Галлахер Шон Как тело формирует сознание. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005

Author(s): Anna Khakhalova / Language(s): Russian Issue: 1/2012

This paper of Gallagher unifies efforts of a number of scientific fields (neurophysiology, cognitive psychology, phenomenology, analytic philosophy) in the analysis of corporeality of experience. Such issues, concerned with corporeality, as how and to what extent body participates in the process of consciousness, its constitution and functioning, formation of subject’s self and his existence and also in the process of cognition. The main aim of this paper is, as it is seen by the author, is the creation of common interdisciplinary glossary, common theoretical system for studies in the field of corporeality.

Анонс исследовательских семинаров при Парижском Архиве Э. Гуссерля

Author(s): The Editorial Board HORIZON / Language(s): Russian Issue: 1/2012

Анонс международной конференции «Проблематика случайности и фактичности в феноменологии»

Author(s): The Editorial Board HORIZON / Language(s): Russian Issue: 1/2012

Анонс международной конференции «Мартин Хайдеггер и философская традиция: повторение vs демонтаж»

Author(s): The Editorial Board HORIZON / Language(s): Russian Issue: 1/2012

Объявление о виртуальном семинаре по книге А. Г. Чернякова «Онтология времени. Бытие и время в философии Аристотеля, Гуссерля, Хайдеггера»

Author(s): The Editorial Board HORIZON / Language(s): Russian Issue: 1/2012

LIFE AND THE REDUCTION TO THE LIFE-WORLD

Author(s): James Mensch / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2017

Husserl’s Crisis contains his final attempt to understand the world in terms of an ultimately constituting consciousness. The path he chooses is that of a reduction to the “life-world,” the world that appears when we bracket the results of the objective sciences. His claim is that “the ‘objective’ a priori [of the natural sciences] is grounded in the ‘subjective-relative’ a priori of the lifeworld”. It is from the latter that he attempts to achieve his vision of “a universal, ultimately functioning subjectivity”. In this article, I question whether this is possible. If the world were the product of this functioning subjectivity, the latter could not be part of the world. But, the inherent sense of the reduction to the life-world leaves us with the sensuous embodied subject, who is a part of the world. How can we think of the a priori in terms of this subject? I conclude by considering both Merleau-Ponty’s and Patočka’s attempts to conceive of such an a priori.

ASYMPTOTE DES LEBENS. DIE PHÄNOMENOLOGIE EDMUND HUSSERLS ALS EINE WELTANSCHAUUNGSPHILOSOPHIE

Author(s): Andrzej Gniazdowski / Language(s): German Issue: 2/2017

Phenomenology, one of the most important and influential philosophical movements of the last hundred years, has been very rarely subjected to the comparative historical research that would placeits idea in the broad socio-political as wells as cultural context. Even more rarely, if at all, has it been analyzed from the perspective of the history of ideas. Such an analysis would allow to regard phenomenology as an expression of some broader worldview. The aim of the article is to reconstruct such a historical as well as practical background of its idea formulated by Edmund Husserl in his Logos-article. The applied method refers in its character to the methodology of the Warsaw School of History of Ideas, especially to the interpretation strategy that Leszek Kołakowski followed in his book Husserl and the Search for Certitude. The conclusion of the article is that the initial, practical impulse of the idea of phenomenology as a rigorous science consisted not so much in his religious,but rather in his socio-political search. This allows us to interpret the idea of phenomenology as a form of resistance against the racist tendencies of that time.

HIDDEN FOUNDATIONS OF DISGUST: REEVALUATING THE EXISTENTIAL NATURE OF DISGUST

Author(s): TOMAS ŠINKŪNAS / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2017

In spite of the many important findings made within the theory of emotions, scholars still struggle to coherently account for the unique structure of disgust or determine its essence. In contrast to much of the contemporary literature on disgust, I aim to show that, through employing the phenomenological method in his 1929 essay “Disgust” (Der Ekel), Aurel Kolnai was able to grasp the real significance of the phenomenon of disgust. The current study aims to clarify and present Kolnai’s insight into the nature of disgust wherein the latter is first and foremost conceived as an ambivalent, multifaceted,but coherent phenomenon. Namely, as a defense mechanism that reacts against the proximity of a disturbing object charged with an ambiguous value of confusion that fluctuates between surplus of life and intention towards death. In order to achieve this goal, I present Kolnai’s notion of disgust by first focusing on the foreground of the phenomena of disgust: the essential features of the intentional content of disgust, the object of disgust in particular. I then present and analyze the life-death complex as the underlying structures of the visceral sense of disgust. Lastly, I show how the life death complex relates to the visceral sense of disgust, thereby affirming the coherence of disgust.

ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ ИНТЕРСУБЪЕКТИВНОСТИ И СОЧУВСТВИЯ МАКСА ШЕЛЕРА. ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ К ПЕРЕВОДУ РАБОТЫ МАКСА ШЕЛЕРА «СУЩНОСТЬ И ФОРМЫ СИМПАТИИ» (ЧАСТЬ A, I — II)

Author(s): Daniil Dorofeev / Language(s): Russian Issue: 2/2017

The article is intended to emphasize the essential significance of Max Scheler, one of the leaders of the “Munich phenomenology”, in the phenomenological movement of the twentieth century,because his role in it is clearly understated today and his phenomenology does not simply amount to a historical context. The author examines the reasons why Scheler’s phenomenology has not received the proper recognition, research and development, appearing in the shadow of such figures as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and others. The article reveals the originality and actuality of Scheler in the field of phenomenological research of intersubjective problems — he began to investigate its in his publications of the 10-ies of the last century first among philosophers. Separately, author marks the principal differences in the solution of the problem of intersubjectivity and the relationship between the I and the Other in the writings of E. Husserl and M. Scheler. So, Scheler’s understanding of intersubjective relations was based on personalistic, axiological, emotional grounds; he did not exaggerate the meaning of the activity of the Self; he turned to the experience of modern psychological theories (for example, Gestalt psychology),especially in the analysis of the perception of the Other in child psychology; he noted intersubjective community as a priori characteristic of human being. At the same time, the connection between Scheler’s understanding of the relationship of the I and the Other and Heideggerian is noted, and his influence to the existential psychotherapy and logotherapy of V.Frankl is a fact. In conclusion author analyzed the four main forms of sympathy that Scheler explores at the beginning of his final work (“The Nature of Sympathy”) in the field of phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As it seems to the author of the article, Scheler’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity is actually today, it can help to more productive reveal the phenomenological potential and deserves more attention and studying.

СУЩНОСТЬ И ФОРМЫ СИМПАТИИ (ЧАСТЬ A, I — II)

Author(s): Max Scheler / Language(s): Russian Issue: 2/2017

We hereby present to the reader a translation of a fragment of one of Max Scheler’s main works,The Nature of Sympathy. Max Scheler was the most important figure in the philosophical life of Europe in the 1910-20s in phenomenology, axiology and philosophical anthropology. This work is an example of expressive, original and deep interconnection and intersection of these directions.The book was published in 1923 and was a significantly expanded, supplemented and rethought version of the book Phenomenology and Theory of the Feeling of Sympathy and of Love and Hate(1913). One of the central themes of this work is the development of a holistic theory of phenomenology of intersubjectivity (which first appeared in printed form) on the basis of the examination of the problems of personal relations between the “I” and “Other” by the experience of emotional sympathy. In the presented translation, Scheler carries out a detailed phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of “sympathy” (Mitgefühl), in the course of which he criticizes theories of the Other (such as that of T. Lipps) and reveals various forms of“sympathy.”

ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ ГУССЕРЛЯ И ФИЛОСОФИЯ СВ. ФОМЫ АКВИНСКОГО. ПОПЫТКА СОПОСТАВЛЕНИЯ

Author(s): Edith Stein / Language(s): Russian Issue: 2/2017

This publication is a translation of the article by Edith Stein, a German-Jewish philosopher, inwhich she analyses and compares philosophical positions and theories of Edmund Husserl andThomas Aquinas. The selection of such central figures results from two main directions in Stein’slife and research: on the one hand, from phenomenological work as Husserl’s scientific assistant and editor of his manuscripts, and, on the other hand, from her conversion to Catholicism, whichled her to a detailed learning of Thomas Aquinas’ legacy and initiation into the Carmelitesreligious order. The challenge that Edith Stein offers in this work is to bring these two waystogether, to break the boundary between faith and knowledge and to show the possibilities ofproductive interaction between both phenomenological and scholastic methods. Despite their greatdivergences caused by historical background and different starting points of philosophical thought,Stein shows us, that these methods share common basic foundations and are able to complementeach other in solving philosophical problems arising from experience, knowledge and practicalaction in the world. Thanks to studies that have been undertaken, the author draws the conclusionthat the scholastic legacy of Aquinas could be promising for findings ways to deal with someinternal problems of Husserl’s phenomenological project and to overcome its limitation. The firstattempt of such a comparison that was realized in this article provides the basis for another ofStein’s works, namely her book Finite and Infinite Being (Endliches und ewiges Sein), where shetries to build her own ontological project based on the synthesis of the scholastics andphenomenology but is placed mostly in the coordinate system of Aquinas’ theoretical field.

IDEEN II: L’ESPRIT ET SON CORPS

Author(s): BEAT MICHEL / Language(s): French Issue: 2/2017

It is well known that Husserl never accepted to publish Ideas II. During one of his conversation swith Cairns, he explained his failure to complete the second volume of Ideas by a “feeling of inadequacy to his task”. In this paper I argue that the apparent simplicity of the subject of Ideas II— the successive constitution of the material and animal nature and of the world of spirit — hides a much more difficult question: the relation between nature and spirit, and even more specifically the relation between mind and body. We will show that in Ideas II this problem leads to an aporiain both senses of the word: contradiction between two apparently valid positions and obstruction of a passage. Husserl may well have noticed this aporia when he spoke of a “vicious circle”.However, he was probably not conscious of its severity and did not really develop a solution. We will argue that Husserlian phenomenology simply does not have the conceptual means to tackle the difficulty. To surpass the aporia one must go beyond the strict context of phenomenology to reason in terms of a phenomenological metaphysics.

Fenomenologije prazne intencionalnosti

Author(s): Mark Losoncz / Language(s): Croatian Issue: 03/147/2017

This paper deals with the notion of empty intentionality, with special regard not only to Husserl’s works, but also to posthusserlian – classical and contemporary – phenomenologies. Attention is devoted to the typologies of empty intentionality. The author makes distinction between four aspects: 1. empty representation; 2. empty horizons of perception; 3. empty temporalization; 4. empty consciousness. It seems that the notion of empty intentionality is relevant for the understanding of the historical development of phenomenology, but also in the context of many contemporary philosophical debates.

The Landscape of Contemporary Phenomenology

Author(s): Marzena Adamiak,Marek Pokropski / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2018

The Four Dimensions of Embodiment and the Experience of Illness

Author(s): Māra Grīnfelde / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2018

In this paper I will try to systematically lay out and describe the multiple dimensions of the embodied experience of illness, which until recently has been the main focus within the field of the phenomenology of medicine. In order to do this, I will turn to analysis of the nature of embodiment in Husserl’s phenomenology. I will argue that based on Husserl’s phenomenology of the body, one can distinguish four ways of experiencing one’s body, or four dimensions of embodiment. I will distinguish between experience of one’s body as 1) a bearer of sensations (the affective dimension of embodiment); 2) a seat of free movement, characterized by the faculty of “I can” (the functional dimension of embodiment); 3) a material thing in a causal relationship with the material world (the material dimension of embodiment); 4) a material thing embedded in a social context (the social dimension of embodiment). I will then apply the proposed classification of dimensions of embodiment to the experience of illness, focusing on the various ways these dimensions have been used within the phenomenology of medicine. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it provides a framework for classification of the existing interpretations of the experience of illness; secondly, it opens up a way for a comprehensive analysis of the experience of illness which includes both individual and social aspects of embodiment as well as their mutual intertwining.

