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August 1991. sam proveo u Kijevu. Kad sam tu početkom mjeseca pristigao, Kijev je bio glavni grad Sovjetske Socijalističke Republike Ukrajine, jedne od petnaest republika u tadašnjem Sovjetskom Savezu. Kad sam otišao, Sovjetski Savez se bio izvalio, a Kijev je bio glavni grad nezavisne Ukrajine.
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Sredinom januara sve je krenulo brzo i pobunjeni građani Ukrajine su razvlastili predsednika Janukoviča koji se sklonio u neku rusku bazu. U zamahu pobune poginulo je nekoliko stotina ljudi i vetar je odneo i narandžastu revoluciju i nade građana, a vetar je severni. Već znamo da V. Putin ne da Ukrajinu, a kriza više nije rusko-ukrajinska već bezmalo planetarnih razmera. U Berlinu i Briselu nisu sigurni kako će dalje ići. Pomorandža u Kijevu je poprskana krvlju i elitni komentatori u svetu ne žure sa svojim tekstovima.
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Ključni zaključak o Rusiji, staroj i novoj, jeste da je ona kontrarevolucionarna sila: ruska spoljna politika posle Napoleonovih ratova, a naročito posle 1848. bez prekida je kontrarevolucionarna i konzervativna, čak i kada njome vladaju reformisti, kao na primer sada, u postsovjetskoj i posthladnoratovskoj Rusiji. Iako su njeni trenutni spoljnopolitički ciljevi ruski, instrumenti njenih intervencija, na primer u Siriji, ostaju sovjetski. Glavna razlika između nove Rusije i obe stare, i carističke i sovjetske, je odsustvo univerzalnih ideoloških opravdanja, bez obzira na pokušaje oživljavanja ideologije ruske kulturne i civilizacijske izuzetnosti, kao načina gušenja liberalnih promena u zemlji i (samim tim) van nje.
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Kažu da je na vest o izbijanju pariske revolucije 1848. Nikolaj Prvi uleteo u dvor, prekinuo ples i izdao kontrarevolucionarnu zapovest: „Na konje! Na Pariz!“
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U pitanju je sticaj okolnosti ili sudbina. U poslednje vreme u Evropi su se rasplamsale dve opasne krize. Jedna se tiče Grčke, čija bi ekonomska katastrofa mogla dovesti do evropskog i čak međunarodnog finansijskog sloma. Druga se tiče Ukrajine, gde bi ruska invazija mogla dovesti do evropskog i čak međunarodnog rata. One su veoma različite, ali u jednom su slične: obe zavise od odluka i diplomatije nemačke kancelarke Angele Merkel.
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1. The Future of Europe: The Threat of Military Aggression Against Ukraine and Secessionism in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2. Listening to the echo of Putin’s Russia in Ukraine 3. Provincialism & Malign Interference: Overcoming Political and Institutional Barriers to Defending BiH’s Constitutional Order 4. Does radicalization pay off? 5. Central Bosnia: The Key to Survival for Bosnia and Herzegovina 6. From the Washington Marriott to the written-off political basketball player 7. The EU and USA should create the space for a new social contract
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1. Budućnost Evrope: Prijetnja vojnom agresijom na Ukrajinu i secesionizam u Bosni i Hercegovini 2. Osluškujući eho Putinove Rusije u Ukrajini 3. Provincijalizam i zloćudno uplitanje: Prevazilaženje političkih i institucionalnih barijera u odbrani ustavnog poretka BiH 4. Da li se radikalizacija isplati? 5. Srednja Bosna: ključ opstanka Bosne i Hercegovine 6. Od washingtonskog Marriotta do otpisanog političkog košarkaša 7. EU i SAD trebaju stvoriti prostor za novi društveni ugovor
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The main topics of the NATO Vilnius Summit held on 11–12 July were deterrence and defense, Ukraine’s future membership of NATO, and deepening relations with partners in the Indo-Pacific. The Alliance is partly returning to the defense planning processes and structures that were in place during the Cold War, but which NATO abandoned in the 1990s. The adoption of three regional defense plans constitutes a structural change in NATO’s approach to collective defense, but will require implementation and funding in the years to come.
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The stability of the Belarusian economy has come under threat from the new Western sanctions, imposed on the country in 2022 for its complicity in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the loss of the Ukrainian market. According to the most pessimistic forecasts, the country will probably face a deep economic recession, involving a decline in its GDP of more than 10%, and a slump in its most profitable exports. However, official statistics for 2022 indicate that Belarus was hit by a moderate crisis during which its GDP shrank by a mere 4.7%, its industrial production by 5.4%and its total foreign trade by just 6%. Belarus has adapted to the new situation, and has been partly able to make up for these losses. The main factor that helped Minsk to ease the severity of the restrictions involved support from Russia. In exchange for Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s loyalty, Russia has made its transport and port infrastructure available for the transit of Belarusian goods and introduced preferential conditions for Belarusian exports onto its market. In addition, the magnitude of the economic crisis is being limited by certain ‘manual steering’ strategies applied by the Belarusian authorities, such as keeping industrial production at a high level (which has led to more and more goods being stored in warehouses), introducing administrative measures to block price increases, and attempting to circumvent the EU’s embargo on road freight from Belarus. However, neither the assistance from Moscow (which is also subject to sanctions) nor the ‘manual control’ of the economy are sufficient to guarantee the country’s economic stability. Moreover, with Poland and Lithuania closing more and more of their border crossing points as of February 2023, an aggravation of the crisis should be expected in the short term.
