Filozoficznie prowokująca teoria kategorii
Recenzja książki: Elaine Landry (red.), Categories for the Working Philosopher, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, ss. xiv+471.
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Recenzja książki: Elaine Landry (red.), Categories for the Working Philosopher, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, ss. xiv+471.
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A standard reading of Anscombe’s “The First Person” takes her to argue, via reductio, that ‘I’ must be radically non-referring. Allegedly, she analogizes ‘I’ to the expletive ‘it’ in ‘It is raining’. Hence nothing need be said about Anscombe’s understanding of “the referential functioning of ‘I’”, there being no such thing. We think that this radical reading is incorrect. Given this, a pressing question arises: How does ‘I’ refer for Anscombe, and what sort of thing do users of ‘I’ refer to? We present a tentative answer which is both consistent with much of what Anscombe says, and is also empirically/philosophically defensible.
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Duh to nije izvršio. Zna se da pojam sistema u svojem emfatičkom hegelovskom slogu, koji, dabogme, ne odgovara deduktivnom pojmu pozitivnih znanosti, zahtijeva da bude shvaćen organski kao međusobno urašćivanje i međusobna urašćenost svih djelomičnih momenata snagom cjeline koja je već sadržana u svakom od njih.
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Najmanje jedinice ljudske komunikacije jesu govorni činovi onog tipa koji nazivamo ilokucijski činovi. Primjeri istih su tvrdnje, pitanja, zapovjedi, obećanja i isprike. Kad god određeni govornik s određenom namjerom izgovori neku rečenicu u odgovarajućem kontekstu, on izvodi jedan ili više ilokucijskih činova. Općenito, ilokucijski čin se sastoji od ilokucijske snage F i propozicionalnog sadržaja P. Na primjer, dva izgovaranja rečenica – “Ti ćeš izaći iz sobeˮ i “Izađi iz sobe!ˮ – imaju isti propozicionalni sadržaj, naime to da ćeš ti izaći iz sobe; no, karakteristično je da prva od njih ima ilokucijsku snagu predviđanja, a druga ilokucijsku snagu naredbe. Slično ovome, za dva izgovaranja rečenica “Ideš li u kino?ˮ i “Kada ćeš se sresti sa Johnom?ˮ je karakteristično da oba imaju ilokucijsku snagu pitanja, ali imaju različite propozicionalne sadržaje. Ilokucijska logika je logička teorija ilokucijskih činova. Njen glavni cilj je formalizacija logičkih svojstava ilokucijskih snaga. [...]
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The hierarchical approach to the solution of logical paradoxes is considered in the article. The foundations and main theses of the hierarchical approach are analysed through consideration of Russell’s theory of types and Tarski’s semantic conception. Basic arguments critical of such an approach that have been formulated in logical and epistemological research are presented. A specific characteristic of Wittgenstein’s position in the context of the hierarchical approach expressed by him in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is identified. The Wittgensteinian version of the hierarchical approach is the most stable in the relation to the critical arguments considered. If we still want to evaluate the hierarchical approach as an acceptable solution to the problem of logical paradoxes, we should employ its Wittgensteinian interpretation, because it is able to overcome the serious critical arguments against the approach presented in contemporary research on logic, epistemology, and the philosophy of mathematics.
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The authors are proceeding from the one-sided viewpoint as a result of absolutization of the analytic way of thinking in contemporaty philosophy. In four theses they present the weak spots of the official Analytic Philosophy (absolutization of the logical moment, disregard for alternative media, one-dimensionality of the favored ordinary language, »softening« of the rigorous assertive claims). In order to overcome these shortcomings but also acknowledging the achievements of the analytic way of thinking (such as ideal of clarity, unified method, self-criticism by critique of language) at the end of their paper the authors make out a case for an integrative understanding of language which is including new aspects of the phenomenon of language (effective, expressive, creative aspect) not only the aspects figured out by language analysis (logical-semantic and pragmatic aspect of language).
