We kindly inform you that, as long as the subject affiliation of our 300.000+ articles is in progress, you might get unsufficient or no results on your third level or second level search. In this case, please broaden your search criteria.

0.00 €

Russian nationalists on the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine

Author(s): Katarzyna Chawryło (Jarzyńska) / Language(s): English

On the Day of National Unity, celebrated in Russia every 4 November, members of nationalist movements organise a so-called Russian March in Moscow. In 2014 the nationalists took part in three competing marches, which illustrated the divisions present in these circles. The reason for these divisions is a difference of opinions on the policy pursued by Russia towards Ukraine. The pro-Russian, Russia-inspired protests in south-eastern Ukraine organised under the slogan of ‘defending’ the Russians living there (the ‘Russian Spring’) and the annexation of Crimea were received enthusiastically by the nationalists and contributed to a consolidation of these circles around the Kremlin which lasted for several months. In spite of this, opinions on the Russian government’s current policy towards the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics have been varied. The most radical groups have demanded that military support be offered, and that the ‘confederation’ of these republics, the so-called ‘Novorossiya’, should be officially recognised. They consider the Kremlin’s policy to have been too soft, and see the signing of the peace agreements in Minsk as a betrayal of the interests of the Russians. For the remaining representatives of nationalist circles, who are not so numerous and are less visible in the public sphere, finding a solution for Russia’s domestic problems remains a priority. Some of them oppose the very notion of Russia’s involvement in the conflict.

More...

0.00 €

Ukrainian economy overshadowed by war

Author(s): Tadeusz Iwański / Language(s): English

Ukraine’s financial results over the past few months prove that the economic crisis which has been ongoing since mid 2012 has exacerbated. According to data from the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy, Gross Domestic Product for the first six months of 2014 shrank by 3%. In the second quarter, it fell by 4.6%[1] and may further be reduced by as much as 8–10% over the year as a whole. After the first six months of this year, the balance of payments deficit reached US$4.3 billion. After deflation last year, prices grew by 12%, and the hryvnia dropped to a historic low. Although a surplus was seen in Ukrainian foreign trade in goods and services, reaching over US$3 billion at the end of June, its trade volume is shrinking. The main reason behind this deteriorating situation is the actions taken by Russia. Moscow has been fomenting the conflict in Donbas since April, has consistently imposed embargoes on imports of more and more Ukrainian goods and cut gas supplies to Ukraine in June. This has forced the government to focus on the current management of state finances and to carry out budget sequestration twice this year. The government has also used this as an excuse not to implement necessary systemic reforms. The increasing share of military expenditure, the shrinking exports (-5% in the first six months), including in particular to Russia, which until recently was Ukraine’s key trade partner, and the rapid fall in industrial production and investments have all made the situation even worse. All that saves Ukraine from an economic collapse is the loan from the International Monetary Fund and higher taxes, which allows the government to maintain budget liquidity. However, if the conflict in Donbas lasts longer and if Russia continues its economic blackmail, including withholding gas supplies, the economic crisis may prove to be long-lasting.

More...

0.00 €

Patriarch Kirill’s game over Ukraine

Author(s): Katarzyna Jarzyńska / Language(s): English

The protests on Kyiv’s Maidan which commenced in November 2013, followed by the conflict in Ukraine’s eastern regions, have redefined the political and social relations between Russia and Ukraine, and have added complexity to the dependences between the Orthodox Churches operating in the two countries. The Kremlin’s policy has put the Russian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) in an awkward position. The ROC is Russia’s largest religious organisation, which also exercises symbolic sovereignty over Ukraine’s most numerous Orthodox community, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP), which since 13 August has had a new leader, Metropolitan Onufry.

More...

