МАКРОБИЙ КОММЕНТАРИЙ НА «СОН СЦИПИОНА»
Translation made on the publication: Ambrosii Theodosii Macrobii Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, ed. I. Willis
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Translation made on the publication: Ambrosii Theodosii Macrobii Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, ed. I. Willis
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Scotus transforms metaphysics as onto-theology into ontology, meaning that the first that is known is not the Supreme (divine) being but the being as such. Metaphysics as the science of the Transcendent is transformed into transcendental science that speaks about the concept of being as such and about the transcendental characteristics of being as such. To the transcendental characteristics in Scotus belong not only convertible transcendentals but also disjunctive transcendentals that can be divided into contradictory (contingency-necessity, finiteness-infinity) and correlative transcendentals. To the correlative transcendentals belong pure perfections (perfectiones simpliciter) and the most important of them are intellect and will. Because the will in Scotus is the principle of free action, it is the proof that freedom belongs to the transcendental characteristics of being. Because in Scotus intellect – belonging to the nature – is the principle of necessary action, and the will is the principle of free action, and because in Scotus freedom is nobler than necessity (“haec enim nobilior est contingentia necessitate”), this proves that Scotus' metaphysics is the metaphysics of freedom and not the metaphysics of necessity. The goal of metaphysics as transcendental science is the knowledge of infinite being. This proves that transcendental concepts are intentional, that they are directed to reality. Scotus proves that the Supreme (Highest) being acts freely and that each of God's actions is a free action (“perfectionis est in Deo nihil necessario causare”) overcoming thereby the metaphysics of necessity of that period. Everything that is logically possible, that is not in contradiction with being, the will of God (freedom) can transform into reality. In this way it is said that Scotus does not accept freedom as voluntarism. In this way the metaphysics of possibility and the metaphysics of freedom go inseparably together. God's freedom is the presupposition of human freedom (“omne efficere erit contingens, quia dependet ab efficientia primi quae est contingens”) and because God is Freedom, the access to God is possible only through freedom. The highest form of freedom in Scotus is charity. Freedom is more perfect if it comes out of the being that is more perfect and if it is directed to the being that is more perfect. By this understanding of freedom Scotus transcends the modern philosophy of freedom.
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Empirijske, racionalne i intuitivne metode u naučnim razmatranjima formulišu različite naučne discipline. Doktrinarna gnoza i filozofija predstavljaju dve racionalno-demonstrativne nauke koje razmatraju ontološka pitanja. Iako osnova njihovog gnostičkog iskustva jeste intuitivno saznanje, gnostici svoje iskustvo opisuju i obrazlažu na racionalan način, s ciljem da sadržaj takvog gnostičkog znanja u njihovim naučnim radovima bude dostupan široj javnosti. Na taj način utemeljuje se doktrinarna gnoza, koja kao i filozofija koristi opšte pojmove. Da bi se stekla jasna slika o suštini doktrinarne gnoze u islamu, u ovom radu ćemo nastojati da predstavimo osnovne karakteristike doktrinarne gnoze i odnos između nje i sličnih naučnih disciplina. Na tom planu, osim toga što će biti važno da se pojasne razlike između doktrinarne gnoze i ostalih aspekata gnostičkog saznanja u islamu, kao što su prenesena gnoza i praktična gnoza, biće potrebno obratiti posebnu pažnju na to da se jasno analizira i razlika između doktrinarne gnoze i filozofije.
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The subject of the article presented is the theological vision of the two „aeons” as it was developed in certain major works of the Byzantine Fathers and Church writers (4th – 8th Centuries) and theirspecific conception of the coming of the „future aeon” into the circle of the „aeon of this world”. This coming is accomplished by the „event of Christ”, and the resurrection and ascension of human nature in His Person. The „circular” structure of the „aeon of this world” is analysed as well as its specific measurability in terms of the „one day” and the „seven days” of the week, this „seven” being defined by St John Damascene as „the number of this world”. Itis the eschatological event of Christ’s Resurrection – the accomplishment of the „aeon to come” in the circle of „this aeon” – that,according to the Byzantine authors concerned, gives ground to their doctrine of the „eighth day” (which is also the „first day” of the healed Creation and a „day-without-evening”). In this article it is also my purpose to defend the assumption that this very doctrine laid the foundations of the peculiar Church perception of time as not-of-this-world time, which resides in this world.
