№127. The EU and Kazakhstan. Balancing Economic Cooperation and Aiding Democratic Reforms in the Central Asian region

Author(s): Bhavna Dave / Language(s): English

Kazakhstan’s continuing socioeconomic and political stability, a formal commitment to political reforms and an unambiguously pro-Western orientation make it the EU’s most reliable partner in the Central Asian region. Its rising oil exports – almost 80% of EU imports from Kazakhstan consist of fuel and geostrategic location make a close and continuing partnership with the EU inevitable. Recognising that Kazakhstan is favourably placed to be the foremost player in the region, this analysis advocates that the EU should 1) develop an internally differentiated strategy towards Central Asia with Kazakhstan as a strategic anchor in the region, and 2) prioritise the promotion of democratic reforms and transparency of political and economic processes which can turn Kazakhstan into a more effective and reliable partner of the EU and a positive engine for reform in the broader region.

The improving economic situation in Russia: reality or creative statistics?

Author(s): Iwona Wiśniewska / Language(s): English

The indicators published in recent months by the Russian Statistics Office (Rosstat) are much more optimistic than the estimates and forecasts announced several months earlier. A significant improvement in statistical data is evident in particular regarding the figures for GDP and industrial production. According to new information, over the last two years (2015-2016) the Russian economy shrank by 3%, and not by 4.5% as previously estimated. Moreover, data compiled by Rosstat show an increase in industrial production was registered, even in the face of a decline in citizens’ income and fixed investment. In addition, the slowdown in the industrial sector was found to have ended at the beginning of 2016 and not at the end of 2016 as previously reported.The improvement of economic indicators can undoubtedly be attributed to certain objective factors, including taking into account more detailed data or a change in methodology, which is a natural element of the process of compiling statistical data. However, the scale of the change and the lack of professionalism on the part of Rosstat, including the manner of presenting the data, its failure to observe the deadlines for issuing publications and selective inclusion of data, undermine the credibility of the presented figures. Therefore, increasing caution is advised when interpreting these data. Doubts regarding the quality of the indicators presented by Rosstat make the assessment of Russia’s actual economic situation increasingly difficult. As a consequence, reservations towards the Russian statistics office seem to be all the more justified. These suggest that Rosstat is under political pressure from the Kremlin and that these new, improved statistics meet the government’s propaganda-motivated demand for information. Ahead of the upcoming presidential election planned for March 2018, the government would like to emphasise its effectiveness, such as by efficiently overcoming the crisis and stabilising the economic situation in Russia.

Central Asia and the Global Economic Crisis

Author(s): Richard Pomfret / Language(s): English

In 2007 the EU published a Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia. In its initial stages the EU focused on developing new forums for dialogue with the Central Asian countries, and received some criticism for inadequate substantive actions. This Policy Brief argues that the current global economic crisis does not alter the priorities of the EU Strategy, but it does require the EU to stick to existing obligations and also provides an opportunity for fresh initiatives to better achieve the Strategy’s fundamental goals. A striking feature of the five Central Asian countries’ economic strategies is that they followed divergent paths after becoming independent in 1991. Despite strong similarities in culture, history and economic structure, their transitions from Soviet central planning ranged from the most rapidly liberalising (the Kyrgyz Republic) to the most non-reforming (Turkmenistan) of all former Soviet republics.

UE wobec oferty Chin: twarde negocjacje czy koalicja przeciw Trumpowi?

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Konrad Popławski / Language(s): Polish

