The Burden of the Past. Lustration as the Instrument of the Political Competition in the Czech Republic

Author(s): Vladimira Dvorakova / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

The past matters in any process of transformation of the society, and sure plays an important role in the processes of transition and consolidation of democracy. It is important not only in the sense of „path dependency“ that I do not want to concentrate on in this paper but mainly as the form of legitimizing the political goals of the elites, as part of the political competition about the future orientation of the country. We can stress two basic aspects of how past is treated that are mostly mutually interconnected. The first one concentrates on the “choice” of the history – on the way how history is reconstructed, preserved and interpreted in the collective memory. The second aspect deals with the question what to do with the “physical relicts” of the past, with the personnel of the “ancient” regime. Both aspects have its impact on the character of future development, integrity of the society, forms of inclusion or exclusion, the understanding of justice, the rule of law, space for political competition, etc.

Predgovor

Author(s): Ljubodrag D. Dimić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

U srpsku i jugoslovensku istoriografi ju zakoračuje nova generacija istoričara. Ubeđena je, kao i sve prethodne, da će dosegnuti one stručne visine sa ko jih se vidi „kako svetlost praskozorja pobeđuje tamu”. Zaželimo joj dobrodošlicu. Ukažimo joj poverenje. Podržimo njena interesovanja za nove teme, pitanja i probleme. Združimo njene stvaralačke energije sa onima koje sami ulažemo pokušavajući da saznamo prošlost. Pomozimo joj da što pre idejama svoga vremena i osobenim senzibilitetom obogati istoriografi ju, koja je plodotvorna jedino ukoliko predstavlja „vrenje svesti” više generacija istoričara koji stvaraju u jednoj kulturi.

Drugi jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob

Author(s): Dragan Bogetić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

After ten years, the same issues, typical of the sharp confrontation between Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1948, characterized the second Yugoslav-Soviet conflict, as this sudden deterioration of relations between Belgrade and Moscow in 1958 was often termed in the West. However, this time the conflicts were less severe and less dangerous than the previous one, but their essence and issues were mainly the same. The cause for renewed discontinuation of cooperation between the states and parties of Yugoslavia and the USSR was Yugoslavia’s rejection to sign the Declarations of 12 communist parties at the conference in Moscow held in November 1957, and the adoption of the Program of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) at the Seventh Congress in Ljubljana in April 1958. However, the main reason of the confl ict between Khrushchev and Tito appeared due to the total failure of the Soviet action to get Yugoslavia back to the camp of socialist states and to persuade the Yugoslavs to renounce the politics of avoiding firm alliance with any of the two blocs. All the Khrushchev’s illusions of Yugoslavia’s return to the socialist circle definitely dispelled when the Yugoslav communists, instead of signing the Moscow declaration that had the character of the constitutive act of the new Cominform, adopted the Program of SKJ, i.e. a document of completely different content, with stress on communist parties’ independent choice of their path to socialism. In the scope of a fierce campaign against the Yugoslav „revisionist leadership” Moscow undertook a series of foreign-policy measures in an effort to hamper Yugoslavia’s international activities and consolidation of its internal order as much as possible. During 1958 and 1959 previously concluded spectacular credit arrangements have been cancelled, the scope of commodity trade has been reduced, the practice of exchange of top-level state visits has been discontinued and permanent political pressure has been exerted, very much like the one practiced in Stalin’s time. Such policy was fully adopted by other socialist countries, even those which have formerly followed some elements of the Yugoslav politics in certain segments of political system.

Нaчалний период нормализации советско югославских отношений (1953–1954 гг.)