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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions that followed it have brought multi-billion losses to Russian big business. The magnitude of blows dealt to its main representatives has resulted in a shift in the business model they have applied thus far. Despite these losses, most Russian billionaires, just like Russian society, have tacitly come to terms with Moscow’s aggressive policy. Even those who reside abroad have not ventured to criticise the Kremlin, and instead have focused on adjusting their businesses to the new economic reality. Silence has been their main defensive strategy, enabling them to avoid being targeted by the Russian authorities.
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The Russian invasion of Ukraine has challenged the security of the countries of NATO's eastern flank on an unprecedented scale. The Baltic states, the Visegrad Group and the Black Sea states are all situated in the neighbourhood of Ukraine or Russia. Due to the invasion, the sense of threat posed by Russia has escalated significantly, although Russia had already been seen as a threat in the region since at least the annexation of Crimea in 2014. All these countries are advocates of strengthening NATO’s collective defence and allied presence on the eastern flank. Most of them are among the top contributors to the political and military support provided to Ukraine. Defence policy and the modernisation of the armed forces have clearly gained priority throughout the region.
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A spike in energy prices provoked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will inhibit the economic rebound in the EU. Member States will have to face high inflation for longer than previously expected. Forced to increase spending, they also could postpone plans to reduce their debts. The conflict with Russia is mobilising the Community to speed up the development of renewable energy and reduce dependencies on third countries, especially authoritarian ones, in strategic sectors.
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The Russian invasion has led to a collapse in Ukraine’s trade, in particular foreign trade. It has also caused major changes in the geographical structure of its imports and exports. Due to the Russian blockade, Ukrainian ports have lost their status as the country’s main export gateway. Rail and road transport has gained in importance, as since 24 February 2022 Ukraine has used them to ship and import most of its goods via the territory of its western neighbors. As a consequence, the European Union has consolidated its role as Kyiv’s main trade partner in both exports and imports, while Poland – for the first time in history – has become the leader in Ukraine’s trade exchange.
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On 24 August 2021 Ukraine was celebrating the beginning of the fourth decade of its independence. Selected units of its Armed Forces paraded through Khreshchatyk, Kyiv’s main street. It would never have occurred to the Ukrainian citizens and politicians or foreign guests who gathered on that day in Kyiv that half a year later the same units would face a full-scale invasion, and even more so, that six months after invasion they would still be successfully defending themselves. After six months, war is slowly becoming the new normal. Although Russia is trudging towards the borders of the Donetsk oblast in the east, and Ukraine still lacks sufficient forces to launch a counteroffensive in the south, the series of explosions at military facilities seen in August in Crimea, which has been occupied by Russia since 2014, shows that Kyiv has the potential for offensive actions. The Ukrainian public is getting poorer and increasingly tired, but it still remains resolute in resisting the aggressor and supporting the government’s policies. Only a small minority believe that Ukraine should put an end to the war at the price of political concessions, and the view that territorial concessions should be made remains a marginal one. The economy is also adapting to the wartime conditions. Despite the deep crisis, the decline in exports is abating, and companies are resuming their businesses or moving them to safer areas of the country while looking for new sales channels abroad. However, the state budget is still dependent on financial support from the West, and this will not change in the coming months.
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Russia’s military invasion has contributed to a major decline in the role of oligarchs in Ukraine. This is largely due to the fact that domestic political rivalry both in the media and in parliament has ceased, which in turn has reduced the role played by those spheres of life in which their influence was most perceptible. Ukraine’s main political forces have backed President Volodymyr Zelensky in defending the country, as a result of which laws are presently passed almost unanimously. In addition, the most important oligarch-owned TV stations, which before the war formed their main tool of influence, have decided to air a joint news programme. Alongside this, the owners’ control of broadcasting content has been further weakened through specific legal regulations. Some oligarchs have lost portions of their assets as a result of military activity and occupation, and some have suffered significant financial losses due to the economic crisis and export restrictions in a situation when they still need to service their foreign debt. Most of the oligarchs have offered funds to help the country in its fight against the aggressor, but some of these activities are being kept low-profile. If the war’s outcome is positive for Ukraine, and if Kyiv receives substantial Western support for its recovery and investment effort, the position of the oligarchs will diminish, and the president, who enjoys an enormously high level of trust from society, will in practical terms be free to continue to reduce the oligarchs’ influence on Ukraine’s political life.
