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Between the end of WWII and the Resolution of the Cominform, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia cooperated intensively. Although Czechoslovakia remained a multi-party state and Yugoslavia had experienced a change of government, the continuity of intensive cooperation and improvement of mutual acquaintance from the previous period were maintained. The two countries were tied by the treaty of alliance (the Treaty of Friendship that was signed in Belgrade on May 9, 1946). Their communist parties were members of the Cominform. The Yugoslav leaders relied in development of industry after WWII primarily on Czechoslovakia that was the major trade partner from where goods, licenses and machinery were imported. Czechoslovakia was irreplaceable in Yugoslav plans for industrialization. Cultural cooperation was very rich, manysided and meaningful. It comprised exchange of artists, writers, musicians, painters, scholars, translations, exhibitions, ample sports cooperation etc. Yugoslavia sent students and apprentices to be educated in Czechoslovakia. During three years (1945-1948) 3000 students and apprentices from Yugoslavia passed through Czechoslovak faculties and vocational schools. Tens of thousands of tourists from Czechoslovakia visited the Adriatic and Czechoslovak students, experts and professors toured Yugoslavia during their numerous visits. On every step they recorded and photographed customs, architecture, people, history and arts of the Yugoslav lands. However, the conflict with the Cominform changed everything. Czechoslovakia sided with the Cominform; cooperation grew weaker and was finally terminated on October 9, 1949 as Czechoslovakia canceled the Treaty of Friendship.
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Milan Gavrilović, the leader of the Union of Agriculturists, of anti-German and pro-British persuasion, became the first ambassador of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to Moscow as diplomatic relations were taken up in June 1940. With a brief recess from early May to mid-July 1941, he remained on that post until the end of 1941. During that time, and after it too, he conceived the most unfavourable opinion about the possible and expected influence of the Soviet Union on the Balkans and in Yugoslavia. Apart from ideological disagreement, the belief that Balkan should be left over to the Balkan peoples contributed to his opinion that the independence of these peoples must be defended against the domination of any great power, as well as against their mutual confrontations. Being sure that this was the true interest of the Balkan states, he espoused the creation of a Balkan federation and he defended his views even at the cost of parting ways with political and personal friends. During the war he was considered a „Greater-Serb“ and „anti-Soviet“.
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The author uses documents of Vjacheslav Molotov’s collections from Russian State Archive of Social-Political History (Rossiyskii gosudarstvenniy arhiv sotsialno-politicheskoy istorii / RGASPI. Fond 82) and Archive of Russian Foreign Policy (Arhiv vneshnei politiki Possiiskoy Federatsii /AVPRF: Fond 06), and several others more consistently than before. On the base of synthesis of these documents with already published Soviet and Yugoslav archival documents and the results of still valuable early research conducted by Nikola Popovic, Yuriy Girenko, Leonid Gibianskiy and Vladimir Volkov this article sheds more light on interrelations and coordination between Soviet leadership and J. Broz Tito from January 1944 to beginning of Belgrade operation October 1944. Several stages of these interrelations are discovered and reviewed this time in some cases more detailed than in previous research. The article discusses main events from January 1944 when decision on formation of Soviet military misson to Yugoslavia was made to end of February when it had beem landed to location of Tito’s headquarters assuming that key trends in this period were coordination of Tito’s activity in international field during end of January–early February. Despite the fact that each stage was important during 1944 it seems that April was extraordinary one because of coming of Yugoslav military mission to the USSR, inner Soviet discussions on the ways and means to improve the assistance to Yugoslav people army, and, the third one, Soviet decision to inform Tito by Stalin (that time codename „Friend”) and Molotov (codename „Alekseev”) that not Bulgaria but Yugoslavia is main Soviet ally on the Balkans during this war and after it. According to documents the end of May and early June when two meetings of Stalin with Yugoslav mission was the point when the final shift in understanding of British activity was made. The stage of July–August when the main stress of Yugoslav liberation forces has been shifted on Serbia the Soviets gave Tito free hand in his contacts with Britain and at the same time gave him full support in Yugoslavia by concentrating all assistance in his hands since only after Tito’s approval this assistance might be get by regional detacheemnts. Despite the fact that author could not obtain Soviet documents on secret Tito’ visit to Moscow in September 1944 he continues the reconstruction of context of these events by involving available indirect data around Tito’s meetings with Soviet leaders that time. The article ends with analysis of already published Soviet military documents on preparations of the Red Army early October 1944 before entering Yugoslavia as friendly country on which despite of they were already have been published were not paid attention by researchers until nowdays.
