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The thinking of the generation of the Austrian politicia born in the last dbecades of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was determined by the unique set of identities and diversity that gave a special dinamics to na tion consciousness awakening in the First Republic.
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The article is dealing with the views on Yugoslav internal affairs of the US representatives to the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia during the first half of 1945. Contemporary US policy was not interested in Yugoslavia, and accordingly did not want to interfere in internal affairs in new Yugoslav state. It is not therefore surprising that the activities of the US representatives were actually limited to passive observation of events and processes. Although observers, the US representatives were closely following with considerable interest and critically what was happening before their eyes. Their observations are therefore valuable source of data about the processes and events during the year of 1945 which have transformed new Yugoslav state into a country in which a totalitarian system dominated by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was established.
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Based on hitherto unused Hungarian documents the paper depicts relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia 1945-1947. Diplomatic relations between Hungary and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were severed in April 1941 due to war and dismemberment of Yugoslavia. They were reestablished after the war under drastically changed foreign-political and domestic circumstances. The “power balance" tipped clearly in favor of the new Yugoslavia that had already been recognized. Hungary, as a defeated country, had to answer before the great powers. According to the Peace Treaty of 1947 some 3 Million Hungarians found themselves once again outside of their nation-state. Yugoslavia triumphantly took the place at the side of the victors and successfully reunited the state that had been dismembered in 1941. Between 1945 and 1947 Hungary was under military occupation and under control of the Allied Control Commission and she regained her formal sovereignty only in 1947 with the Paris Peace Treaty. In this relation: the subordinated and the superior, i.e. the vanquished and the victor, were the diplomatic relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia reestablished on March 10, 1945. In 1947 these relations became more cordial than ever, which was crowned in December 1947 by outwardly glamorously prepared visit of Josip Broz Tito to Hungary.
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Although ideologically opposed and seeing the future social system in Yugoslavia differently, both the Royal Yugoslav Government and the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia shared the interest in enlarging the Yugoslav state, putting overtly forward territorial claims against neighboring countries. The wartime coalition of USSA and Western Powers showed its nonviability in the matter of the future state appurtenance of Venezia Giulia. The territorial dispute wasn’t definitively solved by the Belgrade and Devin agreements and the territorial status of Venezia Giulia remained a bone of contention in the relations between great powers. After WWI through the activity of the League of nations an attempt was made to repudiate the concept of power equilibrium and to implement the concept of collective security. This concept proved its nonviability at the outbreak of WWII. With the beginning of the Trieste crisis at the end of WWII the power equilibrium became the dominant concept in the relations between great powers once again.
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Apart from military and political, economic, cultural and educational cooperation, academic ties of the new Yugoslav authorities with state and scholarly institutions of the Soviet union developed already by the end of 1944. Above all, it was the matter of great expectations and certain aid from the Soviet Union in cadres, material and in organizing of scientific work and of basing of Party and state scientific policy completely on the Soviet scholarly and research model and the achievements of Soviet science. Ideological and political propinquity and the need to develop the backward science and to apply it to the needs of the country and the people, made it necessary to rely on the experiences, achievements and aid of the first country of socialism. This trend found its underpinning in the Treaty on Friendship, Mutual Aid and Afterwar Cooperation between Yugoslavia and USSR from April 1945. Ties between scholarly institutions and scientists were realized through the highest educational organs of the state, and above all through the Society for Cultural Cooperation of Yugoslavia and USSR, founded in 1945. Already from the first afterwar school year Soviet curricula, plans and Russian language were introduced on all levels of education, and it was tried to base the instruction on dialectical materialism. Soviet schoolbooks were translated and Russian-language literature recommended, methodology and results of certain scholarly disciplines were taken over from Soviet science (psychology, pedagogy, history, literary theory, biology etc.) Through exchange and grants primarily Russian-language books and scholarly journals came into libraries of faculties and scientific institutions. Apart from its practical application, Soviet science was strongly advertised and praised as the „most progressive” in the press and in public statements of scientific and public workers, as opposed to the „bourgeois reactionary science” of Western countries. Aid in application and advertising of achievements of Soviet science were lent also by scientists from the Soviet Union, who, apart from lectures at universities and in public, often had the task of organizing scientific research work and of helping with the set-up, organization and work of scholarly institutions. Furthermore, a large number of students and specializing experts, as well as scientists was sent to the Soviet Union. During their stay there they came to know the organization and achievements of Soviet science and they propagated it in public and applied it in their institutions. All forms of scientific cooperation were limited by material resources and possibilities and imbedded in the general cultural and propaganda atmosphere based on ideological and political situation and the relations between Yugoslavia and USSR. After the Resolution of the Informbuerau in 1948 and the conflict between Yugoslavia and USSR scientific ties between the two countries were abruptly severed and the propaganda image of Soviet science was gradually revised.
