Series:OSW Commentary

(Un)realistic neutrality. Attempts to redefine Belarus’ foreign policy

(Un)realistic neutrality. Attempts to redefine Belarus’ foreign policy

Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): English

Keywords: Belarus’ foreign policy

The continuing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, together with the increased tension in relations between Russia and the West, have led the Belarusian authorities to attempt to redefine their country’s foreign policy by stressing neutrality towards the two sides in the conflict. As a result, over the last year or so Belarus has clearly adopted a non-committal stance. Minsk is trying to play the part of a neutral mediator in the hope that this will safeguard it in the event of escalation of tensions between Russia and the West, which is seen as the greatest threat to the country’s security at the present time. Thus Minsk is returning to the notion, discussed in the early 1990s, of Belarus striving for neutrality. Officially, the goal of neutrality is still stated in the Belarusian Constitution. However there are serious limitations to the effectiveness of this new strategy, due to Minsk’s close military alliance with Moscow, and therefore Belarus will not be entirely credible on the international stage as a country that wishes to remain neutral.

Expansion at the state’s expense: Novatek as a driving engine of the Russian LNG sector

Expansion at the state’s expense: Novatek as a driving engine of the Russian LNG sector

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian LNG sector

A deal for France’s Total to acquire a 10% stake in the Arctic LNG 2 project for US$2.55 billion was struck on 24 May during the International Economic Forum in Saint Petersburg. This project envisages the construction of a natural gas liquefaction plant on the Gydan Peninsula and is being implemented by Novatek, Russia’s largest private natural gas producer. In December 2017, the company launched the first production line of an LNG terminal on the Yamal Peninsula – the Yamal LNG project. In addition to this, Gazprom and Rosneft have confirmed their intention to implement their own LNG projects.

The US–China trade dispute: phase two

The US–China trade dispute: phase two

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski / Language(s): English

Donald Trump has pursued his strategy of stepping up pressure on Beijing by threatening it with a tariff war since March 2018. The aim of this strategy is to resolve the problems in US–China economic relations that have been mounting for years. These problems include China’s constant trade surplus with the US, the limitations regarding access to the Chinese market, and the cases of technology theft or forced transfer from US companies. The tariffs imposed so far are of negligible significance for trade exchange, although on 6 July Washington plans to announce a 25% tariff on the import of high-technology goods from China, worth US$34 billion (this amount could be increased to US$50 billion). Should China introduce its announced retaliatory measures, the tariff dispute could cover goods worth around US$95 billion, or around 15% of US–China trade exchange (see Appendix). President Trump has already announced that goods imported from China worth another US$200 billion would be covered by tariffs, should China fail to make concessions.In contrast to the previous phases of negotiations, the US’s present demands focus on long-term structural problems rather than specific benefits for American business. Thereby, the formula of talks based on seeking spectacular agreements (‘deals’) that Trump had initially adopted is losing ground. This heralds a launch of another phase of negotiations, this time more comprehensive and more difficult for China. Until recently, Beijing had tried to contain the dispute by making minor concessions. At the same time, it is communicating its readiness to offer a symmetrical response to the American strikes. China is also trying to take advantage of its dispute with the US by applying diplomatic measures to position itself as a defender of globalisation and multilateral trade rules. The tools the US is using may disrupt global supply chains in the high-technology sector, which in turn may impact the economic condition of America’s allies in the European Union and in East Asia.

