Kladistická revolúcia a koncepcia historických esencií
Klasifikácia je tradičný kognitívny nástroj, pomocou ktorého triedime objekty sveta do určitých skupín.
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Klasifikácia je tradičný kognitívny nástroj, pomocou ktorého triedime objekty sveta do určitých skupín.
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Review of: Joseph Bocheński: Nove lezioni di logica simbolica, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna 1995, 141 s.
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V stati [4] uviedol Peter Sýkora na slovenskú filozofickú scénu jeden zo zaujímavých a diskutovaných problémov teoretickej biológie i filozofie biológie - problém biologického druhu.
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Review of: Pavel Tichý: O čem mluvíme?Vybrané stati k logice a sémantice. Filosofia, Praha 1996, 161 s.
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The author tries to show that if we indentify properties with their extensions (sets) and accept the assumption that universe of discourse is the same at all world-time couples, we can simplify the Gödel´s ontological proof of the existence of God: the necessary existence of God follows from the first three axioms and Gödel´s definition of God (translated into the language of set theory).
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Mnohí filozofi sú náchylní hovoriť o pojmových schémach. Tieto schémy sú podľa nich spôsobmi organizácie skúsenosti; sú systémami kategórií, ktoré usporadúvajú naše zmyslové dáta; sú hľadiskom, na základe ktorého jednotlivci, národy alebo epochy posudzujú dianie. Je možné, že schémy sú navzájom nepřeložitelné, čo by znamenalo, že presvedčenia, túžby, nádeje a poznatky určitej osoby nemajú nijakú skutočnú analógiu u toho. kto reprezentuje inú schému.
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Je nesporne zaujímavé sledovať, akými mnohorakými metamorfózami prešiel vývoj sémantických teórií prirodzených jazykov od čias zakladateľov modernej sémantiky, predovšetkým Fregeho a Russella.
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The ontological proof of the existence of God from Gödel´s heritage is presented and analysed in regard to the classical ontological proofs, due to Descartes and Spinoza, and their criticism by Leibnitz and Kant. Some recent works are taken into account as well, mainly the criticism of Descartes´proof by R. M. Smullyan, the emendations to Gödel´s proof by C. A. Anderson and the analysis of the metaphysical presuppositions and biases behind the proof (and the modern European science in general) assumed from scholastic, due to P. Vopěnka.
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In the first part of this paper, the author analyzes several unacceptable views of properties of physical objects (particulars) and justifies the familiar explication, according to which properties of physical objects are certain functions defined on the set of all couples w,t, where w is a possible world and t is a moment of time (it is assumed that the universe of discourse is the same at all couples w,t). On the background of the indicated understanding of properties, the author demonstrates that there exist empirical essential properties. An empirical property is understood as a property, the extension of which cannot be identified without applying experience. He distinguishes two kinds of essential properties: (i) purely essential and (ii) partially essential. A purely essential property has the same extension at every world-time couple. The extension of a partially essential properties changes in the logical space, but there exists a non-empty set of objects which is a subset of their extension at every world-time couple. Every partially essential property is empirical. The author pays special attention to the essential properties expressible by means of expressions of the form (λx)(P(x) ∨ Q(x)) where P, Q are non-essential empirical properties that are allied through some objects X1, ..., Xn - i.e., the property (λx)(P(x) ∨ Q(x)) belongs to the objects X1, ..., Xn at every world-time couple. In the last part of the paper, the author demonstrates that every empirical property of the type (λx)(x < I) where ”<” denotes the relation of being a part of, and ”I” stands for any physical object, is purely essential. The assumption that the extensions of these properties are changeable, entails unacceptable consequences.
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Úvodom autor konštatuje, že si pokladá za povinnosť, pretože filozofia dialektického materializmu znateľne preniká aj k nám, podať analýzu jej noetických základov.