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Between the end of WWII and the conflict of Yugoslavia with the Informbuerau power was grabbed by the Communists in all East European countries. During that period of time, Yugoslavia established good relations with all these countries, concluding treaties on friendship with them. However, the place of all these countries in the Yugoslav foreign policy was by no means the same. The relations were best with USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland, Slavonic countries and wartime allies. Great efforts were made to establish as close ties as possible with Albania, i.e. to exercise as great Yugoslav influence in that country as possible, as well as to convert Bulgaria’s status of a defeated foe into that of an ally and a friend. Good relations were most difficult to establish with Hungary where „reactionary” forces were strong and with Romania with which many opened questions existed and where Communists were weak. In keeping with the place these countries had in Yugoslav foreign policy, treaties of friendship were signed with them: the one with USSR on April 11, 1945, with Poland on March 18, 1946, with Czechoslovakia on May 9, 1946, with Albania on July 9, 1946, with Bulgaria on November 27, 1947, with Hungary on December 8, 1947, and with Romania on December 19, 1947. Cooperation with these countries meant national affirmation for Yugoslavia, strengthening of its position, security in case of renewed German aggression, an expression of Slavic solidarity, a form of siding with USSR in Cold War divisions etc. Everyday propaganda of Soviet models in Yugoslav public also served foreign policy goals, as well as the endeavor to develop as rich cultural exchange as possible with these countries, particularly Slavic ones. For this reason Yugoslav cooperation with East European countries was marked by mutual visits of writers, scientists and sportsmen, exchange of films, mutual artistic propaganda, but political one as well, in the form of exhibitions etc. In that context, particularly important were societies for cooperation between Yugoslavia and East European countries, founded in Yugoslavia and in those countries. The societies had as their goal to contribute to all-encompassing mutual knowledge and cooperation of these peoples. In Yugoslavia they were completely serving the foreign policy goals of the government and the Communist Party.
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The leading British statesmen, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden tried in fall 1944 to maintain the policy of compromise toward Yugoslavia they had pursued throughout that year, whose basic idea was the formation of a common government comprizing representatives of the partisan movement headed by J.B. Tito and the Communist Party and the representatives of the Yugoslav government under Ivan Šubašić. They hoped that the realisation of that concept would enable them to keep in check the rising Soviet influence in Yugoslavia, at the time when the miltiary victory of Tito's movement seemed quite certain. In order to achieve the goals of that policy they turned to direct communicating with the Soviet leadership, judging it a more efficient way than negotioating with Tito in whom, after his elopement from Vis to Moscow, they had no trust any more. The results of their endeavours were the following: the agreement about common work in Yugoslavia (50:50) between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow (October 1944), the agreement between Tito and Šubašić about the founding of a unified government (November 1944), resolutions and suggestions of the three allied powers at the Yalta conference (February 1945) concerning Yugoslavia, creation of a temporary government of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (March 1945). Although the policy the British were favoring was formally implemented, they were aware that a fundametnal change took place in Yugoslavia, that Tito and the Communists took power and that in the post-war period Yugoslavia would go in a direction that was neither agreeable to their wishes and interests nor in keeping with agreement reached with the Soviet leadership about equilibrium of interests. This was confirmed by reports and estimates of their representatives in