Tourism and the transformation of large cities in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Author(s): Waldemar Cudny,Tomasz Michalski,Rafał Rouba / Language(s): English

The turn of the 1980’s and 1990’s was the time of radical political and socioeconomic transformations in the world and a deep economic and political crisis in the European socialist countries. The General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was Mikhail Gorbachev, who introduced Perestroika. It was a program of economic and political reforms meant to improve the situation in the country. The decline of the Soviet Union and the reforms that were introduced there started the transformation process in other socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Poland (1989), Hungary (1989), the German Democratic Republic or Czechoslovakia (1989). In 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved and new states arose from the ruins of the former empire, such as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, or the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), as well as Asiatic countries – Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The transformation which began at that time is still continuing today. The former socialist countries are constantly fighting to reduce the distance between them and Western Europe, which became evident after World War II. The transformation in the majority of the countries described here leads to the democratization of the political and social life, as well as the introduction of market economy. Some changes are seen as positive and some as negative. All the spheres of life in the countries concerned are strongly affected, but it is cities where particularly far-reaching consequences of the fall of socialism are observed. The book presents transformations in the cities of the former socialist countries in the central and eastern part of the European continent. However, apart from the location, it is important that they have a similar history, and for years were maintaining geopolitical relations. Moreover, they all have a history of a leftist regime, resulting from the course of events in the 20th c. After World War II, they were all under the influence of the USSR as its satellite countries (e.g. Polish People’s Republic, Czechoslovak People’s Republic, Hungarian People’s Republic) or republics, which were parts of a state which does not exist any more (e.g. Belarusian SSR, Ukrainian SSR). The subject of the study is the tourist function of the group of post-socialist cities in several countries in the central and eastern region of Europe. The object of the study presented in this book is the development of the tourist function in these cities, caused by the transformation process after the fall of socialism. The spatial range of the work includes cities in selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe : Lodz in Poland, Bratislava in Slovakia, Kaliningrad in Russia, Minsk in Belarus, and Lviv in Ukraine. The analysis presented in this book concerns the cities within their administrative borders, is dynamic and shows the transformations which took place in the period between the fall of socialism and the present times. The main aim of the book is to verify a research hypothesis, according to which: One of the consequences of the fall of socialism was the political and socio-economic transformation, including rapid development of the tourist function in large cities, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Due to the advancing deindustrialization, as well as the growing importance of the third economic sector, the significance of tourist services increased considerably. The tourist sector offering hotel, catering and entertainment services developed, the accessibility of the studied areas increased, the urban space was revitalized, and the local authorities implemented a number of tourism development programs. As a result, tourist traffic and the number and diversity of tourist arrivals increased. Apart from the general aim of the study, the authors set themselves the following individual goals: 1. Presenting the history of transformations in the European postsocialist countries. 2. Describing the studied cities and their geographical location. 3. Presenting the present socio-economic situation of the cities. 4. Analyze of the changes of the tourist function, which took place in the studied areas after the fall of the socialist system: a) changes in the tourist infrastructure and accessibility, b) transformations of the urban space, which could have influenced tourist phenomena, c) changes in the tourist traffic. 5. Constructing a model of transformations in urban tourism, which have been taking place in the post-socialist cities of Central and Eastern Europe over the last 20 years. The analysis presented in this book features a number of research methods. According to Runge (2007), they may be defined as “… typical and repeatable ways of collecting, processing, analyzing and interpreting empirical data, serving the purpose of finding well-founded answers to the posed questions” (Cudny et al. 2011, p. 25). The methods can be divided according to their universality into general (universal) and detailed, according to the way phenomena are presented – into quantitative and qualitative, and according to the place where they are used – into field work and data processing (Cudny et al. 2011, p. 29). The authors of this book used a variety of detailed research methods, commonly applied in geographical and historical studies. Among other techniques, they used observation and the historical method (chronological analysis of facts). Research materials were obtained from literature, Internet sources and surveys conducted at institutions and offices. Moreover, the authors made use of the results of their own published and unpublished studies. The editors of this book decided that each chapter would be written by a different specialist in a given area. The choice of the authors depended not only on their theoretical knowledge of the studied phenomena; they also know the area of study and its transformations from the practical side. The authors invited to contribute to the book have been conducting their own studies in the areas described in the book for many years, or they are working at tourism institutions. The book consists of eight chapters, the first of which is the introduction, presenting the theoretical assumptions of the publication. Second chapter presents the historical overview of the transformations in the former socialist countries in Europe. It is written by a historian specializing in this field. The next five chapters are an extensive presentation of case studies, where the authors describe the development of tourism in selected post-socialist urban centres. In the final part of the book the editors draw conclusions.

Twenty-five Sides of a Post-communist Mafia State

Author(s): / Language(s): English

The twenty-five essays accompany, illustrate and underpin the conceptual framework elaborated in Post-Communist Mafia State (CEU Press, 2016), published in conjunction with this volume. Leading specialists analyze the manifestations of the current political regime in Hungary from twenty-five angles. Topics discussed include the ideology, constitutional issues, social policy, the judiciary, foreign relations, nationalism, media, memory politics, corruption, civil society, education, culture and so on. Beyond the basic features of the economy the domains of taxation, banking system, energy policies and the agriculture are treated in dedicated studies. The essays are based on detailed empirical investigation about conditions in today’s Hungary. They nevertheless contribute to the exploration of the characteristic features of post-communist authoritarian regimes, shared by an increasing number of countries in Europe and Central Asia.