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Tito met Stalin for the first time in Moscow between September 21 and 27 1944. Tito himself said about it: „That was the first time in my life that I met Stalin and talked to him. Until then I only saw him from distance, such as at the 7th Congress of the Commintern. This time I had several meetings with him, a couple of them in his office in the Kremlin. He also invited me twice to his private house to dinner.” Judging by this statement, Tito was shown great courtesy. Tito’s idea was to meet Stalin in private. It is possible he talked about that with general Kornjejev, chief of the Soviet military mission with the Supreme Staff of the People’s Liberation Army and Partisan Units of Yugoslavia. Tito informed Stalin about the aim of this conversation in his letter of July 5, 1944. Thus, in the beginning he states that the British were doing their best to strengthen the position of the King and the Chetniks and to weaken the People’s Liberation Army, so that for that reason one couldn’t count on their (British) allied help. Right after that he wrote: „We’ll need your utmost help to solve the problem of Serbia which is very important for us, since the final success and the creation of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia depends on that.” The letter was ended with the following words: „There are many important matters I would like to discuss with you in person.” Stalin accepted the proposal as well as the topic of the talks. It was political, military and material aid of USSR to the People’s Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia. All Tito’s pleas for aid met with favourable response. Everything that happened between USSR, the People’s Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia and the Royal Yugoslav Government from September 28 onwards was the consequence of Tito’s conversation with Stalin. The direct consequence of talks between Tito and Stalin was the TASS statement of September 28 about the agreement of the „Soviet Command” and the People’s Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia. With this statement the Soviet government de facto recognized People’s Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia as the Yugoslav government. This act had great consequences for the development of the People’s Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia. At the same time, the advance of the Red Army into Serbia (Kruševac, Čačak, Belgrade) in October 1944 was the fruit of Tito’s agreement with Stalin. The material aid of USSR for the People’s Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia which followed and lasted until the end of the war had also been agreed upon in Moscow. If Tito asked for „large aid” from Stalin, he got it and sealed it during his talks with him between September 21 and 27, 1944.
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The participation of the Red Army in the liberation of Yugoslavia is one of the topics from WWII which have a political flip-side. The news about Red Army's advance into the Yugoslav territory came as no surprise to the White House. The Americans were informed by the British and by their own intelligence service about the trip of the leader of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito to Moscow. In the State Department there were no doubts about the consequences of Tito's visit to Moscow, and already on September 20, 1944 the possibility of scaling down the len-lease aid for Yugoslavia was discussed. The Americans considered the possibility of the Soviet participation in the liberation of the Balkans already in late 1943. President's position voiced at the conferences in Kairo and Teheran prove that Roosevelt, believing in complete success of the Red Army in Romania, deemed its advance in Yugoslavia very likely. The Western Allies could prevent the Red Army's advance only at the cost of the break-up of the Anti-Hitler coalition. Taking into account the complexity of the military actions in the Balkans, a delay of the Allied armies in the case of operations in Istria and Dalmatia, could lead to the Red Army's turning toward Holland, Belgium and France after the fall of Berlin. The information of the US intelligence service say Yugoslavia was liberated largely thanks to the Red Army. American agents claimed the Yugoslav partisans had no heavy armament necessary for larger military actions, which directly caused low military efficiency of the People's Liberation Army. The information of the American intelligence service directed the Washington analysts to better understand the mutual interest of Moscow and the Yugoslav partisans in each other. Relying on the Soviet military and political support Tito conquered power, and the Soviet leadership strove to spread Communist influence through the victory of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. After all, the State Department considered the presence of the Soviet military forces in Yugoslavia as an „important factor” which had to be taken into account in the process of making US policy toward Yugoslavia.
