PORICANJE GENOCIDA DOVODI DO NOVIH LAŽI, NOVIH OBMANA I BUDUĆIH GREŠAKA
Interview with Roy Gutman
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Interview with Roy Gutman
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Interview with Teofil Pančić
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The Soviet Union is one of the old political forces that coerced or voluntarily held together ethnic or religious origins. It is a power that has left a very deep history in its past. The bipolar system in the world came to an end after the Cold War. After this situation, ethnic conflicts increased and spread to the Soviet Union in the 1980s and caused great repercussions in the world (Aslanlı, 2013). Conflicts occurring in the world have been a threat to security. These conflicts resulted in disintegration and in the early 1990s, the USSR was replaced by 15 new independent republics at the end of 1991 (İbadov, 2007).
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In 2019 the Terminology Working Group of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence defined strategic communications as follows: strategic communications, n.: a holistic approach to communication based on values and interests that encompasses everything an actor does to achieve objectives in a contested environment. As of 2022, strategic communications is conceived as a normative project, and as such its theorists and practitioners recognise certain principles that underpin their activities: #1 StratCom affirms the right of the individual to choose between competing ideas or reject them. #2 StratCom affirms a need for transparency and the right of individuals to hold those who practise StratCom to be held to account. #3 StratCom affirms the right of the individual to free speech.
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There’s a fallacy shared by most who practise strategic communications. The common mistake is to talk of messaging and the possible effectiveness that attaching such messages to grievances and those who hold them can achieve. Messages like narratives are an overused term, put through the wash once too often and bleached of the intellectual col-our they once sported. It is as if by sending out a slogan, a cause-and-effect relationship can be brought to bear on a pre-identified audience. The danger inherent in this ‘post-it’ approach to communications is to place all hope on linear, one-way agency while ignoring the nature of the discursive context or what is frequently and unadvisedly called the information environment. As if communicators were caught in a call-and-response exchange or a dangerous thrust-and-parry. By this token, communications is forced into a zero-sum game, rather than the organic or fluid negotiation between contiguous discourses that it really is.
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After February 2022 the social media platform Telegram became ‘one of the most important informational vectors regarding the war’. The unprecedented spike in communications on the platform, which has been re-corded by ExTrac and discussed in the previous part, has given researchers a unique opportunity to examine Russia’s online media environment. While the ExTrac analysis focused on the quantitative increase of Telegram’s significance among Russian social media users, this part qualitatively analyses the content shared on the platform. It aims to shed light on the emergence of a new group of Russian online influencers—the so-called pro-war bloggers. Propelled into the limelight by a surge in online media, the Kremlin’s blocking of Western social media platforms, and increased demand from users for news about the war, these Telegram channels’ administrators formed an online eco-system which became instrumental in spreading pro-Russian narratives at home and abroad.
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Ever since Tito’s death in 1980, the socialist Yugoslavia was going through difficult political, economic, and social temptations, involving ample domestic and international actors, along with the accompanying consequences of the era change of on a global level. The Yugoslav state crisis should be observed in a broader context which will provide a more complete answer. The remaining two fundamental pillars of the Yugoslav federation – Yugoslav Communist Party (SKJ) and Yugoslav National Army (JNA) ‒ were undermined in early 90’. The then republics’ elites, guided by partial interests, mutually confronted to one another, were not ready to adequately face the challenges of democratization that captured the Eastern euripi following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The Yugoslav republics took numerous legal steps towards strengthening their own sovereignty. The crisis culminated in 1991 with the separation of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia, and the armed conflicts that followed. Confronted with the new legal and political surrounding, Bosnia and Herzegovina also began with the revival of its independence. This path proved to be extremely difficult and challenging, mainly due to the revived great-Serbian and great-Croatian attempts to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly expressed in 1991 during the negotiations between Slobodan Milošević, president of Serbia, and Franjo Tuđman, president of Croatia. In early days, these plans, with a strong support of regime affiliated media from Belgrade and Zagreb, manifested in form of numerous obstructions in the operation of the highest authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, promotion of a thesis that Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot survive as an independent political entity, establishment of illegal Serb communities of municipalities and regions, and then Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croat ones in form of regional communities, whereby the most significant one was Herzeg Bosnia. In such complex circumstances, and in line with the recommendations of the Badinter’s Commission, referendum on independence was organized in 1992, when the citizens firmly voted in favor of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. European Community recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6th of April, while the USA did it on the following day. In conditions of aggression and four year long war destruction, a new chapter in legal and state development of Bosnia and Herzegovina began.
