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The Islamic State: A Threat to Russia

Author(s): Anna Maria Dyner,Kacper Rękawek / Language(s): English

The Islamic State’s military offensive constitutes not only a threat to other states of the region, Europe and the United States, but also to Russia. This is down to the potency of the spread of Islamist ideology within the borders of the Caucasus entities of the Russian Federation, and also the latter’s international environment. For this reason, while criticising the American and European policies in the Middle East, Russia is simultaneously in favour of armed activities aimed at the Islamic State, and the Russian authorities are proposing the formation of a new, anti-terrorism coalition under the auspices of the United Nations. Poland should join it only if the U.S. and EU Member States are also going to participate.

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Państwo Islamskie zagrożeniem dla Rosji

Author(s): Anna Maria Dyner,Kacper Rękawek / Language(s): Polish

Ofensywa Państwa Islamskiego jest zagrożeniem nie tylko dla państw regionu, Europy i USA, lecz także dla Rosji. Decyduje o tym podatność kaukaskich podmiotów Federacji, a także jej bezpośredniego sąsiedztwa międzynarodowego, na ideologię islamistyczną. Dlatego Rosja, choć krytykuje politykę amerykańską i europejską na Bliskim Wschodzie, sprzyja operacjom zbrojnym wymierzonym w tę organizację terrorystyczną, a także wysunęła koncepcję utworzenia nowej koalicji pod egidą ONZ. Polska powinna poprzeć taką koalicję jedynie pod warunkiem, że będą brały w niej udział również USA i państwa UE.

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How the War in Ukraine Impacts NATO Policy in the Black Sea Region

Author(s): Filip Bryjka / Language(s): English

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has increased the strategic importance of the Black Sea region for the security of NATO’s Eastern Flank. The activity of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, energy blackmail, and blocking of sea lines of communication pose a threat to the Alliance and its partner states (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia). Although NATO’s ability to operate in the Black Sea is limited by the Montreux Convention, the Alliance can enhance deterrence credibility by increasing its military presence in the region and expanding cooperation with partners.

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Safe skies? Air defence on NATO’s northern, eastern and south-eastern flank

Author(s): Jacek Tarociński,Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

The Russian aggression against Ukraine has highlighted the crucial role of air and missile defence in modern full-scale conflicts. A multi-layered, adequately saturated and integrated system is necessary to provide cover for troops, and also to protect the critical infrastructure and major population centres of the countries on NATO’s northern, eastern and south-eastern flank. These countries, along with Sweden and Finland, have varying levels of air defence protection, but none of them are currently sufficient in themselves, and the ongoing efforts to build multi-layered air defences leave much to be desired. Only some of these countries are in the advanced process of modernising and building up their capabilities. There are also some whose systems provide only rudimentary protection, and which have no plans to develop them adequately or are unable to do so for financial reasons. This poses a problem more broadly for the Alliance as a whole, as the critical infrastructure in these countries – which will be used for military purposes in case of a NATO operation – is insufficiently protected.

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Total defence. Six months of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine

Author(s): Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): English

After six months of war, Ukraine can celebrate success – due to the mobilisation of its entire population to fight, and to unceasing reconnaissance and logistics support from the West, it continues to successfully defend itself. Russia, in turn, has failed to attain its initial objectives, including the “denazification” and “demilitarisation” of Ukraine and the intention to seize control of the country. The armed confrontation has already lasted far longer than the Kremlin had anticipated, which suggests that the first six months of war can be viewed from Russia’s perspective as a failure. Since the end of March 2022, when Russia decided to withdraw its troops from northern Ukraine and from portions of Mykolaiv Oblast, and when a frontline was formed in the south and in the east, Russian aggression has shifted from a phase of manoeuvre warfare to that of trench warfare. Since then, the strategic situation has not changed significantly and remains largely static. However, Russia continues to possess the initiative and any changes happening at the front are the consequences of its actions. The aggressor’s troops have maintained a relatively stable land bridge with Crimea and are slowly pushing the Ukrainian army back from its positions in the Donbas, which continues to be the main area of fighting. For the time being, the counter-offensive announced by Kyiv continues to form part of an information strategy aimed at boosting the defenders’ morale. Ukraine continues to lack sufficient manpower and adequate means, i.e. mainly heavy weaponry of an offensive nature, to attempt to recapture the occupied territories.