Agresywna polityka Donalda Trumpa wobec Pekinu i widmo wojny handlowej stają się katalizatorem dla wznowienia dialogu chińsko-unijnego. W czasie niespełna dwóch tygodni premier Chin odbył trzy spotkania z liderami UE: w ramach formatu 16+1, niemiecko-chińskich konsultacji międzyrządowych i szczytu Chiny–UE. Ofensywa dyplomatyczna Pekinu miała pokazać otwartość na postulaty Unii dotyczące zliberalizowania dostępu do chińskiego rynku, a także zneutralizować zarzuty o wykorzystywanie podziałów między państwami członkowskimi. Pekin liczy, że poprawa klimatu rozmów, a także niewielkie ustępstwa pod adresem Brukseli, zwłaszcza zaś Berlina, pozwolą mu relatywnie małym kosztem przeciągnąć UE na swoją stronę w konflikcie handlowym z USA. Stawia to państwa UE przed dylematem. Z jednej strony, poparcie obecnej presji Waszyngtonu na Pekin może doprowadzić do realnego otwarcia rynku chińskiego, a także zredukować coraz większe nierównowagi w handlu międzynarodowym, których źródłem są Chiny. Niesie to jednak ryzyko załamania rozwoju gospodarczego w Chinach, co oznaczałoby straty dla wielu europejskich koncernów. Z drugiej strony, współpraca UE z Pekinem może wzmocnić wielostronny system handlu oparty na WTO, a także pomóc w obronie umowy z Iranem i paryskiego porozumienia klimatycznego. Jednoznaczne wejście Brukseli w chińską koalicję przeciwko Waszyngtonowi może jednak wywołać poważne podziały wewnątrz UE oraz w relacjach transatlantyckich, a także ograniczyć determinację Pekinu do wprowadzania reform wewnętrznych.

A stalemate in the US–China trade negotiations: the tariff war and technology sanctions

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Michał Bogusz / Language(s): English

The first fortnight of May 2019 saw a major escalation in the Chinese–American trade dispute, in which additional tariffs on around 40% of bilateral trade were imposed and the US introduced an embargo on the Chinese technology company, Huawei. This new phase in the economic conflict between China and the US ends the five month long period of relative de-escalation and intensive negotiations on a framework trade agreement, initiated during the meeting in December 2018 between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping at the G20 summit in Buenos Aires. Unlike during the previous breakdown in the negotiations in May 2018, which resulted in a freeze on contacts, both sides have announced their willingness to continue the dialogue on the trade deal. However, continued escalation of the dispute (for example, over Huawei) is leading to a gradual sharpening of both sides’ rhetoric and a toughening of their stances as regards the conditions for recommencing the talks. The present phase of the conflict has revealed deep discrepancies in issues of fundamental importance for the future of the negotiated deal, including the mechanisms for ensuring its enforcement, in addition to the circumstances and dates in which the current punitive tariffs could be lifted. The prolonged stalemate in the negotiations may cause the US to resume its tactic involving a gradual stepping up of its pressure on China, which in turn will translate into a downturn in the global economic situation and Washington’s increased political pressure on its allies as regards their cooperation with China.

Impas w negocjacjach handlowych USA–Chiny: wojna celna i sankcje technologiczne

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Michał Bogusz / Language(s): Polish

W pierwszej połowie maja 2019 roku doszło do znaczącej eskalacji chińsko-amerykańskiego sporu handlowego, m.in. wprowadzenia dodatkowych ceł na ok. 40% handlu dwustronnego, a także nałożenia przez USA embarga na chińską spółkę technologiczną Huawei. Nowa odsłona konfliktu gospodarczego Chin i USA przerywa okres pięciu miesięcy relatywnej deeskalacji oraz intensywnych negocjacji nad całościowym porozumieniem handlowym, zapoczątkowanych na spotkaniu Donalda Trumpa i Xi Jinpinga na szczycie G20 w Buenos Aires w grudniu ub.r. W odróżnieniu od poprzedniego załamania negocjacji z maja 2018 roku, skutkującego zamrożeniem kontaktów, obie strony zakomunikowały wolę kontynuowania rozmów o porozumieniu handlowym. Dalsza eskalacja sporu (m.in. w kwestii Huawei) prowadzi jednak do sukcesywnego zaostrzania retoryki obu stron, a także utwardzania stanowisk co do warunków wznowienia rozmów. Obecna odsłona konfliktu ujawniła głębokie rozbieżności z kwestiach fundamentalnych dla przyszłości negocjowanego porozumienia, m.in. mechanizmów gwarantujących jego wdrożenie, a także okoliczności i daty zniesienia obowiązujących obecnie karnych ceł. Przedłużający się impas w negocjacjach może doprowadzić do powrotu USA do taktyki sukcesywnego zwiększenia nacisku na Chiny, co przełoży się na osłabienie światowej koniunktury gospodarczej, a także zwiększoną presję polityczną Waszyngtonu na amerykańskich sojuszników w sprawie współpracy z Chinami.