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International community has, on its own will, taken the responsibility to resolve the situation in the then Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, following its dissolution. This has particularly applied to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was threatened by an open aggression, even disappearance. To that end, ample peace plans were designed, and to a large extent based on ethnic divisions, which suggested intentions of the international community in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lack of a good will and unity aimed at prevention of aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the prevention of mass crimes against its citizens, including the crime of genocide, as well as failure to prevent the destruction of state owned infrastructure, silent approval of the several years long siege of the capital, clearly speaks about the attitude on the part of international actors towards the aggressors and innocent victims, particularly the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lack of condemnation of the aggression, and permanent attempts to equalize the victims and aggressors serve as a direct confirmation that the initial attitude towards Bosnia and Herzegovina did not significantly change, although the circumstances to a large extent did. Current development of the situation on a global plan affects the changes in the perception of threat, including the relevance of the Western Balkans, and more specifically Bosnia and Herzegovina, which now suggests the new discourse of the West (EU and NATO Member States) in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The paper is structured in five chapters: Dissolution of SFRY and international recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Quest for a peace solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Intensification of the international community engagement; Final NATO operation and peace establishment; Post-war reaction of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Final considerations. The study is based on the qualitative analysis of documents and critical analysis of activities and actions of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1991-2022.
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The defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the defence of Sarajevo, was based on political and patriotic awareness of its citizens, who were genuinely committed to preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina specific political and statehood being, as a community of equal citizens and peoples. Based on assessment of a big relevance of Sarajevo for the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aggressor has thoroughly planned, prepared, and utilised large military forces to conquer the city and establish there its occupational authority. They wanted Sarajevo to be only a Serb capital of the so-called “Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina”. The combat activities carried out by the 1st Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were organised in a very complex strategic, operational, and tactical conditions, under the conditions of besieged free territories in which the units and the commands of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina operated, including the conditions of specific military siege of a major part of the 1st Corps in the city of Sarajevo. Strategic and operational-tactical positions of the aggressor’s forces were rather favourable for them, given that they controlled main roads that were connecting Bosnia and Herzegovina battlefield with the sources of mobilization into the aggressor’s army with soldiers and material means in the so called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the countries that supported aggressor. The extent of human losses, during and after every war, turned into a big political, historic, and moral and ethical issue. Pursuant to the character of response of the warring parties and their allies to the question of the extent of human losses, it is possible to identify the character of policy that served as a basis for war engagement and support to any of the warring parties. In general, the factors on the side of the warring party that waged the righteous war strive to present truthfully the number of victims, whereas the factors on the side of the warring party that waged unfair war strive to fake the number of victims and adapt it to the character of its unfair political views related to the causes and consequences of the war. Given the fact that the international community with its embargo harmed the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina defence forces, which operated on the grounds of fair policy and righteous war, we arrive at a conclusion that the embargo was unfair, in favour of unfair aggressor’s policy, criminal and genocidal war practice.
