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This article is prepared to review some dilemmas concerning the decision on the constitutionality of the Act on Churches and Religious Communities given by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia in January 2013. The principal of secular state as guaranteed by the Serbian Constitution of 2006 has been tested within the norms on the assistance of the state in enforcement of the decisions and judgments delivered by the churches and other religious organizations, on one hand, and on the rules on the religious instruction in public schools, on the other hand. Taking into account comparative, theoretical and normative method of interpretation, the author concludes that certain provisions of the Serbian Act on Churches and Religious Communities is not in accordance with The Serbian Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights.
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On 15 December in Kyiv, the Orthodox Church General Council of the Metropolis of Kyiv, which is subordinate to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, was convened. The attendees approved the statute presented by the Ecumenical Patriarch, and elected Metropolitan Epiphanius (bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate, UOC-KP) to be its superior. Epiphanius will be granted the tomos, giving the Metropolis of Kyiv autocephaly (canonical independence), in Istanbul on 6 January 2019. The newly founded church will be called the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, thus commencing the process of unification of the church structures of three Ukrainian orthodox churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which recognises the primacy of the Moscow Patriarch. For the moment the number of priests and faithful of the Patriarch of Moscow that will move to the new Metropolis of Kyiv is not clear. The convening of the general council and election of the superior of the united church will not necessarily bring to an end the split within Ukrainian orthodoxy. This is merely the beginning of a complicated process that could trigger a series of conflicts within Ukraine and in Ukrainian-Russian relations. The convening of the Kyiv council is a success for Petro Poroshenko, who agreed the granting of the tomos last spring with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in person. This will be a success actively exploited for the purpose of the presidential election campaign (31 March 2019), but does not guarantee that he will go through to the second round, let alone achieve ultimate victory.
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15 grudnia w Kijowie zebrał się sobór generalny metropolii kijowskiej Kościoła prawosławnego, podporządkowanej patriarchatowi Konstantynopola (patriarchatowi ekumenicznemu). Jego uczestnicy zaakceptowali nadany przez patriarchę ekumenicznego statut oraz wybrali na swojego zwierzchnika metropolitę Epifaniusza (biskupa Ukraińskiego Kościoła Prawosławnego Patriarchatu Kijowskiego), który 6 stycznia 2019 roku ma odebrać w Konstantynopolu (Stambule) tomos, nadający metropolii kijowskiej autokefalię. Powstały w ten sposób nowy Kościół będzie nosić nazwę Kościół Prawosławny Ukrainy. Tym samym rozpoczął się proces jednoczenia struktur kościelnych trzech Kościołów ukraińskiego prawosławia: Patriarchatu Kijowskiego (UPC-KP), Ukraińskiego Autokefalicznego Kościoła Prawosławnego (UAPC) oraz Ukraińskiego Kościoła Prawosławnego, uznającego zwierzchność patriarchy Moskwy (UPC). Na razie nie wiadomo, jaka część kapłanów i wiernych tego ostatniego przejdzie do nowej metropolii kijowskiej. Przeprowadzenie soboru i wybór zwierzchnika zjednoczonego Kościoła nie są równoznaczne z końcem rozłamu w ukraińskim prawosławiu. Jest to zaledwie początek skomplikowanego procesu, który może wywołać szereg konfliktów wewnątrz Ukrainy i w stosunkach ukraińsko-rosyjskich. Kijowski sobór jest sukcesem Petra Poroszenki, który wiosną tego roku uzgodnił nadanie tomosu bezpośrednio z patriarchą ekumenicznym Bartłomiejem. Sukces ten będzie aktywnie wykorzystywany w kampanii przed wyborami prezydenckimi (31 marca 2019 roku), choć nie gwarantuje prezydentowi wejścia do drugiej tury, a tym bardziej ostatecznego zwycięstwa.
