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U ovom tekstu raspravljaću o »balkanističkom stereotipu« i nekim ideološkim mehanizmima koji se oslanjaju na njega, a na osnovu jednog izbora iskaza, uglavnom uzetih iz mas-medija na slovenačkom i hrvatskom jeziku. Analizirani materijal je izabran intuitivno, zbog njegove paradigmatske, to jest, strukturne vrednosti.
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Duboke etničke podjele i negativni historijski narativi – dodatno osnaženi institucionalnim okvirima politika – i dalje koče proces pomirenja u Bosni i Hercegovini (BiH). Lične i kolektivne traume obično se transformiraju u prepričavanje historijskih narativa i koriste za intenziviranje osjećaja neprijateljstva prema “drugima” i želje za osvetom, ometajući tako procese zacjeljivanja i društvene obnove. Snažna kultura poricanja i neprihvatanja narativa onih drugih svakodnevna je pojava, a prate je etničke i vjerske podjele, potpirivanje nesigurnosti i sve veće prijetnje budućim sukobima. Prisutna je i na individualnom i na kolektivnom nivou, jačajući tako redovnu politiku usmjerenu protiv onih “drugih.” U obrazovnim planovima i programima se izostavljaju perspektive različitih etničkih i vjerskih grupa, a historija iz devedesetih godina još uvijek nije pronašla put do školskih udžbenika (vidi dio autorice Jeftić u ovom zborniku). Uz sve ovo su prisutni siromaštvo i slab ekonomski razvoj što doprinosi stvaranju okruženja koje njeguje kulturu nasilja, umjesto nenasilja i prosperiteta. Takva atmosfera prožima društveni život, ali istovremeno otkriva višestruke oblasti za intervenciju, njene brojne izvršitelje i različite vrste u dinamičnom procesu društvene promjene (npr. Kreisberg 1991; Senehi 2002). Uprkos brojnim strukturnim i infrastrukturnim projektima kojima su ponovo izgrađene državne institucije i domovi te poboljšani uslovi za povratnike/ce, proces društvene obnove u BiH je propao što ukazuje na potrebu za različitim intervencijama u cilju pružanja novih mogućnosti za pozitivnu transformaciju. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), u partnerstvu sa organizacijom Caritas Bosne i Hercegovine, je prepoznao potrebu za interveniranjem i osmislio projekat Choosing Peace Together (Izaberimo mir zajedno – CPT) koji je finansirala Američka agencija za međunarodni razvoj (USAID) od 2009. do 2013. godine.
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The Bosnian Serbs have hoped, until late 1991, that Yugoslavia would prevail, but once it was clear that this goal could not be achieved, they have changed their attitude and began with the creation of their own sovereign Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (pseudo-state), with its political, civilian, and military structures. The Bosnian Serb leadership presented, in their speeches, Bosniacs and Croats as “historic enemies of the Serbs” to justify their territorial tendencies in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which they considered “historically Serb territory”. Strategic objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership made the key element in the military strategy of the so-called Republika Srpska Army, namely the creation of the pseudo-state Republika Srpska. Statements and speeches of Bosnian Serb leaders suggested that they supported and advocated the capturing of the territory, previously conquered militarily by the “Serb forces”. Bosnian Serb leadership was aware that the policy of ethnic cleansing would result in violence, given the fact that the population of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was so mixed. And yet, they continued with that policy. In his speeches, statements, and announcements, Radovan Karadžić would blame Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats for separation of population, and he argued that the Bosnian Serbs did not try to make “ethnically cleansed state”. These statements and announcements served for purpose of creating one version, intended exclusively for the international community, based on which Bosnian Serbs would not be guilty for separation and resettlement of population. Public statements often contravened their plans for ethnic separation. Radovan Karadžić and Bosnian Serb leadership continued to talk, in 1994 and 1995, about the removal of Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats from the state they had created and permanent importance of unification of all Serb states. Up until 1995, Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats were still shown as “historic enemies” of Bosnian Serbs and their (pseudo)state.