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Introductory remarks by: - Prof. Ph.D. Rifat Škrijelj, rector of the University of Sarajevo - Prof. Ph.D. Dženeta Omerdić, Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Office of Dr. Denis Bećirević) - Prof. Ph.D. Denis Zvizdić, Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Ph.D. Pavle Krstić, Minister (Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Youth of Sarajevo Canton) - Ph.D. Husein-ef. Kavazovića, reisul-ulema (Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina) - Academician, prof. Ph.D. Mirko Pejanović (President of the Scientific Committee of the Conference of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina) - Ćamil Duraković (Vice President of the RS entity) - Prof. Ph.D. Rasim Muratović, Director of the Institute for Research of Crimes Against Humanity and International Law, University of Sarajevo - Ph.D. Sc. Sedad Bešlija, director of the Institute of History
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With the outbreak of the war and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Bosnia and Hercegovina became a centre of “national concentration” and the newly proclaimed state. The government of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was taken over by the Serbian political elite which ascribed to Bosnia and Hercegovina the role of a unified area which would prevent the creation of any kind of Croatian state while strengthening the newly created state and the Serbian dominance within it. The new government established its authority through terror and violence directed against the non-Serbian peoples. It attempted to undermine every political action or publicly expressed demand of the Croats for a federal unit, or an independent state. Mu-slims saw their land confiscated through the Agrarian Reform, which while in part brought to an end feudal relations and corrected historical injustices, also materially ruined numerous families. In harmony with Serbian political tradition the Constitution and other agreements merely acted as “manifestations” to appease “European public opinion.” The interests of other (non-Serbian) peoples were treated as illegitimate or anti-state activities: nationalism and separatism. Various repressive measures were directed at individuals deemed to be the carriers of these interests. Territories in the new state toward which the government lacked sympathy for national or political reasons and which did not figure into particular plans for unitarism were systematically destroyed and neglected. The key argument for unitarism and centralization was a call to the rights and “decisiveness” of the Serbian people, which was intermixed among the others to bring them to “belong to Serbia.” In this spirit the Vidovdan Constitution was brought into being which eliminated historical rights and historical lands, and created the basis for further unitarism and centralization of the state, but likewise strong reasons for dissatisfaction and resistance. States are determined by the nature of their formation. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes came into existence due to historical circumstances as an intellectual creation and not the result of national development. Primarily, violence was used to impose “unity” and centralized government.
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As a historian, Franjo Tuđman arrived to important conclusions about the relations between Croats and Serbs and the internal and external causes of the situation and the crisis in the country that was ultimately going to cause its breakdown in his research of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/ Yugoslavia in the period between 1918 and 1941, and in his research of Croatia’s position therein. Analyzing archive sources and other materials, along with relevant literature, Tuđman looked into the organization and the actions of the repressive system of monarchist Yugoslavia’s regime in Croatian territory and their dealings with the Croatian people. He recognized the basic elements of Serbian hegemony in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/ Yugoslavia, the Vidovdan centralist regime and the struggle to preserve it at all costs, proving that it would all have been impossible without the principal exponents – the king, the army, the gendarmerie, the police, the state administration, the judiciary, the government, and the political parties. Tuđman proved how King Alexander Karađorđević, supported by his loyal army and gendarmerie, established himself as the top authority in the country since the very beginning in 1918, and how Serbian political and ruling elite gathered around his court and him personally. The constitution gave him authority over the parliament, which he made full use of in the practice, and the parliament held a subordinate role for the entire time. This role of the king and his courtiers would remain unchanged until the end of monarchist Yugoslavia. The army with the king at its helm was, in Tuđman’s opinion, the second most important factor. From the very beginning the army had been built as the principal instrument of Great-Serbian hegemonist and counter-national politics and of Serbian hegemony, fully living up to the role in reality, preserving the monarchy and its centralist and hegemonist system, and serving as an active factor of the state politics until its breakdown in 1941. The army was a tool in the hands of the court that was used as counterweight to parliamentalism and the strivings of political parties to run state politics. Considering the significance of the army for the ruling structure, the expenditures for the army remained at a very high level continually, often having a considerable negative impact on the development of the economy in non-Serbian territories.
