Žmogaus laisvės samprata šv. Tomo Akviniečio veikale Summa theologiae (II dalis)
The conception of human freedom in St. Thomas Aquinas work “Summa Theologiae” (ii)

Summary/Abstract: The article continues the analyses of St. Thomas Aquinas’ conception of human freedom in his most important work Summa theologiae. It consistently researches the Summa in the same way as in the first part of this article. Three Summa‘s parts are analyzed – Prima Secundae, Secunda Secundae and Tertia Pars. The article steps over chronological mark that is pointed out by theoreticians arguing the change of Thomas’ reasoning on the issue of human freedom (D.O.Lottin and B. Lonergan). According to them, namely Prima Secundae and another late text – the 6th question of De Malo – represent changed Thomas’ reasoning on the issue of human freedom in comparison with early-middle and late periods of his work. The purpose of the article is to analyze further the Aquinas‘ conception of human freedom, the nature and action of power of liberum arbitrium and free will as well as to find out whether the arguments of change theoreticians are grounded. According to them, the concept ‚liberum arbitrium‘ „disappears“ from its usual and even essential ontological discourse in Thomas‘ late texts, and while analyzing the interaction of reason and will in the free action he attributes greater importance to the will compared with the reason, and so he moves towards voluntarism. In fact, initial analysis of Prima Secundae shows that liberum arbitrium has no a proper place there. Only indirect remarks allow to presume its importance in the moral action. Thomas just fragmentarily repeats the set of definitions known from Prima Pars, such as: liberum arbitrium is a reason of ruling actions of human being himself, the principle of moving; it is the faculty of the will and reason; it essentially has to be treated as wish, or the will, but grounded by reason, or by consideration of reason (deliberatio rationis); so it has to be described as free decision arising from reason. But the notion of liberum arbitrium almost does not appear in the ontological reasoning of Prima Secundae. Thomas does not use it analyzing the functions of free act, such as choice, consideration, acceptance, command and usage. He limits himself just to notions of will and reason. Meanwhile, a part of these functions was represented as the actions of liberum arbitrium in earlier works of Thomas. Liberum arbitrium disappears from the texts on reasoning of its functions. This concept is also absent in the texts dedicated to the problem of freedom which is described only by the terms of Aristotelian causal freedom (the notions of will and reason are used). It is surprising that the notion of liberum arbitrium grows into the explanation of relationship between the human being and God and totally disappears from ontological structures that were attributed to it as essential in Prima Pars. However there is a lack of arguments for thesis of new conception of liberum arbitrium in late Thomas‘ texts.

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