Thaw in Uzbekistan. Reforms by President Mirziyoyev

Thaw in Uzbekistan. Reforms by President Mirziyoyev

Author(s): Mariusz Marszewski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Uzbekistan; President Mirziyoyev

It has been almost two years since the death of the long-serving leader of Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, and since Shavkat Mirziyoyev took up power (September 2016). The change has had spectacular results, including signs of liberalisation of the previous, extremely authoritarian system of rule, and economic reform, for instance with regard to stimulating growth of small-scale business, and in fact activation of Uzbekistan on the international stage and normalisation of relations with neighbours. Meanwhile, certainly the most important process under way in Uzbekistan is that of consolidation of power by the new president, and a key element of this is dismantling the might enjoyed to date by the National Security Service. The curbing of the position of the National Security Service, which has been successful so far, entails internal restructuring of the state apparatus. The limited liberalisation and opening up to the world are mainly a result of this process.Mirziyoyev has created a new dynamic both internally and in the region. The effects will only become clear in the long term. The outcome of this new situation is uncertain; consolidation of the new president’s power and the ensuing reforms are accompanied by constantly recurring crises which were frozen during Karimov’s rule. There are also external threats – a possibility of return to custodianship of Russia, a country which is fortifying its position, China’s increasing economic dominance, and growing strength of radicals among the Uzbek minority in northern Afghanistan. The emerging processes are therefore proceeding fast, and thus it is hard to determine whether the new Uzbekistan under President Mirziyoyev will prove to be a stable country in which the liberal reforms will continue.

A Basin under Special Supervision. The Russian–Ukrainian tensions in the Sea of Azov

A Basin under Special Supervision. The Russian–Ukrainian tensions in the Sea of Azov

Author(s): Krzysztof Nieczypor / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian–Ukrainian tensions; Sea of Azov

The construction and opening in May 2018 of the Crimean Bridge, which connects the territory of the Russian Federation with the Russian-annexed Crimean Peninsula, has contributed to a worsening of Russian–Ukrainian relations in the Sea of Azov. Since April 2018, Russians have halted merchant ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch, which is greatly limiting the operation of Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. Russia’s actions are affecting Ukraine’s economy in that they make the export of goods that account for a major portion of Ukraine’s state budget revenue increasingly difficult. According to estimates by the Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure, total financial losses due to shipping limitations stand at US$ 20–40 million annually.Russia’s activity in the Sea of Azov and in the Strait of Kerch seems to confirm Moscow’s ambitions to make this basin a fully Russian-controlled internal area. Increased concentration of the Russian armed forces near the Crimean Bridge proves that this piece of infrastructure is of strategic importance for the Russian Federation. Access to the Sea of Azov and control of the ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch enables Russia to exert economic blackmail on Ukraine. The measures Russia has launched are of a permanent nature and are also intended to exacerbate Ukraine’s difficult economic situation. In this way, the Russian leadership is trying to influence the public mood in the southern part of the Donbas (which is controlled by Kyiv) to persuade the local residents that any further confrontation with Russia would be senseless.

Crisis in Turkmenistan. A test for China’s policy in the region

Crisis in Turkmenistan. A test for China’s policy in the region

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Mariusz Marszewski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Turkmenistan; China

The currency crisis, caused by the collapse in gas prices, has turned into the most serious social and political crisis in the history of Turkmenistan. The government in Ashgabat has passed the burden of the economic problems onto the population, suspending the convertibility of the manat and dismantling the extensive social security system. The drastic reduction in the standard of living of Turkmenistan’s population has undermined the stability of the regime. The depletion of Turkmenistan’s foreign exchange reserves could bring an end to the monumental state investment programme which – together with the social security system – is the main source of the regime’s legitimacy. The current dynamics of the crisis are fully dependent on China, the sole recipient of Turkmenistan’s gas (receiving more than 90% of total gas exports) and Ashgabat’s main creditor. The terms of the Chinese-Turkmen contracts (apparently linking gas prices with oil prices) is leading to a drain of Turkmen resources and reducing the inflow of foreign currency. China may be faced with the need to stabilise the economy of Turkmenistan. In the absence of any rescue actions, there is a considerable risk of the collapse of the Turkmen state. However, any greater involvement by China could mean a violation of the Chinese-Russian modus vivendi in the region. Moscow could take advantage of the crisis to rebuild its influence in Ashgabat, and include Turkmenistan within its own political integration projects within the region, resuming gas cooperation and offering military assistance to stabilise the regime.