Author(s): Anatoly Semenovich Anikeev / Language(s): Russian Publication Year: 0

Конфликт между СССР и Югославией 1948 г. обозначил очень важный момент в создании советского блока - одну из интегрируемых в него стран не удалось заставить отказаться, несмотря на мощное давление из Кремля, от части своих на ционально-государственных интересов ради общих интересов, возглавляемой Москвой коммунистической коалиции. Так возникла первая трещина в основании, строящейся на песке сталинской империи. Нормализация советско-югославских отношений стала естественным процессом между двумя странами, избравшими, так называемый, „социалистический путь развития”. В то же время, идущая из Москвы, и лично от Н. Хрущева инициатива вновь содержала прежние установки: Югославия должна вернуться в лоно „социалистического лагеря”, с его жесткой, централизованной дисциплиной и беспрекословным подчинением СССР и его гло- бальным целям. Первые оценки и анализ внутренней и внешней политики Юго- славии, сделанные в советском внешнеполитическом ведомстве в течение 1953- первой половине 1954 гг. практически не отличались от тех, которые были сделаны еще в 1948–1949 гг., в период начала конфликта. Это было особенностью работы дипломатического и партийного аппарата тех лет. Чиновники и функционеры го- товили материал, исходя из предположения, что его будут читать в основном теже лица (МИД в тот период возглавлял В. Молотов – А. А.), которые в свое время подписывали различные резолюции против югославской компартии. Этим же людям предстояло принимать и новые решения. Как мы видели, большую работу по информированию московских „товарищей” о своей позиции провела в эти годы югославская сторона. Белград дал недвусмысленно понять Москве, которая была серьезно обеспокоена постепенной интеграцией Югославии в политические и вое нные структуры Запада через Балканский пакт, что это всего лишь временная так тика, целью которой является решение проблемы Триеста. Перспектива восста- но вления экономического обмена между двумя странами, включавшая и поставки военной техники, отображалась в югославском сценарии нормализации, посыла емом Москве, как один из факторов, который будет способствовать прекращению военно-политического сотрудничества с Западом. С другой стороны, начальный этап нормализации дал дополнительный импульс к постепенной кристаллизации югославской политики неприсоединения. Югославии, выстраивая новые отноше- ния с Москвой, приходилось структурировать сложившиеся ранее связи с Западом, сохраняя все нужное и отсекая избыточное, привязывавшее ее к западным блокам. Белград стремился остаться на периферии двух сфер влияния и, лавируя между ними, каждый раз использовать свою позицию в собственных интересах, как по литических, так и экономических. Любопытно, что югославские дипломаты от кры то, и несколько наивно, говорили Москве о всех преимуществах такой вне- шне по литической линии. Первый период нормализации проходил на фоне скрытой борьбы внутри Кремля между защитниками прежней сталинской поли тики и сторонниками её частичного реформирования. Все это не могло не отразиться и на темпах восстановительного процесса и на его содержании. Итогом стала Белградская декларация 1955 года, которую можно рассматривать и как несомненный реванш Тито в его долгом противостоянии с Москвой, и как, с другой стороны, победу Хрущева над своими противниками. Не случайно Хрущев прислал Тито стенограммы заседаний июльского, 1955 года, пленума ЦК КПСС, на котором были осуждены позиции В. Молотова, Л. Кагановича и Г. Маленкова в отношении его «югославской» политики. Получается, что Тито в чем–то смог помочь Хрущеву. Вообще причины, по которым Югославия и Тито вызывали у Хрущева в те годы приступы „неконтролируемого” энтузиазма, еще предстоит исследовать. Можно только предположить, что в сознании Хрущева происходило формирование некой идеи, сутью которой могло быть следующее. СССР постепенно преодолевает международную изоляцию, устанавливает более-менее добрые отношения с США и Западом в целом, начинает с их помощью модернизацию своей экономики. Пример отношений Югославии с западными странами в этом случае мог казаться временами советскому лидеру идеальным. Поездка Хрущева и Булганина в Индию и Бирму в эти годы, почти параллельно визитам Тито, также ложится в данную гипотезу. Но идеализм Хрущева имел свои границы. Он не мог отрешиться от своих марксистских представлений, а также действовать вне жесткого контроля ЦК и сохранявшего свои позиции ортодоксального окружения. Ухудшение отношений с Югославией осенью 1956 года, в связи с венгерскими событиями, а затем весной 1958 года, убедительно это подтвердили.

Jugoslavija u američkoj vojnopolitičkoj strategiji odbrane zapada od SSSR-a 1950–1954.

