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The purpose of this paper is to discuss the direction in which the command philosophy of the Western militaries is moving. We live in a time of rapid change. The developed world has been living in an information society for some time now, the nature of post-Cold War conflicts seems to be different from previous conflicts, and since 11 September 2001, we have been facing a new and very serious enemy – international terrorism on a truly devastating scale. All of these factors influence the development of the military and pose new requirements for the command structures and arrangements.
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In the past, the cultural dimension of operations abroad either went largely unnoticed or was examined with regard to specific topical aspects. The central issues of analyses were, for instance, intercultural training at domestic military bases, interaction with the local population in the theater, or the coincidence of quite diverse military cultures in multinational units. Based on an evaluation of pertinent literature and my own field research, this article seeks to take another look at the correlation between culture and operations abroad. Using the operation in Afghanistan as an example, it analyzes the claim that a profound reflection on the role of the local culture in the field is necessary and should be of central importance to individual soldiers and to commanders, and should also be recognized at the politico-strategic level at home.
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Chivalry conjures up an image of a medieval warrior in shining armour, riding into battle on a noble steed, to rescue a sleeping princess from a threeheaded dragon. Dragons aside, this popular image is fairly accurate. Chivalry in the broadest sense comprises the ethos of the knight – the mounted combatant that dominated the battlefields of Europe in the Middle Ages – and covers everything from battlefield conduct to courtly love. This association between the mounted warrior and chivalry goes as deep as etymology – in many languages the very word for “knight” is derived from the word for “horse”: thus, in French, chevalier comes from cheval, in Italian cavaliere from cavallo and in Spanish caballero from caballo.
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2013. aasta suvel täitus viis aastat viimasest suurest relvastatud konfliktist postnõukogulikus ruumis – Nõukogude Liidu õigusjärglase Vene Föderatsiooni kallaletungist Gruusiale. Seda võib pidada 1994. aasta detsembris Tšetšeenia sõjaga alanud Venemaa sõjaliste operatsioonide jätkuks Kaukaasias, mille eesmärgiks on olnud suruda maha iseseisvusliikumine ja taastada oma ülemvõim selles strateegiliselt tähtsas regioonis. Lõuna-Kaukaasia on aastasadade vältel kujutanud endast Aasiat ja Euroopat ühendavat transiidikoridori, mida mööda liikusid rahvad ja kaubad. Piirkond oli ka sajandeid kolme naabruses asuva suurriigi – Venemaa, Türgi ning Pärsia (Iraani) – geopoliitiliste huvide kokkupõrke koht. Tänapäeva Gruusia aladel elanud rahvad on näinud ja tunda saanud nii venelastest, türklastest kui ka pärslastest vallutajate piitsa. Eriti rängalt kannatasid moslemite rõhumise all kristlikud riigid Gruusia ja Armeenia. Vene ajaloolased väidavad, et just 1795. aastal Gruusiasse tunginud pärslaste vägivald põhjustas 19. sajandi hakul sealse tsaari Georgi XII pöördumise Vene tsaari Pavel I poole palvega liita Gruusia Vene tsaaririigiga. Vastava manifesti allkirjastas Pavel I 22. detsembril 1800. aastal. Vene väed kindral Lazarevi juhtimisel puhastasid Gruusia pärslastest, riigist sai suure Vene impeeriumi üks osa. Erilise tähtsuse omandas Venemaa jaoks Lõuna-Kaukaasia aga hiljem, sisepõlemismootorite ajastul, kui avastati rikkalikud naftamaardlad Aserbaidžaanis.
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The term “hybrid warfare” was largely unknown to the general public before the EuroMaidan in Kyiv in late 2013 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Despite the recent increased usage of this term, almost to the point of it becoming yet another buzzword, the underlying principles of the phenomenon have been present since the Soviet era. In more recent times, but prior to the events in Ukraine in 2013 and 2014, the concept of hybrid warfare has also been discussed in Western academic and military scholarly work. For example, in 2007 Frank G. Hoffman, described non-linear warfare as a “fusion of war forms emerging, one that blurs regular and irregular warfare”. This is discussed in greater details by Prof. Dr. habil. Col. (ret.) Zdzislaw Sliwa in the current volume.
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The current chapter gives a short overview of political events that played major role in Russia’s information war against Ukraine during the ongoing conflict.
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In the modern international community, there are an increasing number of laws regulating the conduct of states, international organisations, multinational corporations, and individuals. International law is expanding to encompass new areas (e.g. the cyber domain), while existing rules are becoming more detailed (e.g. human rights law). At the same time, various actors have come to attach more importance to legal arguments when, for example, it comes to choosing a course of actions or criticising another’s behaviour. Most states are conscious of how they are perceived by other states and want to avoid the reputation of being a lawbreaking, or rogue state, due to the various negative consequences (e.g. decreased foreign investments, exclusion from international conferences, increased scrutiny by international organisations, etc.).
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This chapter gives an overview of the methods and techniques used by Russia in its information operations against the Ukrainian army in 2014 and 2015. Due to the great variety of these methods, special attention is paid to those that were the most influential and were used most often.
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Ukraine directed its attention to the information sphere only in 2014 when it was faced with a very hostile Russian information campaign combined with overt military aggression. It was then that Ukrainian experts and officials started discussions and analysis, and to publish their recommendations. By the time Ukraine began addressing information security issues and launching countermeasures, the Russian information warfare was already well established.