0.00 €

The crisis in Iraq and the twists and turns of Turkish Middle East policy

Author(s): Krzysztof Strachota / Language(s): English

The spectacular offensive by Islamic radicals in Iraq this June has led the country to the verge of collapse, and is another scene of the deep crisis in the Middle East, in which Turkey is entangled. The immediate consequence of this is a severe crisis of prestige after the kidnapping by terrorists of Turkish diplomats and Ankara’s inability to resolve the situation; in the long term consequences include escalation of the Kurdish problem, and a further increase in threats to the security of Turkey itself as well as the fundamental principles of its foreign policy. Both Ankara's options and its political will to actively respond to the crisis are extremely limited.Yet again in recent years, the current crisis, the broader situation in the Middle East, and finally the position of Turkey in the region elude unambiguous assessments and forecasts – these are prevented by the scale and growth of the reappraisals and tensions in the region. The only undoubted fact is that Turkey is strategically and irreversibly entangled in the Middle East’s problems, which are an important factor affecting the transformation of the state which the ruling AKP is implementing; and in the near future, this state of affairs will only deepen.

More...

0.00 €

Crimean Tatars after Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars face the necessity of working out a modus vivendi to cope with the difficult situation which now confronts them. On the one hand, the desire to remain in their homeland, which they regained after exile in Soviet times, is an imperative encouraging them to accept the status quo, while on the other, the fear of Russia and the strong relations of Crimean Tatar elites with Kyiv would favour opposing the present state of affairs. Another fact pointing in favour of an agreement with Moscow is that Kyiv has not attempted to defend Crimea and has not been active in demanding its return to Ukraine, which has undermined Kyiv’s authority in the eyes of the Tatars. Therefore, the leaders of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (the national self-government) act carefully, trying to avoid actions which could be seen as provocative and thus liable to incite retribution. It could be expected that this course of action will continue, although it faces ever greater difficulties in the context of the Russian authorities’ adoption of a strongly anti-Tatar policy, which is likely to evoke more radical attitudes among the Crimean Tatars.

More...

0.00 €

Gagauzia: growing separatism in Moldova?

Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): English

On 2 February, the regional authorities in Gagauzia - an autonomous region of the Republic of Moldova - carried out two simultaneous referenda. In the first, local residents were asked to declare their support for the country’s integration either with the EU or with the Moscow-led Customs Union (CU); the second referendum sought their opinion on the draft law "On the deferred status of the Autonomous Region of Gagauzia". Under the proposed legislation, if Moldova were to lose its sovereignty (for example, through the unification of Moldova and Romania, or even as some politicians have argued, through Moldova’s further integration with the EU), the autonomous region would automatically become the independent Republic of Gagauzia. As expected, the outcome of the vote has shown overwhelming support for both the CU and for the draft law. According to the figures released by Gagauzia’s Central Electoral Commission, 98.5% of the voters supported Moldova’s integration with the Customs Union, while 98% voted in favour of the ‘deferred independence’ bill. Support for closer integration with the EU was marginal, reaching just over 2%. Despite the one-sided outcome of the referendum, there is no reliable evidence to suggest that the ballot was rigged. It should also be noted that voter turnout was very high, reaching about 70%. Representatives of the Moldovan Central Electoral Commission, however, believe that the figure may have been artificially inflated by excluding many of the voters currently residing abroad from the count.

More...

0.00 €

Russia's Middle East policy after the Arab revolutions

Author(s): Marcin Kaczmarski / Language(s): English

Russia's policy towards the Middle East is instrumental. Its activity in the region has been growing since the middle of the last decade, and its aim is to help Moscow achieve its objectives in other areas, particularly in its policies towards the US and Europe, as well as its energy policy. The establishment of these political influences constitutes a bargaining chip for Russia in its relations with the US. Russia's participation in resolving conflicts is aimed at building up its image as a supra-regional power. Russia's Middle East policy is a key element in its contacts with the Muslim world. At the same time, Russia's policy in the region remains cautious – despite its return to the region, Russia has not decided to 'play' for the Middle East, and its position and role in the region remain limited.

More...

