We kindly inform you that, as long as the subject affiliation of our 300.000+ articles is in progress, you might get unsufficient or no results on your third level or second level search. In this case, please broaden your search criteria.
REVIEW OF: Samuel Charap and Timothy J. Colton. Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia. The International Institute for Strategic Studies / Routledge, 2017. Adelphi 56, no. 460. 212 pp. Maps. Notes. Index.
More...
Argumentation as a function of human communication, and aggression as a feature of communicative behaviour, seem to be contrary to each other. Argumentation should be understood as the regulation of dissent based on rational arguments, whereas aggression can be seen as the manifestation and intensification of dissent. But the boundaries between rationality and irrationality, as well as between the regulation and the manifestation of dissent are often vague. Therefore, not only hate speech but also seemingly rational argumentation can be motivated by aggression and can lead to aggression. In the present study, this intertwinedness of argumentation and aggression is shown in the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict, where we can find the use of aggressive theses, reasons, and aggressive arguments in different semiotic and textual expressions: not only in political statements, but also in poetry and in multimodal forms like political maps. Combining argumentation theory with a case study of aggressive argumentation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the paper presents several forms of intertwinedness of argumentation and aggression. The research is mainly based on maps as a type of popular geopolitics, in which the aggressive thesis of the non-existence of Ukraine is provided. The study also considers the poeto-political war around Anastasiia Dmytruk’s poem “Nikogda my ne budem brat'iami” (“Never ever we will be brothers”). Responses to Dmytruk’s thesis provoke not only disagreement but also negative and positive-negative agreement, which means that the opponent agrees with the thesis but rejects the reasons of the argument, or s/he agrees with the thesis and the reasons but evaluates them in a contradictory way. Whereas the analysis of maps shows mainly the performing of aggressive theses, the analysis of the poeto-political war highlights how reasons are provided in an aggressive communication frame.
More...
REVIEW OF: Timm Beichelt and Susann Worschech, editors. Transnational Ukraine? Networks and Ties That Influence(d) Contemporary Ukraine. ibidem-Verlag, 2017. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 159, edited by Andreas Umland. 278 pp. Tables. Illustrations. Bibliographies.
More...
Thomas D. Grant. Aggression Against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility, and International Law. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. xxx, 283 pp. Treaties and Other International Texts. Cases. Municipal Instruments and Other State Documents. Abbreviations. Notes. Bibliography. Index.
More...
When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the Russian media ran what I propose to call a simulation of “non-invasion”—a spectacle aimed to distance Russia from the war. This essay explores activist art resistance against this simulation. Specifically, I discuss three art projects that were staged during the first, most violent year of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: Mariia (Maria) Kulikovs'ka’s performance at “Manifesta 10” in St. Petersburg, Serhii Zakharov’s guerrilla installations on the streets of occupied Donetsk, and Izolyatsia’s #onvacation occupation of the Russian pavilion at the 56th Venice Biennale. These art projects, I argue, not only attacked the simulation from the outside as independent entities, but, by penetrating the simulation on site and online, they disrupted it from within. I offer three reasons to support this claim. First, these art projects superimposed images of the invasion over the physical sites where the “non-invasion” simulation dwelt and, in this way, not only made the war visible but also produced “a glitch in the matrix” effect—a conflict within the simulation visual regime that was inconsistent with its concealment function. Second, they “hailed” (in Louis Althusser’s terms) actants of the simulation as subjects of Putin’s regime, provoking suppressive reactions that proved Russia’s participation in the war—which the simulation, thus, failed to downplay. And third, with carefully orchestrated strategies of online outreach to the public, these art projects attached themselves to the media dimension of the simulation, making the simulation’s media proliferation work against itself.
More...
History seems to be repeating itself, not as farce but as yet another tragedy. It reveals many of its driving forces at turning points. Those who manage to notice them, get the opportunity to rethink the past from a different perspective. The Russian-Ukrainian ongoing war of 2022 is one such fateful event. I am confident it will start a new chapter not only in history but also in the historiography of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Historians are usually more comfortable when they keep a distance from the object of their studies. I have no such distance; I am a deeply involved observer. When this essay is published, a reader will be better informed than the author about the course of events in Ukraine. However, although many details and aspects of the war remain in the shadow, I have a strong feeling of déjà vu, in particular when it comes to Russia.
More...
