František Mihina, Tatiana Sedová, Marián Zouhar (eds.): Logický pozitivizmus
Review of: František Mihina, Tatiana Sedová, Marián Zouhar (eds.): Logický pozitivizmus IRIS, Bratislava 2006, 540 s.
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Review of: František Mihina, Tatiana Sedová, Marián Zouhar (eds.): Logický pozitivizmus IRIS, Bratislava 2006, 540 s.
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P. Tichý finished, and probably also began to write, this paper in 1973. At that time, he was affiliated at the University of Otago, New Zealand, for already three years. From there he sent the paper to Pavel Materna and me. The paper ‘On Describing’ is connected to, in its content, Tichý’s paper ‘An Approach to Intensional Analysis’ which appeared in Noûs 5, 1971, 273 – 297. The former paper was intended by Tichý to make the public familiar with some ideas published in the technically more demanding Noûs paper. In so doing, he pays particular attention to prospects his conceptual apparatus has for solutions of certain philosophical problems. In the second half of the paper, he utilizes a slightly modified language of Chuch’s theory of types (enriched with possible world variables) that Tichý had introduced already in the paper ‘An Approach to Intensional Analysis’. The study ‘On Describing’ is an excellent introduction into Tichý’s work, in particular his semantics. Fundamental intuitive ideas involved in the paper go throughout, in modified forms, all his work.
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The paper reconstructs three main stages in the development of Carnap’s approach to language in the years 1931 – 1947. It starts with Carnap’s approach to metalogic in his Viennese Zirkelprotokolle (1931) and his Logische Syntax der Sprache (1934) from the point of view of one-level approach to the relation between metalanguage and its object-language. It then analyzes Tarski’s turn to semantics in his paper presented at the Paris conference in September 1935, as well as the implications of his view for Carnap’s approach to semantics from 1935 until 1943. Finally, it analyzes Church’s rediscovery of Frege and its impact on Carnap’s shift to the extension/intension distinction in his semantics in the years 1943 – 1947.
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Review of: Petr Dvořák: Jan Caramuel z Lobkovic. Vybrané aspekty formální a aplikované logiky Oikoymenh. Praha 2006, 291 s.
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Recent extensional logic considers a formula containing existential quantifier as an adequate way of rewriting a statement about the existence of something. Quine even claims that “to be is to be the value of a variable”. That means that if we consider a theory to be true, we have to treat all members of an appropriate universe as existing. This article intends to point out a difficulty in this conception: The primary task of an existential quantifier is only to claim that something can be found in a universe, whatever the universe is.
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V tomto texte by som rád kriticky reagoval na text Jiřího Raclavského O vlivu světa 3 na svět 2 na příkladu hudby a vědecké teorie (Raclavský 2004). K reakcii ma primäli na jednej strane nepresnosti pri interpretácii Popperovej teórie troch svetov (TTS) a na strane druhej argumentácia založená na príklade z oblasti umenia. V prvej časti stručne zhrniem spôsob argumentácie J. Raclavského a následne poukážem na nepresnosti pri interpretácii a aplikácii Popperovej TTS. V druhej časti sa sústredím na dôsledky, ktoré z toho plynú pre ontológiu umeleckých diel a vedeckých teórií.
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Sémantická teória určitého člena a deskripcií z predchádzajúcej časti má významnú históriu. V tomto pokračovaní si priblížime pôvodnú teóriu – ide o teóriu deskripcií Bertranda Russella – a porovnáme ju s najvýznamnejšími druhmi konkurenčných prístupov – Fregeho referenčným chápaním deskripcií a Tichého teóriou. Takisto ukážeme, v akých aspektoch sa zhoduje s koncepciou z predchádzajúcej časti.
