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Mogu li pojmovi, koji se izvode iz onoga što se u XVIII, i još uvek u XIX veku, nazivalo veštinom ratovanja, pojmovi koji vode poreklo od »ratne veštine«, »strategije« i »taktike« - mogu li oni sami obrazovati upotrebljiv instrumentarijum za analizu odnosa moći? Možemo se pitati, da li vojne institucije i uopšte institucije koje su određene da vode rat, da li, dakle, vojne institucije i praksa koja ih okružuje, posredno ili neposredno, čine jezgro političkih institucija.
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Redovi koji slede odgovaraju na jedan zahtev, došao iz Sjedinjenih Država, za nekolikim razmišljanjima o »ratu i tehnici« (za knjigu koju ureduje Tom Konli, Univerzitet u Viskonsinu - Medison). Baš u sred rata (biće bolje ako pribeležim: počinjem da pišem 26. februara 1991, kopneni napad je počeo, njegov ishod ostaje neizvestan) poduhvatiti se ove vrste razmišljanja moglo bi biti neumesno, odnosno nepristojno. Ono što je danas važno, jesu neposredni ulozi, mrtvi, svakovrsne patnje, veliko žaljenje koje prati sve ratove (želim da nešto od toga ostane prikačeno, prilepljeno za ove redove). Ono što je važno sa druge strane, jesu politička odlučnost, odobravanja ili kritike, motivi i razlozi koji još uvek mogu podstaći, ako je to moguće, odgovornost svakoga pojedinačno.
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Prvi svetski rat proizveo je kod nas niz tumačenja koja su omogućila ljudima da shvate te džinovske događaje, koji prevazilaze svakog, čiji su nosioci ljudi, iako ih oni nadmašuju - te, na izvestan način, kosmičke događaje. Trudili smo se da ih smestimo u svoje kategorije, da izađemo na kraj s njima, onako kako smo ih spoznali, tj. u biti, na osnovu misli XIX veka. Drugi svetski rat nije izazvao ništa slično; njegovi neposredni uzroci, njegov izgled, bili su možda odviše jasni, a, pre svega - nije se završio, prešao je u nešto posebno, što nije ni rat ni mir; revolucija, koja bi to stanje komentarisala, nije dopustila nikome da dođe do daha i izgovori reč koja bi »svaku stvar podelila na osnovu njene suštine, rekavši kako stvari stoje«. Osim toga, kod nas je stvoreno uverenje da mora postojati nekakvo pravo, tj. marksističko tumačenje Drugog svetskog rata, nešto skriveno u idejnim riznicama strane koja pokreće istoriju. Kasnije nikom ne smeta što takvo tumačenje realno ne postoji...
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Da li bi čovek koji stremi moralnom savršenstvu mogao da se zlu suprotstavi silom i mačem? Da li bi čovek, koji je religiozan i koji prihvata Boga, njegovo svetostvaranje i njegovo mesto u svetu, mogao da se zlu ne suprotstavi mačem i silom? Ovakvo dvojedinito pitanje, podstaklo je sva naša istraživanja. Šta može i šta treba da odgovori na ovo pitanje, ona moralno-blagorodna duša, koja se u svojoj ljubavi kreće ka Bogu i Božjem delovanju na zemlji - da odgovori religiozno ispravno, da odgovori puninom volje na navalu zla koja pridolazi izvana?
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Iz Bolje-le-Fontena, u departmanu Uaz, gde je 14. avgusta 1917. upravo završio svoj Milieu mistique otac Tijar piše svojoj rodaci: Osećam neko zadovoljstvo što sam sada slobodan da otpočnem, ako mi se ukaže prilika, neku novu temu. U istom pismu on još kaže: Kao uvek posle dugog odmora osećam da me obuzima nostalgija za frontom (Genese d'une penste, str. 260 i 261). To će upravo biti tema mog novog spisa.