0.00 €

Ukraina – Węgry: narastający spór o prawa mniejszości węgierskiej

Author(s): Andrzej Sadecki,Tadeusz Iwański / Language(s): Polish

Od niemal roku stosunki między Węgrami a Ukrainą znajdują się w najgłębszym kryzysie od upadku ZSRR. Główną przyczyną napięć jest przyjęta we wrześniu 2017 roku przez ukraiński parlament ustawa oświatowa, która wprowadzając całościową reformę systemu edukacji, jednocześnie przewiduje poważne ograniczenia w stosowaniu w szkolnictwie języków mniejszości narodowych, w tym węgierskiego. Budapeszt zareagował gwałtowną krytyką pod adresem Kijowa oraz blokowaniem zbliżenia Ukrainy z NATO, domagając się zmiany ustawy. Ukraina z kolei podjęła kroki, aby doprowadzić do złagodzenia stanowiska Budapesztu, poddając ustawę pod ocenę Komisji Weneckiej, a następnie deklarując realizację rekomendacji zawartych w tej ocenie. Wieloletni deficyt zaufania, a także brak realnych działań z obydwu stron na rzecz kompromisu uniemożliwiły rysujące się w maju i czerwcu br. porozumienie. Do kolejnej eskalacji konfliktu doprowadziło powołanie przez węgierski rząd pełnomocnika ds. rozwoju obwodu zakarpackiego, co spotkało się w Kijowie z gwałtowną reakcją i zostało zinterpretowane jako ingerencja w sprawy wewnętrzne Ukrainy. Spór o prawa mniejszości węgierskiej na Ukrainie dotyczy kwestii historycznych i tożsamościowych o ważnym znaczeniu dla obydwu stron i jest mało prawdopodobne, że przez kolejne miesiące zostanie rozwiązany. O ile sprawy te zawsze były fundamentem polityki zagranicznej Budapesztu, szczególnie wobec państw zamieszkanych przez mniejszości węgierskie, Kijów aż do 2014 roku problematykę tę bagatelizował. Jednak od rosyjskiej aneksji Krymu i agresji w Donbasie Ukraina podejmuje kompleksowe działania o charakterze dekomunizacyjnym i derusyfikacyjnym, których konsekwencją jest z jednej strony ukrainizacja przestrzeni publicznej, mediów i systemu oświaty, a z drugiej ograniczanie praw mniejszości narodowych na Ukrainie w zakresie używania języków narodowych w systemie oświaty. Z tych powodów obie strony będą raczej twardo stać na swoich stanowiskach i szukać bieżących korzyści politycznych wynikających z konfliktu, niż podejmować działania na rzecz kompromisu.

More...

0.00 €

Temporary stabilisation: Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś,Wojciech Konończuk / Language(s): English

A five-year contract concerning Russian gas transit via Ukraine was signed after four days of negotiations on 30 December 2019. The previous contract expired on 1 January 2020. The EU-brokered talks between Moscow and Kyiv preceding the deal lasted many months and ended in the signing of a political protocol on 20 December which defined the terms of a package agreement. Gazprom has been obliged under the new transit contract to transport 65 bcm of gas in the first year and 40 bcm in the next years based on the ship-or-pay formula. Four other documents were also signed: (1) an agreement between Naftogaz and Gazprom waiving counterclaims linked to the gas contracts of 2009; (2) an interconnection agreement between Gazprom and a company named Operator of the Gas Transmission System of Ukraine (OGTSU); (3) a settlement between Gazprom and the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine; (4) a transport agreement between Naftogaz and OGTSU. The Russian company had to pay US$2.92 billion in damages under the Stockholm Arbitration Court’s ruling before the documents could be signed; it did this on 27 December.

More...