A revolution in instalments. Whither Pashinyan’s Armenia now?

A revolution in instalments. Whither Pashinyan’s Armenia now?

Author(s): Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): English

Keywords: Whither Pashinyan; Armenia

In mid-August, a hundred days passed since Nikol Pashinyan took office as Armenia’s Prime Minister, which is an office of key importance for the Armenian political system. Formerly an opposition MP, Pashinyan rose to power as a result of a bloodless revolution. He replaced Serzh Sargsyan, whose camp had ruled Armenia for the last two decades. The country’s domestic situation is stable and its economy is growing. However, the parliamentary majority and significant business assets remain in the hands of the old elite, which considerably reduces the present leadership’s room for manoeuvre.

The 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia – circuses instead of bread?

The 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia – circuses instead of bread?

Author(s): Iwona Wiśniewska,Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): English

Keywords: FIFA; World Cup; Russia

The 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia has become the most expensive World Cup in history, with its cost standing at more than US$ 13 billion. Russia gained new sports, transport and tourist infrastructure, and nearly 3 million foreign tourists came to the country to attend the matches. However, the investments and revenues connected with the tournament will have a minor impact on Russia’s GDP growth rate; at best they may contribute to an acceleration in the development of those regions (particularly the less affluent ones) that hosted the World Cup events. Predictably, the main beneficiary from the tournament’s organisation was President Putin’s business environment : companies controlled by Putin’s cronies won the main tenders for the construction of sports and transportation facilities.

Gas revolution? Prospects for increased gas production in Ukraine

Gas revolution? Prospects for increased gas production in Ukraine

Author(s): Wojciech Konończuk / Language(s): English

Keywords: gas; gas production; Ukraine

For a number of months now the Ukrainian gas mining sector has been undergoing a major overhaul to improve the conditions in which it operates, with a view to significantly increasing production. The most important reforms include lowering tax rates and deregulation. These changes are a result of the government’s gas sector development plan for Ukraine, approved in 2016. Under this programme, the amount of gas extracted is to increase from the current 20 bcm to 27 bcm by as soon as 2020. Combined with greater energy efficiency, this would enable Ukraine to become self-sufficient in terms of its gas supply, and even to export gas in subsequent years. Because Ukraine has traditionally been dependent upon imports, and due to the political importance of gas-related issues, this course of events would be strategically important and have implications for energy relations in the entire region.Government forecasts showing an increase in gas extraction in such a short time may not be very realistic, but it does seem likely that in the next few years production could reach a level rendering Ukraine independent of imports. Ukraine has large gas reserves of hitherto untapped potential (the third largest in Europe). Meanwhile, this development can only occur if reforms within the mining sector, a reduction in corruption, an influx of foreign investment, and political stability are all in place.

The Free State of Bavaria and its party: the CSU faces an electoral test

The Free State of Bavaria and its party: the CSU faces an electoral test

Author(s): Kamil Frymark / Language(s): English

Keywords: Free State of Bavaria; CSU

The Christian Social Union (CSU) has ruled Bavaria continuously for sixty years. The CSU’s domination of the province’s political scene, together with its influence on federal policies through its partnership with the CDU in the Bundestag, has made the party one of the most effective groups in Europe. In the medium term Bavaria will have to face challenges connected with the transformation and digitisation of industry, which could undermine the province’s current economic model. In addition, the CSU is being confronted on the political scene by Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a grouping which has a similar profile to the CSU in several aspects. The elections on 14 October 2018 could permanently change the balance of power in Bavaria’s Landtag, lead to a serious weakening of the CSU’s dominance in Bavaria, and affect Germany’s federal politics.The CSU owes its electoral success to a conservative profile combined with the province’s economic achievements, as well as the ability to adapt its programme to changing social trends. Voters see the party as both a guarantor of Bavaria’s economic success and the advocate of the interests of vulnerable social groups. However, the CSU is undergoing a transformation which may result in it losing its status as a mass party appealing to all social groups. These changes are structural in nature; they result primarily from the aging of its traditional electorate and the inflow into Bavaria of residents from other German provinces. This process is overlapping with a strong polarisation within German society (including Bavaria) regarding its approach to the migration crisis. The biggest beneficiary of these changes has been the AfD. A good result for this party in the elections to the Bavarian parliament could permanently change the balance of political forces there. The CSU would be unable to defend an absolute majority, and it would have to seek coalition partners in order to form further governments.

