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5.00 €

Комунисти у југословенској дипломатији 1945- 1956: број и организација партијског живота

Author(s): Slobodan Selenić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

CPJ cadres started coming into diplomatic missions abroad immediately after WWII. The influence of the CPJ and the number of communists increased over years through sending new cadres from the country, accepting into the Party membership part of diplomatic officials who previously hadn’t been communists and through recall of old cadres home. According to the 1949 data in J ugoslav missions in 28 countries there were 602 communists. The largest number was to be found in Germany (94), Italy (70), Great Britain and the USA (55 each) and Austria (47). Until early 1952 the number of communists was increased almost by a third: from 602 to 779. The largest number of Party members was to be found in the USA some 120. Until mid-1950s the CPJ established M l domination of the diplomatic service. 1.300 communists were serving in diplomatic missions abroad then. According to the data of June 30, 1956, there were 1.562 Jugoslav representatives (including students and those specializing) in 43 countries. Out of that number there were as many as 1.341 communists, or some 86%. The largest number of communists served in the USA (117), France (114) and Great Britain (104). The presence of the communists in the diplomatic service posed the problem of their organization. Party cells were set up in most countries after WWII but they were disbanded on the decision of the Central Committee in March 1946. Instead, Party plenipotentiaries were put in charge of the communists abroad. After the Resolution of the Informbureau, the Central Committee ordered reestablishing of Party organizations in the second half of 1948. Ever since a single Party organization existed in each country that was divided into several sections in countries with several J ugoslav missions. In the early 1950s on the orders of the Central Committee new changes were introduced, so Party organizations were set up in every town with a Jugoslav mission, whereas Party committees directed the work on the national level.

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4.50 €

Комунистичка стратегија према српској интелигенцији 1944–1950.

Author(s): Nataša Milićević / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The paper analyzes the Communist strategy toward the Serbian intelligentsia which determined its new role, importance and obligations in the first years after the Second World War. Under the pressure from numerous ideological, political, economic and cultural factors, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia designed a complex strategy toward the Serbian intelligentsia. It comprised several strategic streams which ran parallelly, but which also overlapped. At the same time, they were mutually contradictory. Four strategic streams can be detected, depending on the goal, the methods applied, part of the intelligentsia targeted and the role it was assigned by the Communist Party: annihilation, integration, creation of a new intelligentsia and the build-up of the Communist Party intelligentsia. The first two streams had to do mostly with the intelligentsia left over from the bourgeois society in the period under scrutiny, but not exclusively with it. In opposition to annihilation which meant riding rough-shod over the intelligentsia, the integration was marked by gradual acceptance and integration into the society. In the first case, decisive was the inherited mistrust and suspicion of the Communist party caused by the bourgeois origin (70%) of the intelligentsia, as well as by the wartime adherence of its members. The situation facing the Communist Party after the liberation (small number of intellectuals and lack of cultural capital, low educational level of the society, almost 45% analphabets) was decisive in the later case. This was the framework for changing the old attitudes of the Communist Party toward the intelligentsia. The third stream of action – creation of the new intelligentsia – was the most important part in the Communist strategy toward the intelligentsia in general. Through changes in the school and educational system (by enabling pupils from vocational secondary schools to enroll at universities, by introducing mass grants and by changing curricula at the universities) it was aimed at changing the social make-up of pupils and students, professors, scientists, and at forging a new identity of the Yugoslav and Serbian intelligentsia, eventually creating the new identity of the Yugoslav and Serbian society. The last stream in the Communist strategy toward the Yugoslav and Serbian intelligentsia concerned measures and acts undertaken within the Communist Party. It presupposed increasing the number of intellectuals in the Communist Party membership through suppressing aversion toward the intelligentsia within the Party, increasing the educational level of the Party faithful, particularly after the difficulties encountered during the fulfillment of the Five-Year Development Plan of the country. Depending on the ideological rigidity, political necessity and social and economic needs during the first several years, it happened that, for a while, some of these strategic elements overshadowed the others, as was the case with annihilation and particularly with integration right after the Liberation. In the later phase, the second two streams would be dominant in the strategy, although the first two would not be completely given up.