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The fate of Yugoslavia was decided within the triangle of the „Great Allies”, and the global agreement between USA and the Soviet Union was of major importance. It is needles to ask if the Yugoslav Communists understood the nature of this agreement – they were just consequently following the instructions from Moscow. Revolutionary logic proved very effective in contact with American officers too: they reported that the partisans were fighting. The estimate as to against whom, in what degree and with which goal depended on experience and sagacity of individual officers, but the partisans always fulfilled the first requirement of the Allied coalition: they fought or they made an impression they were fighting. The American government created on purpose an illusion that Yugoslavia wasn’t handed over to the Soviets, but to an autonomous resistance movement of unclear political orientation. Later reports which testified to the Communist character of the People’s Liberation Movement, about the clear intention of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to gain power by all means, about outright inimical attitude toward USA, about the reign of terror, about existence of aggressive mix of nationalism and Communism, about proofs that the new Yugoslav regime was a carbon copy of the Soviet system and that Tito was Moscow’s best pupil, didn’t cause any reaction on the part of the American administration. Yugoslavia was in the Soviet sphere of influence. Comparative analysis of British and American influence on the denouement of the civil war and the post-war social system of Yugoslavia shows that apparent disinterest is more nefarious and more important than excessive engagement. The American military establishment decided that the second front in Europe wouldn’t be opened in the Balkans, and Roosevelt drew political conclusions from this decision and left Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union. Churchill’s endeavors to exercise his own influence on Tito and to retain a modicum of political influence, must be seen in this context. USA had both military and political means of influencing the fate of Yugoslavia, whereas Britain hadn’t. USA cared exclusively about its interests and not about the proclaimed principles of foreign policy. Only the facade of democracy was to be preserved.
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The Soviet Union kept a watchful eye on the Yugoslav presence in Albania immediately after the end of WWII. Yugoslavia was helping Albania in every way during WWII and it continued its aid after the war. In the beginning the Soviet Union wasn’t present in that country to any significant degree. The Soviet influence was confined to symbolic military and diplomatic presence. However, over time the Soviet presence in Albania began to be more perceptible and clearer. The Soviet presence didn’t push back the Yugoslav influence and it didn’t limit the level of the Yugoslav-Albanian relations, but it strictly determined the reach of the mutual cooperation. The Soviets left to the Yugoslavs the organizatorial activities in the Albanian Communist Party, economy and culture. One gets the impression the Yugoslav presence in Albania was a downsized copy of the Soviet influence in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Yugoslavia was a powerful mediator between Albania and the Soviet Union, a country the Soviet top-brass entrusted with the tutelage over Albania, seeing it as the guarantor of Albanian independence and security.
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When October 20, 1944 is in question, it is necessary to keep in mind the »overlapping« of two histories – the history of the event and the history of the interpretation of the event. The Belgrade operation was an important, but not the decisive operation in the South-Western advance of the Red Army on the vast front stratching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. On the other hand, the events in October 1944 introduced a fundamental change in the processes in Yugoslavia itself. It follows from the comparision of the forces of the German army group »Serbia« and those of the partizans that the liberation of Belgrade couldn't have been possible without the units of the Red Army. Over the past 65 years three historiographical discourses clearly featured in the interpretation of the events from October 1944: „common past”, „our past” and „occupation“. The history of WWII in Yugoslavia is interwowen and intersected by different contexts and levels of understanding and interpretation. The general context of the war is the world clash between the Anti-Hitlerite coalition and the Tripartite Pact. The occupation of Europe by the Third Reich and operating of occupation systems in these countries is on the second level. Mutual relations of allies within the Anti-Hitlerite coalition is on the third level. The context of the civil war in Yugoslavia comes only on the fourth level, having several different dimensions. Each of them represented a different historical context: religious war in the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, struggle between the two resistence movements, war between the Quisling forces and the resistence movements... The visit of the Russian preisdent on the 65th anniversary of liberation of Belgrade (proposed by the president of Serbia) re-historicized the whole event and relativized the paradigm of October 20, as the „day of the new occupation“.
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The article analyses the Serbian-Russian official relations on the eve and immediately after the February Revolution of 1917 on the basis of studying archival data and taking into account the Serbian and Russian historiography. Particular attention is paid to the attitude of Serbian official representatives in Russia to Tsar Nicholas II, on the eve and just after his overthrow. The aim of the article was to study the attitude of the Serbian elite and the Serbian state towards the February revolution in Russia in 1917.