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Similarly, as in cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity for which it is necessary to establish cumulative conditions applicable to the existence of armed conflict within which they were committed, the revision of the assessment of the nature of conflict being the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and its relativization are of the paramount relevance in the process of equal redistribution of different aspects of responsibility between all the actors, and ultimately all the national communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This process, whose obvious and daily progression in a broad social spectrum is achieved within several motivationally different and synergically strong tendencies, does not have a benign nature and it does not suggest the assumptions of such societal development that could overcome past contradictions and conflicts. To that end, it is important to highlight different forms of this phenomenon and maintain, in the public discourse, the awareness about the genuine content and meaning of the notion of aggression, structure and responsibility of the executors, particularly in terms of responsibility for the committed crimes. We shall highlight in this paper some aspects of the denial and relativization of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, and remind of the international definition of the aggression and in relation to this suggest some concrete indicators of its. Historic reality, particularly in the territory of Sarajevo.
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The matter of denial of the genocide committed against Bosniacs, including also a revisionism of history has become in course of last several years a current topic in the Bosnian and Herzegovinian society. With the amendments to the Criminal Code off Bosnia and Herzegovina, which prohibits genocide denial and glorification of the adjudicated war criminals, exercising such practices has not stopped. The focus of recent studies related to the genocide committed against Bosniacs is reduced to the contemporary phenomena. Authors of this paper are trying to offer a historic review of the denial of crimes and genocide committed against Bosniacs, which has been in progress ever since the early days of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The denial of camps, massacre at the Tuzla square, Sarajevo Markale market place, ample other crimes, including also the denial of genocide in Srebrenica, clearly suggests the form of institutional denial of crimes, which has been in progress, to a lesser or larger intensity, in the last thirty years.
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The state social policy of the Republic of Bulgaria is aimed at satisfying the needs of all ethnic groups, based on the constitutional principle of equality of citizens. This policy is based on a package of legal and by-laws – laws, strategies and others, which are the basis of all plans and specific actions and measures affecting the population of the Republic of Bulgaria, regardless of the ethnic affiliation of every citizen of the Republic of Bulgaria.
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This article proposes the perception of the „other“ as a response to cultural diversity related to the idea of multiculturalism. In historical perspective and the intensifying globalization processes creating the concept of cultural inequalities are the focus of this article. The geographical location of the Balkans and the instability of the international scene address „collective diversity“ and are a prerequisite for cultural, social and identity continuity. In support of the in-depth analysis on the topic, I conclude with data from a national survey, summarizing the reasons for social distance and discontinuity from of the Bulgarian population compared to the refugees.
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Ethno-religious risks pose a serious threat to national security and the stability of societies. They include conflicts and tensions arising from differences in ethnic and religious identities. These types of risks can lead to social strife, terrorism and even war. Understanding and managing these risks requires extensive research that analyses the factors that cause them, as well as developing strategies and policies to promote stability and security. This complex problem requires an integrated approach that brings together aspects of religion, ethnic identity and social factors in order to promote tolerance and peace in societies.
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In the chosen topic, our attention is directed to outline the existing problem areas and factors affecting the definition of ethnic and religious challenges and the emphasis they place on the security of the countries of Europe. It aims to overcome the existing problems with the ethnic and religious groups found in these countries by introducing and clarifying their particularities.
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Before the beginning of WWI, Croats, Slovenes, and other Slav peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were clearly dissatisfied with its dual organization, which privileged the Germans and Hungarians. Croats were also frustrated because while Dalmatia and Istria administered by the Austrian part of the Monarchy, Croatia-Slavonia were under the Hungarian part of the Monarchy, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were under the governance of the common Ministry of finances. It is therefore not surprising that several proposals for the reformation of the Monarchy had been put forward by the South Slav politicians, nor that all of them called for the unification of the Croatian lands. Three years into the war, the Yugoslav Club of the Emperor’s Council issued on May 30, 1917 a declaration that requested the formation on the territories inhabited by the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs of an independent state, but under the Hapsburg scepter. The request was made on the basis of the national principle and the Croat state right. The May Declaration initiated controversies among Croatian politicians and political parties, but it also began a movement to accept the program of the Declaration. The most enthusiastic supporters were the leaders and the membership of the Catholic organizations. The author highlights the political situation that led toward the issuing of the Declaration, the controversies that surrounded its promotion, and its political consequences. In the end, he draws two conclusions.