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Moscow’s long war: Russia’s political calculations after 100 days of conflict

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak / Language(s): English

Although 100 days have passed since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has not achieved even the hypothetical minimum objective of the operation: the capture of the entire Donbas. The fierce Ukrainian resistance and Western support for Kyiv mean that, despite the concentration of forces in selected sections, the Russian army’s progress is slow, and being paid for with high losses. However, the Kremlin has still not decided on a serious escalation of the conflict, whether by declaring general mobilisation, using weapons of mass destruction, or moving the conflict beyond Ukraine’s borders. These scenarios, although they cannot be completely ruled out, seem unlikely today. Rather, Russia is limiting (albeit probably temporarily) the scale of its ambitions for territorial gains in Ukraine, and is striving to reach lines that could create the appearance of victory and the achievement of the formal objectives of its ‘special operation’. Above all, however, the Kremlin now proclaims and believes that the current situation is merely an episode in a long-term war with the West as a whole. Accordingly, it is attempting to conduct economic and humanitarian aggression, and seeking to maximise the costs on the part of both Ukraine and the West that supports it. At the same time, it hopes that their resilience has clear limits and will ultimately force them to make political concessions to Moscow, which will bring a needed pause allowing Russia to prepare for the next stage of confrontation.

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Ukraine: 100 days of existential war

Author(s): Tadeusz Iwański / Language(s): English

Ukraine: 100 days of existential war President Volodymyr Zelensky’s decision to stay in Kyiv after the start of the Russian invasion on 24 February and his immediate assumption of leadership in defending the country on the very first day of the war made him the leader around whom society and most of the political elite consolidated. His attitude fully reflected the public mood. Together with the army’s effective resistance, it allowed Ukraine, despite losing control over part of its territories in the east and south of the country (a total of around 80,000 km2), to maintain its sovereignty, the functionality of its state institutions and prevent the Kremlin from achieving its original military and political objectives. The 100 days of effective resistance is an undoubted success. It has boosted the pride and ambitions of Ukrainians and prompted the authorities and society to formulate far-reaching political goals: to regain Crimea and Donbas, to cut themselves off from everything Russian, and ultimately to build a new Ukraine – a modern one, institutionally belonging to Europe. The scale of Russian war crimes has drastically reduced public consent to any compromise with Russia. At the same time, the prolonged war has increased the number of military and civilian casualties and deepened the economic and infrastructural disaster, making the country dependent on aid from Western countries. Similarly, capabilities on the battlefield depend on Western military aid: arms and ammunition supplies and, by the same token, the political will of the ruling elites of these countries.

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Having your cake and eating it. Georgia, the war in Ukraine and integration with the West

Author(s): Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): English

Georgia’s reaction to the war in Ukraine can be called ambivalent. Although Tbilisi condemned the aggression, it has not joined the anti-Russian sanctions. Indeed, according to Kyiv, Georgia has been violating them and allowing Russia to circumvent them, although so far there is no hard evidence of this. Georgia’s stance of ‘benevolent neutrality’ towards the aggressor maybe partly explained by the fear of a Russian threat; objectively, however, this stance means de facto support for Moscow. In the context of the cooling of relations between Georgia and the West (i.e. the EU & US) observed over the last few years, this raises the question of whether Tbilisi is not carrying out a creeping reorientation of its foreign policy from pro-Western to pro-Russian – something which the Georgian opposition has accused the government of doing. It seems that although at the moment there is no question of a deliberate geopolitical shift, the drift towards Moscow is setting a new tone, and it is becoming increasingly inconvenient for Washington and Brussels to support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

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Ukraine: from decommunisation to derussification