(Un)realistic neutrality. Attempts to redefine Belarus’ foreign policy

(Nie)realna neutralność. Próby redefinicji białoruskiej polityki zagranicznej

Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): Polish

Trwający konflikt rosyjsko-ukraiński i wzrost napięcia w stosunkach Rosji z Zachodem skłonił władze białoruskie do podjęcia próby redefinicji polityki zagranicznej w kierunku zaakcentowania neutralności wobec skonfliktowanych stron. W rezultacie w okresie ostatnich kilkunastu miesięcy w retoryce Białorusi zaczęła wyraźnie dominować narracja niezaangażowania. Mińsk usiłuje odgrywać rolę neutralnego mediatora, licząc, że taka strategia będzie zabezpieczeniem przed skutkami eskalacji napięcia między Rosją a Zachodem, co postrzegane jest obecnie jako największe zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa państwa. Tym samym Mińsk powraca do dyskutowanej na początku lat 90. idei dążenia Białorusi do neutralności, która wciąż jest formalnie zapisana w białoruskiej konstytucji. Skuteczność nowej strategii poważnie ograniczona jest jednak pozostawaniem Mińska w ścisłym sojuszu wojskowym z Moskwą. W związku z czym Białoruś jako państwo aspirujące do neutralności nie będzie w stanie uzyskać pełnej wiarygodności na arenie międzynarodowej.

The US–China trade dispute: phase two

Konflikt handlowy USA–Chiny. Etap drugi

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: USA; China; trade;

Donald Trump has pursued his strategy of stepping up pressure on Beijing by threatening it with a tariff war since March 2018. The aim of this strategy is to resolve the problems in US–China economic relations that have been mounting for years. These problems include China’s constant trade surplus with the US, the limitations regarding access to the Chinese market, and the cases of technology theft or forced transfer from US companies. The tariffs imposed so far are of negligible significance for trade exchange, although on 6 July Washington plans to announce a 25% tariff on the import of high-technology goods from China, worth US$34 billion (this amount could be increased to US$50 billion). Should China introduce its announced retaliatory measures, the tariff dispute could cover goods worth around US$95 billion, or around 15% of US–China trade exchange (see Appendix). President Trump has already announced that goods imported from China worth another US$200 billion would be covered by tariffs, should China fail to make concessions.In contrast to the previous phases of negotiations, the US’s present demands focus on longterm structural problems rather than specific benefits for American business. Thereby, the formula of talks based on seeking spectacular agreements (‘deals’) that Trump had initially adopted is losing ground. This heralds a launch of another phase of negotiations, this time more comprehensive and more difficult for China. Until recently, Beijing had tried to contain the dispute by making minor concessions. At the same time, it is communicating its readiness to offer a symmetrical response to the American strikes. China is also trying to take advantage of its dispute with the US by applying diplomatic measures to position itself as a defender of globalisation and multilateral trade rules. The tools the US is using may disrupt global supply chains in the high-technology sector, which in turn may impact the economic condition of America’s allies in the European Union and in East Asia.

