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CREATIVITY: METHOD OR MAGIC?

Author(s): Stevan Harnad / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2006

Creativity may be a trait, a state or just a process defined by its products. It can be contrasted with certain cognitive activities that are not ordinarily creative, such as problem-solving, deduction, induction, learning, imitation, trial-and-error, heuristics and “abduction”, however, all of these can be done creatively too. There are four kinds of theories, attributing creativity respectively to (1) method, (2) “memory” (innate structure), (3) magic or (4) mutation. These theories variously emphasize the role of an unconscious mind, innate constraints, analogy, aesthetics, anomalies, formal constraints, serendipity, mental analogs, heuristic strategies, improvisatory performance and cumulative collaboration. There is some virtue in each, but the best model is still the one implicit in Pasteur’s dictum: “Chance favors the prepared mind.” And because the exercise and even the definition of creativity requires constraints, it is unlikely that “creativity training” or an emphasis on freedom in education can play a productive role in this preparation.

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Teologia katolicka w konfrontacji z neuronaukami: przyczynek do dialogu

Author(s): Damian Wąsek / Language(s): Polish Issue: 64/2018

I ask the following question: “How should theology develop in order to avoid conflicts with neurosciences?” I believe that the answer to this question is a turn towards the monistic structure of human nature. It seems that insisting on the concept of a human being as composed of two realities – the body and the soul – makes it difficult, if not impossible, to enter into a constructive dialogue with neuroscientists who point to a clear connection between consciousness and biological processes.

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Dwa porządki normatywne. Komentarz do dyskusji o intencjonalności działania

Author(s): Andrzej Waleszczyński / Language(s): Polish Issue: 3/2017

The characteristic asymmetry of attributes of intentionality which is known as the sideeffect effect and Butler’s problem has been explained by the impact of moral considerations on judgments of intentional action. The commentary on this discussion draws attention to an alternative solution. It uses the concept of moral agency and the possibility of the existence of two types of normative orders: moral and non-moral. They are characterized by different conditions of applying the concept of intentional action. In situations where there are negative effects, there is a “normative tension” between these types of normativity. Therefore, normative competences that would be responsible for separating normative orders may play an important role in the judgments of intentional action.

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Ідея кольору в контексті феноменологічної концепції сприйняття

Author(s): Oksana V. Beldiy / Language(s): Ukrainian Issue: 4/2010

The article is devoted to the problem of person’s perception. The research shows phenomenological interpretations concept of color and principles of its perception.

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Personal Identity and What Matters

Author(s): Jeremiah Joven Joaquin / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2017

There are two general views about the nature of what matters, i.e. about the metaphysical ground of prudential concern, the ground of the concern we have for our own future welfare. On the one hand, the identity-is-what-matters view tells us that prudential concern is grounded on one’s continuing identity over time; I am concerned with my own future welfare because it is my own future welfare. On the other hand, the identity-is-not-what-matters view tells us that prudential concern is not grounded on such continuing identity; rather, it is grounded on some continuityrelation, which only coincides with identity. In this paper, I explore a primary motivation for the latter view—viz., Parfit’s fission case—and show that there are interesting ways to resist it.

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Some (Philosophical) Problems for Consciousness as a Neural Capacity for Objectivity

Author(s): John Ian K. Boongaling / Language(s): English Issue: 3/2015

This paper is a critical appraisal of the most recent attempt from cognitive science in general, developmental and evolutionary biology in particular, to understand the nature and mechanisms underlying consciousness as proposed by Anton J.M. Dijker. The proposal, briefly stated, is to view consciousness as a neural capacity for objectivity. What makes the problem of consciousness philosophically and scientifically challenging may be stated as follows: If consciousness has a first-person ontology and our best scientific theories have a third-person ontology, how can we come up with a satisfactory theory? Moreover, if the reduction of one to the other is impossible, what are we supposed to do? By neglecting what Chalmers calls the “hard problem” of consciousness, Dijker’s proposal seems unable to respond to the foregoing questions, and these questions, I maintain, are the very motivations that most of us have when we inquire about consciousness.