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The resolution of the territorial dispute between Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia, as a result of the London and Osimo agreements in 1954 and 1975 respectively, paved the way for improving the Yugoslav-Italian relations. The process of normalization encouraged close political and economic cooperation between the two countries as well as considerable Italian cultural influence in Yugoslavia. Besides, the Yugoslav-Italian rapprochement was reflected in frequent high-level contacts between the political elites of Yugoslavia and Italy during the 1960s and 1970s. During his visit to Yugoslavia, in October 1979, the Italian president Sandro Pertini discussed with the Yugoslav party and state leader, Josip Broz Tito, the most important aspects of the Yugoslav-Italian relations as well as the burning global issues, such as the situation in the Middle East and Indochina, the détente, the non-alignment as well as the Italian role in the European Economic Community. The transcripts of the conversations between the two veteran politicians and their teams, which took place on 11 and 12 October 1979, indicate the highest level of mutual cooperation as well as their similar attitudes towards a broad spectrum of global topics, such as the détente, the Non-Aligned Movement, the situation in the Middle East and Indochina. The two presidents signaled their readiness to sett le the remaining disputes between the two countries, in particular concerning the rights of the Italian minority in Yugoslavia as well as the Croatian and Slovenian communities in Italy. Pertini and Tito expressed satisfaction with the improvement of the relations between Yugoslavia and Italy despite their opposite ideological preferences and their participation in the different global coalitions – the North Atlantic Alliance and the Non-Aligned Movement respectively.
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The foundations of the diplomacy of the ,,second“ Yugoslavia were laid on the experience and pragmatism of the older generations and by creating the new one that could learn. This enabled the diplomacy of a military movement to gain access to the political sphere through military missions and to achieve international recognition already in the final phase of WWII. Military missions of the People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia were harnessed to the goal of international recognition of the „second" Yugoslavia. The largest name of the partisan diplomacy was Vladimir Velebit. However, Josip Broz Tito was its real instigator and leader who skillfully held all strings of foreign policy of the movement he led in his hands. The Allies recognized the temporary Yugoslav government before the end of the war: on March 12, 1945 the British ambassador Ralf Stevenson arrived in Belgrade, followed by the Soviet ambassador Ivan Sadchikov on March 24 and in late March the USA appointed their ambassador Richard Paterson.
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The paper explores the dynamics of Yugoslav summit diplomacy from the end of WWII to the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries in 1961. Particular attention is devoted to the role of Josip Broz Tito in the development of this segment of Yugoslav foreign policy.
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The most important Yugoslav representations in Czechoslovakia after WWII were the Embassy in Prague, Consulate in Bratislava, Military Mission, Commercial Delegation and the Department of the Social Attache. Due to the developed cooperation with Czechoslovakia in all spheres of life (politics, culture, economy, education of Yugoslav apprentices and students), there were several hundred Yugoslav representatives in that country. The most important persons in these missions were ambassadors Darko Čemej and Marijan Stilinović, attache Zdenko Štambuk, social attache Jovan Petrović, coimnercial delegate Ivan Barbalić, consul Ivan Mahulja, chairman of the Investment Commission Milan Bulja and the military delegate Miladin Ivanović. Apart from them a number of delegates of Yugoslav companies and agencies should be mentioned, particularly Milena Spasojević, the delegate of the Main Administration of the Federal Motor Industry and Oldrih Strelecki, the delegate of the Motor Industry Rakovica.
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After the conflict with the Informbureau in 1948 Yugoslavia’s relations with all countries of „people’s democracy", including the neighboring Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, deteriorated rapidly. The staff of the diplomatic missions in Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana was subject to police surveillance, isolation, coldshouldering in the local ministries and other institutions, as well as to constant incidents in public places. After Stalin’s death, during 1953 and 1954 as Yugoslavia’s normalization of relations with the countries of „people’s democracy" was in its „formal" phase, i.e., in the phase of reestablishing of severed ties in the field of diplomatic relations and communication, the situation of Yugoslav diplomats in Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana was a good indication of Bulgaria’s, Romania’s and Albania’s governments’ true intentions regarding the normalization of relations with Belgrade. Gradual improvement of living and working conditions of members of Yugoslav diplomatic missions in Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana was proportionate to „warming up" of the policies of these countries toward Yugoslavia, but also in correlation with the decisive foreign player - Moscow - and its policy toward Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia the gradual improvement of the situation of its diplomats in these neighboring countries or unexpected incidents were perceived exactly as hints of new - sometimes good, sometimes bad - measures of the official Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana.