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): English

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the brutal manner in which it is being waged have united Ukraine’s society and government in its efforts to derussify many spheres of public life. Pro-Russian parties have lost almost their entire electorate and have been banned, Russian historical figures and symbols are being eradicated from the public space, the Russian language and culture are being removed from school curricula and public spaces, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is facing a crisis and trying to reduce its ties with Moscow. The majority of Ukrainians are rejecting Russian culture, viewing it as a tool their enemy is using to build its imperial status and to shape a Russian-centric, colonial consciousness. This is accompanied by an increase in national pride and identity –the popularisation and affirmation of Ukrainian symbols, historical figures and cultural legacy, and the restoration of those who were removed from the public space during the communist period and remained forgotten after regaining independence. Society is uniting in these aspirations and values, and previous regional divisions have largely been bridged. As in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, the impetus to accelerate the formation of a new anti-Russian identity for Ukrainians was provided by Russia itself. However, the unprecedented scale of ongoing aggression means that the scope of these aspirations is incomparably greater today. From decommunization, which began on a larger scale after the occupation of Crimea, Ukraine is moving towards a “full-scale”, final derussification, covering all spheres of life, including its history and the vision of its future.

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Terror, pacification, occupation Russia’s actions in the occupied territories of Ukraine

Author(s): Piotr Żochowski / Language(s): English

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has put the problem of how to manage the territories it has occupied onto the agenda. The first phase of the land operation did not lead to the capture of any significant areas, destroy the enemy’s army, force the Ukrainian government to flee Kyiv or suppress civil resistance, so it ended in failure – not only militarily, but also politically. The plans to force the inhabitants of the occupied territories into supporting the invaders and establish so-called ‘people’s republics’ there in order to further fragment the Ukrainian state have also ended in failure. The Kremlin, acting according to its modus operandi from 2014, has once again failed to take into account the changes in the attitudes of Ukrainian society, which does not see Russia as a civilizational alternative. Despite the risks associated with doing so, the locals have been protesting in large numbers, and cases of collaboration with the occupiers have been sporadic, which has made it impossible for the latter to exert their full and undisturbed control over the captured territories. And as the invaders see that their actions are ineffective, they take revenge on the civilians: they use terror and pacification, commit war crimes, and bring about humanitarian catastrophes in the occupied towns. The results of the operation so far show that its initial aim was to destroy the civilian population in the north, and to force the Ukrainians to cooperate in the south.

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German arms deliveries to Ukraine – the SPD’s controversial course

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

For some time now, Germany has been vigorously discussing military aid deliveries to Ukraine. The German government, which made a landmark decision in the first days of the invasion to start supplying Kyiv with weapons, became more cautious about extending military support in the following weeks of the war. Domestic pressure from the coalition parties and public opinion, as well as from Ukraine and NATO countries, have forced Chancellor Olaf Scholz to reluctantly extend its scope. German support still remains far behind that of the main NATO countries, however. The Social Democrats, who are responsible for the course of government policy, justify their restrained approach with a number of reasons. Nevertheless, it seems that behind this stance lies a conviction that Ukraine cannot fully win this war and Russia cannot completely lose it and risk being pushed to a political and economic collapse. According to the SPD’s prevailing opinion, this would lead to some potentially risky scenarios – escalation of the conflict by the use of weapons of mass destruction or the implosion of the Russian state, with unforeseeable consequences for Europe. According to the Social Democrats, the war will have to end sooner or later with peace talks, and limiting German military support for Ukraine should enable Berlin to return to its traditional role as an intermediary between Moscow and Kyiv. However, such a strategy on the part of the Chancellery is leading to a loss of Germany’s credibility in the EU and NATO, and in Ukraine also.

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China’s challenges in the Indo-Pacific in the shadow of Russian aggression against Ukraine

Author(s): Michał Bogusz / Language(s): English

The PRC has been in a difficult international position since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The war and the unprecedented sanctions imposed on Moscow are accelerating polarisation in the world. The US global alliance system has worked effectively and there has been not only a consolidation of NATO, but also the establishment of cooperation between US pacific allies – such as Japan and Australia – and European partners. They have also delivered aid to Ukraine, which must raise concerns in Beijing that they could rely on NATO members for support in the event of an Indo-Pacific conflict. Chinese propaganda since the beginning of the war has reproduced the Russian narrative that the Alliance and Washington are responsible. The PRC is not abandoning its long-range strategic goals in the region, but the course of the aggression against Ukraine and the Western response require it to accept new realities. Above all, Beijing must recognise that the incorporation of Taiwan, which remains its priority, will not happen in the near term by means of a local ‘special operation’, but would escalate into a major international conflict for which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will not be prepared in the near future. Recognition of this fact has already resulted in a relative reduction in the current number and intensity of incidents across the Taiwan Strait for the time being.