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Емиграција из Србије у Египту 1945–1956.

Author(s): Aleksandar Životić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Two groups of emigrants from the Serbian territory found themselves in the territory of Egypt in the years following the Second World War. The first group was formed by the emigrants who settled there in several waves since mid-19th century, and the second one were the former army officers and diplomats who fled from Yugoslavia to the Middle East after the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in spring 1941. For larger part, the older emigration, together with members of other Yugoslav peoples living in the Egyptian territory, was organized in several Yugoslav clubs. The Yugoslav Embassy tried to act politically and propagandistically through these associations. The anti-Communist Egyptian regime did not tolerate this, so these associations were disbanded and their members subjected to various kinds of repression which lasted until the bilateral relations were improved after the Egyptian revolution in 1952. The emigrants who arrived in Egypt during the Second World War tried to act politically against the newly established regime in Yugoslavia. In that they enjoyed the support of the Egyptian government, and, according to the opinion of the Yugoslav diplomats, also of some Western intelligence agencies. The students of Islamic universities stemming from Serbia who refused to return to Yugoslavia, were also propagandistically active against the Communist regime in Yugoslavia, enjoying the support of the Egyptian government and the Arab League in the process. An incipient collaboration in the common struggle against Communism in Yugoslavia can be observed between these groups since 1946. Due to speedy improvement of the Yugoslav-Egyptian relations after the revolution of 1952, these groups ceased operating under the threat of arrest and expulsion, whereas part of their adherants moved out of Egypt.

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Ратни циљеви Комунистичке партије Југославије у Другом светском рату

Author(s): Kosta Nikolić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The author writes about the construction of the myth of partisan Yugoslavism in World War II. In the foreground is a critical analysis of the interpretation that the military strategy and national policy of the Communist Party was the decisive factor for the revitalization and renewal of the Yugoslav state. The essence of revolution was in the federation created by the right of nations to self-determination. Ethnic principle was incorporated into the structure of the new federation. Hence the Republic and all (except Bosnia and Herzegovina) was a national, for which the (Slovenia and Croatia) and insisted on the full period of building socialism. Then he adopted the principle that socialism is “abolished” national conflict in Yugoslavia. The most important war aims of the Yugoslav Communists were carrying out the revolution, the seizure of power and create new social and political system. These goals were achieved through the parallel resistance and civil war.

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Jugoslovenstvo Josipa Broza Tita: kontinuitet ili diskontinuitet?

Author(s): Jovo Bakić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The paper considers Josip Broz Tito’s relation towards Yugoslavism, and perception of his Yugoslavism in Anglo-American and Yugoslav Cold War and post-Cold War historiography. It answers the question whether Tito could have had independent view of Yugoslavism in relation to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia, which he led continuously for 43 years between 1937 and 1980. Therefore, in context of structural interconnectedness of the authoritarian Party, and after the WWII authoritarian Party and state, and its leader, one has to investigate Tito’s relation towards national question in Kingdom and socialist Yugoslavia. Main hypothesis is that an authoritarian party and its leader cannot hold different views of such an important question as national one is in a multinational political community. In other words, he was able to influence decisively on programmatic documents of the CPY (LCY) and definitions of recognized national categories in the population censuses, and they had to reflect convictions of the leader. However, these documents had remained unchanged between 1937 and 1980 in terms of Yugoslavia as a multinational federation, and the censuses had never had an unambiguously used national label ‘Yugoslav’. That is why rare occasions when Josip Broz delivered speeches in favor of a ‘Yugoslav nation’ between 1948 and 1956 meant that he only tactically used Yugoslavism before foreign and domestic public in order to empower Yugoslav resistance and Western support to it against the Stalin USSR. As danger of the USSR had become weaker after Stalin death, Tito's tactical national Yugoslavism came back to strategic communist minimal Croatian variant of Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia as a multinational, and not national state.

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Jugoslovenska posleratna emigracija i Josip Broz Tito. Naša reč o sukobu sa IB-om 1948-1949.