Thaw in Uzbekistan. Reforms by President Mirziyoyev

Odwilż w Uzbekistanie. Reformy prezydenta Mirzijojewa

Author(s): Mariusz Marszewski / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Uzbekistan; President Mirziyoyev

It has been almost two years since the death of the long-serving leader of Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, and since Shavkat Mirziyoyev took up power (September 2016). The change has had spectacular results, including signs of liberalisation of the previous, extremely authoritarian system of rule, and economic reform, for instance with regard to stimulating growth of small-scale business, and in fact activation of Uzbekistan on the international stage and normalisation of relations with neighbours. Meanwhile, certainly the most important process under way in Uzbekistan is that of consolidation of power by the new president, and a key element of this is dismantling the might enjoyed to date by the National Security Service. The curbing of the position of the National Security Service, which has been successful so far, entails internal restructuring of the state apparatus. The limited liberalisation and opening up to the world are mainly a result of this process.Mirziyoyev has created a new dynamic both internally and in the region. The effects will only become clear in the long term. The outcome of this new situation is uncertain; consolidation of the new president’s power and the ensuing reforms are accompanied by constantly recurring crises which were frozen during Karimov’s rule. There are also external threats – a possibility of return to custodianship of Russia, a country which is fortifying its position, China’s increasing economic dominance, and growing strength of radicals among the Uzbek minority in northern Afghanistan. The emerging processes are therefore proceeding fast, and thus it is hard to determine whether the new Uzbekistan under President Mirziyoyev will prove to be a stable country in which the liberal reforms will continue.

Gas revolution? Prospects for increased gas production in Ukraine

Gazowa rewolucja? Perspektywy wzrostu wydobycia gazu na Ukrainie

Author(s): Wojciech Konończuk / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Gas revolution; gas production; Ukraine; reforms; lowering tax rates; energy sector development; energy efficiency; increase in gas extraction; political stability;

For a number of months now the Ukrainian gas production sector has been undergoing a major overhaul to improve the conditions in which it operates, with a view to significantly increasing production. The most important reforms include lowering tax rates and deregulation. These changes are a result of the government’s gas sector development plan for Ukraine, approved in 2016. Under this programme, the amount of gas extracted is to increase from the current 20 bcm to 27 bcm by as soon as 2020. Combined with greater energy efficiency, this would enable Ukraine to become self-sufficient in terms of its gas supply, and even to export gas in subsequent years. Because Ukraine has traditionally been dependent upon imports, and due to the political importance of gas-related issues, this course of events would be strategically important and have implications for energy relations in the entire region. || Government forecasts showing an increase in gas extraction in such a short time may not be very realistic, but it does seem likely that in the next few years production could reach a level rendering Ukraine independent of imports. Ukraine has large gas reserves of hitherto untapped potential (the third largest in Europe). Meanwhile, this development can only occur if reforms within the mining sector, a reduction in corruption, an influx of foreign investment, and political stability are all in place.

The 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia – circuses instead of bread?

Mundial w Rosji – igrzyska zamiast chleba?

Author(s): Iwona Wiśniewska,Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: 2018 FIFA World Cup; Mundial; Russia; sports; tourism; hosting World Cup events; economic assessment;

For the purposes of the World Cup, the Russian leadership created an image of Russia as a country that is safe, modern and open to the world: they made sure that the organisation of sports events was efficient, security was guaranteed, visitors had various conveniences at their disposal and that the attitude of law enforcement officers towards them was friendly. Paradoxically, the implementation of many of these arrangements was facilitated by Russia’s authoritarian model of governance, including a comprehensive law enforcement system the Kremlin has at its disposal and the state’s control of the key groups involved. Moscow has used this image, especially by including the enthusiastic opinions voiced by foreign football fans, as one of its soft power tools to contradict the negative image of Russia present in the narrative supported by Western politicians and media, and to solidify Russia’s position in the international arena. Moreover, Russia has used the presence of leaders from Western states, who attended various World Cup matches, to bolster its narrative emphasising the absence of unity among Western states and the rightfulness of Russia’s foreign policy stance. However, there is no indication that Russia’s improved image could have a measurable impact on the betterment of its relations with the West, which is confirmed, for example, by the extension of US-imposed sanctions. Similarly, in domestic politics the World Cup merely brought a temporary wave of enthusiasm within society that quickly subsided, giving way to social discontent triggered by the government pushing through unpopular social reforms. The World Cup is now over and Russia is returning to its inveterate domestic problems and moving to another phase of its confrontation with the West.