The Link between Intersubjectivity and Self-Shaping in the Light of Phenomenological Philosophy

Author(s): Bianca Bellini / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2018

The paper aims to investigate the link between self-shaping and intersubjectivity from a phenomenological perspective. This means that two main topics are here at stake. On the one hand, the paper purports to argue that tackling the link between self-shaping and intersubjectivity from a phenomenological perspective is a meaningful (§1) and sound approach (§2). On the other hand, the paper purports to argue that such an analysis enables us to bring to light an inherent linkage that tethers the topic of intersubjectivity to the sway that other persons hold over one’s process of self-shaping. This influence will be gradually investigated. Firstly, Husserl’s stance on other persons as “variations of my self” (“Abwandlungen meiner Selbst”) will allow us to understand why other persons might hold sway over one’s process of self-shaping and self-knowledge (§3). Secondly, exemplariness will turn out to be the way through which other persons might hold sway over one’s process of self-shaping and self-knowledge: Scheler’s stance on exemplariness will be examined since he makes us treat the question of exemplariness from the standpoint of the process of the formation of individuality: exemplars hold sway over such a process (§4). So, we will rely upon the Husserlian thesis (“the other person is an intentional variation of my self”—“der Andere [ist] eine intentionale Abwandlung meiner selbst”) and the Schelerian thesis (others could become exemplars for me) to argue for a thesis that goes beyond Husserl’s and Scheler’s perspectives: others as exemplars shed light on the eidetic possibilities of myself and others could become exemplars for me since they are variations of myself; that is, they exemplify untaken possibilities of myself.1 We will argue that exemplariness is the key to the link between the issue of intersubjectivity and the process of self-shaping.

ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ИЗМЕРЕНИЕ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИИИ Э.ГУССЕРЛЯ В СВЕТЕ КРИТИКИ Ф.ФЕЛЛМАННА, Х.АРЕНДТ И Ю.ХАБЕРМАСА

Author(s): Andrei Laurukhin / Language(s): Russian Issue: 2/2018

The article analyzes the nature of the presence of the political aspect in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. Reconsidering the critique, expressed in Friedrich Fellmann’s, Hannah Arendt’s and Jürgen Habermas’ works, an author detects the strengths and weaknesses of such critique, as well as reveals the conceptual foundations and content of the political dimension in Husserl’s phenomenology. Herewith, the focus is made on the theory of intersubjectivity and theory of lifeworld, which constitute the conceptual core of Husserl’s phenomenological research on social, ethical and political issues. The reconsideration of Fellmann’s critique is based on considering the nature of the presence of the political dimension in Husserl’s intellectual and biographical legacy. Analyzing Arendt’s critique, an author argues that there are two theories of intersubjectivity existing in Husserl’s phenomenology: a theory of constitution of the alter ego in the “primordial world” through “analogizing transfer” and a theory based on the doctrine of “the primary Self”, mutual constitution and on the analyses of passive genesis. The problematization of Habermas’ critique is based on rethinking given the place of practical philosophy in Husserl’s phenomenology and its importance, as well as on defining the heuristic potential the concept of the lifeworld has for constructing the social and political theory. Relying on the philosophy of the state, reconstructed by Karl Schuhmann adapted from Husserl’s legacy, an author explicates the key prerequisites, ideas and terms, constitutive for the political dimension of Husserl’s phenomenology and essential for its understanding in historic-philosophical and modern contexts. The results of the analysis contribute to more adequate understanding of the nature of the political problematic in Huserl’s phenomenology.

