliwość otwartego wypowiedzenia posłuszeństwa Moskwie. Taki scenariusz wydaje się mało prawdopodobny ze względu na zależność reżimu Kadyrowa od Rosji. Uzależnienie finansowe, piętno kolaboracjonizmu oraz zbrodni dokonywanych na własnym narodzie, które ciążą na czeczeńskim liderze, sprawiają, iż jego reżim nie może istnieć bez poparcia Moskwy. Zależność Kadyrowa od Moskwy oraz względna stabilność sytuacji w republice nie oznaczają jednak, że w Czeczenii nastąpił trwały pokój. Obecny schemat zarządzania Czeczenią i relacji między Moskwą a Groznym jest rozwiązaniem czasowym, opartym nie na trwałych podstawach, lecz sytuacyjnej zbieżności interesów Kremla i Kadyrowa. Zmiana władzy na Kremlu, zaś w jeszcze większym stopniu kryzys wewnętrzny w Rosji, skutkujący osłabieniem pozycji Rosji na Kaukazie, będzie równoznaczny z upadkiem reżimu Kadyrowa oraz reaktywacją haseł niepodległościowych w Czeczenii.
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Over the last few years, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia—comprising the Visegrad Group (V4)—have been developing the global dimension of their foreign policy and exploring economic opportunities in non-European markets. The financial and economic crisis in the EU, coupled with the strong growth in emerging economies, made diversification of exports a more attractive option than before. After two decades of internal transformation and a focus on Euro-Atlantic integration, the Visegrad countries also became more capable and more interested in looking for new partners beyond Europe and rebuilding old relationships that received less attention after 1989.
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W roku 2020 kończy się obowiązywanie umowy z Kotonu o partnerstwie między UE a grupą Afryki, Karaibów i Pacyfiku (AKP). W przeddzień rozpoczęcia negocjacji w ramach Unii Europejskiej na temat przyszłości relacji z 78 państwami AKP przedstawiamy raport PISM prezentujący główne założenia, cele i osiągnięcia obowiązującego porozumienia. Autorzy kreślą też możliwe scenariusze rozwoju partnerstwa po 2020 r. i opisują obecny stan debaty na ten temat w Europie, w tym wstępne stanowiska największych krajów Unii. Także w Polsce, która po raz pierwszy będzie miała wpływ na kształtowanie polityki UE w tym zakresie, potrzebna jest debata o roli krajów AKP w polityce zagranicznej.
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The sanctions are not about democracy promotion in Russia, rather they aim to give a chance for a deeper democracy to take root and thrive in Ukraine, in tune with the popular demands expressed in 2013-2014. The sanctions do not seek to weaken Russia per se. Their reversibility shows that the main goal is to help Ukrainian statehood survive in the context of Russia’s military aggression. As the West has ruled out direct use of lethal means to protect Ukraine, the sanctions came to represent an efficient, low-cost tool to shelter Ukraine and constrain Russia’s power. It was pivotal that the West responded as it did in 2014. Had it delayed, the Russian aggression, unopposed, would have threatened not only Ukraine’s existence but some of its neighbours as well. In this case, the West would have been forced to design a response anyway, although one ultimately riskier and costlier.
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The Ukrainian transformation triggered by the Maidan revolution has boosted development assistance for Ukraine offered by international and bilateral donors, including Poland. This opens more extensive funding opportunities for development projects and investments to Polish companies and organisations, but so far Polish entities have not seized the opportunities available. This publication presents the engagement of key donors in Ukraine and indicates how Polish companies and NGOs can launch new cooperation projects, taking advantage of additional financial resources to support the modernisation and development of Poland’s eastern neighbour.
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Among non-EU states, Russia is Poland’s most important trade partner. However, following Russian involvement the Ukrainian conflict, since the beginning of 2014, a growing number of obstacles have prevented access to the Russian market for exporters from Poland and other EU countries. For Polish companies, lack of a Russian export market can cause serious financial losses, threatening their stability. But in crisis, comes opportunity. Stalled economic relations with Russia should be an incentive for Polish firms do diversify their export destinations. One particularly appealing alternative for Polish goods is the rapidly developing market of non-European countries
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In 2014–2016, Ukraine’s banking sector was affected by what has proven to be the most serious crisis in its modern history. Almost half of the banks went bankrupt and the losses incurred by the state and banking sector clients was in excess of US$ 20 billion. With considerable support and under major pressure from the West, Ukraine’s government has managed to stabilise the situation in the sector. Despite tangible improvement, it is too early to determine whether the reform programme has been successfully implemented and if the improvement is sustainable. The crisis has made it necessary for major changes to be implemented in the functioning and structure of the banking sector. These changes have far-reaching consequences not only for Ukraine’s economy, but also for its political system.
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