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The REPowerEU proposals announced on 18 May confirm the EU’s desire to end its dependence on Russian energy. Nonetheless, it illustrates the problems associated with the process of withdrawing from Russian gas, and above all with the rapid reduction of importing it. The heavy dependence which some EU countries have on Russian gas, the persistence of very high prices and the prospect of crisis and potential shortages in the coming winter make it difficult for the EU to agree internally on a significant, coordinated reduction in supplies this year. As a result, on the one hand, intra-EU discussions about sanctions on Russian gas are very difficult and increasingly rare, while on the other hand, some restraint in the European Commission’s (EC) REPowerEU ambitions regarding the level and pace of reductions in Russian imports is becoming apparent. This weakness of the EU is being exploited by Moscow. Russian counter-sanctions, including the ‘roubles-for-gas’ demand, not only lead to divisions within the EU but also reverse the previous logic of the discussion. The majority of states and companies active on the EU market, instead of thinking about ways to limit imports of Russian gas as quickly as possible, began thinking about ways to guarantee their supplies under new conditions. Therefore, the role of the European Commission in working out common principles for EU gas relations with Russia is diminishing, in favour of the individual actions of member states, which weakens the consistency of EU action. Meanwhile, Moscow appears to be taking control of the process of reducing supplies of Russian gas to the European market. While still maintaining a significant level of exports, Moscow is also maintaining an energy weapon that it could use against the EU in the context of the approaching winter.
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One hundred days of Russian aggression against Ukraine has still not answered the basic question: who will win? The first phase of the clash – a manoeuvre warfare until the end of March, in which the aggressor had broadly defined operational goals – ended in failure for Russia, and resulted in it withdrawing from one of the two main theatres of operations and reducing its aspirations in other directions. The trench warfare phase, which has lasted since the turn of April, has not led to a breakthrough, but the extended actions have exhausted the Ukrainian army to an extent that the enemy has been able to make slow but consistent progress in achieving its assumed minimum goal: taking control of the entire Donbas and the land bridge to Crimea. Moscow has largely achieved this aim; since 24 February it has taken control of80,000 km² of Ukraine’s territory. It is not enough simply to maintain the status quo regarding external support for Ukraine, without which it will no longer be able to fight off the aggressor. The comprehensive rearming of the Ukrainian army with Western weapons and military equipment offers a chance to stop the Russian aggression. Moreover, in order to defeat Russia militarily, the West must display an attitude of consistent solidarity.
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Despite the war that has been raging for more than two months, Ukraine has managed to start this year’s sowing campaign, although estimates are that the areas cultivated will be up to30% smaller than in 2021. A fuel shortage could also be a problem during this year’s harvest. Nor is it clear what the harvest will look like in the occupied territories. Currently, there is no risk of a food deficit, as the country has very significant grain stocks (about 20 million tonnes), exceeding the annual consumption for some species. However, problems may arise in this regard in the Russian-occupied areas as the occupiers have been confiscating grain. The biggest challenge for Kyiv remains the blockade of ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, through which the vast majority of food (especially grains and vegetable oils) has been exported. Although the infrastructure of the most important of these ports has not suffered, it seems unlikely that they will resume operations in the coming months, even if a ceasefire was to be reached. This is because Moscow will be keen to continue the economic pressure. Ukraine will thus be forced to continue using alternative supply routes via EU countries, particularly Poland and Romania.
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Neither the ongoing war in Ukraine nor the rising tensions between Russia and the West and the sanctions imposed by the latter have yet translated into disruptions of Russian gas supplies to the EU. However, they are unequivocally deepening the crisis on the EU gas market, which has been evident for more than six months now. This is evidenced by the record high and volatile commodity prices, as well as the nervousness of all the market players who anticipate disruptions in supplies from Russia and react with panic to suggestions of imposing sanctions aimed at Russian gas exports. The aggression against Ukraine has triggered a significant restructuring of the gas policy of the EU as a whole and most of its individual member states. There is a return to thinking in terms of security of supply – which has largely been absent in recent years – and a determination to become independent of gas and other hydrocarbons from Russia. Although at present many EU countries are not prepared to embargo imports of Russian gas, most are reforming their energy policies in such a way as to minimise their dependence on Russian raw materials.
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With the start of the war against Ukraine, the Putin regime is taking on more and more features of a totalitarian system. The authorities are aiming for a total information blockade and a ‘rally around the flag’, including through the use of a massive propaganda campaign that is demonising Ukraine and the West. The degree of repression against the disloyal elements of society is growing. The few anti-war protests occurring in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have been nipped in the bud. One of the direct consequences of the invasion is the increase in emigration from Russia for political reasons. Although there is a lack of reliable sociological data on the real mood in Russian society, one can see a relatively high level of support for the ‘special operation’ in Ukraine or else passive acceptance of the Kremlin’s policy. Although society is beginning to suffer from the effects of Western sanctions (they include rapidly rising prices of basic products and a shortage of goods), there is no reason to expect any mass protests on economic grounds in the near future. The situation within the ruling elite also appears stable, despite the deep frustration among many groups of influence caused by the sanctions. Western restrictive measures have significantly raised the cost of participation in the Putin regime. Anti-war calls from the representatives of the establishment are few and far between, and they usually avoid direct criticism of the Kremlin, which maintains the ability to discipline those who are discontented. The narrow circle of decision makers, which comprises mainly the heads of secret services and law enforcement bodies, seems to fully share the objectives and methods of war set out by the president.
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