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Na Palackého univerzite v Olomouci vyšla minulého roku útla, 104 stránková knižka Filozofie logiky Pavla Tichého, v ktorej sa jej autor Karel Šebela zaoberá filozofickými problémami transparentnej intenzionálnej logiky (TIL-ky). Treba oceniť a pri hodnotení jeho práce vziať do úvahy okolnosť, že Šebela napísal prvú väčšiu štúdiu zameranú na filozofické otázky Tichého logiky. Hlavnou ambíciou Šebelovej publikácie, ktorá vznikla, ako píše v úvode, „na základě [jeho] stejnojmenné dizertační práce“, je rekonštrukcia Tichého názorov na tieto problémy a „pokus o obhajobu filozofie logiky TILu“.
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Review of: Marta Vlasáková: Bernard Bolzano. Cesta k logické sémantice. Filosofia. Praha 2005, 108 s.
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Review of: Ludwig Wittgenstein: O istote, Kalligram. Bratislava 2006, 160 s.
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In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P (simpliciter), because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there is a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: ‘point of view’ is a homonymous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term ‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a (set of) evaluating proposition(s) about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent’s attitude to the respective object. The paper is organised into two parts. In Part I we first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II we then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of agents’ attitudes. We explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a P and at the same time a non-P: the agent applies different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes de re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes de dicto, is also analyzed. We show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes unless some additional assumptions are added, and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, we explicate the notion of conceptual point of view and analyze cases of viewpoints given by conceptual distinction. We show, finally, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version.
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Review of: Willard V. O. Quine: Z logického hľadiska, Přeložil Richard Cedzo. Kalligram, Bratislava 2006, 256 s.
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Review of: Lynn Hankinson Nelson – Jack Nelson: Quine, Přeložil Marián Zouhar. Albert Marenčin – Vydavateľstvo PT, Bratislava 2005, 127 s.
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In a 1997 paper Jennifer Saul adduces various examples of simple sentences in which the substitution of one co-referential singular term for another appears to be invalid. I address the question of whether anti-substitution is logically justified by examining the validity and soundness of substitution of co-referential singular terms in three simple-sentence arguments each exhibiting a different logical structure. The result is twofold. First, all three arguments are valid, provided Leibniz’s Law is valid with respect to simple sentences (something Saul herself does not doubt). Thus, as far as these arguments are concerned, there is no logical problem with substitution in simple sentences. Second, two of the arguments cannot be sound, because their respective sets of premises are inconsistent. Thus, it would be logically irrational to commit oneself to all the premises of the respective arguments. To the extent that the origin of Saul’s puzzles is in logic (rather than pragmatics, say), I suggest, tentatively, that substitution may appear to be invalid because the issues of validity and soundness have not been kept separate. I then consider in depth Saul’s first sentence, “Clark Kent enters a phone booth and Superman exits”. Obviously, two-way substitution is trivially valid, if the expressions are co-referential semantically (and not just grammatically) proper names, the conclusion being but a rephrasing of the premise. However, I argue that a non-trivial semantic analysis of this sentence should take account of the diachronicity of Clark Kent’s entrance and Superman’s exit while preserving the internal link between being Superman and being Clark Kent. I propose the following. ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ refer to two distinct individual concepts. “Superman is Clark Kent” then no longer expresses the self-identity of an individual bearing two names, but that two named concepts are held together by the requisite relation: wherever and whenever someone falls under the concept of Superman the same individual also falls under the Clark Kent concept, whereas there are exceptions to the converse. This semantic analysis always validates the substitution of ‘Clark Kent’ for ‘Superman’, but validates the substitution of ‘Superman’ for ‘Clark Kent’ only if the additional condition is met that somebody should fall under the Superman concept when Clark Kent enters. The analysis is accompanied by a device of extensionalisation from individual concepts to individuals and two rules of predication.
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The introductory section of the paper attempts to clarify the theoretical framework of truth-relativism. The paper then presents three obstacles to those who would like to relativise truth of a statement. These concern the distinction between absolutely and relatively true statements, the identity of a proposition across different perspectives and the possibility of distinguishing between various ways of construing the truth predicate.
