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THE PROBLEM OF PASSIVE CONSTITUTION IN HUSSERL’S GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY

Author(s): Natalia Artemenko / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2019

The problem of passive constitution in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is worthy of particular attention, since it is passive constitution, rather than active conscious constitution, which can be considered to be one of the focal points of 20th century philosophy. Thematisation of the sphere of passivity is related to resolving the problem of intersubjectivity. The elaboration of the problem of intersubjectivity is not so much a response to an externally cast reproach ‘in solipsism’ as an internal theme of phenomenology itself. Husserl aspired to establish phenomenological science as being of universal significance to everybody, but in order to make this discipline significant, i.e. in order to make it necessary for everyone else, it was primarily necessary to prove the existence of these other Selves or of the transcendental subjects. I will elaborate on the history of the consideration which Husserl gave to the problem of intersubjectivity, in order to clarify how his attempts to resolve the problem of intersubjectivity, based on the activity of the Self, led to an egocentric model, and in turn how the need to overcome this model led to the thematisation of the genesis of subjectivity, and the detection of passivity as the very basis of such genesis. According to my working hypothesis, it was largely the demand for thematisation of the genesis of the sense of ‘the Other’ which influenced the modification of the phenomenological method. Finally, I will turn to the concept of primary subjectivity, or Ur-Ich, in order to bring into focus the methodological significance of distinguishing the proto-Self for the substantiation of intersubjectivity, since only in its ‘context’ does the ultimate level of the foundation of the individual Self appear to be not merely a deeper level of consciousness, or the history of a universal subject, but the absolute subjectivity, as a field of intersubjective interaction in which the individual subject is awakened (individualized) to self-constitution in the world. Only then can we reconsider the constitution of the individual Self as being primarily passive, as being permeated by the primordial passive, independent from the Self, aiming for the co-constitution of the intersubjective world.

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О ВНЕШНЕМ И ВНУТРЕННЕМ ОПЫТЕ: ФРАНЦ БРЕНТАНО И МЕЙСТЕР ЭКХАРТ

Author(s): Yaroslav Slinin / Language(s): Russian Issue: 2/2019

Franz Brentano takes as a premise of his theory that along with an external experience there is an internal experience. The external experience introduces us into the world of things that are transcendental with regard to our consciousness. The internal experience helps us to read the structure of the consciousness itself. While the basis of the external experience is censorial perception, the basis of the internal experience is internal perception. The internal perception shows that the consciousness is a sequence of acts in the flow of our internal time. According to Brentano each act of consciousness is an intention or an orientation towards an object, which can be called an intentional object. Intentions together with their objects are immanent with regard to consciousness. Among the acts of external experience are censorial perception, imagination, contemplation, desire, will, and etc. There is no agreement within philosophers on the issue of the relation between intentional objects of the acts of that type and transcendental things. On this basis, Brentano believes that the data of the external experience acts is not obvious. On the contrary, the data of the internal experience is obvious since the objects of inner perception are the acts of consciousness, and so the inner experience has nothing that is transcendent with regard to consciousness. Brentano points out that scholastic philosophers have already been aware of human consciousness intentional nature. The article investigates the theory of soul powers of Meister Eckhart. According to Eckhart soul powers are, among others, censorial perception, imagination, intellect, and will. The results of their contact with objects that belong to the external, created world are the images of that objects in soul. Hence, soul powers correspond to intentions of external experience acts, and images in soul correspond to the intentional objects of that acts. Furthermore, Eckhart argues that another power intended not towards external, created world, but towards consciousness profundity can be woken up in souls of specially prepared human beings. Eckhart refers to this ‘honorable’ intention as to ‘light’ or ‘spark’ of the soul. This ‘spark’ is fully related to the inner experience and meets God on its own way not in the capacity of an image, but at first hand and in a manifest manner. However, it is important to note that according to Eckhart Holy Trinity is only an intermediate point on the way of ‘honorable’ intention. The intentional object that is at the very end on the way of ‘honorable’ intention is allegorically called by Eckhart the Profundity of Profundity, Silent Desert, and Undivided Silence.