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In the course of his lifetime, King Stjepan Tomašević was frequently nothing but a object in political conflicts within and around medieval Bosnia. For this reason his (alleged) posthumous remains became an instrument in political clashes in modern Bosnia and Herzegovina. The exhumation in 1888 was conducted to prove symbolically the continuity of the rule of Roman Catholic monarchs in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Habsburgs followed the Kotromanićs. In the latest war of 1991-1995, royal remains became an important symbol used and appropriated by the warring sides. Towards the end of the war the skeleton became a motive in serious political and diplomatic conflicts between Croats and Bosniaks that continued into the peacetime. Today the king’s remains continue to provoke occasional fervent polemics between Croats and Bosniaks concerning the ethnic affiliation of the late king, and the related origins of the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Banovina Hrvatska was Croatian nation’s political and territorial unit in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia that enjoyed a high level of autonomy from the central government. It was established on August 26, 1939 when Vladko Maček, the president of the Croatian Peasants’ Party and the representative of the Peasant-Democratic Coalition, signed an agreement with Dragiša Cvetković, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the representative of the Yugoslav Radical Union. By granting Croats this autonomy, the political circles in Belgrade with the regent Prince Pavle at the helm aimed to solve the question of Croatian national and territorial individuality in the Yugoslav state (the Croatian question), and thus give the Kingdom of Yugoslavia internal political stability in the circumstances of growingly tense political relations in Europe in the eve of World War II. The establishment of Banovina Hrvatska was the beginning of an internal political reform whose ultimate objective was to transform the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from a unitary country into a federation. In this project Dravska banovina was supposed to be converted into Banovina Slovenija with Slovenes as its dominant population, and the entire territory east of Banovina Hrvatska, in which the Serbs constituted the relative majority, was supposed to be joined into a political and territorial unit called The Serbian Territories. This plan had its opponents both on Serbian and on Croatian side. Croats felt that they had a historical right to Vrbaska banovina, as this territory had been a part of the Kingdom of Croatia throughout the Middle Ages, and they also felt that they had a right to entire Syrmia, as it had been a part of the former Austro-Hungarian Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia until 1922. Serbs, on the other hand, felt that they had a historical right to the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavonia, and Dalmatia. Opponents of the reform assembled around the Serbian Cultural Club were especially active among the latter, and so were some officers of the Yugoslav Army, who brought down the Cvetković-Maček government in a coup on March 27, 1941, thus putting an end to the reform that had just begun. There is no dilemma that these events were the subject of Tuđman’s professional interest, but some of his close friends and political associates (Stipe Mesić, Josip Manolić, Dušan Bilandžić, Petar Kriste) and some of the journalists (Branko Tuđen, Tihomir Ponoš, Darko Hudelist, Marinko Čulić, and others) advocate the thesis that Banovina Hrvatska was an obsession for Tuđman, that he was burdened by historicism, Banovina Hrvatska in particular, that he moved into «the field of conservative Croatian ideology and politics» by «identifying» himself with Maček and by studying the agreement on Banovina Hrvatska, and that he had accordingly striven to set up the independent Republic of Croatia within the historical boundaries of Banovina Hrvatska in the first half of the 1990s.