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The author of the article seeks to find an answer to the question whether it is possible to determine a priori the truth value of the statement „M = N“ where „M“ and „N“ are proper names of the same particular. He analyses the argumentation of the conception defending the positive answer to the question and tries to present arguments in favour of the opposite view. Let us suppose that the individual I is named by „M“ at time t1 and by „N“ at time t2. If the individual changes considerably during the interval (t1, t2) or presents us from quite different sides at t1 and t2, respectively (e.g., as a mountain seen from different sides at the respective time moments), we will be unable to find out a priori, without certain empirical knowledge, whether M = N, although there were any doubts about the identity of the baptized individual neither at t1 nor at t2.
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V knize Pravda a fakt ([Kolář 2002]) publikoval Petr Kolář rozsáhlý přehled teorií pravd, (svoji) teorii nepřímé korespondence a dále své analýzy tzv. faktuálního diskurzu, který chápe jako diskurz, jehož předmětem jsou tzv. jazykové fakty. Právě jazykové fakty zkusil definovat, což je předmětem mých revidujících zkoumání. V tomto smyslu je tento text doplňkem k poměrně významné koncepci z Kolářovy knihy, které se navíc dlouhodoběji věnoval (srov. např. už [Kolář 1993]). Nejprve stručně podáme Kolářovu filosofickou motivaci pro konstituci jazykových faktů. Dvě různé věty jako např. ‚Adam je vyšší než Bára‘ a ‚Bára je nižší než Adam‘ poukazují na týž fakt – ontologický fakt ve smyslu propozice,1 ovšem dvěma rozdílnými způsoby. I z tohoto důvodu Kolář zamýšlel podat analýzu faktuálního diskurzu, jež „je založena [na tom, že] jazykovými fakty jsou objektivní, mimojazykové entity, které jsou na jedné straně spjaty s větami (přirozeného) jazyka a na druhé straně jsou spjaty s pravdivými propozicemi, které jsou takovými větami označovány (nebo vyjadřovány)“ (Kolář 2002], s. 154). Na jedné straně myslíme na jediný fakt poměrné výšky Adama a Báry, ovšem na druhé straně myslíme na dva fakty, z nichž jeden je vyjádřen větou hovořící o Adamově výšce přesahující výšku Báry a ten druhý je vyjádřen větou hovořící o Bářině výšce, jež je menší než výška Adamova
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Review of: Pavel Tichý’s Collected Papers in Logic and Philosophy, Editors: Vladimír Svoboda, Bjørn Jespersen, Colin Cheyne. Filosofia, University of Otago, 2004, 902 s.
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There are two fundamental questions concerning the choice and presence of objects in various formal systems: (1) Where do these objects come from? (2) What do (can) we know about them? To answer these questions I introduce the notion of a proto-ontology as the pre-theoretic realm of (unspecified) entities from which the basic objects – individuals – of the formal system S are postulated. The pragmatic aspects of such choices are investigated with regard to first-order logic, both pure and applied, set theory and mereology. It is claimed that the postulated (chosen, constructed) objects enter the formal system S with a package of properties and relationships, the recognition of which depends on the interpretation and application of the available predicates of S. If these properties and relationships are not made explicit, a possible clash may arise between them and the properties and relationships “assigned” to the individuals of S by the interpreted predicates of S. As regards the relationship between logic and metaphysics, I contend that logic can perhaps be viewed as the articulation of the fundamental features of proto-ontological objects without which no discourse or theory would be possible. In this sense logic could also be viewed as a theory and method of the construction of a well-articulated metaphysical theory.
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The paper deals with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s approach to „rule following activities“. Wittgenstein made many profound remarks, especially on the nature of the rules determining our communication in everyday language. Some of these remarks are in the centre of a current philosophical controversy known as rule following considerations. Among many contributors the most important one is probably Saul Kripke. The aim of this paper is to refute Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s approach to these activities, which Kripke developes in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. According to Kripke, the central argument of Philosophische Untersuchungen – the private language argument – leads us to so-called sceptical conclusion. From this conclusion it follows that in everyday language there is no clear meaning of the term „following a rule“. The paper is an attempt to reconsider this approach and to demonstrate that this sceptical interpretation of the private language argument is misleading.
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