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Slovakia: strategic dilemmas after the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Author(s): Krzysztof Dębiec / Language(s): English

The centre-right government in Bratislava decided to discontinue its long-standing policy of avoiding antagonizing Russia. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Slovakia has found itself in the vanguard of the countries most involved in providing military and humanitarian aid to Kyiv. Bratislava has expelled 35 Russian diplomats, has closed several pro-Russian websites and intensified the activity of the secret services targeting collaborators of Russian intelligence. Nevertheless, these unprecedented attempts to rid the country of Russian influence are encountering increasing resistance in Slovakia. The opposition, which leads in the polls, is calling for Slovakia to return to the policy of avoiding ‘superpower conflicts’ and is taking increasingly open pro-Russian positions. This way it meets the mood of a large section of the Slovak public who are distrustful of the US. Inside the government, there are concerns about how a rapid end of the reliance on supplies of Russian raw materials will affect the domestic economy and this is making it difficult to reach a consensus on how quickly this should proceed. Halfway through its term in power, the centre-right parties are facing strategic decisions that will also determine their chances of re-election. If the current approach towards Kyiv and the Kremlin is maintained, Slovakia’s position in the EU will strengthen and Russia’s influence in this country may also weaken in the long run. The government, which is not very popular, will have to face the challenge of continuing the effort to become independent of Russian raw material supplies amid an economic downturn and the strong polarisation of public sentiments at home. An alternative may be the continuation of military and humanitarian support for Kyiv, while only simulating activities aimed at energy diversification.

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Wrestling in Greenland. Denmark, the United States and China in the land of ice

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English

International interest in Greenland has been growing for several years. This trend is a result of the increasing global competition between the US, China and Russia (including in the Arctic)and the acceleration of climate change, which is opening the region up to commercial and military activity. The independence aspirations of the island’s inhabitants are also of note in this context. Copenhagen seeks to maintain sovereignty over Greenland because it strengthens Denmark’s significance in the world and provides access to the Arctic. The US has increased its visibility in Greenland due to Chinese investments, and has even considered buying it. For Beijing, the island represents a potential area of economic expansion, providing a valid argument for China to become a major player in the Arctic. This growing interest pleases Greenlanders, who see balancing between Denmark, the US and China as an opportunity for new investments and building the economic foundations of sovereignty.

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The (pan-)Turkic Caucasus. The Baku-Ankara alliance and its regional importance

Author(s): Mateusz Chudziak,Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): English

The Nagorno-Karabakh war of autumn 2020 and the military parade organized in Baku after its end, which was jointly hosted by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey, Ilham Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, highlighted the potential of the alliance between both countries. The close ties between Baku and Ankara result from a strategic choice made almost three decades ago. The diverse activities they have undertaken to strengthen their cooperation have varied in intensity over that period, but their overall direction has remained unchanged. As a result, Azerbaijan has gradually distanced itself from Russia, and through its cooperation with Turkey, it has moved closer (albeit mainly economically) to the West. Ankara, on the other hand, has strengthened its position in the South Caucasus. This has led to the formation of an Ankara-Bakuaxis, which presents a challenge to Moscow because it limits Russian influence in the region. However, the Turkic duo has been taking care not to antagonize Russia directly; one expression of this approach is their acceptance of Moscow’s key role in resolving the Karabakh conflict.