Author(s): Nemanja Milošević / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Military-political relations between Yugoslavia and the USA (1950–1954) were very important part in geopolitical and strategic planning of the American foreign policy. After Tito-Stalin conflict in 1948 Yugoslavia was confronted with possible antagonism from the countries under the „Soviet umbrella”. This situation, precarious for Tito’s regime and survival of Yugoslavia, both in economic and political sense, dictated a slew toward the USA and Western countries. Soviet military threat was very realistic for Western analysts. As response to the Soviet threat, Western allies created a military alliance – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. This organization was very important for the future relations between Yugoslavia and the U. S. The first serious dialogues and contacts were initiated in 1950. Yugoslav authorities were afraid of the possible Soviet aggression. U. S. policy-planners, analysts and members of administration shared the same opinions and estimates. The war in Korea did not broadcast fears and pessimistic expectations on both sides. The result was Military Aid Agreement between Yugoslavia and USA, signed in November 1951 in Belgrade. Greece and Turkey joined NATO the same year. Those two countries had important role in Western strategic planning of defence against Eastern threats. Their position had directly closed Soviet output in the Mediterranean. Yugoslavia became more important not just as an example of „axle-pin strategy” but also as a strategic part of „defence-wall” against the Soviets. American policy-planners saw West Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey as „corner-stones” of that defence wall. Contacts between three Balkan countries started in 1952. The result was the Balkan Pact in 1953 and the Balkan Alliance in 1954. On the one side, American administration supported this Alliance because in that way Yugoslavia was much closer to the NATO, but, on the other, it slowed down negotiations between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey because it wanted to have Italy in the Alliance as well. It would help the solution of the Trieste Crisis. The Trieste Crisis and the „Djilas Case” were problems which burdened relations between Yugoslavia and the USA. The agreement in 1954 between the USA, Great Britain and Yugoslavia about Trieste was a significant relief for both sides and helped further improvement in their relations.

Nemačka odšteta žrtvama pseudomedicinskih eksperimenata u Jugoslaviji

Author(s): Zoran Janjetović / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

In 1951 Germany expressed its willingness to indemnify the victims of Nazi pseudo-medical experiments. The Yugoslav diplomacy availed itself of this opportunity, collecting some 1500 applications by 1956. However, the solution of the problem was delayed by the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries in October 1957. Eventually German bureaucracy sifted the applications early in 1959, and in May 112 victims were subjected to medical examination. The year 1960 passed in futile negotiations. Later that year, the Yugoslav diplomacy suggested lump payment, but used the opportunity to announce their demand for a (much larger) payment of indemnification for „victims of Nazi persecutions”. The agreement on indemnification for the victims of pseudo-medical experiments was reached on 25 April 1961. Under the treaty, Yugoslavia received DM 1.75 million. Since late 1961 the Yugoslav officials strove to revise the settlement and to increase the sum. This was eventually achieved on 7 September 1963. Germany conceded to grant DM 7,950,000 for the victims of pseudomedical experiments – not least in order to avoid paying a much higher sum for other Nazi victims. The Yugoslav side used both matters to pressurize Germany – the victims being only an excuse to get some money for the socialist economy.

U senci gvozdene zavese.

Author(s): Sanja Petrović Todosijević / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The policy of the Yugoslav state toward the International Children’s Fund in the period following the end of World War II reflects the international position of the socialist Yugoslavia which was considered, until the summer of 1948, a territory under pronounced Soviet sphere of influence. In keeping with the policy of Western powers and the United States, after the conflict with the „big” Soviet leader it acquired a status of a country which should at least be „kept afloat”. By the summer of 1950 Yugoslavia became a privileged benefi ciary of UNICEF programmes. As the only Eastern bloc country which managed to oppose Soviet infl uence and tried to build what was often referred to as „its own road to socialism”, Yugoslavia became strategically an extremely important partner to Western democracies. The work of the UNICEF Mission’s Office in Belgrade, particularly the activities of its foreign members, were under close scrutiny of the community traditionally sceptical of anything and anyone coming from abroad or more precisely from the West. They were also closely watched by police bodies of the new Yugoslav authorities which did not want to take any chances. The need to protect and defend the established order, particularly after the split with the USSR in the summer of 1948, often turned into paranoia. Field work was an additional challenge for the Yugoslav police. Restricted in movement, access to information and institutions through which UNICEF programmes have been carried out, the officials of the Fund Mission temporarily on assignment in Yugoslavia have been facing challenges of development of the new state and order in socialism. Promotion of UNICEF activities in FPRY was in direct correlation with Yugoslavia’s foreign-policy orientation between 1947 and 1954.