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The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is one of the main beneficiaries of the socio-political changes in the Arab world. Its pragmatic Islamism is gaining widespread popularity in the region, as expressed at the ballot box as parties either formed by the Brotherhood itself (such as the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party) or inspired by it (such as the Tunisian Ennahda) dominate elections in the Arab world. After a turbulent history spanning almost 90 years, the Brotherhood is finally becoming a force in the world of political power. Such an advance offers a unique chance for the organisation, which in effect functions mostly as a confederated alliance of social movements operating in different Middle Eastern and North African countries, to develop and grow. However, it also carries risks associated with newly gained political responsibility, and the need to strike a balance between some of its members’ and followers’ cultural, economic, political and social expectations and the extent to which these could be addressed and fulfilled by, for example, the Brotherhood-dominated government of Egypt.
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Spotkanie papieża oraz patriarchy Moskwy i Wszechrusi, które miało miejsce 12 lutego w Hawanie, ma szczególne znaczenie religijne i polityczne. Papież Franciszek i patriarcha Cyryl podpisali wówczas oświadczenie, w którym odnieśli się m.in. do bieżących wydarzeń, głównie konfliktów na Bliskim Wschodzie i Ukrainie, jak również do kryzysu migracyjnego oraz prześladowania chrześcijan. Kontrowersje wzbudziły fragmenty dotyczące politycznej sytuacji na Ukrainie i mówiące o nadziei na zjednoczenie ukraińskich Kościołów prawosławnych, odebrane jako wsparcie Kościoła katolickiego dla polityki prowadzonej tam przez Rosję. Oświadczenie powinno być wykorzystane przez Stolicę Apostolską do działań ułatwiających funkcjonowanie Kościoła katolickiego w Rosji, na Krymie oraz w Donbasie.
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Nije nas iznenadilo to što je protekle nedelje Srpska pravoslavna crkva od državnog vrha tražila prekid zabrane kretanja radi održavanja uskršnje liturgije. Ovim zahtevom crkva je zatražila poseban status koji uživa i van vanrednog stanja – poput poreskih povlastica i neiscrpnog i višegodišnjeg finansiranja crkvenih aktivnosti i potreba iz državnog budžeta. Nakon što je epidemiologdr Predrag Kon zapretio ostavkom, a stvarni gospodar epidemiološke zaštite razgovarao sa patrijarhom, crkva je saopštila da će „poštovati državne mere“ u suzbijanju epidemije.prekid zabrane kretanjaprekid zabrane kretanja
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Ne zna se gde sede neodgovornije osobe – u vrhu SPC-a ili u vrhu države. Mrtva trka u brutalnoj nesposobnosti da se razume i prihvati realnost. Ali, niti je to crkva, niti je ovo država. Kamen na kamenu tu nije ostao ni od vere ni od poretka. S jedne strane zatucani i za stvarnost i ljudske živote slepi popovi, s druge – zadrto nesposobni iza stvarnost i ljudske živote slepi politički čelnici. Na apsolutno idiotski zahtev SPC-a da se za vikend dozvoli liturgijsko okupljanje vernika, država odgovara apsolutno idiotskim produženjem zabrane kretanja za još jedan dan – sa 60 sati na 84 sata.
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Republika Srbija je svetovna država. Crkve i verske zajednice su odvojene od države. Nijedna religija ne može se uspostaviti kao državna ili obavezna. (Član 11. Ustava Republike Srbije) Premijerka nas je nedavno obavestila da je jedan od prioriteta Vlade – vladavina prava.
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The paper aims to describe phenomena of modernization in Moldavian Csango villages in the context of religiosity. It interprets the most significant shifts in the life forms and traditional religiosity, the change of central values, tendencies of secularization and the emergence of sectarianism. The author argues that the religious experience gradually evades community and (Church) legitimation, so that the ever-larger individualization of religious experiences and conceptualization leads to the pluralization of worldviews. The impersonalization of social control, the changing norms that affect everyday life, the role change of religious values, the individualization of communities, basically the transforming forces of modernization on society disable the catholic church to fully integrate the Csango village population, who in rising numbers attend new teachings that offer an updated worldview, as well as a brand new set of community/religious norms. The author argues, that sectarianism/sectarianization is a part of modernizational strategies, and that as a consequence of transnational life forms, sects have become part of social mobility.