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Cooperation despite mistrust. The shadow of Trianon in Romanian-Hungarian relations

Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): English

On 3 November, the Romanian parliament declared that 4 June would be a new public holiday commemorating the signing of the Treaty of Trianon on that day in 1920. This document formalised the transfer of large territories then belonging to the Hungarian part of Austria-Hungary to the neighbouring countries, including Romania. These lands today constitute over 40% of Romania’s land area. Over the past two years, preparations for the 100th anniversary of the treaty’s adoption have exacerbated the relationship between Romania and Hungary, which perceives this event as a national tragedy. The two states’ widely divergent perceptions of the treaty, and the presence in Romania of a large and politically active Hungarian minority as its result, are a constant source of tensions between the two countries. The Hungarian problem, symbolised by the aforementioned document, resonates throughout society, and has traditionally been exploited as an instrument of political struggle by representatives of the main Romanian political groups. Budapest has also been willing to exploit the ‘Trianon complex’ in the Hungarian mentality for its domestic political aims. However, Hungarian politics does not constitute a real threat to the stability of Romania in the current international environment. The geographic location of both countries obliges them to cooperate, especially in the fields of economy and energy, which mitigates their historical and symbolic disputes.

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No special status, no Armenians? The prospects for Nagorno-Karabakh in a unitary Azerbaijan

Author(s): Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): English

In recent weeks, the Azerbaijani blockade of the Lachin corridor connecting the Armenian-controlled portion of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, which has been in place since mid-December2022, has intensified, and its consequences are becoming increasingly painful: the parastate has been hit by a profound humanitarian crisis. Baku’s main goals are to dismantle the separatist Armenian structures and to fully integrate Nagorno-Karabakh into the Azerbaijani state. If this scenario came to pass, it would most likely prompt a major portion of the Karabakh Armenians to leave, which may effectively be an additional unrevealed goal for Baku. The exodus of this population could pose a serious threat to Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan’s rule. Russian peacekeeping forces, which are responsible for maintaining the corridor’s passability, do not intend to start a conflict with Baku, and have maintained a passive attitude towards the blockade. It should be assumed that they would also not object to Azerbaijan taking over Nagorno-Karabakh, although they could attempt to slow down this process. Since the Second Karabakh War in autumn 2020, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh has not been discussed in the peace talks. The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan have recognized the territorial integrity of both states within the borders of the respective former Soviet republics, which equates to them approving of Baku’s jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh. However, under pressure from Armenians living in Armenia, in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian diaspora, Pashinyan has raised the issue of the Karabakh Armenians’ rights in international forums (effectively demanding that the Lachin corridor should be unblocked). Thus far, the reaction of the international community has been limited to condemning the blockade.

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Global south engagement for peace in Ukraine

Author(s): Matthias E. Leitner / Language(s): English

Precarious Conflict Trajectory - Russia and Ukraine are preparing for a spring offensive with higher levels of military involvement. Spill-over into the region has been avoided so far, despite several drone attacks on Russian bases in occupied Crimea and in western Russia as well as the bombing of Kerch Bridge that connects Crimea with Russia’s Taman peninsula in October 2022, one day after President Putin’s 70th birthday. It is not excluded that intensifying conflict or a costly prolonged stalemate can lead to escalation and actively involve NATO or one of the front-line states with Ukraine.

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2023 Parliamentary Elections in Bulgaria: Between Brussels (Berlin) and Moscow

Author(s): Not Specified Author / Language(s): English

In the Republic of Bulgaria early parliamentary elections will be held on 2 April 2023. At the elections 240 representatives/deputies of the Bulgarian National Assembly will be elected according to the proportional closed-list system. There is a total of 31 electoral constituencies from which, depending on the size of the constituency from 4 to 16 representatives/deputies will be elected. The election threshold is 4%. These are the fifth elections in the past two years, as it was not possible to establish a government on the basis of the results of the previous elections.

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Putin’s War, world meetings, etc.

Author(s): J Scott Younger / Language(s): English

The last period has been busy with world meetings none of which have or only peripherally involved Russia because of their malign intent on Ukraine. A distinct change from reporting about the Ukrainian conflict is the football World Cup, the 4- yearly event now being hosted by Qatar, an occasion which was previously hosted by Russia in 2018, and where Putin was frequently visible. The fact that he had annexed Crimea 4 years before had been ‘forgotten’ about and he took all the praise for a successful event. However, Russia has not qualified for the current Middle East held event. They will be sorely missed! The Qatari event is taking a significant amount of airtime, not just about football, but that is another story.

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