0.00 €

Tymczasowa stabilizacja: porozumienie gazowe Rosja–Ukraina

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś,Wojciech Konończuk / Language(s): Polish

Po czterodniowych rosyjsko-ukraińskich negocjacjach 30 grudnia br. podpisany został pięcioletni kontrakt na tranzyt rosyjskiego gazu przez Ukrainę (dotychczasowy kontrakt wygasa 1 stycznia 2020 r.). Zostało to poprzedzone wielomiesięcznymi negocjacjami między Moskwą a Kijowem przy udziale Komisji Europejskiej, zakończonymi 20 grudnia podpisaniem politycznego protokołu, który określił warunki porozumienia pakietowego. Kontrakt tranzytowy nakłada na Gazprom obowiązek przesyłu 65 mld m³ gazu w pierwszym roku i 40 mld m³ w kolejnych latach zgodnie z formułą ship-or-pay. Podpisano również cztery inne dokumenty: (1) porozumienie pomiędzy Naftohazem a Gazpromem w sprawie rezygnacji z wzajemnych roszczeń związanych z umowami gazowymi z 2009 r.; (2) umowę o współpracy międzyoperatorskiej między Gazpromem a spółką pn. Operator Systemu Gazociągów Transportowych Ukrainy (OGTSU); (3) ugodę między Gazpromem a Ministerstwem Sprawiedliwości Ukrainy; (4) umowę transportową między Naftohazem a OGTSU. Warunkiem zawarcia tych dokumentów było wypłacenie przez rosyjski koncern 2,92 mld dolarów odszkodowania zgodnie z wyrokiem Trybunału Arbitrażowego w Sztokholmie, co nastąpiło 27 grudnia.

More...

0.00 €

The consequences of Brexit for the UK’s security policy and NATO’s eastern flank

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English

Regardless of how the UK leaves the European Union and what final timetable it adopts, Brexit has influenced the British debate on security policy, and may have implications for Britain’s involvement in NATO’s defence and deterrence strategy towards Russia. The United Kingdom plays an important role on NATO’s north-eastern flank. London has deployed British troops to the NATO battlegroups in Estonia and Poland, and it is expanding its military cooperation with Norway in securing the maritime areas of the North Atlantic. The UK has also bolstered its military presence in Romania. After leaving the European Union, London will still be involved in the security of Northern and Central & Eastern Europe. However in the future, Britain’s strong military footprint on NATO’s eastern flank may be challenged by the increased activity of British armed forces beyond Europe as part of the ‘Global Britain’ concept, or by a change in the priorities of Britain’s security policy by the Labour Party, which wants to focus to a greater degree on global threats and the UN’s peacekeeping operations.

More...

0.00 €

Konsekwencje brexitu dla polityki bezpieczeństwa Wielkiej Brytanii i wschodniej flanki NATO

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): Polish

Niezależnie od ostatecznego harmonogramu i formy opuszczenia Unii Europejskiej przez Wielką Brytanię brexit wpływa na brytyjską debatę o polityce bezpieczeństwa i może mieć konsekwencje dla brytyjskiego zaangażowania w natowską strategię obrony i odstraszania wobec Rosji. Wielka Brytania odgrywa ważną rolę na północno-wschodniej flance NATO. Londyn zapewnia obecność brytyjskich żołnierzy w natowskich grupach bojowych w Estonii i Polsce oraz rozwija współpracę wojskową z Norwegią w zakresie zabezpieczania obszarów morskich na północnym Atlantyku. Wielka Brytania jest też obecna wojskowo w Rumunii. Po opuszczeniu Unii Europejskiej Londyn nadal będzie się angażować w bezpieczeństwo Europy Północnej i Środkowo-Wschodniej. Jednak wyzwaniem dla utrzymania dużego wkładu Wielkiej Brytanii w obronę wschodniej flanki może okazać się zwiększanie aktywności brytyjskich sił zbrojnych poza Europą w ramach koncepcji „Global Britain”. Ponadto na brytyjską obecność na wschodniej flance może wpłynąć zmiana priorytetów polityki bezpieczeństwa przez Partię Pracy, która w większym stopniu chce koncentrować się na zagrożeniach globalnych i operacjach pokojowych ONZ.

More...