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Reisu-l-ulema Islamske zajednice (IZ) u BiH Husein ef. Kavazovića se uobičavao pismima obratiti institucijama i osobama na vlasti povodima koji nisu čisto vjerske prirode. On je 2011. pisao visokom predstavniku Valentin Inzku tražeći da se zaustavi govor mržnje Rajka Vasića i da se razjasni da li je BiH „kršćanska zemlja“. Generalnom sekretaru UN Ban Ki-moonu je pisao 2013. pozivajući ga da u svom mandatu spriječi nastavak politika revidiranja činjenica o zločinu, ponižavanje žrtava i manipuliranje žrtvama genocida u Srebrenici. Predsjednici Republike Hrvatske je pisao 2017. tražeći da se prestane sa zlonamjernom kampanjom kojom se diskredituju Bošnjaci i sije strah od njihovog prisustva u Evropi. Članovima Predsjedništva BiH i predsjedavajućem Vijeća ministara BiH je pisao 2019. apelujući da državne institucije zaustave zlonamjernu kampanju pritisaka i napada na povratnike i IZ u Republici Srpskoj. Ambasadorima više zemalja je pisao 2020. godine upozoravajući na iskustvo Bošnjaka muslimana sa zločinima i progonima. Iste godine im je uputio pismo zbog napada na muslimane u Crnoj Gori i ispred naroda kojem pripada je pisao predsjedniku Svjetskog jevrejskog kongresa Ronaldu S. Lauderu i predsjedniku Jevrejske zajednice u BiH Jakobu Finciju kako bi podsjetio na žrtve holokausta i genocida. Vlastima u Sarajevu je pisao 2022. sa zahtjevom da preuzmu odgovornost za javni moral i red u glavnom gradu jer dijeli „zabrinutost velikog broja vjernika zbog sve češćeg otvaranja javnog prostora za neukusne i nemoralne sadržaje i šutnje državnih zvaničnika, akademske zajednice i medija, dok se istovremeno javnost postepeno priprema za problematiziranje zvuka ezana u javnom prostoru“. Iste godine je uputio pismo visokom predstavniku Christianu Scmidtu, UN-u, ambasadorima SAD, Velike Britanije, Njemačke i Nizozemske u BiH, predsjednici bosanskohercegovačkog entiteta RS Željki Cvijanović, potpredsjedniku RS Ramizu Salkiću i predsjedniku Suda Bosne i Hercegovine Ranku Debevecu pozivajući ih da podrže njegovu inicijativu da se stratišta žrtava genocida obilježe kao mjesto stradanja i da se spriječe vođe lokalnih zajednica da unište vlastitu krvavu historiju. Pisma su, dakle, uobičajena i uhodana forma komunikacije reisa, institucija, funkcionera i javnosti.
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Konferencija “Uloga religije u društvima Zapadnog Balkana” je regionalna konferencija koju su organizovali Institut za demokratiju i medijaciju (IDM) iz Albanije, Centar za društvena istraživanja “Analitika” iz Bosne i Hercegovine, Beogradska otvorena škola iz Srbije i Institut za društvene i humanističke nauke Skoplje (ISSHS) iz Republike Sjeverne Makedonije. Cilj konferencije je istražiti izazove i mogućnosti kada je u pitanju uloga religije u društvima Zapadnog Balkana, te doprinijeti jačanju društvenih mehanizama i politika kako bi se na što bolji način odgovorilo budućim izazovima u ovom domenu. Pored toga, konferencija je pružila priliku da se prezentiraju rezultati istraživanja koje je provedeno u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana, a koje se bavilo ulogom religije u društvu. Konferencija je okupila lidere vjerskih zajednica, predstavnike akademske zajednice i medija, vladine zvaničnike i predstavnike civilnog društva sa Zapadnog Balkana, ali i otvorila i širu raspravu među njima o potencijalu za jačanje uloge religije u ovim društvima. U svjetlu općih izazova s kojima se suočavaju zemlje Zapadnog Balkana, kao što su nizak ekonomski razvoj, spora tranzicija i problemi sa vladavinom prava, učesnici su poseban naglasak stavili na implikacije i doprinos religije ovim pitanjima. Konferencija je organizovana uz velikodušnu podršku Ministarstva vanjskih poslova Holandije i uz učešće predsjednika Republike Albanije, Njegove ekselencije gospodina Ilira Mete.