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Consciousness and Peripheral Self-Awareness

Author(s): Sinem Elkatip Hatipoğlu / Language(s): English Issue: 3/2013

It has been argued that consciousness is not possible without peripheral self-consciousness; i.e., without an implicit awareness of oneself as the subject of one’s mental state. My purpose is to undermine this view. I contend that a subject’s firstpersonal access to her conscious mental states and an awareness of them as hers, along with a particular approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things motivate the view that consciousness is not possible without self-consciousness. In order to undermine this view I argue that not all conscious states are accompanied by a sense of mineness. I also reject the reasons for endorsing an approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things. Then I critically examine Kriegel’s arguments for the dependence of consciousness on self-consciousness based on the first-personal access a subject has to her conscious mental states and discuss the difficulties involved.

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Infallibility about the Self

Author(s): Glen Hoffmann / Language(s): English Issue: 3/2013

On a common formulation, rationalist infallibilism is committed to two main theses: (i) ‘analytic a priori infallibilism’ and (ii) ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. According to thesis (i), a relatively wide range of analytic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified. According to thesis (ii), a relatively wide range of synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified. In this paper, I focus on rationalist infallibilism’s second main thesis, what is being called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. I argue that synthetic a priori infallibilism, and by extension rationalist infallibilism, is untenable. In particular, exploring what seems to be the only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of propositions about the self.

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Empiricka vyzva filosofickému pojeti mysli

Author(s): Martin Vraný / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 1/2013

The article reflects on influential views of the mind that come from cognitive science and seem to undermine the traditional philosophical view that the mind is simply unified and transparent to itself. Specifically, the modularity thesis is presented, along with its important modifications and criticisms, suggesting that the apparent unity can be ascribed only to higher cognition, if at all. Various theories of why the mind seems to be unified while being composed of autonomous modules are discussed. The overview results in the conclusion that our linguistic capacity plays a prominent role in the unity of the mind.

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William Jaworski: Philosophy of Mind. A Comprehensive Introduction

Author(s): Peter Volek / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 3/2012

Review of: William Jaworski: Philosophy of Mind. A Comprehensive Introduction Malden – Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, 411 pp.

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Are There Process-Requirements of Rationality?

Author(s): Julian Fink / Language(s): English Issue: 4/2011

Does a coherentist version of rationality issue requirements on states? Or does it issue requirements on processes? This paper evaluates the possibility of process-requirements. It argues that there are two possible definitions of state- and process-requirements: a satisfaction based definition and a content-based definition. I demonstrate that the satisfaction-based definition is inappropriate. It does not allow us to uphold a clear-cut distinction between state- and process-requirements. We should therefore use a content-based definition of state- and process- requirements. However, a content-based definition entails that rationality does not issue process-requirements. Content-based process requirements violate the principle that ‘rationality requires’ implies ‘can satisfy’. The conclusion of this paper therefore amounts to a radical rejection of process-requirements of rationality.

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Mentálnosť a intersubjektívna dostupnosť intencionálnych entít

Author(s): Pavel Cmorej / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 4/2011

V tomto článku by som chcel nadviazať na príspevok prof. Sousedíka (2011b), v ktorom reagoval na moje otázky a nejasnosti týkajúce sa jeho koncepcie intencionálnych predmetov.1 V stati Cmorej (2011b, 248) som na základe jeho tézy, že „intencionální jsoucna jsou entity, které existují pouze jako předmět nějaké naší poznávací schopnosti a jinak ne“ (Sousedík 2011a, 243) a jeho príkladu o Ferdovi mravcovi konštatoval, že keby sme toto vyjadrenie vzali doslova, „jeho koncepciu intencionálnych objektov by sme mohli bez rozpakov charakterizovať ako mentalistickú“.

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Alva Noë: Out of our heads Why you are not your brain, and other lessons from the biology of consciousness

Author(s): Jaroslav Peregrin / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2011

Review of: Alva Noë: Out of our heads Why you are not your brain, and other lessons from the biology of consciousness Hill and Young, New York, 2009, 214 pp.

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Svoboda vůle: Sic et Non

Author(s): Antonín Dolák / Language(s): Czech Issue: 3/2010

The paper is about the conception of free will. It describes arguments and counterarguments for free will. Its main aim is to submit a novel argumentation opposite to traditional arguments regarding, for instance, accounting of free will, emergent free will in complex brain or anthropocentric argument with emergent free will in human reason.

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Kam zmizli futbalisti?