Jugoslavija i Azija (1947–1953)

Author(s): Jovan Čavoški / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The aim of this paper is to present the evolution of early relations between Yugoslavia and the major states in East, South and Southeast Asia, implying primarily China, India and Burma, using archive materials from the main domestic archives and, for the first time, recently declassifi ed sources of the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of China. The timeframe of the paper encompasses the period between 1947 and establishment of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, which can be considered the first serious contact of Yugoslav diplomacy with the main Asian states, and 1954, which was crowned by extremely successful visit of Josip Broz Tito to India and Burma, as well as establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the PR of China in January 1955. Monitoring the activity of Yugoslav diplomacy through three main stages (revolutionary, observational and active), this paper provides a detailed analysis of bilateral relations of the socialist Yugoslavia with the mentioned three Asian states. In fact, analyzing all the details of ideological and political relations that were developing with Asian partners in all fields, or were limited by certain external factors (adverse influence of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict on Chinese-Yugoslav relations), we can clearly review all the details which contributed that Yugoslavia and its leadership choose the mentioned countries as the main partners in their strategic choice of the course toward the non-engagement and peaceful coexistence policy.

1968. година – повратна за Източна Европа

Author(s): Iskra Baeva / Language(s): Russian Publication Year: 0

The year 1968 was one of crisis, both for Eastern and Western Europe. There was a similarity in student-riots (in France, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), but mutual differences were much greater. An attempt at revamping the social system which had been established after WWII under Soviet influence was made in Eastern Europe in 1968. The new leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, headed by Alexander Dubček undertook a reform with the goal of making the state socialism more democratic, in order to weld social security with human rights („socialism with human face”). In connection with reforms in the neighboring Czechoslovakia, Polish students stood up to protect intellectual freedoms. However, the government managed to stir up anti-intellectual and anti-Semitic sentiments and supress the dissatisfaction. Władisłav Gomułka came out against reforms. The changes in Czechoslovakia – abolition of censorship, preparation of the Action program with the aim of making socialism more democratic, economic reforms of Oto Šik – led to troubles in the relations between the countries of the Eastern Bloc. At meetings in Dresden (March 23), Moscow (May 8) and Warsaw (July 14–15), the leaders of the Warsaw-Pact countries increasingly criticized Czechoslovak reforms and demanded increasingly more determined that they be rescinded. Finally the danger of a reformist spill-over led to the decision to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968. The military intervention changed the relations in Eastern Europe. Yu goslavia and Romania felt endangered and they reacted sharply. The suppression of the ”Prague Spring of ‘68” influenced mostly the attitudes of Eastern Europeans. They realized the preservation of the system and power was more important in the Eastern Bloc than the interests of the society.

Југославија и блискоисточна криза 1967–1968. године

Author(s): Aleksandar Životić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The crisis in the Middle East in 1967 left extremely durable marks not only on the relations in the Middle East, but also on global international relations. The vehemence of the conflict between Israel and the Arab nations caused the reaction not only of the countries from the region and both super-powers, but also of other major powers and smaller countries, particularly the non-aligned ones. As a non-aligned country with a tradition of very close ties with Arab countries, Yugoslavia took an active part in the events caused by the brief Third Israeli-Arab war in which the armies of the Arab nations had been routed. Ever since the crisis started, the Yugoslav administration reacted swiftly, participating in a number of actions aimed at helping the Arab countries and alleviating the consequences of the disastrous defeat of their armies. The Yugoslav diplomacy was particularly active in evacuation of the Yugoslav Blue- Helmet contingent stationed in Sinai, which was successfully done. Considerable military and economic aid was sent to the Arab countries. In the diplomatic field Yugoslavia advocated the interests of the Arab nations, insisting on a compromise solution – which at certain point led to a brief cooling of the Yugoslav-Arab relations caused by the rigidity of the Arab nations. The Yugoslav attempt at diplomatic mediation was based on day-to-day contacts with great powers, with an attempt at broader and more versatile engagement of the non-aligned countries with the aim of strengthening the position of the Arab countries. However, the crisis in the socialist world in 1968 and the aggravation of the conflict in the Far East, particularly the war in Vietnam, coupled with the transition of the process of solving the Middle East crisis into a slower, negotiatory phase, caused the Yugoslav diplomacy to show less interest in the removal of the consequences of the Middle East crisis.