Author(s): Mira Radojević / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

In numerous and variegated circles of the post-war Yugoslav emigration the union „Liberation" and its mouthpiece Naša reč were recognizable for their consequential Yugoslavism and democratism which included decisive opposition to building fronts exclusively on anti-communism, without championing democratic changes. For the same reason they also refused cooperation with all right-wing forces, remnants of fascist groups who used the idea of unified anti-communist forces in order to try to avoid responsibility for the support they lent to nazism and fascism during the war. The attitude towards communism and the communist regime in Yugoslavia was shaped at the time of the incipient conflict of the Yugoslav communist party and the state with the Informbuereau, the Soviet Union and with Stalin personally. Not knowing the real causes of the conflict and not knowing how deep the consequences of the rifts opened in the hitherto strictly controlled communist system could be, the „Liberation" and Naša reč considered its outcome important for communist parties and regimes of the countries of „people's democracy" but not for the „enslaved" peoples in them who could find salvation from communist rule only in a democratic system. Therefore western countries were not expected to help Josip Broz Tito, the first man of the Yugoslav party and the state to resist Stalin more easily, but to lend support to democratic emigration and adherents of democracy in the country. The adopted views didn’t remain unchanged, chained by ideological exclusivism and intolerance. Events, time and witnessing the end of certain historical processes caused many previous opinions to be subject to subsequent analysis. Views on Tito and his role changed too. From initial total condemnation and harsh moral judgement, by the end of his life one came to recognize the contribution that he and the party he headed, gave first during the anti-fascist struggle and then in opposing the intentions of the Informbuereau and Stalin. Still, as the most important was seen the fact that he „had built himself in" the whole post-war regime, so that his period in power can be called „Tito’s personal era".

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„Deset godina komunističkog raja" Miloš Moskovljević o Titovim pogledima na ekonomsku politiku (Dnevničke beleške 1949-1955. godine)

Author(s): Momčilo Isić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Watching Tito's public statements concerning the state's economic policy between 1949 and 1955, Miloš Moskovljević dwelled in his Diary primarily on Tito's explanation of the clash with the USSR, on the policy of approaching the West, on the question of peasant cooperatives and on the process of industrialization. By analysing Tito's speeches in his diaries Moskovljević convincingly depicted the goal and the contents of the state's economic policy, as well as its changes first hinted at by Tito as the main actor, who was also the first and often also the only one who admitted errors in directing it. This spurred Moskovljević to conclude, having in mind his personal experience while he was part of the ruling apparatus, that only Tito and Stalin „could admit mistakes and criticize, and anyone else who would do it, was a foreign mercenary". As the proof that the state's 10-year's economic policy was unsuccessful, Moskovljević took Tito's speech about the New Economic Policy held at the session of the Executive Committe of the Socialist Union on Sunday, November 28,1955. In it he was extremely critical of the direction of the economic policy until then and of its results. However, Moskovljević was also critical here, claiming this Tito's speech was „a proof of and a monument to communist incapability" as well as that Tito hadn't reached the negative conclusions about the economic policy and the need of a New Economic Policy by himself, but that they were rather a consequence of Kardelj's trip to London.

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Dobrica Ćosić o Josipu Brozu Titu. Skica za istraživanje političkog i intelektualnog odnosa