0.00 €

ROBOTROLLING 1/2022

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Martha Stolze / Language(s): English

In this edition of Robotrolling, we trace messaging about the build-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, there has been an expectation that kinetic activity would be preceded by large-scale information activities. We assess that the period from August 2021 to 20 February 2022 saw an increase in elite statements (and troop movements) unmatched by fake pro-Kremlin social media activity. This may reflect a top-down communication hierarchy, wherein lower echelons either received little guidance, or the guidance was to be silent. The volumes of automated activity were too low to offer any reliable signal of the looming invasion. In February 2022, pro-Kremlin channels and accounts amplified the narrative that the “genocide” of Russian-speakers in the Donbas justified intervention. Our analysis shows that this narrative’s traction was attributable to statements by Putin personally, not online propaganda channels. The comparative absence of pro-Kremlin activity on Twitter, combined with increased activity on VKontakte, suggests that Kremlin propagandists prioritised domestic audiences. On Twitter, the increase in Russian-language tweets about NATO was overwhelmingly driven by anti-Kremlin and pro-Ukrainian messaging. The share of automated messages on Twitter and VK about the Baltic states, Poland and NATO dropped, amidst greatly increased overall traffic. Bots accounted for 30% of Russian language and 12% of English-language messages on Twitter; and for 15% of messages about the region on VK. In February 2022, the number of English tweets was seven times higher than Russian tweets.

More...

0.00 €

Virtual Manipulation Brief: Russia's Struggle to Circumvent Sanctions and Communicate Its War Against Ukraine

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Martha Stolze / Language(s): English

In this first issue of the Virtual Manipulation Brief, we zoom in on the Russian language conversation, and how it changed as a result of the decision to invade Ukraine. Sanctions hindered the Kremlin’s messaging on Western platforms, while the focus on domestic audiences pulled many propagandists to Telegram, VKontakte, and RuTube. The number of Russian Telegram users has increased by two-thirds, while four in five users of Facebook and Instagram have left Meta’s platforms. The increase in users understates the importance of Telegram. It acts as a reliable hub, where pro-regime voices can post (almost) without fear of platform censorship. Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan’s social media posting patterns reveal how communication has adapted following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In response to sanctions, she, together with many journalists working for RT and Sputnik, moved to posting through Telegram. Telegram posts are automatically cross-posted to her Western platforms, meaning the messaging continues to flow at little or no extra effort. This method has the added benefit of evading attempts by Twitter to prevent the amplification of RT content. Such use of automation means the Kremlin’s messaging will not disappear on Western platforms, even when domestic audiences are the primary focus. The comparison of Russian-language messaging about NATO on VKontakte and Twitter shows how this combination of push and pull factors has dramatically altered the Kremlin’s reach. We estimate that the relative reach of pro-Kremlin messaging on VKontakte in March 2022 was a hundred times more than normal, compared to Twitter. The Virtual Manipulation Brief builds on our Robotrolling reports, tracking how Russian bots and trolls manipulate the flow of information online. It expands the area of focus beyond the conversation about NATO to Russia’s war against Ukraine. And it will look beyond Twitter and VKontakte to track how antagonists use other social media platforms to disinform the public. In this issue, we start by examining how social media usage in Russia changed since February. A comparison of heavily amplified content about NATO on Twitter and VKontakte exposes the Kremlin’s waning ability to control conversations on Western platforms. Finally, we show how the Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan moved her communication to Telegram to evade sanctions directed at RT.

More...

0.00 €

Historical Trauma and Radicalisation - How Can Intergenerational Transmission of Collective Traumas Contribute to (Group) Radicalisation?