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The Oxford Calculators’ School, active in the first half of the fourteenth century, is famous among historians of science for its introduction of mathematical tools of analysis into Aristotelian natural philosophy. A tool they developed and exploited was the calculationes, based on the Euclidean theory of ratios derived from the book V of his Elements. Th is introduction of mathematics into natural philosophy became possible thanks to William of Ockham’s concept of theoretical science. William rejected the Aristotelian prohibition of metabasis — that is, the prohibition of using arguments taken from one science (for example, mathematics) in order to prove statements of other science. For Ockham and his intellectual heirs at Oxford, mathematics was a handy tool of argumentation with regard to physical problems, especially to the so-called science of motion. For instance, William Heytesbury, one of most important Oxford Calculators, used the mathematical method of calculationes to prove the “mean speed theorem,” establishing the exact relation between uniform and uniformly-accelerated or decelerated motions. His student, Richard Swineshead, analyzed motions that are characterized by uniformly changing acceleration or deceleration. A few Continental thinkers — like Nicole Oresme, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen — adopted and developed Calculators’ theories. Yet they faced, it would seem, much stronger opposition from philosophers in their communities that accepted the Aristotelian prohibition of metabasis.
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This paper is focused on the methodology of Richard Kilvington, one of the founders of the Oxford Calculators School in the fourteenth century. This methodology is based on mathematics and the secundum imaginationem procedure. Mathematics, used by Kilvington to solve all kind of problems belonging to logic, physics, ethics and theology, is a special trait of Kilvington’s methodology. He is especially interested in describing different types of changes that can occur in the real world and in imaginary ones. Kilvington finds uses for all types of “measuring” of different changes, which was a popular intellectual endeavor in his time. Kilvington uses the secundum imaginationem procedure to prove that mathematics is a proper method in doing philosophy of science. He is certain that mathematical science has practical implications. Kilvington accepts Ockham’s logico-critical approach, which focused on empirical, logical and mathematical evidence in order to ensure a firmer foundation for philosophy.
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The paper deals with the widely-discussed problem of the change in Aquinas’s interpretation of the relationship between the intellect and the will. The change may be located in his work around 1270, between the Prima Pars and the Prima Secundae/De malo 6. It comprises three main elements. (1) At the beginning, Thomas explains the role of the intellect in the act of liberum arbitrium by final causality and the role of the will by efficiency; after the change of his position, the role of the intellect is understood by formal causality and the role of the will by final causality. (2) After the change, the will is described as having the capacity to be a source of motion on its own (not only responding to the activity of the intellect). (3) It is the will and not the intellect, according to Aquinas’s later interpretation, that is set in motion by the first cause. The paper presents the discussion on the divergent interpretations of the above-mentioned evolution, begun by several famous texts by Otto Lottin in the 1920s and 1930s and followed up by a book by Yul Kim published in 2007. The new position adapted by Aquinas at the end of his career has been evaluated as a voluntaristic one, an intellectualistic one, or as some sort of middle position. Taking into account that (1) Thomas consistently understands the act of liberum arbitrium as the unique act of the intellect and the will operating together, (2) Aquinas’s philosophy of action is never prone to deterministic Aristotelianism and (3) for Aquinas, the first cause, always understood as transcendent, cannot be a danger to human freedom, it can therefore be concluded that the position adapted by Thomas after 1270 remains in substantial agreement with his former interpretation. The act of liberum arbitrium is rooted in the will. If one wants to judge Aquinas’s position according to this aspect, it should be labelled voluntarism. But the act of liberum arbitrium cannot be executed without the cooperation of the intellect; according to Aquinas it is never the result of some blind force. If one wants to focus on this aspect, one must describe Thomas’s solution as intellectualism. As mentioned above, the act of liberum arbitrium is the unique act of the intellect and the will operating together. If one wants to consider that aspect as the most important, one will probably be inclined to describe Aquinas’s position as a middle one between voluntarism and intellectualism. What is most important is that each of the above-mentioned descriptions of Aquinas’s position is the same before and after the change.