Belgrade about the situation in Yugoslavia in the first months after the Communist takeover – first by Fitzroy McLean and then by ambassador Ralf Stivenson. Shortly put, the main conclusion was that everything pointed in the direction that the new authorities were bent on establishing a system based on the Soviet model in domestic affairs, and on following closely policy and views of USSR in foreign affairs. Disapointed and unhappy with such development, Churchill proposed in March 1945 that Britain should gradually withdraw and disengage from Yugoslav affairs and that it should leave Tito „to be cooked in the Balcan stew”. However, Eden didn't think Britain should withdraw and „leave the whole business to Tito and Moscow”. In the period that followed the British policy toward Yugoslavia was a kind of mix of Churchill's and Eden's views and it wasn't substantially changed even after Churchill's fall from power in summer of that year. The important events in 1945 took place in accordance with that policy. Britain took a very sharp stand against Yugoslav territorial demands in Italy, managing to force Tito to withdraw his troops from Trieste, but it wasn't overly engaged in internal Yugoslav development: certain attempts to do something more at the Potsdam conference and during the elections for the Constituent Assembly bore no fruits due to the attitude of Moscow which stood firmly behind the proces of establishment and recognition of the new government in Belgrade. Throughout 1946 the British continued to intensly observe and analyze both the internal development and the Yugoslav-Soviet relations. They didn't look with favor at strong Yugoslav leaning toward USSR and other East European countries and they considered that the Yugoslav leadership was determined on completly relying on Moscow and that it was activly working on political and economic integration of these states under the leadership of USSR. Nevertheless, they didn't give up hope, thinking there was hope Yugoslav policy would change down the road and that things could turn to their favor. Lacking arguments to substantiate these hopes in everyday political practice, they counted on the effect of the geographic factors: „Belgrade is much farther from Moscow than is Warsaw.” From the information and analysis they had gathered, they concluded that Tito's regime and the Communist system in Yugoslavia were the reality one had to put up with, as well as with the fact that Tito's government was strongly tied to Moscow and that under such circumstances one had to be patient and to keep the door to the West opened for Yugoslavia, to develop relations with it in the limits of the possible, primarily economic ones, and to preserve in that way the remaining influence and lay the foundations for its increase in the future. In the British public, as well as among observers and analysts the image of Yugoslavia wasn't changed in 1947. It was still depicted as the closest and the best beloved ally of Moscow, as the main exponent of the Soviet policy in the region of South-Eastern Europe etc. Not even in the Foreign Office did one expect siginficant changes in the relations with Yugoslavia, nor in the relations between Belgrade and Moscow. The refusal of the Yugoslav government to join the Marshal Plan – which was in keeping with attitude of the Soviet leadership – and active participation at the founding of the Cominform later on, were seen as solid proofs that Tito's government firmly stood on the position of a close ally and follower of the policy of USSR. However, there were opinions that not everything was so rosy in the Yugoslav-Soviet relations as it seamed. F. Roberts, minister-advisor in the British Embassy in Moscow (ambassador in Belgrade later on) suggested in early 1947 that there was a colision between the Yugoslav national interests pursued by Tito's government and the principles of proletarian internationalism advocated by the Soviet leadership, which could lead to a conflict between the Yugoslav and the Soviet governments. However, Ch. Pick, the ambassador in Belgrade, and the officials in the Foreign Office didn't countnance his opinion. They thought that, although Roberts' s observations were founded on realistic arguments, „Belgrade would never dare to refuse any demand Moscow would seriously wanted to impose.”