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Oto Fridrih Bolnov se 1938. godine u okviru jednog teksta, vrlo jasno pro-režimskog, (između ostalilh se ponavljaju i citati nekih režimskih ideologa) izričito pozvao na Hajdegera i na njegovu kategoriju povesti da bi osporio apstrakcije »pojma univerzalnosti čoveka« »konkretnog totaliteta« jedne istorijski determinisane zajednice: »Ako pođemo od pomankanja vere u um kao suštine, presudne za čoveka i za podržavanje istorijske svesti, više ne postoji mogućnost da se čovečanstvo posmatra kao svekoliko realno postojeće čiji su delovi pojedinačni narodi, već postoje narodi protiv naroda. Narodi se udružuju u najviši oblik jedinstva, i uspevaju da se slože, dok je čovečanstvo samo univerzalni pojam i ne predstavlja stvarno jedinstvo.«
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Jan Patočka u jednom od svojih Jeretičkih ogleda o filozofiji istorije dovodi u odnos tajnu i odgovornost, tačnije misteriju svetog i odgovornost. On ih suprotstavlja, odnosno ističe njihovu heterogenost. Pomalo na način na koji to čini Emanuel Levinas, Patočka upozorava protiv iskustva svetog ili stapajućeg oduševljenja, i to posebno protiv demonske otmice koja bi imala za posledicu, i katkad kao pravi cilj, da izazove neodgovornost, da učini da nestanu smisao ili svest o odgovornosti. Patočka istovremeno razlikuje religiju i demonsku sakralizaciju. Šta je religija? Religija pretpostavlja pristup odgovornosti slobodnog jastva. Ona dakle podrazumeva raskid sa ovom vrstom tajne (jer ovo naravno nije jedina vrsta) koju povezujemo sa sakralnom tajnom i sa onim što Patočka stalno naziva demonskim. Između demonskog, s jedne strane, (onog što brka granice između životinjskog, čovečnog i božanskog i što nije bez srodstva sa mističnim, inicijacijskim, ezoteričnim, tajnom ili svetim) i odgovornosti, s druge, valja praviti razliku. Reč je dakle o tezi o poreklu i suštini religijskog.
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Postoji široko prihvaćeno mišljenje da su kontrola i uzdržavanje strani samoj prirodi rata. O tome govori Klauzevic u uvodnom delu studije O ratu - »Rat je«, piše on, »čin sile kojim primoravamo neprijatelja da prihvati našu volju… Silu prate i neka samonametnuta, jedva primetna ograničenja, poznata kao međunarodno pravo i običaji, ali njima je sila tek neznatno oslabljena... Uvođenje načela umerenosti u teoriju rata nužno vodi u logički apsurd«.
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Koliko mislilac može da pogreši a da još uvek polaže pravo da ga tretiramo sa dužnom pažnjom? Da bi se to proverilo, koristan je slučaj Žana Bodrijara (Jean Baudrillard), kultne figure današnje postmoderne scene, ličnosti koja je iznela neke od najluđih ideja koje su se do sada mogle čuti među kreatorima francuske intelektualne mode.
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Kako smo stigli od Makijavelija do sigurnog uzajamnog uništenja? Tradicija realizma koja dominira u našim razmišljanjima o međunarodnim odnosima ne samo da pretpostavlja nego i zahteva kretanje »od... do« na način koji ću razmotriti u prvom delu ovog teksta, ispitujući postavke realizma u svetlu pitanja koja pokreće feminizam. U drugom delu, polazeći od istih pitanja, bavićemo se najvažnijim istorijskim protivnicima diskurzivne hegemonije realizma i teorije pravednog rata. Budući da su centralna obeležja realističkog mišljenja i teorije pravednog rata već poznata većini čitalaca, koncentrisaću se na promišljanje onoga što se čini odveć lako mislivim na razotkrivanje onih pretpostavki koje se aktiviraju kada se nađemo pred situacijom kolektivnog nasilja. U procesu razrade prva dva argumenta feminizam, kao poluga kritičkog mišljenja, ustupiće mesto savremenom feminizmu kao sistemu artikulisanih stanovišta. Skrećem pažnju na načine na koje se feministička misao o ratu i politici lako može zaplesti u nasleđenim diskurzivnim oblicima, reprodukujući pretpostavke koje učvršćuju umesto da razgrađuju sadašnje stanje stvari. Rad završavam tumačenjem teksta Hane Arent O nasilju, teksta koji obiluje inspirativnim simbolima i slikama koje ukazuju na mogućnost alternativnog diskursa.