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The philosophy of Ante Starčević had two components. The national component contained the contention that the Croats were a unique nation, which could not be compared to any other nation. As an expression of this contention ‘Right-ism’ denied the existence of Serbs as a unique nation, believing them to be a mix of various peoples without their own culture or common tradition. The political component of this philosophy taught that Croats, as a unique people, had the right to their own state, by which this component came into conflict with not only Yugoslav or Great Serbian political programs but also with all the programs in the Monarchy which would reduce the Croatian state to a region of either the unified Monarchy or its Hungarian part. At the end of the 19th century, limiting the territory of the Croatian state to the lands that were incorporated into the framework of the Monarchy, ‘Rightism’ recognized the existence of Serbs in lands outside of this framework, tying at the same time their political program unconditionally to the framework of the Monarchy. As a result the ‘Rightists’ viewed the Croato-Hungarian Agreement (Nagodba) and not the Austro-Hungarian Agreement as the main obstacle to the realization of their political program, clearly believing that it was possible to realize the unity of the Croat lands and the full sovereignty of the Croatian state even within Dualism. This assumption was supported by the belief, which was held by the ‘Rightists’ as well as their political opponents on the eve of the First World War, that the key tenets of ‘Rightist’ ideology was the negation of the existence of Serbs in Croatian lands and the negation of the Nagodba. In this period the wing of the Party of Right that was supporting Josip Frank (frankovci) based its work on both of these fundamental tenets of ‘Rightist’ philosophy; even if they were prepared for tactical reasons to accept the legality of the Nagodba, that is to say, at least temporarily suspend their political program. The wing of the party supporting Mile Starčević (milinovci), on the other hand, convinced that the Orthodox population of Croatia might accept the ‘Rightist’ political program, rejected that national component of ‘Rightist’ ideology and recognized the existence of Serbs in Croatian lands. Though Mile Starčević’s followers remained true to the rejection of the Nagodba, they likewise came to reject the legality of the Austro-Hungarian Agreement, attempting to replace the union of the two halves of the Monarchy with a federalist framework. Thus, indeed, they also rejected the political component of ‘Rightist’ ideology.
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The conflict between Juraj Tomac and Stjepan Radić analyzed in this text had many causes. The first and foremost was determined by their various parties’ differing views of the place and role of the peasantry in political and public life. To the followers of Josip Frank, regardless of what their party was formally called, the Croatian peasantry was only one class within the Croatian nation and it was indivisible from the whole of the Croat political people. Certainly, due to its difficult political and social situation it required particular attention. To the Radić brothers, especially the younger Stjepan, the peasantry was the most important class of the Croatian people, to which, because of its national consciousness and numerical majority, the leading role belonged. Indeed, because of this the Catholic priest Juraj Tomac most oft en pointed out the negative consequence to which this principle of Radić’s could logically lead, a weakening of the ‘Rightist’s’ main goal, that is, the unification and independence of the Croatian lands. An important difference also existed between these men in terms of their views on the political and legal position of the Serbs in the Croatian lands: Tomac often criticized what he felt were Radić’s naïve views on Slavic and South Slavic reciprocity, in which he saw the opportunity for Serbian expansionism. In Monarchist Yugoslavia both of the men found themselves in the same situation, as a result of which Tomac demonstrated his preparedness to recognize the growth in power of Radić’s party. Similarly, Tomac, unlike Radić, demonstrated a higher degree of commitment to his political principles, which was especially obvious after Radić recognized the Monarchy officially. Radić’s pragmatic use of attacks against clericalism was likewise criticized by Tomac; in it he saw nothing more than yet another naïve attempt by Radić to rely on Slavic reciprocity in an attempt to weaken his political opponents. The preference of the Croatian peasantry, mostly because of reasons Tomac could in no way have an influence on, fell on Radić and his party.
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Munir Šahinović Ekremov entered Sarajevo public life at the time of the 6th of January dictatorship as a young participant in the Muslim cultural, national and political scene, formed on the basis of Croatian (‘Rightist’) national thought during the Austro-Hungarian period. He expressed his political-national views in Sarajevo’s Muslimanska svijest (1936–1941), though they can be summarized in two elements: the demand for the indivisibility of Bosnia and Hercegovina and its administrative-political autonomy as long as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia perseveres as well as the promotion of cultural-national and social renewal of the Bosnian-Hercegovinian Muslims on the basis of the symbiosis of Islam and the legacy of Croatian national ‘Starčevićism.’
