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This paper uses the tools of mathematical analysis to try and shed light on the age-old question of whether a monotheist God would be simultaneously present everywhere in the wider Universe, or whether It would rather usually keep to privileged locations within space-time. On the narrow basis of where the mathematics leads, it reaches an unexpected but definite conclusion.
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The specific languages referred to in this presentation are: scientific language, mathematical language, theological language and philosophical language. Cosmological, scientific or theological models understood as distinct interpretations of a common symbolic language do not ensure, by such a common basis, a possible or legitimate correspondence of certain units of meaning. Mathematics understood as a symbolic language used in scientific and theological interpretation does not bridge between science and theology. Instead, it only allows the assertion of a rational-mathematical unity in expression. In this perspective, theology is nothing less rational than science. The activity of interpretation has an interdisciplinary character, it is a necessary condition of dialogue. We cannot speak about dialogue without communication between various fields, without passing from one specialized language to another specialized language.
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In this article, I will discuss a moral dilemma known as the “trolley problem”, developed for the purpose of finding an answer to whether the idea of saving five people by sacrificing one innocent person can be justified. Is it possible that current research in neuroscience can shape our moral preferences? Can this view be justified outside the utilitarian theoretical conception? Considering the role of intuitive moral judgement in the context of this issue, we can say that intuitions can be thought of as being regulatory principles for achieving a coherence between deliberative moral judgements and general principles, i.e. reflective equilibrium, even though they cannot serve as empirical evidence in science. I conclude this essay with a basic idea that there is no moral justification for killing an innocent human being.
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This article elaborates upon Ibn Al-Haythams use of “Qiyas” (conclusion and induction with analogy) as a method of experimental research in natural sciences. The article analyses the tools of analogical method of research, domain of its applicability in study of natural phenomenon discussing the example from the history of natural sciences which applies analogical qiyas methodology: Ibn Al-Haytham’s method of research in optics. Qiyas was familiar to the Islamic culture as a research method in studies of religious jurisprudence. The movement itself can be considered as an important turning point in the history of science offering a new method of research. The use of this methodology in natural sciences at that time made a significant contribution to the development of natural sciences.
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The article deals with the Stoic category to lekton and G. Frege’s category of Sinn. I explicate some formal features of these categories, which demonstrate the similarity of the Stoic and the Fregean logical theories, and develop some ideas related to this matter, previously expressed by B. Mates (1961). In particular, I demonstrate that the concept of “complete lekton” (axiōma) in the Stoic doctrine has the same structure as the concept of thought (Gedanke) in Frege’s semantic theory. However, the formal structural similarity between to lekton and Sinn does not presupposes the ontological, epistemological and logical doctrinal similarities in these theories.
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A review of: Hintikka, Jaakko. Socratic Epistemology: Explorations of Knowledge-Seeking by Questioning. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
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The text that has been presented here offers a model of analysis based on the comparison of cumulative and relativistic approach in contemporary methodology and philosophy of science. The analysis is related to some of the most important problems of these disciplines, such as possibility of defining the falsification criteria for scientific theories or growth of scientific knowledge. Therefore, we have Popper (and later Lakatos) on one side, versus Kuhn on the other side. The analysis is conducted in a form of internal critique of uniformistic notion of scientific progress, in compliance with all the normative and formal requests of such argumentation. The emphases has been put on the development of conventionalism in modern science, which led to it's acceptance as a legitimate point of view in contemporary methodology. This happened due to the fact that the criteria for refuting scientific theories where constantly lowered when confronted with logical arguments derived from the very own structure of development of contemporary science. The main thesis of this work explains how aforementioned development of conventionalism implicates certain devastating consequences for methodology itself. Conventionalism encompasses by definition the external (social) factor of influence in every further development of methodology, seriously damaging the autonomy of science and scientific knowledge as well.
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In this paper Locke’s account of substance is interpreted. Locke analyzes different meanings of the notion of substance, the origin of the ideas of substances and problems concerning their justification and function within our knowledge. Two meanings of the notion of substance appear to be most important and at the same time confronted with each other: the complex idea of substance and the idea of substratum. Bennett’s claim that Locke didn’t decide whether to keep or discard the idea of substratum is refuted. Locke discards only the scholastic concept of substratum as an indeterminate support in which accidents inhere, due to its inutility as an explanatory model. The idea of substratum is kept because it is indispensable for explanation of the necessary coexistence of simple ideas in complex idea of substance. This feature differentiates ideas of substances from ideas of mixed modes. The importance of this distinction in Locke’s epistemology validates the use of the idea of substratum. Ayers’ claim that Locke identifies ontologically substratum and real essence is confirmed. But, it is claimed that this identification cannot be applied to the issues of origin and justification of these ideas. In the course of the interpretation it is shown that Locke’s account of substance is modem insofar as it contains anticipations of Berkeley’s, Hume’s and Kant’s arguments and claims, as well as contemporary philosophical topics such as multiple realizability, explanatory gap and logico-linguistic argumentation.