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The entry of the Yugoslav Army troops into Trieste on May 1, 1945 escalated the crisis in the relations between Yugoslavia and Western Allies. The bone of contention was the status of the territory of Venezia Giulia and the city of Trieste. The Yugoslav government justified its territorial aspirations by the fact that the region was Slavic-inhabited. Especially powerful argument was the Anti-Fascist Councils that had been set up in the area. On the other hand, the British and the American governments strove by agreement and through military occupation to create the possibility for annexation of Venezia Giulia to Italy after the peace treaty. During the solving of the crisis in May and June 1945 the British and the American governments kept in mind the possible reaction of the Soviet government - which ushered into the first serious misunderstandings within the Anti-Fascist coalition. The difficult matters of Venezia Giulia’s status and of control of the Trieste harbor were the topics of military expert talks, but lack of consensus threatened to lead to an armed conflict between the Yugoslav and the Allied forces. However, the armed attack on the Yugoslav units was discussed only as a matter of principle. The Allied commander in the Mediterranean, filed-marshal Alexander, warned the British government that the Allied soldiers could protest at having to fight the Yugoslav forces. Apart from the reasons of morale and reluctance to fight the recent ally, the British and the American governments also discussed strategic reasons in favor of refraining from war with Yugoslavia. The assumption that the Soviet government would react to an attack on the Yugoslav forces, led to a diplomatic solution in the form of the Belgrade and the Devin agreements. The stipulations of the latter were in force until the Peace Treaty with Italy went into force. The Yugoslav government didn’t fulfill its territorial ambitions, but the pacification of the crisis enabled it to pursue the diplomatic struggle to define the North-Western borders of Yugoslavia.
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This article highlights ways in which British military and political personnel acted towards Croatian refugees fleeing the Communist takeover in the final stages of World War II and thereafter. Although events relating to the surrender o f various pro-German and anti-Communist forces at Bleiburg, a town in south Austria near the border with Yugoslavia, and the following quarrel over "war criminals" from Yugoslavia is a complex affair, this contribution examines sources shedding light on British perspectives on the Croatian part, notwithstanding that the developments and problems treated here also affected Serbian, Slovenian and (ethnic) German nationals. As a result of this study, the changes in the intentions of the decision makers in London as well as the principal-agent problem become transparent.
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The Allied Military Government in the Zone A of Venezia Giulia that existed between mid-June 1945 and mid-September 1947 was an occupation formation of the Allied army whose primary aim was to stop the Yugoslav military and political penetration (and annexation) in the territories that formally had belonged to the Kingdom of Italy but that were earmarked to be united with their mother countries (Slovenia and Croatia) in political documents of the Partisan movement, so as to prevent the Peace Conference from facing a fait accompli. Another, no less important goal was social and economic. The Allied Military Government was to prevent the humanitarian catastrophe and to restore the economy at least to some degree and enable it to provide for the population. To be sure, it was also necessary to prevent anarchy and lawlessness immediately after the war. It is questionable to what degree it succeeded in performing these tasks. It did manage to prevent the more violent consequences of political frictions, but not the process of mass emigration, primarily of Italian town population, as well as the change of the town’s geo-political status. The fact that the Allied Military Government was the butt of criticism of both the pro-Yugoslav and the pro-Italian political forces, testifies that it strove to do its job in good faith, to stay neutral and abide by the agreements that had been signed as much as it was possible with regard to the conflict-laden political situation among the former allies.
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The liberation from the Fascist occupation of a number of East European countries by the Soviet army was the first step in the process of transformation of political systems and the formation of the Soviet block. The dominant position in the Balkans was taken by the Communist Yugoslavia which strove to expand its influence in the region. In the first phase such a role of Yugoslavia tallied nicely with the interests of USSR which was willing to delegate part of its power to Yugoslavia. Albania, whose independence and territorial integrity were guaranteed by the agreement between USSR, USA and Great Britain, was in informal alliance with Yugoslavia and in the sphere of its military and political interests which, was one of the main reasons for Moscow to hand that country over to Belgrade in summer 1946 for »vicarious« administration. Having entrusted the Yugoslavs with this task, USSR took over the responsibility to supply aid to Albania, retaining at the same time the control over the execution of decision concerning foreign policy of that country. During 1946 and 1947 Yugoslavia concluded with Albania a number of treaties concerning economy and finance. It reorganized Albanian army according to the Yugoslav standards, which, to all intents, should lead to Albania becoming one of the Yugoslav republics. The Soviet leadership considered such policy realization of the agreements which had been reached, but only until the moment when, the Yugoslavs broke them – in the opinion of the Cremlin. Parallel aid from these two countries caused a clash of interests among the Albanian leaders and led to the formation of two groups, one of which started to consider the alliance with Yugoslavia a burden and to turn increasingly toward Moscow. In November 1947, under pressure from the Yugoslavs, the leader of that group, N. Spiru ended his life in suicide. This enraged Stalin who summoned Djilas to talks in Moscow. By the end of the year it became known in Cremlin that Tito intended to send an infantry division to Albania near the Greek border, which was a severe »transgression« that would endanger Soviet interests in the region. Stalin talked about that to Yugoslav leaders in February 1948 who were summoned to Moscow together with the Bulgarians to be »filled in«. The totality of these circumstances was one of the reasons for the conflict with Yugoslavia which would begin soon. In that experiment of the Cremlin Albania was held hostage by ambitions of the two Communist leaders, one of whom, having entrusted that country to Yugoslav patronage wasn't able to foresee all consequences of such a step, so he made an ultimatum to Yugoslavia at the crucial juncture. Disregarding the scale of its involvment in the events in Albania, Yugoslavia fulfilled the demands of the Cremlin, but it was forced to withdraw from Albania during the increasing conflict with USSR. Stalin's estimate that one could continue to run Yugoslavia from the Cremlin by relying on ideological instruments and economic pressure wasn't justified. For its part, Albania proved a faithful ally of Moscow until the end of the Stalin's era, together with other faithful and enraged (for reasons of their own) enemies of »Titoism«. On the whole, the episode of Yugoslav-Albanian relations which developed under Cremlin's careful auspicies during the first postwar years showed, coupled with other factors, the deeply flawed character of the policy on which Stalin tried to build his East-European empire.