A revolution in instalments. Whither Pashinyan’s Armenia now?

Rewolucja na raty. Dokąd zmierza Armenia Paszyniana?

Author(s): Wojciech Górecki,Jan Strzelecki / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Revolution; Armenia; politics; government; Armenian political system; Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan; reforms;

In mid-August, a hundred days passed since Nikol Pashinyan took office as Armenia’s Prime Minister, which is an office of key importance for the Armenian political system. Formerly an opposition MP, Pashinyan rose to power as a result of a bloodless revolution. He replaced Serzh Sargsyan, whose camp had ruled Armenia for the last two decades. The country’s domestic situation is stable and its economy is growing. However, the parliamentary majority and significant business assets remain in the hands of the old elite, which considerably reduces the present leadership’s room for manoeuvre. || Pashinyan started his work by forming a government in which key political posts were taken by his close collaborators. Next, he appointed new heads of central-level offices, local administration institutions and law enforcement agencies. The prime minister also initiated the process of settling accounts with the old elite, although this has met with resistance on the part of Robert Kocharyan (Armenia’s president in 1998–2008) and his supporters. Due to the absence of the relevant legal instruments, the new government has failed to launch political and economic reforms (aside from its ostentatious fight against bribery and corruption), even though in his political promises Pashinyan mentioned his intention to thoroughly reconstruct the state, including the political scene, which is in line with what the public expects him to do. The prime minister’s main goal is to organise early parliamentary elections in the upcoming months and to win a stable majority in the new term of the National Assembly. In the present public mood, Pashinyan’s group could win by a landslide. However, it is not known whether its approval rating will remain stable in time. The plan to hold early elections is opposed by the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) led by Serzh Sargsyan, which holds the largest number of seats in parliament.

Crisis in Turkmenistan. A test for China’s policy in the region

Kryzys w Turkmenistanie. Test dla polityki Chin w regionie

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Mariusz Marszewski / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Turkmenistan; currency crisis; collapse of gas prices; political crisis; reduction of living standard; foreign exchange reserves; investments programmes; China; geopolitics; gas cooperation;

Kryzys walutowy w Turkmenistanie, wywołany załamaniem cen gazu, przerodził się w najpoważniejszy w historii państwa kryzys społeczny i polityczny. Rząd w Aszchabadzie przerzucił ciężar problemów gospodarczych na ludność, zawieszając wymienialność manata i likwidując w zeszłym roku rozbudowane przywileje socjalne. Drastyczne obniżenie poziomu życia turkmeńskiego społeczeństwa podkopało stabilność reżimu. Wyczerpywanie się rezerw walutowych Turkmenistanu stawia pod znakiem zapytania dalszy wzrost oparty na monumentalnych inwestycjach, będących głównym – obok zlikwidowanej polityki socjalnej – źródłem legitymizacji władzy. Obecna dynamika kryzysu zależna jest w pełni od Chin, które są niemal wyłącznym odbiorcą turkmeńskiego gazu (ponad 90% całości eksportu surowca), a jednocześnie głównym wierzycielem Aszchabadu. Konstrukcja chińsko-turkmeńskich kontraktów (m.in. związanie cen gazu z cenami ropy) prowadzi do drenażu turkmeńskich zasobów przy wyraźnie zmniejszonym napływie dewiz. Chiny mogą być postawione przed potrzebą stabilizacji gospodarczej Turkmenistanu, w przypadku braku działań ratunkowych, ryzykując rozpadem państwa. Większe zaangażowanie Chin mogłoby z kolei oznaczać rewizję chińsko-rosyjskiego modus vivendi w regionie. Moskwa może wykorzystać kryzys do odbudowy wpływów w Aszchabadzie, włączenia Turkmenistanu w obręb własnych projektów politycznej integracji regionu, w zamian oferując pomoc wojskową w ewentualnej stabilizacji reżimu, a także wznowienie współpracy gazowej.