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This article discusses contemporary revisions of viewpoints and texts undertaken by historians of the Polish language, discloses motivations behind the revisited views, and elaborates on further research avenues in this area, as well as pinpoints the most common limitations. The literature on the subject reveals that although the necessity of research revision is widely recognised by researchers, studies specifically addressing the issue are relatively rare. Nonetheless, revision should be seen not only as a pretext for altering the established beliefs, but also as an opportunity to revisit the research object in order to unearth new, previously unnoticed data. Such a broadly defined concept of revision brings tangible benefits not only to historians of language, but also to representatives of related disciplines. Revision can result in, among others, a change in the dating of literary monuments, a change in lexical chronology, a change in text interpretation, a changed view on text origin, a new relationship postulated between text editions, and, finally, an expanded state of research. These arguments speak in favour of seeing revision sometimes as a necessity, at other times as a privilege and an opportunity, but never as a threat to established scientific methods or theories.
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According to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the fundamental tool for understanding the development of thought is logic, and Hegel’s philosophy of logic is approached in three stages: abstract logic, concrete logic, and the logic of spirit. Abstract logic examines the most basic conceptual framework of thought, while concrete logic explains how these concepts transformed into more complex thought processes. The logic of spirit analyzes how thought processes evolve in a societal and historical context. Comprehensive research on Hegel’s principles of reality and intercultural communication has not been found in the literature. Therefore, religious beliefs and cultural communication phenomena have been examined based on Hegel’s philosophy of logic. The research findings are as follows: The principles of reality are based on three basic principles: materialism, causality, and reciprocity. Understanding the interactions between religions and cultures, which represent different conceptual structures is significant in the light of these principles. The research results show that Hegel’s dialectical process explains how conflicts between different systems of thought give rise to more complex levels of thinking. This principle plays a crucial role in resolving conflicts arising from religious beliefs and cultural diversity. The principle of transforming reality emphasizes that thought is not merely a theoretical activity but also a process that impacts social reality. In this context, religious and cultural communication is not merely a mental activity but also a process that shapes reality. The principle of the unity of opposites stresses the need to see the diversity between different religions and cultures as complementary elements with the potential for mutual understanding and enrichment. I addition, the principle of the historical process and social evolution highlights the importance of considering historical and social contexts in understanding the interactions between religious and cultural beliefs and practices. This study demonstrates that Hegel’s principles of dialectical progress, transforming reality, the unity of opposites, and the historical process can be used as a functional methodology in the behavioral sciences.
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This paper is about the problem of abstract ideas, which is one of the key notions and issues of classic British empiricism. I will analyze the problem of abstract ideas following its development from its basic conception, given by Locke, through Berkeley’s critique of Locke and concluding with Hume’s refinement of Berkeley’s thesis that abstract ideas do not exist. The focus of my analysis will be the way in which the mind acquires abstract ideas, i.e. the nature of abstraction, as well as the issue of character and function of ideas considered to be abstract. Finally, my aim is to show that the problem of abstract ideas is an immanent field of development of classical empiricist thought, in its search to give an empiricist account of the use of reason.
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The aim of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is to call into question the illusions of the great systems of metaphysica rationalis that preceded his philosophy. Through the doctrine of the transcendental dialectic Kant reveals the mechanism of transformation of the natural dialectic of the mind into a metaphysical illusion. This mechanism of transcendental illusion originates within the subject-object relation. It can be expressed as an (illegitimate) assertion that the mind enables objective knowledge. According to Kant, the metaphysical errors of his predecessors can be interpreted as manifestations of this fundamental mistake. Within Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, Kant’s teaching is transformed, and it seems to take aim at metaphysical systems of empiricism. In Fichte’s view, transcendental illusion rests within the subject-object relation, but its origin lies on the side of the object, which is expressed through the assertion of the existence of immediate experience. The author will examine more closely the circumstances according to which the determination of the transcendental illusion changes in the context of Fichte’s philosophy, highlighting the significance of this transformation for idealist arguments against empiricism.
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The position of logic classes in secondary schools in Serbia during the last two decades has been a part of the broader context, where the education reform of secondary schools has been implemented. The period that is the subject of the study in this paper coincides with the education reform in secondary schools and with the beginning of the reform of grammar schools. The analysis of the position of the logic classes throughout this period includes all kinds of secondary schools, being looked at from the angle of plans, syllabi, and student books.