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The article analyzes the contribution to the Yugoslav diplomacy of one of the most important Yugoslav diplomats, Dr. Vladimir Velebit. Dr. Velebit spent 18 years in Yugoslav diplomacy, out of that two in partisan diplomacy. He was one of trailblazers and organizers of the diplomacy of the ,,new“ Yugoslavia. He entered diplomacy during WWII in 1943 when he was appointed chief of the mission of the People’s Liberation Movement in Egypt. During the negotiations in Egypt he acquitted himself excellently so he became the pennanent representative of the People’s Liberation Movement with the Western allies. He played one of the key roles during the negotiations with the emigre Yugoslav government in London concerning the formation of the postwar government and the idea of introducing a regency as a transitional government originated with him He was the man in whom Tito had special confidence, the person who broke through the international isolation of the People’s Liberation Movement, Tito’s personal aide acting on his orders. During the first six months of the Tito-Šubašić government he was the sole aide foreign minister. Considering his intimacy with Tito it is likely that Velebit was then the most important person in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more important than the minister Šubašić himself. He took part in resolving the most important Yugoslav postwar matters - the Trieste crisis, negotiations about a loan from the World Bank, negotiations with USA on aid in food and annament, organization of Tito’s visit to Great Britain. He served as ambassador in Rome and in London. The list of his achievements and contributions to the Yugoslav diplomacy would perhaps have been even larger but for two factors: firstly, Velebit wasn’t a high ranking Party official but just an ordinary Party member, and secondly he was accused of being a British spy in the Informbureau resolution. He spent the last 14 years of his career serving on international bodies (secretary of the European Economic Commission of the UN in Geneva, director for planning in the International Labor Organization, he chaired the project of reconciliation between the Jews and the Arabs within the framework of the Carnegie Endowment, he organized a round table on Cyprus in Rome between 18 and 22 November 1973). Velebit was one of the best known Yugoslav diplomats in international circles, respected in the diplomacy of the United Nations and of other international organizations.
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In many respects the first ten years of socialist Yugoslavia’s existence were an important, dynamic and decisive period. Yugoslavia was transformed from an ally of the USSR and an enemy of the West into the enemy no. 1 of the USSR and an ally of the West. As a member of the innermost circle of the Yugoslav State and Party leadership Milovan Đilas took active part in all these developments - from meetings and negotiations with Stalin and state delegations to foreign countries to the representative of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and one of the first Yugoslav delegates to the so-called Third World countries.
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The tradition of organizing border gatherings (trade shows) on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border existed in the twenties of the 20th century and represented a form of cross-border cooperation between the two countries. Being rebuilt after the Second World War, it was rapidly re- suspended after the Yugoslav conflict with Stalin and long-term blockade conducted by the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, including Bulgaria. On the initiative of Bulgaria, the tradition was renewed in 1956, but with the clear intentions of Bulgaria to use gatherings for propaganda and political influence on the Yugoslav citizens, which Yugoslavia after the initial disorientations, was trying to parry. Gatherings that were organized on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border in the mid-fifties of the 20th century were a true expression of the Cold War atmosphere and the Cold War mindset. They show how a relatively small and clearly limited geographical area which by definition should be a place of separation, not meeting or connecting, with the presence of a large number of people, became a training ground for ideological competition between the two ideologically and politically opposing parties. Although Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were on the way of full normalization of bilateral relations, at the time when the practice of maintaining gatherings was rebuilt, all the circumstances surrounding the organization of these meetings showed, however, how the normalization was fragile and largely superficial and insincere and how the roots of the conflict (not just ideological, but also many others, inherited from the past) were deep and lasting.
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Какви год да су били прорачуни Стаљина приликом закључивања совјетско-југословенског договора, они су се показали нереалним, што је ускоро показала, у тим раним часовима, 6. априла 1941. Хитлеровска агресија на Југославију. Став који је Москва заузела после тога, када је напад на Југославију постао известан, био је противречан. Са једне стране, главне совјетске новине изашле су 6. априла са насловима о првим информацијама о потписивању совјетско-југословенског споразума, а следећег дана – са чланцима о том догађају. Ујутру 6. априла, у совјетском генералштабу, вођени су разговори са Симићем и постигнути конкретни договори о слању наоружања и војне технике за југословенску војску, чија је припрема за пребацивање у Југославију одмах почела. Са друге стране, према сведочењу Новикова, тог јутра, 6. априла, Стаљин је одлучио да откаже званични дипломатски пријем, који је договорен за то вече, у случају закључења совјетско-југословенског споразума, сматрајући да новонастала ситуација захтева свестрану обазривост, како се не би још више компликовали, и без тога напети, совјетско-немачки односи. Нису уследили никакви јавни совјетски демарши са осудом нацистичке агресије или са изражавањем подршке Југославији. Само је, као одговор на вест мађарског амбасадора у Москви о прикључивању Мађарске нападу на Југославију, Вишински изјавио да совјетска влада то не може одобрити.
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