A stinking business. Environmental issues, protests and big money in the waste business in Russia

Śmierdząca sprawa. Ekologia, protesty i duże pieniądze na biznesie śmieciowym w Rosji

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Russia; waste business; environmental issues; social protests; municipal waste landfills; waste management; waste disposal; illegal waste dumps; waste collection; toxic gases;

W ostatnich miesiącach obwód moskiewski stał się ośrodkiem protestów społecznych przeciwko problemom środowiskowym, powodowanym przez składowiska odpadów komunalnych. Składowiska są przeciążone, nieodpowiednio zabezpieczone, emitują trujące gazy i odcieki do wód gruntowych. Problem jest najmocniej odczuwany w obwodzie moskiewskim (stolica generuje najwięcej odpadów), a poza wymiarem stricte ekologicznym dotyka sfer ekonomicznej i społecznej. Kluczowymi problemami, charakterystycznymi dla gospodarowania odpadami w Rosji, są przeciążenie legalnych wysypisk oraz tworzenie składowisk dzikich, nieodpowiednia utylizacja odpadów narażająca mieszkańców okolicznych miejscowości na skażenie powietrza i wód gruntowych, a także rabunkowa gospodarka prowadzona przez podmioty powiązane z prezydentem Władimirem Putinem, które zmonopolizowały sferę transportu odpadów. Pogłębiające się problemy ekologiczne, a zwłaszcza kłopoty zdrowotne mieszkańców powodowane przez wyziewy z wysypisk, stały się katalizatorem społecznego niezadowolenia. Mieszkańcy wielu podmoskiewskich miejscowości od kilku miesięcy protestują, a w niektórych wypadkach sięgają również po postulaty polityczne. Jednak analiza przebiegu (i wygasania) dotychczasowych protestów nie pozwala oczekiwać, iż doprowadzą one do systemowych zmian w funkcjonowaniu wysypisk czy do długofalowych efektów społecznych – powstania struktur kontroli obywatelskiej i zmiany relacji państwo–obywatel. „Protesty śmieciowe” wydają się dobrze ilustrować ogólną dynamikę protestów społecznych w Rosji. Mają one charakter spontaniczny i lokalny, koncentrują się na konkretnym problemie i wygasają po jego choćby cząstkowym rozwiązaniu, zmęczeniu protestujących lub presji ze strony władz. Ponadto protestujący rzadko postrzegają trapiący ich problem jako element szerszego systemu, sankcjonowanego z samej góry. Horyzontem ich oczekiwań jest dotarcie z petycją do prezydenta – „dobrego cara” – i punktowe rozwiązanie problemu, bez wprowadzania zmian systemowych. Pozwala to Kremlowi na zachowanie statusu wyłącznego decydenta i daje mu rozległe możliwości gaszenia protestów poprzez niewielkie ustępstwa, manipulacje uczestnikami wystąpień i zastraszanie lub przekupywanie ich liderów.

A Basin under special Supervision. Russian-Ukrainian Tensions in the Sea of Azov

Akwen pod specjalnym nadzorem. Rosyjsko-ukraińskie napięcia na Morzu Azowskim

Author(s): Krzysztof Nieczypor / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; Sea of Azov; Russian–Ukrainian tensions; Crimean Bridge; Russian-annexed Crimean Peninsula; conflicts; crisis;