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Plato is a thinker who puts the concept of justice into the very center of philosophical discussion. His concept of dikaiosyne, as a virtue which is in essence related to the essence of the state, is elaborately defined in the dialogue The Republic, although in other works (Charmides, Protagoras, Gorgias, Symposium) we can also see views related to its philosophical understanding. Plato particularly emphasizes the universality and permanence of the concept of justice, its substantial significance for the proper state of the human soul and the alignment of three distinct parts of the soul, as well as the connection to the threefold social rank basis of the best politeia, and differentiated forms of the rule, developed, in addition to the Republic, in Statesman and Laws. The most commonly noted concept of justice, which sublimes its concept “in general”, is presented in Δ book of The Republic: “This, then, I said, my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice, this principle of doing one’s own business.” Plato advocates Sophocracy, i.e. the political rule of the philosophers, being of the opinion that only in such a form of constitution it is possible to realize a complete harmony, the agreement of spheres of practical life, but also the adequacy and the equivalence of giving and taking on behalf of free citizens of a polis and the very polis. The justice in the Kingship i.e. in Aristocracy should be applied, primarily based on the principle of geometrical equality, while arithmetical equality would be only an auxiliary means to mitigate increased tensions in the classical polis of Plato’s times.
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The review of: “Colour as Mathematics: An Approach on Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Colour”” Remarks on Colour (Bemerkungen über die Farben), (ed. G.E.M. Anscombe), UK/ USA/ Australia, Blackwell Publishing, 1977
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This paper investigates the understanding of justice in the known verses of Solon elegies. These elegies, according to the author, imply, so called legal justice, which is a consequence of Solon’s determination to understand the laws and justice primarily as a human creation; however at the same time he recognizes the legitimacy of the traditional order being established within the divine order of the world. Athenians actually gave to Solon all authorities of a law-maker in order to enable him to implement a broad range of social, political and economic reforms with the purpose to achieve the unity of the polis which, at that time, was in a deep crisis. While saving the Athens, Solon made a series of radical cuts in all spheres of its life, but that, however, did not mean equating the property related and other differences between the aristocracy and demos. Solon, eventually, did not understand the justice as the right of every citizen to have or receive the same amount of honor and goods at distribution, i.e. arithmetic equality, but more as a distributive or geometric proportion which was taking into account somebody’s rank and merits belonging to him accordingly.
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Iz sklopa vodećim razumijevanja pojma dijalektike u istoriji filozofije autor problematizuje dijalektiku u Marksovom djelu. U prvi plan interpretacije se iz tog sklopa izvlači problem odnosa Marksovog prema Hegelovom pojmu dijalektike, što je zahtijevalo obimniju obradu ideje dijalektike kod Hegela kao «kretanja samih stvari», momenta onoga logičkog i elementa filozofske spekulativne metode. S te osnove se tematizuje Marksov misaoni dug Hegelu, ali i ključni momenti njegovog vlastitog mišljenja, razvijanog najčešće upravo u kritičkim objekcijama na Hegelovu filozofiju. U tom se svjetlu pokazuje specifičnost Marksovog pojma dijalektike kao moći negativiteta u samoj zbiljnosti, kao modela kritike ideologije i kao filozofsko-naučne metode.
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Im Rückgriff auf Hans Leisegangs Lehre von den Denkformen skizziert der Autor in seinem Beitrag die Form; in der sich Hegels Art zu philosophieren niederschlägt. In der Einleitung wird in aller Kürze Leisegangs Theorie vorgestellt, ehe dann im Hauptteil der Arbeit die Beschreibung jener Form gegeben wird, die für Hegels Denken typisch ist. Es wird die logische Struktur dieser Denkform erörtert, neben dieser auch ihre theologisch-metaphysische Motivation und Genese, aber es wird auch auf die Problematik ihrer Rekonstruktion hingewiesen. Nachdem eine konkrete Hegel-Textinterpretation aus Leisegangs Werk wiedergegeben worden ist, wird ein Blick auf die methodischen Besonderheiten des Hegel’schen „Denkstils“ geworfen. Im Schlussteil der Arbeit wird ein Vergleich von Hegels Philosophie und Leisegangs Denkformenlehre vorgenommen mit dem Ergebnis, dass es sich letztlich um zwei „Programme“ mit grundverschiedener Intention, aber auch mit einem gemeinsamen Nenner handelt: Letzterer liegt in der Forderung nach einer ontologischen Fundierung der Logik.