Социализм против социализма: феномен чехословацкой оппозиции после поражения Пражской весньи. 1969–1972. гг

Author(s): Ella Grigoyevna Zadorozhnyuk / Language(s): Russian Publication Year: 0

The phenomena of the Czechoslovak opposition after collapse of the Prague Spring, genesis of its ideological and program goals in 1969-1972, when antireform part of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia began repression against the opposition, were analyzed in this article. The representatives of conservative course were victorious and the Prague Spring party’s programs and documents were canceled as „erroneous” (revisionist or opportunist). Opposition demonstrated their adherence to the democratic socialist ideas and this was the main paradox of the movement. The difference was shown within the framework of this movement and it was reflected in formation of some organization trends of the movement - The Movement of revolutionary youth (MRY), The Socialist movement of the Czechoslovak citizens (SMCC) and the Czechoslovak movement for the democratic socialism (CMDS). In general their activities were characterized in this period by double removal of the centers of the opposition’s movement - firstly, from the legal to illegal forms and secondly, from ideology of „socialism with human face” to the ideology of human rights. Confrontation between socialists (Czechoslovakia was named socialist republic) and democratic trends (including ex-communists), who composed the main part of the opposition, was fi nished after their arrests in January and political processes in summer 1972. After this, the Czechoslovak opposition began the search for the new alternatives, in which the socialist ideas did not occupy such important place and the search for new forms such as dissident movement.

Полуслужбено партнерство – Југославија и Савезна Република Немачка шездесетих година XX века

Author(s): Zoran Janjetović / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The paper deals with the relations of Yugoslavia with West Germany in 1960s. It gives a survey of these relations in the previous decades and concentrates on their development particularly since the official breach of diplomatic relations in 1957. Political questions (such as indemnification for victims of Nazi persecutions or quasi-medical experiments, recognition of the German Democratic Republic), economic cooperation (credits, trade, tourism, „gastarbeiters”) and extreme anti-Yugoslav political emigration are dealt with. The paper embeds these matters in a broader context of international relations. The article is based on Yugoslav and German archival sources and relevant literature but it does not propose to be more than just a sketch of rich and variegated relations between the two countries.

Брантова источна политика и југословенска економска емиграција у СР Немачкој

Author(s): Vladimir Ivanović / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Accession of the Grand Coalition marked the change of the direction of West-German foreign policy. The main actor, Willy Brandt started giving up the former guiding principles of foreign policy and began the process of normalization of relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc, accepting the reality of the existence of two German states in the process. The new course affected the relations between Yugoslavia and West-Germany too. The two countries reestablished diplomatic relations on January 31, 1968. This was the main precondition for solving problems burdening the bilateral relations. The author analyzes the matter of regulation of the status of the Yugoslav labor force in the FR of Germany and how the new Eastern policy of the new German government and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations influenced the solution of one of the most important problem of the bilateral relations. The solution of this problem encouraged both parties to believe that other problems encumbering the relations of the two countries could also be solved, above all the one concerning indemnification of the victims of Nazi persecution.