Author(s): Latinka Perović / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The insight into the life of Dobrica Ćosić uncovers a personality that, although in formative years at first in contact with the religious movement of Bishop Velimirović, soon came under influence of communism siding with it, above all out of belief in the possibility of a more just society. With that aim he fought at war, but according to his own testimony, soon became disappointed. In 1951 he left professional Party work and turned to writing, remaining an important link between intellectuals and politics. The work and influence of Ćosić show that he wasn't just another contemporary of Josip Broz Tito, but rather more than that. The research of the relation of Dobrica Ćosić to Tito, to national and social question and to Yugoslavia has several starting points: firstly, Ćosić's relation to communism as a new religion; secondly, the writer's need to „change the world"; thirdly, the novel Roots (1954] as the turning point in Ćosić's opus; fourthly, his positioning in the discussion about leaving the Soviet party model, and in connection with that, the understanding of Yugoslavia in early 1960s; finally, the novel The Time of Death which established Ćosić in the position that would secure him the status of „the Father of the Nation" a decade later. That status is no empty metaphor, and Ćosić himself saw himself as „the paradigm of Serbian fate". On the one hand - there were numerous editions of his works, adaptations for film and theater, imposition of it as mandatory school literature, literary awards, on the other - membership in the Central Comittee of the Union of Communists of Serbia and, later on, the post of the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. With that dual role, with great self-awarenes of that role, Ćosić became a kind of institution, a collective project of a sort, around whome a network of social, political and intellectual ties came to being. From that vantage point, he acted for decades as one of the key actors in politics and culture. The polemics with the Slovenian intellectual Dušan Pirjavec in 1961/62, his positioning concerning the fate of Aleksandar Ranković, his views on national question and the overall Yugoslav ideology of the Yugoslav communists kept pushing Ćosić away from the Party which he realy left in 1971. By that time he had already become the chairman of the Serbian Book Cooperative and a corresponding member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. In the meantime in 1969 a book by Ćosić (Power and Anxiety) was banned for the first time. During the 1980s Ćosić became the leading figure of the out-of-institutions opposition and his reputation would constantly be on the rise from then on, leading him finally to the post of the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the midst of the war in 1992. With distancing from the national policy of the Party Ćosić increasingly embraced the idea of solving the Serbian national question through a unification of the Serbs in one state. Transplanting a 19th century goal - the Serbian state - to the end of the 2 0 th century determined everything else. The priorities: mobilizing the people and their firm unity before the domestic and foreign opponent of the goal. Means: wars for state borders. Several phases of Dobrica Ćosić's relation to Tito should be distinguished. For start, it would be important to establish chronological borderlines and internal characteristics of each period. Conditionally speaking, the periods could be named thus: 1) Fasciantion by Tito (1945-1961); 2) Struggle for Tito (1961- 1966); 3) Refusal to be Defeated (1968-1980); 4) Ideological War agains Titoism as Anti-Srbism (1980-1991); 5) Armed War for Solving the Serbian Question as a State Question (1992-1999); 6) Anti-Titoism as the Basis of the New Serbian Identity (1999-2000). Each of these periods views Tito in a different way, having in mind above all Ćosić's views on the national question to which he increasingly reduced his views on Yugoslavia and socialism.

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Ljudi na strateškim mestima. Uzroci, posledice i smisao sukoba Josipa Broza Tita i Milovana Đilasa na Trećem (vanrednom) plenumu CK SKJ 1954. godine

Author(s): Goran Miloradović / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The relation between Josip Broz Tito and Milovan Djiias are analyzed in the paper with speciall stress on the events on the eve, during and after the Third (Extraordinary) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia held on January 16-17, 1954. Theoreticaly the question is asked if Djiias realy had the role of a „dissident" in a particular Yugoslav totalitarian state of a stalinist type, since the phenomenon of dissidence in international context is connected with the changes which came about in the USSR after the so-called „Khruschev’s thaw" and since the term itself appeared only in the late 1960s. The period of the dissidents’ activity in the USSR makes up one and a half decade (1965-1980). In virtue of the published and unpublished archival sources, interviews, memoirs and literature, Djilas’s „rebelion" is explained as an episode in the struggle for power within the UCY and not as an ideological dissent of a lonely intellectual. Djiias was a representative of the opposition who tried to use the strategic foreign political turn (Yugoslavia’s rapprochement with the West), as well as ideological and political divisions that followed, for his own ascent in the hierarchy. He tried to achieve that by grouping the intellectual core of his fellow-travelers around the journal Nova misao, militating at the same time for political and ideological competition in Yugoslavia, including the two-party system. By doing that he jeopardized the position of the undesputed leader J.B. Tito, as well as the position of the conservative faction within the UCY. Despite the sympathies of part of the British Labor Party for Djiias, he neither received sufficient support from abroad nor secured a strong enough foothold in Yugoslavia. His policy was defeated at the Third Plenum of the CC of the UCY in 1954 as „anarchism" or „bourgeois liberalism" and he was relieved of all his posts and sent into retirement. By comparing the Soviet and the Yugoslav systems the author concludes that Djilas’s role in Yugoslavia is comparable to the role of the internal party opposition of L. Trotsky and N. Bukharin in the USSR, but not to that of Soviet dissidents who cherished their personal and professional freedom and moral dignity (such as A. Sinyavsky, J. Daniel, A. Solzhenitsyn, R. Medvedev, A. Sakharov etc.) and who were neither revolutionaries nor politicians. Djiias was a revolutionary, a member of the Politbuereau of the CC of the UCY who 230 openly presented his views, formed a faction and gathered increasingly broad support for his policy with the aim of conquering the highest post in Yugoslavia - Tito's. The understanding of Djilas’s status was made blear by the negative propaganda instigated against him by his enemies in power, but also by later positive advertizing of his friends of the opposition, which created two, equally distorted images of Djilas: the „demonic" and the „angelic". However, after a detailed analysis it is clear that the struggle for the supreme power in the Party and in the state was what it was all about, and not just „dissatisfaction" with the existing situation and the system, as was the case with dissidents in other parts of Eastern Europe.