СПЕКУЛЯТИВНОЕ РАССУЖДЕНИЕ В МЕОНТИЧЕСКОЙ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИИ О. ФИНКА

Author(s): EVGENIA SHESTOVA / Language(s): Russian Issue: 2/2018

This study deals with the role a language plays in the phenomenologizing, focusing on the problem of the phenomenological language posed by E. Fink. The function of a language cannot be reduced to expressing the achievements of phenomenologizing. It gives appearance of transcendental realm both as the “illusion” and the “semblance”. The problem of the phenomenological language matters for the theory of phenomenological method as such: E. Fink emphasizes the meontic nature of transcendental realm in the 6th Cartesian Meditation. Though, in order to describe this realm phenomenologists have to use natural language, preformed within the natural attitude. The new way of description is required in order to prevent phenomenology from being “mundanized”: allowing the transcendental realm to appear and yet maintaining its particular ontological characteristic. It may be achieved through the metaphor-based speculative projection (Entwurf). This study considers the relevant correlation between Fink’s theory of the method and classical German philosophy: it juxtaposes Kant’s transcendental dialectics and the doctrine of the method with Fink’s “transcendental theory of the method” and Hegel’s Absolute spirit with Fink’s concept of Absolute. The ambiguous and vague natural word, that may be redefined, has a productive capacity for being used in the speculative projection. The right way of description transforms it into a speculative concept, which both raises a problem and maintains its problematic nature. The speculative projection provokes philosophical astonishment and requires readers to get into phenomenologizing.

TRACING THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS TO ITS SOURCE IN THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF A PSYCHIATRIST

Author(s): SVETLANA SHOLOKHOVA / Language(s): Russian Issue: 2/2018

The paper explores the guiding motif of psychopathological phenomenological investigation. In other words, it investigates when, how and why the phenomenological method is applied to that, which represents the sole object of study in psychopathology. The exploration begins with a reappraisal of a famous case of melancholia presented by one of the founders of phenomenological psychiatry, Ludwig Binswanger. In critical reading of Binswanger’s analysis I give, I argue that we should shift the focus from a patient to a phenomenologizing psychiatrist, to his or her own experience of the situation and the role it plays in application of the phenomenological approach to the analysis of this situation. Surprisingly, the personality of a psychiatrist has never been regarded as the ultimate object of phenomenological and psychopathological study per se neither by Binswanger, nor by other phenomenologizing psychiatrists, although a certain amount of attention has been paid to the relationship between a clinician and a patient by researchers. Moreover, to date, no one has questioned the relationship between the psychiatrist’s subjective experience, characterized by a strong emotional input, and the process of establishing a phenomenological attitude. In this paper, I reveal how feelings of a psychiatrist encountering psychosis and, in particular, the malaise of a psychiatrist relate directly to applying the phenomenological method in order to understand of the clinical situation. This, in turn, allows me to revise the role of the phenomenological approach, as providing a psychiatrist with the tools for acknowledging the singular relationship, which his or her psychiatric knowledge has with his or her own experience of the clinical encounter.

BUDDHISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MINDFULNESS MEDITATION

Author(s): Pradeep P. Gokhale / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2018

Unlike most other philosophical systems of India, Buddhism, though it gives a central place to “consciousness” in its philosophical enquiry, does not raise its status to a transcendental metaphysical level. Buddhism, in this way, has a special affinity with the phenomenological approach. The present paper focuses on the points of a contact between phenomenology and mindfulness meditation, the Buddhist spiritual practice. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part gives an account of the four kinds of mindfulness meditation based on the Buddha’s sermons on mindfulness. Then it focuses on their core features, namely, “objectivity”, “impermanence and other essential features” and “dynamic, yet passive awareness”. These features bring the two approaches close to each other. The second part brings out similarities and differences between the two approaches. The phenomenological approach, like the approach of mindfulness meditation regards consciousness as being of the intentional and propositional nature. It also emphasizes immanent to consciousness and brackets transcendent to it. Both approaches exhibit a scientific temperament and both tend to be presupposition-less. In spite of these close similarities, there are glaring differences between these two approaches. The phenomenological inquiry is aimed at intellectuality, whereas that of the Buddhist approach is spiritual. Phenomenology attributes reality to essences, whereas there is a tendency to deny ontological status to essences in Buddhism. Husserl’s acceptance of transcendental or pure ego contrasts with the no-self theory of Buddhism. Intentionality attributed to consciousness is also alien to all forms of Buddhism. The third part of the paper asserts the similarities and differences between the two approaches open to various possible forms of phenomenological practice. Furthermore, the paper suggests that different models of phenomenology are possible within Buddhism.