Југословенско-италијански односи и чехословачка криза 1968. године

Author(s): Biljana Mišić Ilić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The crisis in Czechoslovakia greatly influenced the development of political and economic relations between Yugoslavia and Italy. Yugoslavia’s disagreement with the policy of the USSR and her condemnation of the military intervention removed any doubt as to the independence of her foreign policy and spurred Italy to change her policy toward the official Belgrade which had hitherto been marked by reserve and distrust. Furthermore, Italy started regarding her relations with Yugoslavia from the point of view of her own security. This opened the way for improvement of relations between the two countries, so that Italy and Yugoslavia tried to demonstrate by a number of activities, the policy of goodneighborly relations and cooperation. After the August events in Czechoslovakia and the danger the USSR could militarily intervene in Yugoslavia too, Italy started lending support to the official Belgrade through numerous public and secret statements of her state officials. At the same time, she launched initiatives to solve unsolved questions in bilateral relations, such as drawing the definitive borderline. In the field of economy she tried to help Yugoslavia in her negotiations with the European Economic Community concerning export of some Yugoslav commodities to the countries, members of the Community. The new course of Italian policy was welcomed in Yugoslavia, due to the importance of this country for the Yugoslav state. Therefore the official Belgrade tried to use the propitious attitude of Italy to solve numerous matters concerning bilateral relations, particularly those from the sphere of economy.

Az új orosz állami történetfelfogásról. Három historiográfiai ujjgyakorlat

Author(s): Gyula Szvák / Language(s): Hungarian Publication Year: 0

Војногеографски положај Југославије на почетку Хладног рата (1945–1954)

Author(s): Aleksandar Životić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The first post-war decade was filled with big foreign policy challenges for the newly established communist rule in Yugoslavia. Firmly siding with the Soviet Union, the subsequent sharp conflict, adherence to the Western world as a kind of way out of difficult situation and the subsequent normalization of relations with the Eastern bloc have caused the Yugoslav military-geographic position at the time. In the years of conflict with the western world Yugoslavia represented the most forward point on the west of the Eastern bloc and as such had a special status. The situation has completely changed during the conflict with the Soviet Union when it became an important bridgehead west to east. By its geographic, political, military and economic potentials Yugoslavia in these moments represented an important international factor, the space through which East and West communicated, as well as the space of potential conflict between them. In a way, its geographical location and military importance determined its role and fate during the Cold War.

IS THERE A THREAT OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?

Author(s): Lukáš Visingr,Miroslav Mareš / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

Central and Eastern Europe, taking into account the potential impact of the contemporary crisis in Ukraine. The authors start by describing the historical attempts made by Central and East European countries to obtain nuclear weapons during the Cold War and the post-Cold War period. The main focus is on current trends, including a prediction of possible future developments. The policies of state as well as non-state actors are considered, including nationalist calls for nuclear armament. The authors conclude that the risk of proliferation in this region should not be overestimated; equally, however, certain ‘early warning signals’ should be not ignored.

Cultural Encounters and the Role of Art in Yugoslav-US Relations 1961-1966

Author(s): Stefana Djokic / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

This paper discusses the role of art in Cold War diplomacy in Yugoslav-US relations between 1961 and 1966. During the 1960s, culture was often, sometimes unwittingly, at other times intentionally, infused with the politics of the Cold War. According to one line of existing scholarship, the rise of US art after WWII and exhibitions of American art abroad amounted to cultural imperialism and a “profound glorifying of American civilization.” These historians persuasively identified the political motives behind the exhibition strategies of American museums, such as MoMA’s promotion of Abstract Expressionism through the International Program of Circulating Exhibitions (established in 1952), or the US Government’s Central Intelligence Agency endorsement of US art through its offices around the world. Accordingly, Abstract Expressionist works were staged as par excellence representations of America’s democratic values, where the messages of freedom and individuality behind the works of such artists as Jackson Pollock were contrasted against the tyranny and totalitarianism of the USSR. Indeed, John Hay Whitney, Chairman of the Museum of Modern Art, explicitly stated that the role of the Museum and of art is to “educate, inspire, and strengthen the hearts and wills of free men in defence of their own freedom.”

Dinamika političke promjene unutar komunističke vlasti: primjer SFRJ

Author(s): Krsto Cviić / Language(s): Croatian Publication Year: 0

Just as the governments of the other communist countries in Europe, the Yugoslavian government operated within the formula of “challenge and response’’, which was first devised by the once fashionable yet today almost totally forgotten British philosopher of history, Arnold Toynbee. For a long time dissidents were a relative minor threat to the powerful and proud Yugoslav authorities, but gradually, owing to the combination of internal and external events, the dissidents gained in importance and came to play a significant role in the defeat of the political system and the destruction of the Yugoslavian state. This process is the theme of this article.

Dokumentation der Zeit 1962 / 264

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): German