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Pristup Titovog režima Kosovu krajem pedesetih godina

Author(s): Jan Pelikán / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Based primarily on the documents of the conference of the Executive Committee of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia (UCY) held in March 1959 the paper analyses the approach of Tito's leadership to Kosovo. It tries to point out the main tendencies in the approach to the Albanian question and the different opinions of certain members of the highest leadership of the UCY. A gradual change in viewing the Albanian problem by the leading people of Tito’s regime set in in the late 1950s. Many members began to be aware of the importance of the Albanian community in Yugoslavia and the necessity of improving its situation, above all access to education and to employment. The need to industrialize Kosovo as soon as possible was stressed. Although these tendencies existed, the repressive elements of Tito's regime remained dominant, above all the secret police.

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Uloga Josipa Broza Tita u definisanju srpskog etničkog prostora

Author(s): Branko Nadoveza / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Thanks to his personal activity and historical circumstances Josip Broz Tito managed to define the ethnical and territorial boundaries of the Serbian people. The two basic periods of his activity were 1937-1945 and from 1946 to his death. The solutions to the national question offered by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could be compared with the solution of the nationality question proposed by the Croat Peasant Party that presupposed the division of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia into historical provinces. In paper special attention was devoted to the definition of the borders of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo. The author quoted particularly intensively the critique of the Yugoslav Communists by political emigres.

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Titoizam: tri perspektive

Author(s): Todor Kuljić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Die Instrumentalisierung des Titoismus ist die Asymmetrie der verschiedenen Perspektiven und hegemonialen Erinnerungsrahmen Thema. In gewisser Weise ist Tito die Signatur des postjugoslawischen Raums geblieben. Im schon zu Lebzeiten kontroversen Machthaber sieht Author eine „vielschichtige Figur" die aus drei unterschiedlichen Perspektiven betrachtet werden kann: Aus der heute vorherrschenden „Froschperspektive" erscheint Tito als der große, unantastbare, totalitäre Herrscher. Dazu gehören die Nationalisten, die davon überzeugt sind, der Titoismus sei von außen in die Nationalgemeinschaft hineingetragen worden. Die „Vogelperspektive" zeigt hingegen, dass Jugoslawien unter dem autoritären Herrscher Tito einen außerordentlichen Modernisierungs- und Mobilitätsschub erlebte. Die „Flugzeugperspektive" legt eine SichtaufTito als den„letzte Habsburger des Balkans" nahe - wobei Habsburg hier als „Metapher für den Herrscher in einem multinationalen Staat" gilt. Hier werden die Grundmerkmale der postkommunistischen Erinnerungskulturen der postjugoslawischen Staaten rekapituliert Einen differenzierten Blick auf den Titoismus, der dem Balkan fast fünfzig Jahre des Friedens ermöglichte, so lautet das Zwischenfazit, gibt es bisher nicht. Stattdessen dominiert eine einseitig dämonisierende Form der Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Das führte zu einer sehr selektiven Geschichtsauffassung.