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Thirteen presentations from the scientific conference "Camps, Prisons, and Forced Labor in Croatia/Yugoslavia 1941-1945, 1945-1951" held on May 12, 2009, at the Croatian Institute of History are published in this proceedings. Seven Croatian, five Serbian, and one German historian presented the results of their latest research on deprivation of freedom, camps, prisons, and forced labor during World War II and in the post-war period.
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Collection of papers from the session on the history of Dubrovnik and its historical crises, held at the 5th Congress of Croatian Historians.
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The proceedings before you brings together the collected works based on a smaller part of the presentations at the round table "Historiography/History in Contemporary Society". The meeting was held on October 11 and 12, 2011 as part of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the scientific work of the Croatian Institute of History. The aim of the meeting was to determine historiographical trends over the past half century and to question the diverse research perspectives and methods of using and processing information about historical heritage, to examine different historiographical discourses and the interaction of these discourses with political and educational discourses and to consider their relationship to the phenomenon of memory. Our desire was also to assess the contribution of the Croatian Institute of History and the scientific work of its employees to historical research.
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On the occasion of the 550th anniversary of the coronation of the last Bosnian king, Stjepan Tomašević, by the papal legates in November 1461 in Jajce, the Croatian Institute of History from Zagreb and the Catholic Faculty of Theology from Sarajevo marked this event in 2011 with a special scientific conference. This event, which soon proved to be a direct prelude to the collapse of the medieval Bosnian Kingdom, was commemorated with the aim of gaining new insights and deepening knowledge about this historiographical topic. Although both Stjepan Tomašević himself and the collapse of the medieval Bosnian Kingdom have been subjects of interest in Croatian, Bosnian-Herzegovinian, and Serbian historiography, as evidenced by numerous previously published works, the mentioned anniversary provided an opportunity for a fresh examination and deepening of understanding of this historical theme. The international scientific conference "Stjepan Tomašević (1461-1463) - The Collapse of the Medieval Bosnian Kingdom," held on November 11th and 12th, 2011 in Jajce, gathered distinguished scholars from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Hungary. Their presentations, collected in this anthology, constitute four comprehensive thematic sections.
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What was the Czech foreign policy in 2009 like and why? The team of authors from the Institute of International Relations and four other partner institutions have been looking for answers to these questions for three consecutive years. The book Czech Foreign Policy in 2009: Analysis of the IIR is thus the third volume of the IIR’s series of books on Czech foreign policy, bringing together 21 chapters from 19 authors. The analytical framework of the book remained unchanged. The analysis begins with a general chapter that explores the nature of the political context of the process of the Czech foreign policy making. The main argument is that even if the executive and administrative background of the Czech foreign policy is solid and full of potential, the worsening political context (embodied in the fall of the government as the Czech Republic was in the middle of executing the European presidency) seriously hampers the outcomes of Czech foreign policy. The second general chapter adds an important analysis of the media coverage of the Czech foreign policy as a part of the policy’s context. This chapter has undergone a conceptual change since the last edition as it now also includes a qualitative analysis of the media coverage in addition to the quantitative one. The following individual chapters follow the same structure as their counterparts in the previous two editions. Each chapter first inquires into the nature of the political and conceptual context of a given foreign policy dimension or theme, and then it goes on to follow the actual agenda and main events in 2009. Each chapter also contains an important part that consists of focusing on the key actors involved in the particular policy making, thus enabling us to point out possible changes in the process of the Czech foreign policy making. The last part of each chapter is devoted to the public and media substratum of a given policy.
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