Why was an academic conference devoted to problems in the Black Sea basin held in landlocked Kharkiv? Those who wish to find the answer to this question would do well to recall that in 2010, Kharkiv was the place where the “Agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine” (widely referred to as the Kharkiv Pact or Kharkiv Accords) was signed. Upon travelling even farther into the depths of history, one would see how important the strategic role of Kharkiv was in Russia’s expansion and modernization of the southern reaches of its empire. As well, Kharkiv seemed to attract more than its fair share of people from the Balkan region, particularly those from what is now Serbia and Bulgaria. In this respect it suffices to mention the founder of Kharkiv University, Vasyl' Karazyn (Russ. Vasilii Karazin, 1773-1842), and two of its professors, Teodor Filipović (1778-1807; pseud. Božidar Grujović), who authored the first constitution and laws of Serbia, and Marin Drinov (1838-1906), who was among the founders of the constitution and national academy of sciences of Bulgaria. Against this background, the North-South axis of Ukraine and Kharkiv’s symbolic geography appears no less important than the East-West axis.
More...
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked debate over its implications for the world order. Although there is no unanimously accepted perception of ‘world order’, one can assume that the existing one can be described as a system of actors and their relations, developed after World War II as a combination of liberalist and realist elements. This could mean that the order stands for a liberalist international political economy, in addition to liberal internationalism establishing international institutions. At the same time, the importance of realism-based elements, i.e. nuclear deterrence and sovereignty, should not be neglected. The Russian invasion may have smashed the world order; but Russia lacks the required power elements for constructing what it desires to replace it with.
More...
The global discourse over the current situation in Ukraine includes many definitions of it, such as a conflict, aggression, war, special military operation, etc. Is it within the power of the rules-based international order to get a controlled level of escalation in the conflict on the territory of Ukraine and to find a compromise in limited local framing – as the “Russian-Ukrainian War”? There were two attempts to find such a compromise. During the Orange Revolution in 2004 it was formulated on the basis of Ukrainian domestic legislation. After the Euromaidan and subsequent Russian intervention, the compromise was found based on international law. Ukraine has de facto lost some of its territories, but it has remained as a democratic state. The global discourse of the Russia-Ukraine war in the UN Security Council and the 11th Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly reveal the potential of the concept of a rules-based international order.
More...
Both the political elites and society at large in Russia are obsessed with Ukraine because of, firstly, Russia’s perennial quest for a strong state; secondly, the struggle of the Kremlin with the colour revolutions; thirdly, the perception of Ukraine as a mirror image of Russia; fourthly, “East Slavic” ideology; finally, Putin’s belief that Ukraine is “an artificial country”. In the 2022 war, Putin wants to make progress towards all these aims through toppling the pro-Western government of Ukraine, making the country a vassal state like Belarus, and signalling that further expansion of NATO to the east will not be tolerated. The status of a buffer state for Ukraine would become a factor that affirms the tumultuous situation not only in Ukraine but in the whole region.
More...
Some ideas on the political nature, causes, motivations of the parties, and essence of the Russian-Ukrainian war are presented. The ideological preconditions, reasons for, and current consequences of the Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, as well as the evolution of the formation of political and security doctrines of the ruling political regime of Russia, from quasi-liberal views to the expansionist concept of the «restoration of historical Russia» and justification for an aggressive war against Ukraine, are considered. The theoretical discourse of the authors is based on the provisions of the classic military theory. These fundamental ideas are gaining new relevance in the context of this war. Conclusions are based on the analysis of a number of Russian conceptual documents over the past 15 years.
More...
The Russian war against Ukraine and full-scale invasion that started on 24th February 2022 is both a challenge and an opportunity for the CEE and the Baltic States. It has triggered global attention in the region, enhanced the regional actors’ solidarity with Ukraine and may eventually boost the regional initiatives, e.g. Three Seas Initiative or the Bucharest Nine. Also, it may inspire the creation of brand-new alliances. Nevertheless, the role of NATO and the EU is crucial in the region and their gravity remains decisive for the viability of the regional formats.
More...
Since the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the issue of information security has become acute for European countries. Russian propagandists use all available channels of communication to promote Russian narratives. The primary focus of this paper is to determine the main social media strategies used by Russian diplomatic agencies to disseminate propagandistic content in the Baltics and Eastern Europe. The countries examined are Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Moldova, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary
More...
Russia’s most recent aggression has resulted in its geopolitical, financial, economic, as well as online isolation. Russia’s Internet is changing rapidly due to censorship and surveillance regulation; laws introducing technical requirements for the independent functioning of the Internet; Western sanctions; and the exit of key IT providers from the Russian market. But efforts to create a self-reliant Russian Internet are not new. Over the last decade, Russia has introduced regulations to shape a distinct online sphere. This paper provides an overview of Russian Internet governance, examines the cyber aspect of the ongoing war, and analyses the current developments and their effects on cyberbalkanisation.
More...
In the era of hybrid threats, international security has become more complex in content and meaning, especially when dealing with state terrorism. When identifying key features of state terrorism, it is argued that hybridisation as a process of careful concealment of aggressive foreign policy objectives generates prerequisites for external aggression, as well as conditions for terrorist attacks of both a conventional and unconventional nature. This article investigates the correlation between the hybrid aggression of Russia and Ukraine’s vulnerabilities to resile from state terrorism, as Russia’s proxy-war against Ukraine at some point could be identified as such.