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In this paper the author at first describes basic parameters of Pythagorean doctrine, expressed primarily with Aristotle, more precisely the part of which states that “things are numbers”, or that they “imitate” or “represent” numbers, even that Italian thinkers “supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things, and the whole heaven to be a musical scale and a number”. Bearing in mind the fact that according to Pythagoreans the number is the substance of all things the segment of diverse Pythagorean learning of numbers in regard to their view of justice is particularly being considered. Two definitions of justice are in the focus of the author’s investigation: in the first place the one which was negatively formulated from Magna Moralia (1182a11-14), which states that justice is not a square number. Then the segment of Nicomachean Ethics (1132b21-23) is quoted according to which the justice is some sort of reciprocity i.e. they defined justice simply as requital to another. The numerical expression of such definitions later became the subject of confrontation for the commentators, however the analysis has shown that the justice was expressed with at least five numbers. Most frequently the numbers were 4 and 9, but in the literature the numbers 8, 5, and 3 are also being mentioned. The paper, eventually, lists the deficiencies of such identifications, particularly in reference to Hegel’s objections to such determination and emphasizing that, in his opinion, mathematics can not grasp the reality which postulates itself and which exists in its own concept since its relation to the reality is external and nonconceptual.
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Durch die Vermittlung von Johannes Daubert und kurze Zeit nach ihrer Veröffentlichung 1900/1901 haben Husserls Logische Untersuchungen, das Hauptwerk der Phänomenologie, eine besondere Rezeption in den psychologischen und philosophischen Kreisen von München erlebt, hauptsächlich im Kreis von Theodor Lipps’ Schülern. Durch die Auseinandersetzung mit den Logischen Untersuchungen Husserls sowie durch die Debatte, die sie mit ihrem Lehrer gehabt haben, haben die Schüler Lipps’ einen eigenen phänomenologischen Kreis gebildet. In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich, die Geschichte der Rezeption von Husserls Phänomenologie in München zu rekonstruieren, mit Berücksichtigung von zwei Schülern Lipps’: Pfänder und Reinach. Ich versuche hier auch zu erklären, in wie fern sich Pfänder und Reinach von ihrem Lehrer nach der Begegnung mit der husserlschen Phänomenologie distanziert haben, obwohl sie Husserls Phänomenologie nicht ohne weiteres übernommen haben.
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The fundamental ontological categories of Aristotle are in language (Cateories, IV 25). They are ontological. Norms are not in this classification. They are not descriptive propositions - they can not be true or false. But the logical tradition is concerned with norms as linguistic entities. It is justified by the ideas of Aristotle. The linguistic approach leads to some theoretical difficulties of the contemporary logic of norms. [...]
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Filozofi oštrijeg suda koj i se trude oko ispitivanja prirodnih stvari slažu se u uverenju da moramo sa najvećom brižljivošću da sprečimo da se u prirodnu nauku uvuče ono što je izmišljeno nekim srećn i m obrtom ili na temelju neke nepromišljenosti, kao i da se preduzima bilo šta neizvesno bez saglasnosti iskustva i bez posredovnja geometrije. Sigurno da ne bi moglo da se pretpostavi bilo šta što bi bi lo blagotvornije i korisnije za filozofiju od ove od luke. Pošto, verovatno, jedva da je nekome od smrtnika dopušteno da čvrstim koracima napreduJe na pravom putu istine, a da pri rom tu i tamo ne odstupi u stranu, onda su neki ovaj zakon do te mere razvili da se uopšte više ne usuđuju da se u ispitivanju istine otisnu na puč inu , već smatraju da je zgodn ije da jedre duž obale: oni su dozvoli li pristup samo onome što je neposredno poznato putem svedočanstva iskustva. A zapravo, na ovom putu možemo pouzdano da raščlanimo zakone prirode, ali ne i poreklo i uzroke zakona. Jer, onaj ko samo sledi prirodne pojave, uvek ostaje jednako udaljen od razumevanja prvih uzroka koj i leže daleko, i ism tako malo će da dospe do nauke o prirodi samih tela kao i onaj ko se sve više penje na vrh nekog brda zanoseć i se da će konačno dodirnuti rukom nebo. [...]