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Herojstvo, mučeništvo i karizma u civilnoj religiji titoizma. Proturječja između Titovog kulta i kulta narodnih heroja Jugoslavije

Author(s): Vjekoslav Perica / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Josip Broz Tito founded and ruled socialist-era Yugoslavia for 35 years. His personal cult was a part of a more complex system of myths, symbols and rituals for legitimating the nation and the regime that this article calls civil religion of titoism. This civil religion consisted of a number of elements such the Tito personal cult, the „Peoples' Heroes" cult, the Myth of the Partisans Antifascist War, etc. The article discovers and analyzes comparatively the Tito personal cult against the peoples' Heroes cult i.e. the cult of the fighters in World War II that liberated and founded the nation but most of them sacrificed their lives in that struggle.. It discovers a striking contradiction between the traditional Balkan, i.e. Eastern pattern of ascetic-puritan and self-sacrificing hero-martyr of the Peoples' hero versus Tito's cult based on his personal charisma and nonascetic or „western" lifestyle. However, Tito’s cult acquires the missing martyr dimension at the end of his life during his illness and death.

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Titova komunikaciona strategija kao politički činilac

Author(s): Predrag J. Marković / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The paper tries to explain Tito’s communication strategy on several characteristic examples, from three different phases of his life. The first one is from his way to power within the Communist Party in 1928. His sudden rise in the ranks of the Party was partly enabled by his skilful performance at the 8th conference of the Zagreb’s Communists. Thereafter he attracted the attention of the public opinion, as well as of the Moscow, by his attitude at the „Bombers trial". He demonstrated a firm attitude that affirmed the public image of Communists. The second example of Tito’s communication strategy could be found in 1955-1956. Khrushchev came to Belgrade in May 1955 to apology for the Stalinist policy toward Yugoslavia. This led Tito to the conclusion that he could be a mentor to Soviets themselves. Therefore, he gave over enthusiastic statement on the future of socialism in Stalingrad, during his triumphal visit in 1956. Seeing the shock of the Western Allies, he immediately gave another, more balanced statement During 1956, he had to overcome complex and frustrating position of Yugoslavia in the Hungarian crisis. He also used a communication strategy to do so. Finally, perhaps the most brilliant case of his communication strategy is TV speech devoted to student rebellion in June of 1968. Contrary to all expectations of the more dogmatic Party apparatchiks, he supported students, with few „exceptions". Later this „exceptions" turned to be victims of the regime’s persecution. But, in the wake of his famous speech everybody was delighted: students, foreign media, even some dissidents. His careful timing and the precise calibrating of messages in this speech have remained as an example of the communication mastery.

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Sovjetski uticaj i Josip Broz Tito uoči izbijanja ustanka u Jugoslaviji 1941. godine

Author(s): Aleksej J. Timofejev / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

In the holdings of the Comintern reports by J. B. Tito are preserved that testify to the role of this organization in appointing new leader of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) and in determining personal and financial policy of the Party on the eve of WWII. Considerable number of Yugoslav communists received good military-partisan training in the USSSR and Spain during the prewar period. It is very likely that Josip Broz Ttio himself was educated at the „partisan school" in the USSR and that he later taught there himself. Connection with the Soviet security organs is also proven by Tito's special engagement in a tricky „cader" matter during the Spanish civil war. After the defeat of the Spanish republic most of the Yugoslav „Spaniards" were interned in France. Only in 1941 did part of the „Spaniards" manage to return to the Balkans. According to the official version of Tito’s biography the whole action was organized by Cvetko Većeslav Flores „without anyone’s help". Obviously someone with military and partisan experience had to help the Yugoslav communists to reach their homeland on the eve of the uprising. In the Comintern’s files of the Yugoslav „Spaniards" questionaries about their engagement on the Iberian Peninsula appeared in late 1940 and early 1941. These enquieries in the files of the Yugoslav „Spaniards" were made at the request of the „external organization" i.e. of the Soviet intelligence service. Some 250 former Spanish combatants took part in the events in Yugoslavia 1941-1945 and to all intents they were one of the main pillars in creation of the partisan movement The ascent of Tito’s career was aided by several factors which had different importance atvarious stages of his career. On the eve of 1941 the most dominant were the endeavors of Soviet instructiors to impart the Yugoslav Party cadres and even J. B. Tito himself, military and special skills during the 1929-1938 period. An important role was played by Tito’s ties with the Cadre's Department of the Comintern and the Soviet intelligence organs which Tito forged during the sending of Yugoslav cadres to Spain.