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Franjo Tuđman, an academician, Ph. D., and the first president of the Republic of Croatia, published his first text in Belgrade in 1952, a publicist article about a current military topic that he published as an officer of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). He published his first article about the subject matter of this paper, history, in 1954 in Krapina. It was another publicist article about his home region of Hrvatsko zagorje in the People’s Liberation Struggle, in which he had been an active participant as a member of the Communist Party of Croatia and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. His writing was politically intoned in the customary post-Stalinist register. He wrote his first works of historiographical value after he was moved to the study department of the Supreme Command in Belgrade in 1957, and his works after 1961 were written outside of the confines of the Army at the Institute for the History of the Workers’ Movement in Croatia, whose co-founder and first director Tuđman had been. Addressing the topics that are the subject matter of this paper, he developed into a distinguished scientist (Europe), holder of a Ph. D. (Zadar), and an associate university professor (Zagreb). In addition, at the Institute he influenced the professional development of a number of other distinguished Croatian historiographers who researched this and other subjects. He strove to adhere to the globally recognized scientific and professional standards of the time, set forth in Croatia by Jaroslav Šidak: he based his writings on sources and on critical contemplation of literature (both Yugoslav and foreign), and he made his own historiographically useful scientific and professional judgments and assessments. The antifascist and supernational ideas are prevalent in his work, but the Croatian national idea also gains importance as time passes by. His writings have held their value, but have for the most part been (unjustly) neglected in comparison with other writings he produced after the 1970s, when he, expelled from the League of Communists of Croatia and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, removed from the position of the director of the Institute, and no longer allowed to teach, functioning as a prisoner and active politician, supplemented his old writings about this subject with new, mostly publicist values characterized by prominent Croatian national spirit in the contemporary anti-communist and anti-Yugoslav political standing. Still, his overall contribution to this subject is positive, and he also provided very vigorous impetus to his critics and followers, including scientists and experts, regardless whether their views about his work were positive or negative. Some of them made their own new contributions to historiography and publicist writing by defending or rejecting his theses and results, sometimes even unwittingly. These solid results about this subject would be nonexistent without Franjo Tuđman.
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The unstable economic situation with frequent financial crises in developed European countries, years of crop failure, and famine among the lower classes, a widespread dissatisfaction with the political situation, the strengthening of national movements, and the spread of liberal ideas created fertile ground for a new wave of unrests in Europe. The first revolutionary sparks ignited in January 1848 in Palermo, and in February in Paris. In the following weeks, they escalated into a revolutionary fire that engulfed much of Europe. The revolutionary turmoil was especially strong in France, the German and Italian lands, and in the Austrian Empire. Different social strata took part in the revolutionary movements, and their core consisted of the citizenry, craftsmen and merchants, workers and peasants, students, and in some places the nobility (for example, the petty and middle nobility in Hungary). Therefore, their goals were also different. Nevertheless, in most countries the main goals of revolutionary movements imbued with liberal and national spirit were the enactment of a constitution (except in France, which had one), i.e. the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, electoral reforms, expansion of the suffrage, abolition of the feudal order (in the countries east of the Elbe, which still had it), introduction of civil rights and freedoms, and creation of unified nation-states.
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Early in May 1914, when official news about Archduke Francis Ferdinand’s military manoeuvres in Bosnia appeared in the Croatian newspapers, no one could have guessed that the tragedy of World War I was imminent. Although tensions between Austria-Hungary and the Kingdom of Serbia had been growing since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkan turmoil, few were predicting an escalation of the conflict in a domino effect. Assassination of the Crown Prince and his wife Sofia on June 28, 1914, in the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, led to the outbreak of a war in which the political map of Europe would be redrawn. The struggle for European supremacy between two blocs of states brought to the fore major military and foreign policy is-sues, in which smaller nations without their independent states had to demonstrate their ability to survive. In Croatia, the political public unanimously condemned the terrorist act of the Yugoslav revolutionaries gathered in the organization Young Bosnia (Mlada Bosna). It was committed on Vidovdan, a significant religious holiday for the Eastern Orthodox Serbs commemorating the notorious defeat of medieval Serbia in a conflict with the Ottoman Empire in Kosovo and symbolizing hope in revenge. Further developments were expected, in which the Croats could not play a significant role due to the underrepresentation of the Croatian elite in the leading positions in Austro-Hungarian key institutions: the governments of both countries, various ministries from foreign affairs to public finances, and the army.
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Loňské vydání této řady analýz afrického rozměru české zahraniční politiky označilo předchozí rok za „nejrušnější od roku 1993“ v historii vzájemných vztahů se subsaharskou Afrikou. Rok 2009 také označilo za „nadějný“ z hlediska naplňování koncepce Příprava strategické debaty o přístupu ČR k Africe. Zároveň ale bylo v kapitole zdůrazněno, že přes mimořádnost předsednictví v Radě Evropské unie zůstává subsaharská Afrika i nadále na okraji české politické scény: „Může se totiž stát, že postupný proces evropeizace zahraničněpolitické agendy povede v rámci dělby práce k dalšímu posílení východního a jihovýchodního rozměru české zahraniční politiky na úkor vztahů se subsaharskou Afrikou.“ Rok 2010 tento trend potvrdil.
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