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In this paper, the author tries to show the connection between Theophrastus' Metaphysics and Aristotle's dialectical method. The author will analyze the dialectical method through its connection with two important concepts in Aristotle's philosophy: the concepts of endoxa and aporia. We will point out the way in which Aristotle moves through aporia in his works – through the stages of diaporia and euporia. It will be shown that Aristotle think in aporetic and endoxic-dialectical way. In this sense, we will try to point out that Theophrastus Metaphysics is very close to Aristotle at the level of the methodology of thinking itself, and that the way in which Theophrastus derives arguments and moves within the aporia is essentially Aristotelian. So Theophrastus, even when he questions the positions of Aristotle's Metaphysics, acts in anaporetic-dialectical manner.
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Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963) was one of the eminent representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School; his main interests were logic, theory of cognition, methodology of sci- ence and philosophy of language. The aim of the paper is to analyze selected problems con- cerning Ajdukiewicz’s concept of justification, in particular certain tensions and changes in his views on what can justify beliefs and assertions in science. The analysis is based primarily on Ajdukiewicz’s two volumes of papers, Język i poznanie [Language and Cognition], and his book, Problems and Theories of Philosophy. Ajdukiewicz’s views are discussed in the context of contemporary debates in Anglo-American epistemology concerning the dichotomy between internalism and externalism, as well as the role of epistemic individualism contrasted with epistemology of testimony and authority-based beliefs.
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This reflection on the recent work of Nenad Miščević on thought experiment pursues two themes. One is the congruence between the historical development of the practice of thought experiment in science over the centuries and the development of philosophical accounts of thought experiment. The second is the idea that thought experiment provides a point of contact between common-sense and scientific conceptions of particular phenomena.
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In this paper, I deal with recognising an appropriate criterion for distinguishing two competing conceptions of the propositional content among the content realists—the Fregean and the Russellian—especially in connection to some classical proponents of the realist view (Frege, Moore, and Russell). My starting point is a survey characterisation of the two conceptions and the accompanying classification of Russell’s and Moore’s conceptions of the propositional content, which I find problematic on several accounts. I set up a context for my consideration and elaborate on why I find it problematic. My central point is that, given how the classical proponents of propositions understood their respective conceptions, as well as how more recent proponents of propositions (for example, David Kaplan) understood them, one should draw the distinction between the Fregean and the Russellian conception on the grounds of what propositional components do rather than the nature of propositional components (unless, of course, one ultimately reduces the latter to the former).
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There is an important difference between a thought that is directed towards a particular object and a thought that is not so directed. For example, there is a difference in my thoughts about my brother, and my thoughts about brothers, more generally. The first has the earmarks of singular thought, while the latter does not. After showing that there is no agreement about the nature of singular thought, I revisit early Russell to find greater clarity. I then advance a version of Millianism that builds on early Russell’s view of singular thought. I argue that the advocates of the direct reference view who argue that being on the receiving end of a name is sufficient for having singular thoughts about the object named have not provided good reasons for their views. Passing on a name can provide the recipient with a general understanding of the name, but not specific understanding. That is, when acquiring the name, the recipient may not learn the identity of the object named as this very object which, I argue, is required for one having singular thoughts of that object.
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This paper presents an analysis of Rescher’s conception of the mode of structuring and operation of human rationality, which Rescher approaches from a historical-philosophical, logical, and semantic matrix. The aim of this research is to explore the specific features of Rescher’s analysis of rationality through the lens of the instability of optimality and the calculus of risk, which emerge as essential presuppositions of his research. Rationality, understood in this context, has a threefold manifestation: as a procedural matrix, as a modus operandi, and as potential and materialization. This paper, drawing on Rescher’s original works and other relevant sources from the tradition of pragmatism, will explore his approach to this topic with a focus on what Rescher terms the instability of optimality and the calculus of risk.
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Iracionalnost je, kao i racionalnost, normativni koncept. Neko ko djeluje ili razmišlja iracionalno, ili čija su uvjerenja ili emocije iracionalni, odstupio je od standarda; ali koji standard, ili čiji standard, treba biti sudija? Ako odstupate od mojih normi racionalnosti i ne dijelite moj osjećaj za razumno, jeste li onda stvarno iracionalni? Uostalom, potpuno racionalne osobe mogu se razlikovati u pogledu vrijednosti. Ako je racionalnost samo još jedna vrijednost ili složeni skup vrijednosti, tada bi se nazivanje nekoga iracionalnim činilo samo izražavanjem neslaganja s njegovim vrijednostima ili normama.
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