Budowa i oddanie do użytku w maju br. mostu krymskiego, łączącego terytorium Federacji Rosyjskiej z zaanektowanym Półwyspem Krymskim, stały się przyczyną zaostrzenia rosyjsko- -ukraińskich relacji na Morzu Azowskim. Od kwietnia Rosjanie zatrzymują przepływające przez Cieśninę Kerczeńską jednostki handlowe, co wpływa na znaczące ograniczenie pracy ukraińskich portów nad Morzem Azowskim. Działania rosyjskie uderzają w gospodarkę Ukrainy, utrudniając eksport towarów stanowiących istotny udział w dochodach do budżetu. Ukraińskie Ministerstwo Infrastruktury szacuje całościowe straty finansowe z tytułu ograniczenia żeglugi na poziomie 20–40 mln dolarów rocznie. Rosyjska aktywność na Morzu Azowskim i w Cieśninie Kerczeńskiej potwierdza dążenie Moskwy do uczynienia z akwenu w pełni kontrolowanego, wewnętrznego obszaru. Zwiększona koncentracja rosyjskich sił zbrojnych w pobliżu mostu krymskiego dowodzi strategicznego znaczenia tej infrastruktury dla Federacji Rosyjskiej. Dostęp do Morza Azowskiego i kontrola przepływających przez Cieśninę Kerczeńską jednostek daje możliwość szantażu ekonomicznego wobec strony ukraińskiej. Przedsięwzięte przez Rosję środki mają trwały charakter, a ich celem jest również pogłębianie trudnej sytuacji gospodarczej Ukrainy. Władze rosyjskie starają się w ten sposób wpłynąć na nastroje społeczne w południowej części Donbasu (kontrolowanej przez Kijów), wzbudzając wśród tamtejszych mieszkańców przekonanie o bezsensowności dalszej konfrontacji z Federacją Rosyjską.

Are reforms unavoidable? Belarus’s economy facing a reduction of subsidies from Russia

Nieuchronność reform? Gospodarka Białorusi wobec redukcji rosyjskich subsydiów

Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Belarus; reforms; economy; economic policy; economic development; economic relations with Russia;

Rok 2018 przyniósł kontynuację wzrostu gospodarczego na Białorusi, zapoczątkowanego w roku poprzednim po kilku latach recesji. Nie oznacza to jednak realnej poprawy sytuacji białoruskiej gospodarki, wciąż opartej na nieefektywnych radzieckich metodach planowania i zarządzania. W zgodnej opinii niezależnych białoruskich oraz zagranicznych ekonomistów Białoruś znajduje się w pułapce niskiego wzrostu gospodarczego rzędu 2–3% rocznie, co nie pozwala na nadrobienie zapóźnienia wobec innych państw regionu. Dodatkowo sytuację ekonomiczną komplikuje przyspieszająca od połowy ub.r. redukcja rosyjskich subsydiów, będących nie tylko jednym z głównych czynników wzrostu, lecz także warunkiem stabilności białoruskiej gospodarki. Moskwa uzależnia kontynuowanie wsparcia od gotowości Mińska do realnej integracji w ramach istniejącego formalnie od 1999 roku Państwa Związkowego Białorusi i Rosji. Tym samym prezydent Alaksandr Łukaszenka stoi obecnie przed wyzwaniem utrzymania niezależności od Rosji albo utraty części lub całości rosyjskich subsydiów stanowiących 10% PKB Białorusi. Alternatywą dla wsparcia ze strony Moskwy mogłaby być kompleksowa transformacja gospodarcza. Jednak wprowadzone dotąd reformy mają ograniczony charakter i dotyczą głównie sektora IT oraz małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw. Obawiający się nadmiernego osłabienia systemu władzy, szczególnie w kontekście zbliżających się wyborów prezydenckich, Alaksandr Łukaszenka nadal będzie blokował bardziej zdecydowane działania, w tym prywatyzację lub likwidację niektórych nieefektywnych państwowych zakładów przemysłowych. Oznacza to zatem konieczność poszukiwania porozumienia ze stawiającą coraz większe wymagania Moskwą, którego ceną będzie dalsze pogłębienie zależności Białorusi od Rosji.