Author(s): Mirza Buljubašić,Barbora Holá / Language(s): English

In this paper, we attempt to build upon existing theoretical and empirical knowledge stemming from criminology, conflict and peace studies, and radicalisation/extremism studies, among others, in order to explore the (potential) role of historical trauma in (collective/group) radicalisation. Historical trauma is objective, altered, or imagined trauma that occurred in the (more or less distant) past and is shared by a group of people (i.e., is one of the markers of their group identity across generations). Radicalisation refers to a process of acquiring more and more extreme political, religious, or social ideologies, and becoming more prone to endorsing any form of (violent) extreme behaviour to achieve one’s goals. The intergenerational transmission of collective trauma can arguably have a significant role in the radicalisation of future generations who consider themselves historically victimized by “the Other”. The aim of this paper is to explore how the intergenerational transmission of collective trauma may contribute to (group) radicalisation. The paper, therefore, introduces a (thus far relatively neglected) intergenerational perspective in radicalisation studies. In order to do so, we first briefly address the existing knowledge on individual and collective radicalisation. Thereafter, we discuss individual and collective trauma and describe their consequences and manifestations. Then, we turn the attention to scholarship on the intergenerational transmission of the legacies of political violence, focusing in particular on the intergenerational transmission of collective trauma, i.e., historical trauma. The final section synthesizes our arguments and makes a couple of (tentative) claims on how historical trauma can potentially contribute to the radicalisation of present and future generations. This paper does not present conclusive evidence nor policy recommendations. Its main aim is to open new doors for further discussions and the future exploration of (violent) radicalisation, trauma, and their intergenerational consequences.

More...

0.00 €

Historijska trauma i radikalizacija - Kako međugeneracijski prijenos kolektivnih trauma može doprinijeti (grupnoj) radikalizaciji?

Author(s): Barbora Holá,Mirza Buljubašić / Language(s): Bosnian

U ovom radu, nastojimo se oslanjati na postojeće teorijsko i empirijsko znanje - koje proizilazi, između ostalog, iz kriminologije, studija sukoba i mira i studija radikalizacije/ekstremizma - s ciljem ispitivanja (potencijalne) uloge historijske traume u (kolektivnoj/grupnoj) radikalizaciji. Historijska trauma je objektivna, izmijenjena ili zamišljena trauma koja se desila u (daljoj ili bližoj) prošlosti i koju dijeli određena grupa ljudi (odnosno, koja predstavlja jedan od markera njenog grupnog identiteta kroz generacije) kroz generacije. Radikalizacija se odnosi na proces u kojem osoba postaje sve ekstremnija u političkim, vjerskim ili društvenim ideologijama, te podložnija prihvatanju bilo kojeg oblika (nasilnog) ekstremnog ponašanja da bi postigla svoje ciljeve. Međugeneracijski prijenos kolektivne traume može nesumnjivo imati značajnu ulogu u radikalizaciji budućih generacija grupa koje smatraju da ih “Drugi“ historijski viktimizira. Cilj ovog rada je istražiti kako međugeneracijski prijenos kolektivne traume može doprinijeti (grupnoj) radikalizaciji? U ovom radu se stoga uvodi (do sada relativno zanemarena) međugeneracijska perspektiva u studije radikalizacije. U tu svrhu, trebamo se prvo kratko osvrnuti na postojeće znanje o pojedinačnoj i kolektivnoj radikalizaciji. Nakon toga, govorimo o pojedinačnoj i kolektivnoj traumi i opisujemo njene posljedice i pojavne oblike. Pažnju onda skrećemo na međugeneracijski prijenos nasljeđa političkog nasilja, sa posebnim fokusom na međugeneracijski prijenos kolektivne traume, odnosno historijske traume. Posljednji dio daje sintezu naših argumenata i predstavlja nekoliko (okvirnih) tvrdnji o tome kako historijska trauma potencijalno može doprinijeti radikalizaciji današnjih i budućih generacija. U ovom radu se ne izlažu konačni dokazi niti ultimativne preporuke za politiku. Glavni cilj rada je da otvori nove prostore za dalje rasprave i buduća istraživanja (nasilne) radikalizacije, traume i njenih međugeneracijskih posljedica

More...

0.00 €

Newsletter - 04/2002

Author(s): Sead Turčalo,Edward P. Joseph,Selmo Cikotić,Srđan Šušnica,Harun Karčić / Language(s): Bosnian

1. Uvodnik - Vrijeme neizvjesnosti. 2. Potreban nam je novi početak, s novim liderstvom u SAD-u, na Balkanu, u Evropi i svijetu. 3. Kako upravljati migracijama u Bosni i Hercegovini. 4. Sarajevo – Moskva: Glava u raljama medvjeda. 5. Nagorno-Karabah: Otapanje "zamrznutog konflikta".