More...
Russia’s invasion in Ukraine has proved to be an important challenge for a lot of countries and revealed the level of resilience one people could have or find inside its own ranks. But societal resilience is not a given fact and does not have a constant value in time. It could drop dramatically if there are no incentives to maintain the same reasoning and cohesion that led originally to the level of resilience able to do miracles. Ukraine’s lessons in front of the unprovoked, illegal and unjustified Russian aggression are tremendously important to be considered when estimating the resilience of the European countries in front of the costs and risks accepted already by their population. It is crucial for the defense of the collective West in front of Russia’s attempt to change the strategic landscape of the world with the war launched in Ukraine.
More...
The large-scale invasion of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine has marked the beginning of the deadliest conflict in Europe within the past decades. The Russian Armed Forces who attacked Ukraine benefitted from the whole range of their capabilities, including land artillery, AA rockets, long range precision fires (LRPF), short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), electronic warfare units and logistic and fight support structures. However, the Russian forces have generally performed poorly due to the rigid chain of command and control, lack of tactical vision and professionalism of troops, inefficient communications, low accuracy of weapons systems and inadequate logistical support, to which is added the unexpected resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces.
More...
After almost three months since the beginning of the so called Russian special military operation in Ukraine, Moscow has started to see its strategical project of conquering Ukraine declining. In February 2022, Kremlin elites assumed that war with Kiev will be more like “a walk in the park” because the Ukrainians would be more than happy to be freed from the “Nazi regime” and will welcome Russian soldiers with “flowers and hugs”. Three months later, the Ukrainians are fighting Russian invaders. Meanwhile, Moscow is facing a huge international pressure that targets financial and energy resources, Putin allies and friends and military leaders involved in atrocities against civilian population from operations areas. The statements made by the Russian top diplomats leave no doubt about the course Moscow is going to develop in the months to come. But there are questions about how Kremlin is going to act: - military – generating false flag operations in the south-eastern flank of EU and NATO in order to make the two blocks react? Not very likely. Russian army is barely keeping lines in eastern Ukraine, with soldiers and Wagner mercenaries revolting against unprofessional generals. - politically – applying disruptive strategies in European countries that are not members of the two alliances EU and NATO in order to destabilize the whole continent? Very likely if the military campaign in Ukraine turns bad for Putin. From the geopolitical point of view, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina are the perfect choices for Kremlin.
More...
The following text is the written version of a lecture given by Prof. em. Dr. Heinz-Jürgen Axt on 22 February 2015 at the “Europäische Begegnungsstätte am Kloster Kamp e.V.” in Kamp-Lintfort (Germany). Even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the thesis developed in the article remains valid, namely that Russia under President Putin sees the establishment and consolidation of democratic systems in former Soviet republics as a threat to its own autocratic system. Reading Axt’s remarks from seven years ago raises the question to which extent necessary lessons were not learned, or have been insufficiently learned in Germany, Europe and the West in general. If the Russian president had been betting that the West was too weak to resist successfully (which is why he felt encouraged to go to war against Ukraine and its democratically legitimised order), he may have been fundamentally mistaken. Most of the West is more united than ever. As Axt’s analysis offers a plausible interpretation even today and reveals background information, we are reprinting the lecture written seven years ago almost unchanged.
More...
Investors are humans and are sensitive to rumours of war and actual war events, which appear to have different impacts on stock market performance. Objective: this paper evaluates a two-stage differential effect of the current Russian invasion in Ukraine on stock market volatility in EU, UK and US stock markets. Prior work: the paper inclines on related prior works on the effect of international conflicts on stock markets. Method: the paper uses stock market data for EU, US and UK for 21 days before Russian troop build-up on Ukraine boarders in 2021 and 21 days during the troop build. It also collected 21 days stock market data for 21 days in 2022 before Russian invasion in Ukraine and for 21 days during the Russian invasion. Data were analysed using the t-test statistics and line graphs for trends. Finding: results show that Russian invasion in Ukraine has significantly caused stock market volatility for EU(FTSE EU), UK (FTSE London) and US (S&P500). However, the EU stock market (FTSE EU) has suffered higher volatility compared to UK and US. In the same vein results show that, the US stock market (S&P500) remains the less volatile and safest investment haven to safeguard stocks during the ongoing war in Ukraine. Implication: The results contribute latest stock market investment information to investors and stock market hedgers to make risk and investment decisions in this conflict times. It also offers an important new case study for business economic classes in higher education-business schools, and highlights an agenda for further research. Value: the paper contributes a two-stage differential analysis approach (stage 1 troop build-up stage, and stage 2 actual war stage) –and reveals divergent implications of a two stage application and results for stock market analysis.
More...