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The liberation from the Fascist occupation of a number of East European countries by the Soviet army was the first step in the process of transformation of political systems and the formation of the Soviet block. The dominant position in the Balkans was taken by the Communist Yugoslavia which strove to expand its influence in the region. In the first phase such a role of Yugoslavia tallied nicely with the interests of USSR which was willing to delegate part of its power to Yugoslavia. Albania, whose independence and territorial integrity were guaranteed by the agreement between USSR, USA and Great Britain, was in informal alliance with Yugoslavia and in the sphere of its military and political interests which, was one of the main reasons for Moscow to hand that country over to Belgrade in summer 1946 for »vicarious« administration. Having entrusted the Yugoslavs with this task, USSR took over the responsibility to supply aid to Albania, retaining at the same time the control over the execution of decision concerning foreign policy of that country. During 1946 and 1947 Yugoslavia concluded with Albania a number of treaties concerning economy and finance. It reorganized Albanian army according to the Yugoslav standards, which, to all intents, should lead to Albania becoming one of the Yugoslav republics. The Soviet leadership considered such policy realization of the agreements which had been reached, but only until the moment when, the Yugoslavs broke them – in the opinion of the Cremlin. Parallel aid from these two countries caused a clash of interests among the Albanian leaders and led to the formation of two groups, one of which started to consider the alliance with Yugoslavia a burden and to turn increasingly toward Moscow. In November 1947, under pressure from the Yugoslavs, the leader of that group, N. Spiru ended his life in suicide. This enraged Stalin who summoned Djilas to talks in Moscow. By the end of the year it became known in Cremlin that Tito intended to send an infantry division to Albania near the Greek border, which was a severe »transgression« that would endanger Soviet interests in the region. Stalin talked about that to Yugoslav leaders in February 1948 who were summoned to Moscow together with the Bulgarians to be »filled in«. The totality of these circumstances was one of the reasons for the conflict with Yugoslavia which would begin soon. In that experiment of the Cremlin Albania was held hostage by ambitions of the two Communist leaders, one of whom, having entrusted that country to Yugoslav patronage wasn't able to foresee all consequences of such a step, so he made an ultimatum to Yugoslavia at the crucial juncture. Disregarding the scale of its involvment in the events in Albania, Yugoslavia fulfilled the demands of the Cremlin, but it was forced to withdraw from Albania during the increasing conflict with USSR. Stalin's estimate that one could continue to run Yugoslavia from the Cremlin by relying on ideological instruments and economic pressure wasn't justified. For its part, Albania proved a faithful ally of Moscow until the end of the Stalin's era, together with other faithful and enraged (for reasons of their own) enemies of »Titoism«. On the whole, the episode of Yugoslav-Albanian relations which developed under Cremlin's careful auspicies during the first postwar years showed, coupled with other factors, the deeply flawed character of the policy on which Stalin tried to build his East-European empire.
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The paper analyses how personalization of tragedy of the participants of WWII was used to strengthen Yugoslav-Soviet ties in the first days after the liberation of Yugoslavia. The text also analyzes the processes of rapprochement and of establishing closer ties between the two countries during 1960s when new forms of political and cultural cooperation were based on renewed remembrance of the courage of the participants in the war. Special attention was devoted to interpretations of WWII in contemporary historiography which unearthed new data and opened new perspectives. Turning to experiences of individuals was suggested as a possibility of drawing conclusions without ideological revisions of the whole history of 20th century.
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The new powers that be in Yugoslavia after WWII faced lack of expert and well educated, but also pro-Marxist diplomatic cadres that would also be loyal to the Communist Party. In the beginning, the problem was solved by cautious taking over of the diplomatic officials of the Kingdom of J ugoslavia, by employing the cadres who graduated from humanities faculties and by using the existing Party cadres, regardless of their expertise. Very soon higher schools were set up to broadly educate and improve Marxistically the chosen Party cadres and to enable them to work in the diplomatic service. Firstly, the one-year Diplomatic School at the Foreign Ministry was founded in 1946, and in 1948 the Journalist and Diplomatic High School in Belgrade, that had the rank of a faculty and two departments educating the cadres for diplomacy and journalism. Despite public competitions, only communists and youth activists proposed by Party committees in federal republics were accepted. The teaching staff consisted mainly of university professors, officials of the Foreign Ministry and of other institutions. Due to political problems with the Infonnbureau, the school was abolished in 1952, but it was possible for 200 students to end their studies and graduate. Only in the late 1950s the opinion within the Party leadership prevailed that a higher school for education of the Parly cadres for diplomacy and other political posts should be founded, so that within the framework of the Party school system the High School of Political Sciences started operating in 1960. In 1968 the School was turned into the Faculty of Political Sciences within the framework of the Belgrade University, that, among other things, educated diplomatic experts.