More...

0.00 €

Newsletter 08-09/2021

Author(s): Vesna Pusić,Boris Pavelić,Srđan Šušnica,Mustafa Akyol,Vlado Azinović,Afiya Shehrbano Zia,Jennifer Heath,Ashraf Zahedi / Language(s): Bosnian,Croatian

U ovom broju Newslettera Atlantske inicijative donosimo niz aktualnih analiza i mišljenja o političkoj situaciji na Zapadnom Balkanu, s posebnim fokusom na posljednju krizu u Bosni i Hercegovini uzrokovanu sistemskom blokadom njenih državnih insititucija, ali se osvrćemo i na globalnu krizu nastalu u Afganistanu nakon povlačenja Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Umjesto uvodnika objavljujemo tekst Vesne Pusić koja piše o deblokadi euroatlantskih procesa kao putu ka transformaciji Bosne i Hercegovine i ostalih zemalja Zapadnog Balkana, te kako EU mora pronaći novi modus vivendi s Rusijom i na taj način oduzeti vjetar iz jedara lokalnih disruptora koji su se u tom političkom međuprostoru pokazali efikasnom preprekom europskoj transformaciji ovog regiona. Također, u kontekstu posljednje krize, poznati hrvatski novinar Boris Pavelić piše o odnosima Sarajeva i Zagreba. Pavelić se posebno osvrće na politiku predsjednika Hrvatske Zorana Milanovića koja u posljednje vrijeme sve više parira politici predsjednika Srbije Aleksandra Vučića, a koje zajedno osnažuju destruktivne nacionalizme u Bosni i Hercegovini. Posljednje tenzije na Zapadnom Balkanu analizira Srđan Šušnica, kutlurolog i publicista, te dobar poznavatelj ruske politike i njenog malignog utjecaja u regionu, posebno na Srbiju. Prema ovom autoru stabilnost i mir u regionu Balkana ovisiće o odlučnosti Evropske unije i Sjedinjenih Država da vojno, ekonomskim i političkim sankcijama spriječe remetilačke politike u Srbiji, bh. entitetu RS kao i u Crnoj Gori i na Sjeveru Kosova. Za ovaj broj Newslettera interjvu je dao ugledni turski pisac i novinar Mustafa Akyol koji piše o religiji i politici u muslimanskom svijetu. S Akyolom je povodom izlaska njegove knjige Ponovno otvaranje muslimanskih umova, koja uskoro izlazi i u bosanskom izdanju, razgovarala Amila Buturović. Njegova knjiga je izazvala globalnu pažnju i veliko zanimanje, posebno zbog poziva na reformu i prosvjetiteljstvo unutar islama kao put ka rješavanju nagomilanih problema muslimanskih društava. Vlado Azinović u ovom broju piše o nedavnom izlasku iz zatvora Huseina Bilala Bosnića kojeg je Sud Bosne i Hercegovine osudio na sedmogodišnju kaznu zatvora zbog podsticanja i vrbovanja na terorističke aktivnosti i organiziranja terorističke skupine. Budući da je u sudskom procesu Bosniću bio vještak Tužiteljstva BiH, Azinović se osvrće na sami proces i optužbe zbog kojih je Bosnić osuđen, ali donosi i analizu njegovih aktivnosti, ideologije i mogućih budućih angažmana. U ovo broju također donosimo dva aktualna teksta o novonastaloj situaciji u Afganistanu nakon povratka talibana na vlast. Afiya Shehrbano Zia piše o otporu i borbi afganistanskih žena protiv ugnjetavanja u kontekstu globalnih feminističkih rasprava i kritike prema intervencijama zapadnih sila u Afganistanu, ali i angažmana nezapadnih feministkinja u pružanju pomoći ženama ove zemlje. Također, Jenifer Heath i Ashraf Zahedi, pišu zajednički tekst o stanju i perspektivama žena u Afganistanu, o njihovom djelovanju, obrazovanju i pravima u kontekstu nove realnosti povratka talibana na vlast nakon dvadesetogodišnje američke okupacije ove zemlje i nedavnog povlačenja.