Author(s): Silvia Gáliková / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 1/2010

Vo svojom príspevku budem reagovať na niektoré úvahy zo state Jozefa Bugára (2008) zameranej na kritické preskúmanie materializmu v súčasnom filozofovaní o povahe mysle. Materialisticky orientovaným koncepciám vytýka slabú explanačnú silu pri vysvetľovaní mentálneho života ľudských bytostí, t. j. vedomia, spánku, nevedomia, smrti. S Bugárom sa zhodnem v tom, že „akceptovanie súvislostí medzi prežívaním a stavmi mozgu nemusí nevyhnutne znamenať akceptovanie ich identity (s. 463), a takisto, že „materializmus nie je jedinou možnosťou, ako chápať vedomie“ (s. 471).

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‘Persons’ and Persons

Author(s): Paul Snowdon / Language(s): English Issue: 4/2009

In chapter 3 of Individuals, entitled ‘Persons’, Strawson argues against dualism and the no-ownership theory, and proposes instead that our concept of a person is a primitive concept. In this paper, it is argued that the basic questions that frame Strawson’s discussion, and some of his main arguments and claims, are dubious. A general diagnosis of the source of these problems is proposed. It is argued that despite these problems Strawson gives an accurate and very insightful description of the way we think about ourselves, which should form the starting point for more speculative accounts of ourselves.

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Strawson on the Notion of the First Person

Author(s): Manidipa Sen / Language(s): English Issue: 4/2009

The paper is an attempt to understand Strawson’s notion of the first person in the context of his general theory of a person. More specifically it will relook into the idea that the concept of a person is ‘primitive’, and see how Strawson’s idea of primitiveness of the concept of a person can be extended to his notion of the first person. One way of cashing out the notion of primitiveness in the context of the first person is in terms of the way the pronoun “I” functions in self ascription, like “I am feeling terrible”. As Strawson himself points out, ‘use of “I” is guaranteed against two kinds of failure to which the uses of some other definite referring expressions are sometimes exposed: it is guaranteed against lack of reference, and it is guaranteed against mistaken or incorrect reference.’ (1994, 215) Does this way of understanding the primitiveness of first person work? If it does what kind of a notion of first person and authoritative self-knowledge may be derived from it? Another related issue that will be dealt with in the paper is how can one construe the relationship between the first person and the world on the one hand and the first person and ‘the other’ on the other hand within the Strawsonian framework.

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Strawson and Kant on Being ‘I’

Author(s): Jan Kuneš / Language(s): English Issue: 4/2009

Strawson developed his descriptive metaphysics in close relation to Kant’s metaphysics of experience which can be understood as a particular version of descriptive metaphysics. At the same time, Strawson rejects the foundations of Kant’s version of descriptive metaphysics which, according to him, is a species of psychology. His argument against Kant’s conception of subject, or of the ‘I’, can be found in his conception of person. A closer scrutiny of this conception of Strawson can, however, reveal that it is not comprehensive enough compared with that of Kant. Speaking with Kant, Strawson understands the part of being ‘I’ which can be known via self-knowledge but he fails to appreciate the second part of being ‘I’, namely self-consciousness. A comparison of Strawson’s conception with Kant’s conception of being ‘I’ reveals its systematic shortcomings that rather support, against Strawson’s purpose, Kant’s version of descriptive metaphysics as a theory of subjectivity.

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Anti-Individualism, Materialism, Naturalism

Author(s): Tomáš Hříbek / Language(s): English Issue: 3/2007

This paper starts from the familiar premise that psychological anti-individualism is incompatible with materialism. It attempts to state more clearly what this incompatibility consists in, and—rather than arguing in detail for any particular resolution—to inquire whether this incompatibility admits any resolution. However, the paper does offer a conditional argument concerning the possibility that the incompatibility is genuine and cannot be resolved. Provided that anti-individualism and materialism cannot be squared, and anti-individualism is correct, it follows that materialism has to be abandoned. If so, the situation is not as disastrous as it might at first seem. We need not, in consequence of our inability to construe a coherent metaphysics of mind, give up on intentional vocabulary any more than we must stop, in consequence of our inability to make sense of induction, anticipating the future.

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Eros Corazza: Reflecting the Mind Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality

Author(s): Marián Zouhar / Language(s): English Issue: 3/2005

Review of: Eros Corazza: Reflecting the Mind, Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2004, xiv + 368 pages

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