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CPJ cadres started coming into diplomatic missions abroad immediately after WWII. The influence of the CPJ and the number of communists increased over years through sending new cadres from the country, accepting into the Party membership part of diplomatic officials who previously hadn’t been communists and through recall of old cadres home. According to the 1949 data in J ugoslav missions in 28 countries there were 602 communists. The largest number was to be found in Germany (94), Italy (70), Great Britain and the USA (55 each) and Austria (47). Until early 1952 the number of communists was increased almost by a third: from 602 to 779. The largest number of Party members was to be found in the USA some 120. Until mid-1950s the CPJ established M l domination of the diplomatic service. 1.300 communists were serving in diplomatic missions abroad then. According to the data of June 30, 1956, there were 1.562 Jugoslav representatives (including students and those specializing) in 43 countries. Out of that number there were as many as 1.341 communists, or some 86%. The largest number of communists served in the USA (117), France (114) and Great Britain (104). The presence of the communists in the diplomatic service posed the problem of their organization. Party cells were set up in most countries after WWII but they were disbanded on the decision of the Central Committee in March 1946. Instead, Party plenipotentiaries were put in charge of the communists abroad. After the Resolution of the Informbureau, the Central Committee ordered reestablishing of Party organizations in the second half of 1948. Ever since a single Party organization existed in each country that was divided into several sections in countries with several J ugoslav missions. In the early 1950s on the orders of the Central Committee new changes were introduced, so Party organizations were set up in every town with a Jugoslav mission, whereas Party committees directed the work on the national level.
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After the passing of the Resolution of the Informbureau a perceptible deterioration of the relations between socialist countries set in. The change in relations was felt to a large degree on the Danube. Between 1948 and 1953 the position of Yugoslav diplomats and officials in the Danube Commission and the Iron Gate Administration, but also in the ship agencies, was extremely difficult. Constant surveillance, checking of documents, searches, preventing of reception of written materials from home country, expulsions etc. became frequent forms of pressure. During 1949 and 1950 the Yugoslav shipping agencies in Romania, Bulgaria and the USSR were closed down and their officials expelled. The situation in the sector of the Iron Gate was particularly difficult because it comprised the border zone of two countries, and was at the same time, the most difficult part of the Danube for navigation. A considerable number of Yugoslav officials was expelled from Orsova that was the seat of the Temporary' Committee directing the Iron Gate administration. The Yugoslav Permanent Delegation with the Temporary Committee headed by permanent delegate Velizar Ninčić. left Or§ova in September 1949. The situation on the Danube changed drasticly after death of Joseph Visarionovich Stalin.
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Stanoje Simić started his diplomatic career in the first days of the existence of the Yugoslav state. He was born and raised in the family of the distinguished diplomat and national activist Svetislav Simić. He was a pupil of the Second Male High School in Belgrade, a student of the Faculty of Law, wartime volunteer, devoted to the state and the people, aware that regimes and ideologies were transient and that state and popular interests stood above all else. He represented one of the few personages in the discontinuity-riddled history of the Yugoslav diplomacy who left their mark on the activities of the Yugoslav diplomacy during the inter-war period, in the whirlpool of WWII and during the first post-war decade. Possessing expert and general education, Slavophile and Russophile by conviction, a republican by determination he stood out by his looks, behavior and lifestyle from his postwar environment. He was at the helm of the Yugoslav diplomacy in hard moments as the postwar society and its institutions were being built, when Yugoslavia forged close ties with the USSR and the countries of „people’s democracy” in all fields and antagonized the West. Closeness to the Soviets decisively conditioned his withdrawal from diplomacy, but not from political life in which he remained active until his retirement.