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One characteristic of the organisational culture of the armed forces is the collectivist disciplinary model. This model is based on values that have developed by the officers’ corps as ‘experts of violence’. Military professionalism is considered to the main value-based concept and is shaped by military, instrumental, nationalist, and traditionalist aspects. A military (self)-identity based on the above aspects can be seen as a type of formalism that is the sum total of other values of individual and collective (including the unconscious) identity. In other words, a serviceman, especially an officer, may also be influenced by the elements of his other non-military identities, e.g. ethnic, religious, political, sexual, or other value-based identities.
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The propaganda war plays a growing role in the confrontation between Russia, Ukraine, and Western countries. However, the criteria and definitions of success in this war have been in constant development during the last two years of the confrontation. The central activities of are based on the same concepts – the demonization and deterrence of the adversary, the legitimisation of one’s own activities to the general public, and the mobilisation of the population and promotion of political elites.
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Komsomolskaya Pravda (KP), established in 1925 in Soviet Union, is one of the oldest newspapers in Russia. The Komsomolskaya Pravda Publishing House does not only have online and print outlets, but also owns a radio channel. KP is still well respected among the Russian audience and is very influential not only in Russia, but has also in Ukraine (especially in Eastern Ukraine), Moldova, Belarus, and in other countries with large Russian diasporas, including the Baltic States.
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Western media and experts refer to the violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and the armed conflict in the Donbas region as: the “Ukrainian crisis”. The term “hybrid warfare”, however, serves as a better designation for the series of actions conducted by Russia against Ukraine, as it provides a more comprehensive understanding of the causes, orientation and nature of these events. “Hybrid warfare” is a military strategy that combines conventional war, cyber war, and small war tactics. Some of the fundamental components of “hybrid warfare” include information dissemination, psychological actions, and cyber attacks aimed at both the physical and technological infrastructure of a state and its citizens1.
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This article traces the evolution of Russian propaganda and its role in active measures. Active measures were originally conceived during the Soviet era but still remain operative as they were recently deployed during the Russian occupation of Crimea and the war against Ukraine in Donbas. During these events active measures underwent something of a renaissance as there was the dramatic upsurge in propaganda usage and media manipulation. Fake media stories and forgeries have long played an integral part in the active measures that have been conducted by the Kremlin, which then amends its military capacity and diplomacy efforts to cover up the deceit. The manufacture and dissemination of fake news stories is carried out in a centralized and systematic fashion as the fabrications must be coherent and maintain alignment with the Kremlin’s policies and talking points. It will be shown that the use of media-related active measures is not a new phenomenon and was widely utilized by the former Soviet Union as a way of actualizing its foreign policy by clandestine means. When examining more than 500 Russian propaganda pieces, which were debunked by the StopFake.org verification project, it becomes evident that the same of falsification and deception patterns that were common to the USSR already in the 1950’s, are still present today. The only difference is the parasitic way in which the current Kremlin propaganda has seized on core liberal Western concepts, such as the promotion of freedom of speech, and then used this as a screen to allow it to deliver ‘the other point of view’. Whereas before the Kremlin historically relied on traditional media, such as printed news to distribute its fake news stories, it now makes use of a much wider array of mediums such as the internet and social media.
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The battle of narratives was a significant aspect of the Ukrainian crisis because the interpretations of events by parties involved in the conflict were very different. This paper addresses issues related to the perception of stories reported by the Russian and Latvian media about the Ukrainian crisis. Latvia was chosen as a case study because it is a country with a pro- Western geopolitical orientation where Russian media content is also widely available. It is estimated that as of March 2016, 25% of Latvia’s television audience were regular viewers of Russian television channels, including the First Baltic Channel, which is registered in Latvia but largely retranslates media content from Russia.
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A debate during the 34th Days of Contemporary Art in Białystok with Edwin Bendyk, Alex Freiheit, Father Wojciech Lemański, Tomasz Sikora, Joanna Wichowska and Serhiy Zhadan. Moderated by: Anna Łazar
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The modern Russian historiography tries to prove the fact as if the ethno-conflicts among Caucasian people (Abkhazian conflict, South Ossetian (Tskhinvali Region), Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan; the so-called Nazran conflict between Ossetians and the Ingush, and Chechen conflict) have historical roots. Actually, Russia generally had the final word in breaking out ethno-conflicts in Caucasus, and later had “an attempt” to settle them, it always tried and even now tries to keep control in the regions, following the principle “Divide and Rule”. The Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region Conflicts represented intrastate conflicts until 2008, where two sides confronted each other, on the one hand – the central government, and on the other hand, the de facto government of breakaway regions. Since the August war 2008, after the Russia`s widespread military aggression and the occupation of 20%of Georgian territories, Abkhazian and South-Ossetian conflicts underwent transformation and became a Georgian-Russian conflict. As far as it concerns the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is a disputable territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The same can be said about the Ossetian and Ingush conflict, where Russia officially plays the role of a mediator, but in reality it is the interested party, and the settlement of conflicts is not in its strategic interests. Regarding Chechnya, it is an open aggression against the country fighting for its independence, which had undergone several genocides before (70s of the XIX century, 1944).
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This paper seeks to analyse Syrian and Eritrean refugees' mobility experience across European borders, in a framework of mobility and insecurity. Drawing on the conflict model of migration, the paper focuses on the effects of migration and asylum policies when these are not in line with refugees’ needs and aspirations. We argue that when the asylum system does not meet with those expectations, insecurity brings into play secondary movements, which occur in a framework of irregularity. The considerations behind this article are motivated by the empirical evidence that both Syrian and Eritrean refugees undertake irregular secondary migration, whilst being within a protection system that most of the times satisfies their asylum claims. This paper is the result of a qualitative research conducted in 2017 through observation, in-depth interviews with Syrian and Eritrean refugees, and consultations with experts and practitioners in Italy, Greece, Germany and Lebanon.
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