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Most ancient Greek and Arabic Peripatetic works following the footsteps of Aristotle’s De anima and Ethica Nicomachea stood at odds with key aspects of the traditional Christian doctrines of the human soul, intellect, and ultimate happiness. Alexander of Aphrodisias presents no exception to this picture. The young Thomas Aquinas thus heavily criticises his thought on the human soul and intellect in his Commentary on the Sentences II.17.2.1. Yet at the same time, he explicitly approves of some aspects of Alexander’s thought on ultimate human happiness for his doctrine of the beatific vision in his Commentary on the Sentences IV.49.2.1. The purpose of this paper is to dissolve these seemingly paradoxical treatments of Alexander’s thought in Aquinas’ earliest work. By showing that Aquinas performs two distinctive transformations of Alexander’s Aristotelian philosophy — an anchored transformation and a dissociated transformation — I uncover how Aquinas systematically consolidates his own earliest theological anthropology and eschatology.
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This article shows that the palimpsest Par. gr. 2575, included in the “philosophical collection”, was the Greek exemplar used by William of Moerbeke for his translation of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. It is also shown that the palimpsest is the only Greek witness of an independent branch of the direct tradition of Simplicius’ commentary. The implications of our discovery for the biography of William are finally discussed.
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The manuscript Ottobonianus latinus 591 has several interesting features: an origin that is diffi cult to trace (Cambridge or Northern Italy?); a Venetian copyist, Brother Petrus de Fenestris; the reference to an Oxonian “edition” of the text (Oxon. editus ; rubricated titles); the designation of the text Sciendum quod Daniel as notula lecta; the title Replicatio for the six articles. This “edition” has the following characteristics: it transforms question 1 into a prologue; it removes the prologues of Book II and of the six articles; it contains the notula Danielis in Book III, between [018 de beatitudine] and [009 angelo custode]. Two tabulae are joined in a separate gathering, one of them [Tab. de materiis Abraham] to be compared to that of ms. Paris, BNF, Lat. 14576 (a. 1389). This manuscript also has common characteristics with ms. Paris, BNF, Lat. 3087: the [notula Danielis]; and the explicits of questions [012 confi rmatione] and [014 necessitate confessionis].
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Mathematics studies objects such as numbers, sets, points, lines and plane figures. Since the time of the Pythagoreans, philosophers have pondered the nature of these entities. Although Aquinas adopted many of Aristotle’s views on these matters, he also made his own contributions to the philosophy of mathematics. The aim of this paper is to examine the answers that Aquinas gives to two major problems in this area, namely, what is number and what is the relationship between mathematical entities and reality. The first of these issues is dealt with in section one. The result is as follows: number (as such) is a species of discretequantity; it is multitude measured by one. One is a principle of number: its “constituent” and unit of measurement. A particular number, such as the number 7, is a species of number. The specific difference that distinguishes it from other numbers is the last unit that builds it. Section two is devoted to the problem of the relationship between mathematics and reality. The present state of research doesn’t provide a clear and unequivocal solution to this problem. It is widely accepted that Aquinas doesn’t deem mathematical objects purely mental constructs, since their existence depends on matter. Their definitions, however,do not include matter due to the fact that the entities in question are considered in an abstract way. Many scholars add that, in Aquinas’ view, mathematical objects are not entirely real. Rather, they are partly constructs of the human mind.
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The article analyzes the thomistic concepts of universals and existence (esse). In the Middle Ages, the question of universals was one of the most relevant problems of scholasticism. Theologians and philosophers debated over cognition of eternal forms and their existence in human understanding. They used asking: did universals exist in reality or in the intellect alone. Aquinas treated universals in three ways: as forms abstracted from matter, as forms in the divine intellect, and as forms which are the essences of intellectual substances. He was convinced that human cognition is grounded on sense perceptions and imagination without which the cognition is not possible: no body – no cognition. This attitude of the Angelic Doctor was very important for the development of philosophical anthropology. He claimed that being and essence are the first things to be conceived by our understanding, that being (ens) is understood through substantial forms thanks to which all beings have existence (esse). Existence was one of the most important parts of Aquinas’s metaphysics used in explanation of general development of the material world, nature of universals and modes of their existence.