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MIKSER, Dušan Grlja: Crna i Gora država– O feudalizmu XXI veka; BLOK BR. V, Studiostrip: Primeri 51; anti-CEMENT, Branislav Dimitrijević: Poznavanje prirode i društva; ŠTRAFTA, Vesna Madžoski: Crni kvadrat, beli okvir; ZID, Mirjana Dragosavljević: Gde budućnost počinje?; TENDERSKA DOKUMENTACIJA, Vladimir Milojković: Zatvor
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Fondacija Boris Divković formirana je u ljeto 2013. godine u Sarajevu. Ideja osnivača je da se kroz rad Fondacije što veći broj mladih ljudi, kako u našoj zemlji tako i u regiji, upozna i uči odgovornoj političkoj teoriji i praksi. Iako Fondacija djeluje na socijalno liberalnim polazištima, odlučilo se ovim obrazovnim procesom obuhvatiti i mlade ljude koji su dijelom različitih organizacija, političkih ili nevladinih, drugačijih ubjeđenja, ali i one koji individualno žele unaprijediti svoja znanja o političkoj kulturi. Pitanje sprege morala i politike bilo je od velike važnosti za našeg kolegu Borisa Divkovića i upravo je jedna od prvih značajnijih aktivnosti Fondacije organizacija Akademije političke odgovornosti u kojoj su učestvovali mladi brojnih političkih orijentacija i profila. U novembru 2016. godine održana je treća Akademija političke odgovornosti, a zbog velikog interesa polaznika u maju ove godine organiziran je i njen drugi modul. Teme su obuhvatile: opšti pojam političke kulture, njen razvoj i važnost, dominantnu paradigmu regionalne političke kulture iz perspektive koncepcije svjetskog etosa, religiju kao podcjenjeno mjesto političke socijalizacije. Razgovarali smo o ekonomiji u području politike, kulturi sjećanja. Također, predstavljeni su globalni politički portreti ličnosti poput Vaclava Havela i Wangari Muta Maathai, te regionalni politički portreti kao što su: Zoran Đinđić, Vlado Gotovac, Bogić Bogićević I Boris Divković. Drugi modul išao je detaljno u političko-ekonomske paradigme sa stajališta svjetskog etosa, religiozne socijalne nauke, itd. Posebna pažnja posvećena je ekološkim temama.
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29 March 2023 marked the deadline for representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) to leave the Pechersk Lavra monastery complex in Kyiv, which they had been leasing. On 10 March the Ministry of Culture, which formally supervises the shrine, announced the termination of the agreement following a government audit which uncovered numerous irregularities there. Some of the clergy complied with the order, while another group headed by the lavra’s abbot, Metropolitan Pavlo (Lebid), refused. On 1 April, on the basis of a court ruling, the metropolitan was placed under house arrest for 60 days on charges of justifying the Russian attack on Ukraine. However, some monks still remain at the facility.
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After 16 years of independence, there are no significant political forces in Montenegro that could openly challenge this status and seek to re-establish a federation with Serbia. However, the relationship with Serbia continues to be among the key issues shaping the young state’s politics. Its relations with Belgrade are the source of a protracted dispute between the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS), which had spent over three decades in power until 2020,and a Church-backed alliance of more than a dozen parties, mostly with a centre-right profile, united in their intention to remove DPS from power. The legacy of DPS, who view themselves as the founding fathers of Montenegrin independence, is associated with certain successes (the launch of accession talks with the EU, Montenegro joining NATO, the country’s economic development), but also has major drawbacks, such as the reduction of democratic standards, the concentration of economic and financial resources in the hands of the ruling elite, increased financial dependence on China and a rise in corruption and organised crime. Although a centre-right coalition has been in power in Montenegro since 2020, it is affected by instability resulting in high social polarization and by a conflict over the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church operating in the country, which is viewed as an instrument of leverage used by Serbia and as a regional centre of cultural influence associated with the “Serbian world”.