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The efforts to explain the other constantly fail. The creation of images reveals the presence of the other who appears both as an excess of any explanation and as a condition for the understanding of the diversity of such images. Even in its denial, such presence demands a dialogical dimension which includes both the explainer and the other. The birth of Western civilization, in its Socratic mode, was profoundly dialogical. Various trends, such as scientism and theology, shifted discourse to monological doctrines. Regardless of the kind of monologue, each claimed to subsume the other in its own logic, depriving the other of equal voice. Yet what is significant is that such a voice was always present – even in its denial. Good examples come from cultural conquests, racisms and colonialisms. Yet the most pronounced monological logic is scientific reductionism to a single ontological base: the fragmenting logic of materialism.
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The social theory of knowledge developed by Marx and Engels is unfolded in three steps: (1) by explaining the meaning of dialectic as a form both of thinking and of being; (2) by discussing the anthropological and historical materialism that pervades the original Marxist epistemological perspective; (3) by presenting Marx’s and Engels’ belief that the material means and relations of production determine the existence of society in all respects; (4) by isolating the multiple senses of ideology as they occur in the writings of Marx and Engels and by discussing the various methods of unmasking the hidden agendas of ideologies. Throughout the article, a clear and sympathetic exposition of Marxist social epistemology is combined with an insightful and playful criticism of several inconsistencies that the author of the article finds in Marx’s and Engels’ accounts of things.
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The analysis of the second operation of the human intellect presented in lectures on logics by the main representatives of scholastic logic in Lithuania of the second half of the sixteenth century, Marcin Úmiglecki and Diego Ortiz, virtually belongs to the so-called major logic (logica major). That is, the cardinal object of the above-mentioned analysis was the content of proposition. On the other hand, such an analysis involved some elements of dialectics, or minor logic (logica minor sive dialectica), namely, certain rules of logical square and conversion. Following the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition, Úmiglecki and Ortiz defined the proposition as a correct or false sentence (oratio vera sive falsa). Meanwhile, opposition, equivalence (aequipollentia) and convertibility were regarded as the main properties of proposition (propria propositionis). These properties were also interpreted in the spirit of the scholastic tradition. Úmiglecki and Ortiz traditionally considered necessary propositions the main elements of scientific knowledge. As for the terms of necessary proposition, it was affirmed that neither subject nor predicate ought to bear actual existence. That is, two conditions alone are necessary for these terms: a) there must be at least a logical potentiality (potentia logica) for the existence of a subject (that is, the subject needs not be a contradictory being, such as a circular square); b) such an existence having been assumed, the predicate must be inseparable from the existing subject.
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The social theory of knowledge developed by Marx and Engels is unfolded in three steps: (1) by explaining the meaning of dialectic as a form both of thinking and of being; (2) by discussing the anthropological and historical materialism that pervades the original Marxist epistemological perspective; (3) by presenting Marx’s and Engels’ belief that the material means and relations of production determine the existence of society in all respects; (4) by isolating the multiple senses of ideology as they occur in the writings of Marx and Engels and by discussing the various methods of unmasking the hidden agendas of ideologies. Throughout the article, a clear and sympathetic exposition of Marxist social epistemology is combined with an insightful and playful criticism of several inconsistencies that the author of the article finds in Marx’s and Engels’ accounts of things.
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The social theory of knowledge developed by Marx and Engels is unfolded in three steps: (1) by explaining the meaning of dialectic as a form both of thinking and of being; (2) by discussing the anthropological and historical materialism that pervades the original Marxist epistemological perspective; (3) by presenting Marx’s and Engels’ belief that the material means and relations of production determine the existence of society in all respects; (4) by isolating the multiple senses of ideology as they occur in the writings of Marx and Engels and by discussing the various methods of unmasking the hidden agendas of ideologies. Throughout the article, a clear and sympathetic exposition of Marxist social epistemology is combined with an insightful and playful criticism of several inconsistencies that the author of the article finds in Marx’s and Engels’ accounts of things.
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