DOES HETEROPHENOMENOLOGY SURMOUNT AUTOPHENOMENOLOGY? Cover Image

AR HETEROFENOMENOLOGIJA ĮVEIKIAAUTOFENOMENOLOGIJĄ?
DOES HETEROPHENOMENOLOGY SURMOUNT AUTOPHENOMENOLOGY?

Author(s): Ernesta Molotokienė
Subject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Vilniaus Universiteto Leidykla
Keywords: heterofenomenologija1; autofenomenologija2; sąmonė3; metodas4; intencionalumas5; patyrimas6;

Summary/Abstract: Daniel C. Dennett’s heterophenomenological method for analyzing the experiences of one’s consciousness using the third person approach, as well as an analysis of the argument correctness of its superiority over the autophenomenology or introspective method of the first person approach applied in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology are presented. By introducing the third person perpective, Dennett seeks to bestow the impartiality which is typical of the nature sciences, to heterophenomenological method. the Husserl autophenomenology project had failed in this field because of its inevitable subjectivity. Therefore, Den¬nett provides the subject’s messages about experiences of consciousness with the conviction status, which is legitimated not by the subject but by the observer (the heterophenomenologist), and in this way he carries out the scientific research of the subject’s convictions about the experiences of consciousness. But can the subject’s convictions be neutral, without a shell of subjective interpretation, as Dennett expects them to be? The article argues that the ambitious heterophe¬nomenologic method of Dennett is unable to avoid the subjectivity typical of Husserl’s phenomenology, because Dennett interprets Husserl incorrectly by twisting his ideas, but is unable to elude the drawbacks of autophenomenology.

  • Issue Year: 2010
  • Issue No: 77
  • Page Range: 70-79
  • Page Count: 10
  • Language: Lithuanian
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