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„I posle Tita – Tito”. Održavanje i rušenje Titovog kulta u Srbiji 1980-1990.

Author(s): Kosta Nikolić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The Yugoslav political system was an attempt to create a new reality in virtue of the principles of „communist philosophy of history" (scientific socialism), shaping it and managing it The one-party power of CPY/UCY was the result, but also Tito’s personal power. His cult in Serbia was part of the political identity and no-one questioned itutil mid 1980s when political processes that would lead to the break-up of Yugoslavia started. A historical phenomenon occurred in Serbia at that time where the ruling political oligarchy still respected the „person and the work" of Josip Broz, but transformed it in keeping with its political tenets, using only those elements of the cult that were useful at a given moment. At the end of that process, Tito’s cult in Serbia was completely abandoned but Serbia still remained a typical ideocratic state, because the ideology of class was substituted for the ideology of nation.

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Titov kult u Jugoslovenskoj narodnoj armiji

Author(s): Mihajlo Basara / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The paper discusses the ideological obstacles to the research of Tito's era, characteristics of the cult in the self-managing socialism and its special features in the Army, as well as characteristics and manifestations in the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). The author concludes that Tito's course towards liberalization of socialism in the form of self-management, as well as the results achieved in the modernization of the country, reduced the leeway for a broader use of the cult as an ideological instrument, especially in comparison with the countries of the former Eastern Block. Simultaneously with that, the historical science was rearranged and Tito became the creator of the theory and practice of socialism in Yugoslavia. With the YPA personnel loyalty was secured through selection (participation in WWW, social background, ideological background of parents), Party control and planned and systematic indoctrination. Having been coupled with the process of training, including the Army into peacekeeping operations and military-industrial activities and also having been to a larger degree under the influence of self-management due to the concept of General People's Defense, the cult in YPA hadn't the typical traits of a rigid personality cult. The break-up of Yugoslavia proved that Tito's cult wasn't of long duration. It was replaced by the cult of the nation and its new leaders.

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O nacionalizmu, socijalizmu, Jugoslaviji, Evropi

Author(s): Latinka Perović,Olivera Milosavljević / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Interview with Latinka Perović, by Olivera Milosavljević.

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Drugačija Rusija: Pogled iz Srbije

Author(s): Milan Subotić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Ove godine navršava se četvrt veka od „avgustovskog puča” (1991) čiji je neuspeh ubrzao raspad Sovjetskog Saveza i doveo do nastanka Ruske Federacije i drugih nezavisnih država – članica negdašnjeg „neraskidivog saveza”. Za brojne „sovjetologe” koji su decenijama proučavali „prvu zemlju socijalizma” mirnodopski slom svetske supersile koji je, na početku svog drugog predsedničkog mandata, Vladimir Putin nazvao „najvećom geopolitičkom katastrofom XX veka” (Putin, 2005), bio je potpuno neočekivan. Stoga je razumljivo što se još vode teorijski sporovi o uzrocima i dinamici raspada države koja se njenim podanicima i inostranim posmatračima „činila večnom, sve dok nije nestala” (Yurchak, 2005). Tokom devedesetih godina prošlog veka ove rasprave su pretežno bile usmerene na tumačenje sovjetske istorije, jer su polazile od uverenja da je, za razliku od neprozirne prošlosti, budućnost postsovjetskih društava i država lako predvidljiva. [...]

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Urban Transformation in a Post-socialist Society-From unity to separation

Author(s): Aleksandar Joksimović / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

Yugoslavia was established in 1918-at that time known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In 1946 (post-WW II), when a communist government was established, Yugoslavia changed its name to the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. Only two years after that, in 1948, conflict between Tito and Stalin resulted in the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau. Given this situation Yugoslavia developed a new agenda of positioning itself “between capitalist West and communist East.” Consequently, cultural and architectural production needed to manifest new ideas.

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