A ‘last-minute’ transit contract? Russia-Ukraine-EU gas talks

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś,Agata Loskot-Strachota,Sławomir Matuszak / Language(s): English

On 21 January another round of trilateral gas talks between Russia, Ukraine and the European Union was held in Brussels. This meeting mainly concerned the new Russian-Ukrainian transit contract; the transit contract currently in force between Gazprom and Naftogaz will expire as of 1 January 2020. During the meeting, European Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič submitted proposals to the parties concerning the parameters of a new contract transit, but did not make them public. The meeting was the latest in this series of trilateral gas talks; the previous round was held in Berlin in July 2018. In Brussels Russia declared its willingness to conclude a new transit agreement, although it highlighted the need for the legal dispute between Naftogaz and Gazprom to be resolved before that could happen. The lack of success during the talks so far, the divergent interests of the various parties and the current political context suggests that a new contract transit will probably only be concluded by the late autumn or winter of this year, and possibly in the period immediately before the expiry date of the current contract between Naftogaz and Gazprom. It is also conceivable that the negotiations will be extended into 2020, and that meanwhile transit will take place on the basis of principles agreed in the short term, along the lines of the so-called winter packages in 2014 and 2015, something which would be very disadvantageous for Ukraine and the EU, but extremely convenient for Moscow. There is no reason to expect rapid progress in the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations; they are proceeding in complicated conditions, including the ongoing political conflict between Kiev and Moscow, the numerous legal disputes between Naftogaz and Gazprom, the construction of new Russian export pipelines, the continuing fundamental reform of the Ukrainian gas sector, and finally a packed political calendar (for both Ukraine and the EU) in 2019. The negotiation process is also difficult because of the contradiction between the long-term interests of Ukraine, which wants to maintain its status as a key transit route for Russian gas in the long term, and Russia, whose strategic goal is to become independent of the Ukrainian transmission network.

Kontrakt tranzytowy „last-minute”? Rosyjsko-ukraińsko-unijne rozmowy gazowe

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś,Agata Loskot-Strachota,Sławomir Matuszak / Language(s): Polish

21 stycznia odbyła się w Brukseli kolejna runda trójstronnych rozmów gazowych między Rosją, Ukrainą a Unią Europejską, dotycząca przede wszystkim nowego rosyjsko-ukraińskiego kontraktu tranzytowego; ważność umowy tranzytowej obowiązującej aktualnie między Gazpromem i Naftohazem wygasa bowiem 1 stycznia 2020 roku. Podczas spotkania wiceprzewodniczący Komisji Europejskiej Maroš Šefčovič przedłożył stronom propozycje dotyczące parametrów nowego kontraktu tranzytowego, nie podając ich jednak do publicznej wiadomości. Spotkanie było kolejną rundą trójstronnych rozmów gazowych – poprzednia odbyła się w Berlinie w lipcu 2018 roku. Strona rosyjska zadeklarowała w Brukseli gotowość zawarcia nowej umowy tranzytowej, wskazując jednak na konieczność uprzedniego uregulowania sporu prawnego między Naftohazem i Gazpromem. Następne spotkanie w formacie trójstronnym zapowiedziano na maj 2019 roku. Brak sukcesów w dotychczas prowadzonych rozmowach, rozbieżne interesy stron oraz bieżący kontekst polityczny wskazują na to, że nowy kontrakt tranzytowy zostanie najprawdopodobniej zawarty dopiero późną jesienią lub zimą tego roku, a niewykluczone, że w okresie bezpośrednio poprzedzającym datę wygaśnięcia obowiązującego kontraktu między Naftohazem i Gazpromem. Nie można również wykluczyć, że negocjacje przeciągną się na 2020 rok, a tranzyt odbywał się będzie na doraźnie uzgadnianych zasadach, na wzór tzw. pakietów zimowych zawieranych w 2014 i 2015 roku, co byłoby bardzo niekorzystne dla Ukrainy i UE, a niezwykle wygodne dla Moskwy. Brak jest bowiem przesłanek, by oczekiwać szybkich postępów w rosyjsko-ukraińskich negocjacjach. Toczą się one w skomplikowanych warunkach, m.in. ze względu na utrzymujący się konflikt polityczny na linii Kijów–Moskwa, liczne spory prawne między Naftohazem i Gazpromem, budowę nowych rosyjskich gazociągów eksportowych, trwającą fundamentalną reformę ukraińskiego sektora gazowego, wreszcie napięty kalendarz polityczny (zarówno ukraiński, jak i unijny) w 2019 roku. Proces negocjacyjny jest utrudniony także ze względu na sprzeczność długofalowych interesów między Ukrainą, która chciałaby długoterminowo zachować status kluczowego szlaku tranzytowego rosyjskiego gazu, a Rosją, której strategicznym celem pozostaje uniezależnienie się od ukraińskiej sieci przesyłowej.