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The problem of the meaning of a reasonable natural language expression is solved. First, traditional ”denotational” approach is criticized. The meaning of a sentence is not its truth value, similarly the meaning of, eg, ”The president of U.S.A.” is not Bill Clinton, etc. Frege met this problem when analyzing the so called propositional attitudes in which ”denotational” approach has lead to the paradox of analysis. His well-known solution consists in splitting the meaning into sense and reference. But this is rejected in the paper as well, for its radical contextualism. In the first attempt, meaning is defined as an intension — mapping from possible worlds and time points — (empirical expressions) or extension (analytical expressions), respectively. The problem of the propositional attitudes is seemingly solved. The proposition that Morning Star = Evening Star is different than that of Morning Star = Morning Star. But, alas, in the case of analytical expressions we get the paradox of omniscience. A fine-grained solution is, therefore, proposed: the meaning is a closed construction denoted by the respective expression. Yet this solution is still not precise enough. Eventually the meaning is a concept which is the equivalence class of quasi-identical constructions indiscernible from the conceptual point of view. Finally, homonymous, synonymous and (analytically and empirically) equivalent expressions are precisely defined. Concluding we state that only synonymous expressions, having exactly the same meaning, ie. representing one and the same concept, can be mutually substituted in propositional attitudes without lea_ding to paradoxes.
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Review of: S. Neale: Descriptions, A Bradford Hook, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, London, 1990, XIV + 286 strán.
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The aim of the paper is to attack some prejudices against contemporary analytical philosophy spread among Slovak philosophers. The author tries to show that 1. the analytical philosophy is philosophy and not logic or logical analysis of language, that 2. this philosophy is not purely analytical and 3. it is not a system of assertions accepted by all analytical philosophers but rather a philosophical movement unified by the conviction that philosophical problems cannot be put and solved properly without knowledge of language and its logic. In authorś opinion the analytical way of doing philosophy is deeply rooted in the history of philosophy. Contemporary analytical philosophy conspicuously resembles the ancient Greek philosophy in the period of its bloom.
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The paper considers one of the most enigmatic problems of Wittgenstein`s Tractatus - the problem of solipsism. The authorś task is to reveal how the discussion of solipsism illuminates Wittgenstein`s metaphysical view in this treatise. Wittgenstein`s method is considered as one through which the status of what cannot be said is demonstrated. Wittgenstein has not embrased solipsism or idealism in the Tractatus, and neither has he rejected metaphysics as a whole. His attack has been directed against dogmatic philosophy and ethics, against the effort to say what cannot be said in true/false propositions. The discussion of solipsism brings into philosophy the importance of metaphysical "I" as a transcendental limit of the world and language. Wittgenstein`s aim in the Tractatus has been twofold: a) to show the nonsensicality of philosophical, ethical, aesthetical propositions (based on truth function theory), b) to emphasize, that the inexpresibility of the higher (in language) is the most important thing in our lives.
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Po prečítaní repliky môjho oponenta sa ina zmocnilo nefalšované pobavenie a priznávam, že takmer som podľahla pokušeniu začať svoju odpoveď výkladom o paralógii ako bežnej metóde nielen na slovenskom politickom trasovisku. N
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Keďže som nechcel svoj príspevok koncipovať rozsiahlejšie ako na niekoľkých stránkach, musel som svoje úvahy vyjadriť vo veľmi hutnej a koncíznej forme, ktorá nedovoľovala širšiu argumentáciu. Prosím preto čitateľa o zhovievavosť.
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Individuové deskripcie. Nie každé indivíduum z univerza daného jazyka musí mať vlastné meno, a ak ho aj má, nemusíme ho poznať alebo si nemusíme naň v prípade potreby spomenúť.
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Review of: J. R. Searle: Mysl, mozek, věda, MLADÁ FRONTA, PRAHA 1994, 129 s.
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The Fictitious Dialogue with the Double of a Certain Critic
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9. Molekulárne výroky. Zložené výroky jazyka 1. rádu sa tvoria viacerými spôsobmi. V tejto časti nášho výkladu sa budeme zaoberať stavbou výrokov utvorených z atomárnych výrokov pomocou tzv. výrokových spojok.
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