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The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the brutal manner in which it is being waged have united Ukraine’s society and government in its efforts to derussify many spheres of public life. Pro-Russian parties have lost almost their entire electorate and have been banned, Russian historical figures and symbols are being eradicated from the public space, the Russian language and culture are being removed from school curricula and public spaces, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is facing a crisis and trying to reduce its ties with Moscow. The majority of Ukrainians are rejecting Russian culture, viewing it as a tool their enemy is using to build its imperial status and to shape a Russian-centric, colonial consciousness. This is accompanied by an increase in national pride and identity –the popularisation and affirmation of Ukrainian symbols, historical figures and cultural legacy, and the restoration of those who were removed from the public space during the communist period and remained forgotten after regaining independence. Society is uniting in these aspirations and values, and previous regional divisions have largely been bridged. As in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, the impetus to accelerate the formation of a new anti-Russian identity for Ukrainians was provided by Russia itself. However, the unprecedented scale of ongoing aggression means that the scope of these aspirations is incomparably greater today. From decommunization, which began on a larger scale after the occupation of Crimea, Ukraine is moving towards a “full-scale”, final derussification, covering all spheres of life, including its history and the vision of its future.
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In Israel as in other countries, when the COVID-19 epidemic surfaced it exacerbated the existing divisions and tensions in society. A group that came under severe attack from the public was the Jewish Ultraorthodox population (the Haredi). This was due to disregard on the part of certain ultra orthodoxgroups of the restrictions imposed in response to the epidemic and an exceptionally high infection rate in that community – as much as 70% of cases recorded from February until May this year affected members of that community.
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Since the beginning of the 1990s, the West was obliged to deal with several crises in the Balkans and pledged to a complete reconstruction of the post-war situation in the region. During this demanding process, the Western countries however maximised their traditional stereotyped attitudes towards the Balkan countries. Both the European Union and the United States have typecast the Balkan states according to the extent of the internal problems of these states, and according to their own ability to deal with such issues. Despite the good intentions behind the acting of the West, this process resulted in a mixture of shambolic strategies that have made the Western presence in the region very complicated. The West has been gradually loosing its military and managing respect, given its reluctance to pursue the proclaimed objectives. Such disinclination to act has played into the hands of the local bosses, who very soon found out how the system can be abused in order to satisfy both their electorate and the Western custodians. Nowadays, it is clear that such a hesitant attitude of the West towards the Balkans is no longer sustainable. A significant change in the Western strategy towards the Balkan countries is required, should the integration of the Balkans into the Western structures (i.e. NATO, EU) be successful.
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The Orthodox Church and the Christian tradition have always assumed a role of primary importance in Russian history and tradition. The origins of Christianity in Russia go back to 988 and coincide with the baptism of Prince Vladimir the Great. He had come to Constantinople, following which the evangelization of the Principality Kievan Rus’ started. The latter included the space currently occupied by the areas of Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus, considered the predecessor of the Russian Empire. Formed by Igor in 882, the Principality Kievan Rus’ is the first political form organised by the Oriental Slav tribes placed on those territories. This gave rise to the common orthodox faith and the Russian people’s sense of national belonging. Retracing the path of the Principality one can indeed observe that the Orthodox Christian Faith was immediately embraced by those populations. It also succeeded in asserting itself in the Eastern zones, where there was strong pagan influence. This barely digested the advent of the new creed and accompanied their evolution, acting as a stalwart for the Country’s national and cultural identity. Orthodoxy is even granted with Scripture, which is surely a culture’s fundamental principle. It was introduced via the spread of Christianity among the Slav tribes through the creation of the Cyrillic characters due to two great saints, Cyril and Methodius. It also constituted the prerequisite for the political and cultural development of the Principality of Kiev, leaving a heritage that would last even after its disintegration.
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