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Është e njohur që pas kryqëzatës (një mijë e dyqind e trenjë mijë e dyqind e katër) sundoi në vendin e Shqipërisë së sotme trubullirë që keqësohej nga kontraditat midis grekëve, sllavëve, anzhuinëve dhe në disa qytete të fuqishme italiane që përbënin një faktor të fuqishëm ekonomik në tokën dhe bregdetin e Ilirisë. Kjo gjëndje që kishte dobësuar akoma më shumë sundimin qëndror të Kostadinopojës lehtësonte për hapjen e popullatës shqiptare drejt jugut.
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Emigracioni shqiptar në Francë është një nga emigracionet e hershme pas atij në Greqi (që në kohën bizantine), në Itali, para dhe pas historisë legjendare të Skënderbeut, ose në kryeqytetin e perandorisë otomane, në Stamboll pas pushtimit të Shqipërisë nga kjo perandori. Gjurmët e para të këtij emigracioni i gjejmë në historinë e shënuar të stratiotëve shqiptarë në fundin e shekullit XV dhe gjatë shekullit XVI, epokë kur ata, të nisur nga Durrësi, Shkodra dhe veçanërisht nga Morea e Greqisë, (nga ku morrën dhe emrin stratiotë), u dyndën drejt Italisë e më pas drejt Francës. Qindra e mijra stratiotë, pasi u shquan në luftërat midis principatave dhe mbretërive të vogla italiane, veçanër-isht nën flamurin e Republikës së Shën Markut, “Serenissima”-s, Venedikut, u vunë në shërbim të mbretërve të Francës, duke krijuar kështu valën e parë të emigracionit shqip-tar në Francë.
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Turkey’s path to membership in the European Union (EU) is full of many obstacles. The history of relations between Turkey and the EU is long and full of twists and turns. The subject of Turkey’s membership also triggers mechanisms of public debate that have been formed in the course of the countries’ past experiences. Over the centuries, Europeans formed an identity in which the Ottoman Empire, in the face of the Turks, was opposed to a different people. Hence the psychological barrier for an 80 million Muslim nation with an authoritarian presidential rule and a much lower standard of living with increasing hyperinflation. That is why the accession of Turkey to the EU will shake the European integration and in particular its Christian basis. At the end of October 2023, an interim report on the progress of Turkey’s negotiations towards joining the European Union is expected to be published.
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Since 2011, Türkiye officially hosts around four million refugees. On March 18 2016, the European Council and Türkiye signed the European Union (EU)-Türkiye Statement aimed at stemming the influx of irregular migration via Türkiye to the EU. The aim of the study is to examine the financial support program developed within the scope of the EU-Türkiye Statement, which focuses on managing irregular migration and financial aid. The Facility for Refugees, a main component of the EU-Türkiye Statement, consists of an EU budget of €3 billion and EU Member States contributions of €3 billion. More than 100 projects have been implemented in Türkiye with the funds provided under the Facility. In the study, financial aid will be evaluated in terms of humanitarian and development actions.
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Ukraine is a linguistically diverse country, with Ukrainian and Russian being the two most widely spoken languages. It has a long history of linguistic and cultural differences, with the western parts generally being more Ukrainian-speaking and the eastern parts having a significant Russian-speaking population. The language policies adopted by the government have sometimes been a source of tension. In 2012, the Ukrainian parliament passed a law making Ukrainian the sole official language in government and education. This sparked protests and concerns among Russian-speaking communities, particularly in regions where Russian is more commonly spoken. The conflict has also impacted the use of language in political discourse. Ukrainian officials and politicians have used Ukrainian as a way to assert their patriotism and loyalty, while Russian officials and propaganda have portrayed the conflict as a fight for the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine.
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