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The question of the constitution of the Kingdom of SCS is inseparable from the struggle for its international recognition. One of the important aspects of this process was the issue of borders. On the southern borders of the new state, there was the prevailing situation of neither war nor peace. While diplomats and experts at the green table in Paris tried to provide better boundaries for their country, the soldiers in the field endured great sacrifices for the same purpose. Occupations of Strumica, Caribrod and Bosiljgrad were the result of the implementation of a peace treaty with defeated Bulgaria. Events on the Yugoslav-Albanian border represented a continuation of the efforts of the Kingdom of Serbia to ensure itself better positions after the Balkan wars in highly complex military, political and economic conditions that characterized the emergence and further maintenance of the Albanian state.
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The rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Austria following the decision of the Yugoslav regime to renounce its claims to Carinthia resulted in enhanced economic cooperation between the two countries. Besides, during the 1960s and 1970s tens of thousands of Yugoslav labor migrants immigrated to Austria. Numerous meetings of high-ranking politicians from Yugoslavia and Austria confirmed the improvement of relations between the two countries. During the 1960s and 1970s the Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito met several times the leading politicians from Austria, including its president, chancellors and foreign ministers. The records of these conversations represent extremely valuable sources for anyone interested in the relations between Yugoslavia and Austria after the Second World War.
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This is the first complete publication of the Russian translation, with comments, of the Journey to Persia by the 15th century Venetian public figure, diplomat and traveler Giosafat Barbaro. He headed Venetian embassy to the Persian shah Uzun-Hassan. The discussed travel account was written in late 1480s — early 1490s as a narration of this embassy, during which Barbaro had to make a long and eventful way through different cities and localities of the Mediterranean, Ottoman Empire and Persia. Besides, he provides some details on the countries he had never visited — India and China. Journey to Persia is a valuable source on history of international relations, historical geography, ethnography, economy and culture of medieval Persia and other Oriental countries. The article contains parallel Italian original and Russian translation texts.
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This paper discusses the role of art in Cold War diplomacy in Yugoslav-US relations between 1961 and 1966. During the 1960s, culture was often, sometimes unwittingly, at other times intentionally, infused with the politics of the Cold War. According to one line of existing scholarship, the rise of US art after WWII and exhibitions of American art abroad amounted to cultural imperialism and a “profound glorifying of American civilization.” These historians persuasively identified the political motives behind the exhibition strategies of American museums, such as MoMA’s promotion of Abstract Expressionism through the International Program of Circulating Exhibitions (established in 1952), or the US Government’s Central Intelligence Agency endorsement of US art through its offices around the world. Accordingly, Abstract Expressionist works were staged as par excellence representations of America’s democratic values, where the messages of freedom and individuality behind the works of such artists as Jackson Pollock were contrasted against the tyranny and totalitarianism of the USSR. Indeed, John Hay Whitney, Chairman of the Museum of Modern Art, explicitly stated that the role of the Museum and of art is to “educate, inspire, and strengthen the hearts and wills of free men in defence of their own freedom.”
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Bu çalışma, Kenneth Waltz tarafından ortaya konulan Neorealist yaklaşımın uluslararası sistemin temel özelliklerine ilişkin varsayımları bağlamında, 1945-1965 yılları arasında Türk dış politikasının temel parametrelerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmada, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın hemen ardından ortaya çıkan iki kutuplu sistemin, Türk dış politikası üzerinde belirleyici bir etkisinin bulunup bulunmadığı sorusuna cevap aranmaktadır. Çalışmanın hipotezi şu şekilde formüle edilmiştir: Kenneth Waltz tarafından geliştirilmiş olan Neorealist yaklaşımın uluslararası sistemin temel özelliklerine ilişkin varsayımları dikkate alındığında, iki kutuplu sistem, bilhassa 1945-1965 yılları arasında Türk dış politikası üzerinde belirleyici bir etkide bulunmuştur.
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