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SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING: WITTGENSTEIN BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND POSITIVISM

Author(s): Ondřej Beran / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2019

The paper explores some philosophical consequences of the phenomenological criticisms addressed (indirectly) to logical positivism. It introduces arguments by Husserl and Patočka concerning the duality inherent to the notion of world, as suggested by modern scientism: the real world is alleged to be different from, and hidden behind, the everyday appearance (perception) of the world and things within it. Carnap’s project of reconstructing (scientific) knowledge in reductionist terms of psychological—atomic sense-data—and, ultimately, physical objects distinguishes him from Husserl: for the latter, meaningful experience originates in primitive encounters with meaningful things. Both, however, share a certain preoccupation with reductionist analyses of scientific rigour, while this tendency has been abandoned in Wittgenstein’s works. His expanded notion of verification betrays motivations of a phenomenological kind. He tries to show that the relationship between simpler and more complex contents of knowledge is a relationship between contents playing different, but interlinked, roles within our practices of understanding and making ourselves intelligible. Understanding other people and the events in their lives in terms of a soul (and what happens to it) is not a marginal, eccentric, or derivative case: it is the central, primitive form of this understanding. Wittgenstein’s working with the notion of ‘soul’ parallels Husserl’s analyses from Ideas II.

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Vnímání druhého a dialog

Author(s): Maurice Merleau-Ponty / Language(s): Czech Issue: 57/2019

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Poznámka k Merleau-Pontyho textu Vnímání druhého a dialog

Author(s): Jakub Čapek / Language(s): Czech Issue: 57/2019

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Prostorovost zkušenosti

Author(s): Eliška Fulínová / Language(s): Czech Issue: 57/2019

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Fenomenologie na křižovatce. Zamyšlení nad prací Elišky Fulínové La conception phénoménologique de l’espace

Author(s): Pavel Kouba / Language(s): Czech Issue: 57/2019

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L’ACTE THÉRAPEUTIQUE ET LOGOTHÉRAPIE TRANS-NOÉTIQUE

Author(s): Rolf Kühn / Language(s): French Issue: 1/2020

The therapeutic act and trans-noetic logotherapy. This text shows the permanent interference of clinical and phenomenological data in the logotherapy of Viktor E. Frankl in what concerns the existential analysis from our historical being and its “meaning”. This debate remains essential for any reader and practitioner in current psychotherapy and psychoanalysis to identify the foundations of man in his trans-noetic unity of flesh, drive and spirit, engaging his freedom and responsibility from an original desire without particular object.

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Regėjimo fenomenas: neregimybės nuo

Author(s): Rolandas Bartkus / Language(s): Lithuanian Issue: 102/2020

In this article the relation between vision and the invisibility is discussed. The journey begins in the world of the visible things and reflections. The territory of invisibility is reached while discussing paradoxes of the encounters of the seer and the seen. Invisibility is evidently referred to and linked by the visible things; at the same time invisibility speaks in riddles to the depths of the seer. Excursion from the visible to the invisible is not accidental or unexpected: this intuition is already laid down in the beginnings of an insightful mind or a vigilant look. After all, visibility is woven in the medium of things which extend the human body. Therefore extensions mediate the relations of seer and seen. Contradictions arise when one tries to combine the separate parameters of the visible reality with the whole.

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L’inconscient et conscience de soi. Merleau-Ponty entre phénoménologie et psychanalyse

Author(s): Jan Puc / Language(s): French Issue: 2/2018

This paper addresses the question as to whether the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious is compatible with the phenomenological notion of consciousness defined as self-awareness. This problem is approached by explicating various concepts that Merleau-Ponty used in his attempts at a reinterpretation of the psychoanalytic unconscious. At first, the paper focuses on MerleauPonty’s position in the Phenomenology of Perception, which is specified by the concepts of bad faith, institution and body schema. After that, it is explained what are the implications of Merleau-Ponty’s late conceptions of primordial symbolism and embodied intersubjectivity for the problem of the unconscious and its manifestation in the consciousness.

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DER SCHATTEN AN DER GRENZE DER EPOCHE

Author(s): Luigi Azzariti-Fumaroli / Language(s): German Issue: 1/2020

The postulate of Husserlian phenomenology, according to which evidence is the giving of thought to the thing, also contemplates the possibility that certain ways of givenness may be achieved by transgressingthe dynamics proper to intellectual intuition. Thus, the primacy of direct perception would be replaced by a system of relations between thought and thing in respect of which there would be no single evidence. This outcome, rather than the finiteness of human subjectivity, should bring one back to the very essence of the object. Evidence would therefore know a conversion that would make it coincide with the ultimate degree of visibility, corresponding to the invariant element of the object.But the attestation, in Husserl’s reflection, of an a priori rooted in the factual or in a “definitively true world” would imply in turn the assumption of a perspective inclined to a form of realism sustained by a “minimum of reality.” This would entail a phenomenology in which the manifestation of entities is no longer linked to the subjective sphere but to a dimension of self-evidence within which the phenomenon coincides with its own evidence. In this sense Husserl seems to reach the acquiescentia in re ipso of the phenomenon: a dwelling of it in its own essence; a dwelling in which the phenomenon would not reveal itself through any grammar of the visible.