More...

0.00 €

Montenegro – persons missing within armed conflict during the 1990s - A review of the situation and recommendations for improving the results of the search for the missing and the position of their families

Author(s): Tamara Milaš,Miloš Vukanović,Vasilije Radulović,Petar Đukanović / Language(s): English

The wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia have had severe and longterm consequences, which Montenegro too still faces today and only to a limited degree. Also, almost all states of the former Yugoslavia face the challenge of addressing systemic violations of human rights, which is reflected in the process of building functional democratic institutions that should establish a responsible attitude towards the recent violent past. Such a relationship is inconceivable without establishing the truth about the fate of persons who are still listed as missing due to the armed conflicts of the 1990s. The states of the region continue to owe the families of 9,969 missing persons a full and impartial investigation into the circumstances under which their loved ones were killed or went missing, and they fail to carry out responsible sentences in accordance with the gravity of the crime committed. In Montenegro, the legislative framework does not recognize the families of persons considered missing as civilian victims of war, whereas the system of reparations is flawed and discriminatory. Given the recorded activities of Montenegro in the armed conflicts during the 1990s, as well as the court-established facts indicating the role of Montenegrin citizens in these events, a proactive approach by Montenegrin institutions is crucial in determining the fate of missing persons. Victims’ communities have high expectations from these institutions, which is proportional to the participation of the armed forces under the direct or indirect control of the state of Montenegro in the waged wars. Unfortunately, the disproportionate commitment of Montenegrin decision-makers and institutions to this issue remains. The process of searching for the missing is difficult and conditioned by the political situation in the countries of the region. Although the need to find out the truth about the fate of persons who disappeared during the armed conflicts is expressed, above all, among their family members, and sporadically appears on the agenda of meetings of statesmen in the region, in practice, there are obstacles to the search for missing persons. These obstacles range from the inadequate capacities of state bodies involved in the search for missing persons, through insufficient financial resources, to a lack of political will to substantially improve regional cooperation, which also includes the determination to make the search for missing persons more efficient. In general, there is not enough information on this issue in Montenegro, and it is also marginalized in public discourse. Therefore, this publication, as an alternative report, offers an overview of international standards and national legislation, reviewing the results and challenges of the search for missing persons during the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but also proposes recommendations for improving efficiency in this area.

More...

0.00 €

Negative headlines, positive tone: how military exercises, peacekeepinig missions and IPAP are seen in Serbian media

Author(s): Pavle Nedić / Language(s): English

In Serbian media peacekeeping missions and military exercises are mainly referred to in the context of Kosovo. Multinational operations are overwhelmingly brought up in positive context. Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) is mostly touched upon in positive tone, but the reports are generally very polarized and the number of neutral texts is rather small. Overall, military exercises are the most frequently mentioned topic. However, in the reports on military exercises, Russia is never referred to in a negative tone. On the other hand, NATO is primarily mentioned in a neutral or a negative tone. This analysis focuses on media reporting regarding selected keywords, namely military exercises, peacekeeping missions, multinational operations and IPAP. These keywords were selected because they receive considerable attention in the media, but there is often a mix of true and false information in reports on them. The analysis covered 383 media pieces published between 1 December 2018 and 28 February 2019. Media sources included online portals, printed newspapers, TV and radio. The goal was to determine how often and in what context these subjects are mentioned in the media, which media sources report on them the most and whether they are brought up in positive, neutral or negative tone. We also measured how often key international actors, namely NATO, Russia and the EU are referred to. Furthermore, the tone towards NATO and Russia was analyzed in media pieces regarding military exercises and IPAP respectively.

More...