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The article analyzes the concept of intellectual soul as it was understood by Albertus Magnus, who developed it on the background of Christian tradition, relaying on the texts of Ancient Greek and Arab thinkers. While inquiring the nature of intellect, Albertus Magnus proves that the essence of the soul consists in the cognitive ability, which it obtains from the first cause. He uses the term “soul” equivocally, relating it to being and acting, but the term “cause” he uses univocally. When created soul acquires the ability to know, it becomes intellectual and desires to approach the first cause as the source of knowledge. The image of the soul is like that of the first cause but it is not exact because of the remoteness of the soul from that cause. In some way, human intellectual soul is the perfection of the body but at the same tame it is a separate soul, therefore it functions as nature as well as potency. The intellectual nature of the soul reveals itself by the actualization of potential ideas.
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The article discusses the problem of the natural potentiality involved in faith. Stephen Langton and his disciple, Geoffrey of Poitiers, defend the view that the human being has a natural ability to believe, and by believing they intend acts and movements of a meritorious virtue. However, the two thinkers offer different interpretations of this natural ability. This difference makes it possible to ascribe a small group of anonymous questions to Geoffrey rather than to his English master. The article concludes with a critical edition of two theological questions by Geoffrey of Poitiers and Stephen Langton.
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This article is concerned with an accurate reading of St. Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of natural law that would secure the intelligibility of its principles from the reductions of moral emotivism. It aims to show that in light of some criticisms of a “purely ethical” reading of this doctrine, the sources of intelligibility of practical reason cannot be detached from his metaphysical insights, especially those concerning the notion of the good (ratio boni). Moreover, it points out that for Aquinas the principles of natural law based on the intelligibility of the good require some sort of imitation of nature by practical reason. The “purely ethical” interpretations, which tend to disregard the intelligibility of the good manifest in the realm of physical natures, may turn out to be unable to account for the rational truthfulness of the doctrine of natural law intended by Aquinas.
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The present article was my attempt to present the natural theology (scientia divina) of St Thomas Aquinas in a more analytical and metaphilosophical way. The collected material allows us to distinguish Aquinas’s two approaches, the categorical and beyond-categorical, both in the demonstration of God’s existence and the procedure for establishing His attributes. This distinction becomes apparent in the five ways. I interpreted the first, second and fifth as simple modifications of Aristotle, whereas the third and the fourth represented, to me, original conceptual speculation. The speculation takes us to an interesting concept of God as ipsum esse. This concept, which constitutes an exceptionally mature synthesis of perfect-being theology and creation theology, is greater than the concepts of his predecessors and can be used as a tool for expressing essential elements of the Christian doctrine. The most interesting component of this concept is the idea of God’s simplicity, which requires us to get rid of any categorical-anthropomorphic habit in our way of thinking. According to it, we can state that God is a person, but not in the sense of being such-or-such a person (as some being among other beings), but in the sense of being a mysterious source and principle of existence and perfection of persons.
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This article analyses some of the most significant topics of scholastic theory of science, namely, classification, hierarchy and subordination of sciences. The author of the article focuses on theoretical sources as well as the criteria of those scholastic procedures. The article comes to the conclusion that scholastic theory of science took over the Aristotelian division of sciences into theoretical and practical ones, yet productive sciences lost the status of independent area of sciences within frames of above-mentioned theory. On the other hand, practical sciences were not unanimously given the status of real science. Within frames of the hierarchy of sciences, two cases of scientific priority were distinguished: a) according to the very nature of science; b) in respect of human cognition. Finally, the article captures two types of scientific subordination in scholastic theory of sciences: a) according to premises; b) according to objects.
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In the first part of the introductory article to the translation from German into Russian of the Edith Stein’s work “Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas” is given a short biography of Edith Stein who has written her PhD thesis by Edmund Husserl in Göttingen then worked with him in Freiburg and who was one of the originators of the early phenomenological movement, collaborated with such phenomenologists as Dietrich von Hildebrand, Alexandre Koyré, Max Scheler, Hans Lipps, Martin Heidegger, and Roman Ingarden. In the second part of the introductory article the main theses and ideas of the translated work are presented in which Edith Stein tried to compare the seemingly uncompatible philosophies o fEdmund Husserl and St.Thomas Aquinas.
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The article analyzes some of the most important real compositions in Aquinas’s metaphysics: form and matter, supposit and nature, substance and accident, as well as act and potency. On some way, act and potency are identified with the other principles insofar as they designate certain constitutive tendencies which other principles have as common. Because of the lack of the space, the most important composition for the Aquinas’s metaphysics have not been considered that is the real composition between esse and essence in created beings.
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