№87: Consequences of the U.S. Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Author(s): Marek Wąsiński,Damian Wnukowski / Language(s): English

Donald Trump, at the beginning of his presidency, decided to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation free trade agreement signed in 2016. By this act, the U.S. has lost a very important economic and geopolitical tool in the Asia-Pacific region. Although there are chances that the remaining 11 countries will ratify the agreement without the U.S., it is much less significant and most probably will not be a template for future trade agreements as planned. As a result, the leadership of regional integration may fall to China, which perceived TPP as part of a U.S. containment strategy. At the same time, the EU can benefit from the disarray by pursuing its own trade agenda in the Asia-Pacific region.

№71: Straw in the Wind: State Aid for Nuclear Energy in the UK and Lessons for Visegrad Countries

Author(s): Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk,Miłosz Wiatrowski / Language(s): English

With as many as 12 EU Member States currently considering investment in nuclear builds, the European Commission’s decision finding the UK’s support for the Hinkley Point C nuclear plant as being compatible with the EU state aid law was met with relief not only by Whitehall, but also by governments across the European Union. Yet latest EU–British settlement is a point of reference, not a silver bullet. EU countries interested in new nuclear power plants, including those in the Visegrad Group, should draw lessons from the Commission’s decision, and at the same time explore variant possibilities of state support.

№69: The Power to Influence Europe? Russia’s Grand Gas Strategy

Author(s): Zuzanna Nowak,Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz / Language(s): English

As most of Russia’s energy exports go to the European Union, both players are strongly interdependent. For Russia, energy resources, especially gas, are viewed as a tool to project power beyond its borders. However, Russia’s room for “gas manoeuvre” is constrained by its own capacities, the gas strategies of other players, and the EU’s ability to project its regulatory power. As Russia’s relations with Europe go beyond purely economic practices, and inevitably have geopolitical overtones, Europe should, in the short-term, try to limit the damage caused by the current application of Russian grand strategy; in the long-term, it should find out how to influence it, to its benefit.

Rat košta

Author(s): Vladimir Gligorov / Language(s): Serbian

Najpre malo neformalne teorije. Reč je, zbog rata i sankcija, o smanjenju ponude, proizvodnje, slično kao kod pandemije, ali se tražnja, željena potrošnja, ne smanjuje, što je različito od pandemijske krize. Naime, kao što sam pisao, u pandemiji se potrošnja smanjuje sledeći pad proizvodnje, pa je promena u nivou cena mala ili čak izostaje ili drukčije rečeno inflacija se ne ubrzava.

Klimatske promene, kovid i globalna nejednakost

Author(s): Branko Milanović / Language(s): Serbian

U jučerašnjem blogu ponovo sam kritikovao osobeni način mišljenja popularan među zagovornicima ograničavanja ekonomskog rasta koji opisujem kao „magijski“ ili kvazireligijski. Činio sam to i ranije, u prikazu veoma zanimljive, ali sasvim „magijske“ knjige Kate Raworth, kao i u debati sa Jasonom Hickelom. Vreme je da postavimo pitanje: kako bi se o klimatskim promenama moglo razmišljati na ne-magijski način?

Virusna i virtualna privreda

Author(s): Vladimir Gligorov / Language(s): Serbian

Ovo bi mogla da bude kriza veća od Velike depresije, i svakako od Velike recesije, ali nije ista ni sa jednom od njih. Usled čega su potrebne drukčije mere privredne politike. Da bi ovo bilo možda zanimljivije, u čemu su grešili Hajek i Fridman, a Kejnz bio u pravu? I zašto je Fridmanova politika u trenutnoj krizi, mada nedovoljna, prikladnija od Kejnzove?