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NEO-HUSSERLIAN MEDITATIONS: EXTENDING INTENTIONALITY TO THE OBJECTIVE REALM IN FIRST PHENOMENOLOGY

Author(s): Ádám Lovász / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2020

I seek here to return to the original spirit of Edmund Husserl’s “radicalism.” To be radical means to be both rooted in a tradition and to retrace a path back to one’s roots. According to the position I advocate,phenomenology may be reconceived of as an enterprise in realism. Through a creative rereading of one of phenomenology’s founding texts, Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, I suggest that phenomenologycan indeed provide us with a semantics applicable to realist ontologies, provided we excise phenomenological concepts from their subjectivist framework, providing a new structure with which to analyze reality. Specifically, Husserl’s eidetic Apriori may be reconceived as denoting the inherent dynamism of existents. Movement would be the basis of manifestation, a universal category unconditioned in itself.That which appears need not be synonymous with all that which is given to experience. The eidos is the manifold of coiled movements awaiting manifestation, whilst the a priori is movement in itself. Following Graham Harman’s lead, I expand the scope of the Husserlian idea of intentionality, reconceptualizing it as the directionality pertaining to any process whatsoever. Following Jaakko Hintikka, I takethe cogito to be nothing other than performativity in its emergent state. Several different phenomenal horizons can connect to the same type of intentionality. The nonlinear nature of temporality means that even radically distant horizons are capable of sharing in the same intentionality. Once reenvisioned as a “genuine universal ontology” (this is Husserl’s expression), phenomenological semantics can be extended to include any and all types of existents. First phenomenology need not maintain the primacy of perception or subjectivity.

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SOUND ONTOLOGY AND THE BRENTANO-HUSSERL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME

Author(s): JORGE LUIS MÉNDEZ-MARTÍNEZ / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2020

Both Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl addressed sound while trying to explain the inner consciousness of time and gave to it the status of a supporting example. Although their inquiries were not aimed at clarifying in detail the nature of the auditory experience or sounds themselves, they made some interesting observations that can contribute to the current philosophical discussion on sounds.On the other hand, in analytic philosophy, while inquiring the nature of sounds, their location, auditory experience or the audible qualities and so on, the representatives of that trend of thought have remained silent about the depiction of sound and the auditory phenomena in the phenomenological tradition. The paper’s intention is to relate both endeavours, yet the perspective carried out is that of analytic philosophy and, thus, I pay special attention to conceptual analysis as a methodological framework.In this sense, I first explain what sound ontology is in the context of analytic philosophy and the views that it encompasses—namely, the Property View (PV), the Wave View (WV) and the Event View (EV)—. Secondly, I address the problems it entails, emphasising that of sound individuation. Ina third section, I propose the possibly controversial conjunction of a “Brentano-Husserl Analysis of the Consciousness of Time” (for short “Brentano-Husserl analysis”) and outline the commonalities of both authors, without ignoring its discrepancies. My main focus is Husserl’s 1905 Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins. While addressing the Brentano-Husserl analysis, I elaborate on the problem of temporal and spatial extension (Raumlichkeit and Zeitlichkeit, respectively) ofboth consciousness and sound. Such comparison is a key one, since after these two developments, one can notice some theoretical movements concerning the shift of attention from sounds to the unity of consciousness, and how they mirror each other. After examining the controversial claims concerning the temporal and spatial extension of both consciousness and sound, I argue in the concluding paragraphs that while considering the accounts of sound ontology, the Brentano-Husserl analysis would probably endorse a Property View and that this could have interesting consequences for the issue of Sound Individuation.

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ФЕНОМЕОЛОГИЯ И СИМВОЛ: ОТ ГУССЕРЛЯ К БАШЛЯРУ

Author(s): Boris Sokolov / Language(s): Russian Issue: 1/2020

“Blindness” to the problem of the symbol necessarily follows from the main positions of the research strategy of Husserl phenomenology. However, both noema and noesis, as well as the flow of cogitations in our minds are initially infected with symbolism, and therefore the project of phenomenological description needs a “symbolic correction.” The supposed and experienced object is supposed as a symbolically filled object, and the position of the ego describing, constituting, experiencing its object is not only initially infected with cultural symbolism, but also represents the “assemblage point” of any phenomenon as a “constellation” formation. Symbolism is initially “embedded” in any phenomenon and in any scheme of “pure” consciousness. Correspondingly, the flow of phenomena that can be subjected to both noematic and noetic description proceeds according to various “scenarios,” “schemes,” which are nationally and culturally based, and do not follow the single universal route (Past, Present, Future), which is peculiar only to the new European model of time. This drawback of Husserl’s project was overcome in varying degrees by some phenomenologically oriented philosophers. The author of the article analyzes one of such “symbolic adjustments” by reference to the poetic topology (microphenomenology) of poetic image of the Home in the text of French philosopher G. Bachelard.