Kapitalizam i zdravlje

Author(s): Eva Illouz / Language(s): Serbian

Francusko-izraelska sociološkinja Eva Iluz analizira planetarnu krizu izazvanu korona virusom - Dok gleda hipnotišući film Larsa fon Trira „Melanholija“, obuzet mešavinom prestravljenosti i nemoći, gledalac postepeno shvata da je svet na pragu nestanka, osuđen na neizbežni sudar sa planetom po imenu Melanholija. Na kraju filma gledalac, istovremeno fasciniran i paralizovan, posmatra tu planetu čija se putanja okončava sudarom sa Zemljom. Ukazavši se u vidu udaljene tačke na nebu ona postepeno raste, sve dok se na kraju, u trenutku sudara, ne pretvori u ogroman disk i ne ispuni čitavo filmsko platno.

Integracja ubezpieczeń środowiskowych i systemów zarządzania środowiskowego według ISO 14001 – raport z badań

Author(s): Malwina Lemkowska / Language(s): Polish Publication Year: 0

The article is a summary of research on the actual and potential integration of environmental insurance and ISO 14001 environmental management systems (EMSs) in Poland. The aim ofthe research is to analyze the relationship of the above-mentioned instruments of environmental risk management and to identify the factors determining the propensity of enterprises to implement such elements of the system that will increase the usefulness of ISO 14001 standards for insurance purposes in the future. The data for the study were obtained through an asynchronous group interview conducted on the Bulletin Board platform among insurance sector experts and through a survey of organizations that implemented the ISO 14001 system in Poland. Template analysis of qualitative data, supported by narrative techniques and statistical analysis based on the chi-square test of independence, U Mann–Whitney test, Kruskal–Wallistest, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient were used to interpret the data. Environmental management systems according to ISO 14001 are not, in their current form, used in the process of providing insurance cover for environmental risk. Organizations managed according to ISO14001 rarely design and implement solutions useful to insurers. The latter, however, are statistically significantly correlated with the awareness attributes of the organization. Awareness attributes were also strongly related with the variables describing the propensity to implement additional – useful for insurance purposes – EMSs elements. The strongest motivators for the above, however, were of a non-insurance nature (e.g. obtaining tax credit).

European logistics hubs of Belt and Road Initiative.Aftermath of the BRI implementation in CEEC

Author(s): Maria Smotrytska / Language(s): English

The article describes the place and significance of the CEE region in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Being a geopolitical bridge between Asia and Europe, the CEE countries provide the Chinese side with large platforms for investment and development of trade and economic collaboration. Main economic and infrastructural opportunities, provide by the BRI are analyzed in the article. Author comes to the conclusion of the position of the region in geopolitical map of the Chinese initiative.

Strategie firm w obliczu sankcji nałożonych na Rosję

Author(s): Beata Stępień,Szymon Truskolaski / Language(s): Polish Publication Year: 0

Purpose: In this chapter, we analyse how companies responded to sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. We examine the impact of selected external (public-legal pressure, the size of sanctions and crisis caused by the war) and internal factors (strategic agility, code of ethics and sustainable conduct) on the degree of compliance with sanctions and the type of adaptation strategies adopted. Design/methodology/approach: The objects of the study are medium-sized companies from countries that have imposed sanctions (here, Poland, Germany and the US). The results come from an electronic questionnaire survey conducted in 2023 among 610 medium-sized companies operating in industries directly or indirectly affected by trade restrictions. Findings: The company’s code of ethics and the perceived severity of the crisis have the greatest impacton the approach to sanctions and respective adaptation strategies. At the same time, external and internal pressure affect companies in opposite directions, with consequences for their adaptation strategies.

Implicațiile eventualei aderări a Republicii Moldova la Uniunea Economică Euroasiatică asupra măsurilor tarifare aplicate de UE față de exporturile moldovenești

Author(s): Vadim Gumene / Language(s): Romanian

Four paths to Transparency in Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Much of the discussion on the region is rightly focused on the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. The outcome of the conflict will hold weighty consequences for the state of democracy not only in the region, but on the global stage. In these uncertain times, it remains more essential than ever for the region’s leaders to commit to building strong and inclusive democracies that welcome the participation of civil society and the public in budget processes. The international community should also continue to support reformers in the region, and citizens that have demonstrated a strong commitment to advance transparency and accountability. Ensuring full and comprehensive budget transparency—and pursuing avenues to engage the public more meaningfully in public spending decisions— will remain a key pillar of strengthening democracy and open government in this region.