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НА ГРАНИЦЕ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКОГО ОПЫТА: ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ К ПУБЛИКАЦИИ ПЕРЕВОДА ФРАГМЕНТА ИЗ «ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИХ РАЗМЫШЛЕНИЙ» МАРКА РИШИРА

Author(s): Anna Yampolskaya,Sacha Carlson / Language(s): Russian Issue: 1/2020

The aim of this paper is to present and briefly comment on our Russian translation of the first of Phenomenological Meditations of Marc Richir (1943–2005), a key figure of the “New French Phenomenology”(a term of Gondek and Tengelyi). Richir develops a phenomenological architectonics by distinguishing between the “symbolic” and “phenomenological” layers of sense. The symbolic sense, as a sense that is already instituted or that could be instituted, is opposed to the phenomenological sense,which is a sense in formation. The sphere of the phenomenological can be reached by way of a new,more radical reduction, which Richir calls a “hyperbolic reduction.” Richir’s phenomenological project nova methodo opens up new possibilities for the transcendental phenomenology.

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Fenomenologie bez theologie. Nad knihou Dominiqua Janicauda Theologický obrat ve francouzské fenomenologii

Author(s): Petr Prášek / Language(s): Czech Issue: 58/2020

This article is a critical review of the book: Na rozhraních fenomenologie. Transcendence, jevení a zkušenost (přel. M. Pokorný, Praha 2019

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Problemgeschichtliche Notizen zur „Architektonik“ als „Prinzip der Suche“

Author(s): Fabian Erhardt / Language(s): German Issue: 1/2019

In the following considerations we want to demonstrate that “architectonics” in the Kantian sense, as the “zetetic principle of search”, forms an informative tool to address the dynamization of the transcendental, an extremely productive motif of contemporary philosophy in general, and of phenomenology in particular. Furthermore, we want to outline the extent to which Marc Richir tries to make the concept of architectonics fruitful in order to address the “phenomenality of phenomena” in its irreducible contingency, without concealing it in an archaeological foundation or teleological finalization.

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Richir lecteur de Fink : méthode et architectonique

Author(s): Stéphane Finetti / Language(s): French Issue: 1/2019

This paper focuses on an important moment in Richir’ s elaboration of the question of method and architectonic: his confrontation with Fink’ s phenomenology and especially with Sixth Cartesian Meditation. Moving from Fink’ s approach to phenomenological reduction and to architectonic in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation, we will see how Richir recasts them in the Sixth Phenomenological Meditation.

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L’aporie architectonique dans la phénoménologie richirienne

Author(s): Frank Pierobon / Language(s): French Issue: 1/2019

Marc Richir has made innumerable mentions of architectonics in most of his major works. The very name comes from Kant’ s Critique of Pure Reason where it refers to an “art of systems” which status is rather elusive. Yet, the stringent systematicity of Kant’ s thought may give the feeling that it is nothing more than a monstrous theoretical construct, that which Marc Richir would denounce as Gestell. His fascination for architectonics nevertheless endures while he radicalises the dichotomy between the Gestell – a machine-like logical automaton – and a newly coined version of the Kantian sublime to locate the “phenomenon as nothing-but-phenomenon”. Phenomenology, especially in Husserl’ s legacy, struggles to establish itself as a rigorous science and fails to acquire the required “transcendental theory of methodology” for doing so. Marc Richir, while tackling head on the same aporia in his Phenomenological Meditations (1992), hopes for a solution in promoting an utterly radicalised phenomenology solely concerned with nascent phenomena with no regard to epistemological concerns of methodology. I suggest that such aporia may prove indomitable as long as the phenomena which phenomenology undertakes to explore only exist as scriptural descriptions, i.e. as text(s).

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Que veut dire, finalement, « épochè hyperbolique » ?

Author(s): Pablo Posada Varela / Language(s): French Issue: 1/2019

The so called “hyperbolic épochè” by Richir has currently been understood from its consequences alone (“suspension of the symbolic institution”, “return to the realm of the pre-objective”, “suspension of intentionality itself ”). We thus miss the very specificity of its operations. Among these, the hypothesis of a Genius Malignus should be grasped as a counter-apperception which leads to a suspension of the phenomenologizing ego itself, therefore spread away from the living present and from its identity with the transcendental ego and the pre-being of the transcendental in general. Only such a counterperformativity allows the phenomenalization of a wider spectrum of phenomena that can only be analyzed by means of an architectonical reduction. 1.

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