Zbornik o Pavlu Anđeliću

Author(s): / Language(s): Bosnian,Croatian,Serbian

U organizaciji Franjevačke teologije u Sarajevu održan je 14. i 15. listopada 2005. godine Međunarodni znanstveni skup posvećen uglednom arheologu i povjesničaru dr. Pavlu Anđeliću (1920-1985). Gotovo cijeli svoj radni vijek Anđelić je posvetio istraživanju bosanskoga srednjovjekovlja. Prvotno je studirao pravo, a po završetku studija radio kao kotarski sudac u zavičajnom Konjicu. Već za vrijeme sudačke službe počeo se zanimati za povijesno-kulturno nasljeđe. Po prelasku u Sarajevo (1956), ubrzo je, kao uposlenik Zemaljskoga muzeja, upisao studij povijesti i sasvim se okrenuo proučavanju prošlosti Bosne i Hercegovine. Bavio se pitanjima arheologije od prethistorije do srednjega vijeka. U svojim se istraživanjima s posebnim interesom okrenuo srednjovjekovnim gradovima bosanskih vladara, te pitanjima arheološko-historijske topografije, sfragistike, heraldike, epigrafike i diplomatike. Sam je vodio iskopavanja na više arheoloških lokaliteta: grad Bobovac, vladarski dvori u Kraljevoj Sutjesci, crkva Sv. Marije u Jajcu, grad Blagaj kod Mostara, krunidbena i grobna crkva u Milima (Arnautovićima) kod Visokog. Zapaženi doprinosi rasvjetljavanju povijesti bosanskoga srednjovjekovlja, akribija u znanstvenom radu, utemeljenost i visoka pouzdanost rezultata istraživačkoga rada Pavla Anđelića, razlozi su koji su nas potaknuli da znanstvenim skupom obilježimo dvije njegove obljetnice: osamdeset pet godina od rođenja i dvadeset godina od smrti. Pritom smo se vodili i činjenicom da je on, kao franjevački đak, osam godina pohađao Franjevačku klasičnu gimnaziju u Visokom gdje je stekao klasičnu izobrazbu. Skup je inicirao Dubravko Lovrenović s ciljem da se njime oda ne samo počast uglednom znanstveniku, nego također svrati i pozornost na njegove znanstvene doprinose na polju arheologije i historiografije Bosne i Hercegovine. U Zborniku je sabrano i objavljeno ukupno devetnaest referata. Jedan dio njih bavi se Anđelićevim doprinosima na polju arheoloških istraživanja, a drugi dio zahvaća tematiku koja prostorno i vremenski ulazi u okvir njegova istraživačkoga područja.

Rosja w polityce zagranicznej Polski w latach 1992–2015

Author(s): Mieczysław Stolarczyk / Language(s): Polish

The main research aim of this monograph is to distinguish main stages in the foreign policy of Poland towards Russia between 1992 and 2015 and outline their specifics. The author attempted at a synthesis of major manifestations of Polish-Russian cooperation and most sticking points in the intergovernmental (international) relations during that period. An important objective was to show the sources and examples of a divergence of interests, and point to the goals, which were based on these premises, established by the foreign policy-makers in Poland and Russia and pursued in mutual relations and international affairs.Between 1992 and 2015, in Poland’s foreign policy towards the East and national security policy, the relations with Russia and the Ukraine were of utmost importance. On the economic level, considering the volume of mutual trade turnover, Poland’s main partner in the East was the Russian Federation, whereas on the political level, the Ukraine was seen as a strategic partner. Along with the Ukraine, Russia played a key role in Poland’s security policy in the discussed period. It should be emphasized that Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian relations were very closely linked, and so was Poland’s policy towards Russia and the Ukraine. In Poland’s foreign policy towards Russia, or in broader terms, in Polish-Russian relations between 1992 and 2015, seven stages can be distinguished; each having their own characteristic. Despite some new specifics in each particular stage, they all shared an element of continuity. The constant theme was a great divergence of interests between Poland and Russia, particularly with regard to the European security system, and the role of NATO in shaping this security, as well as further stages of the alliance’s enlargement, especially by countries of the post-Soviet area; energy security and Poland’s strive for diversification of fuels supplies faced with Russia’s actions aimed at the diversification of routes of sending its gas and crude oil to Western Europe bypassing the Ukraine and Poland; a historic dispute, in which a thorough, satisfying for the Poles, explanation of the Katyn Forest massacre was particularly high on the agenda among other issues; opposing visions of building anorder in Eastern Europe, and first and foremost, in the Ukraine. With the passing of time, especially after Poland’s NATO and the EU accession, the future of Eastern European countries, particularly the Ukraine and Belarus, has become a fundamental issue in Polish-Russian relations. Both Russia and Poland treated Eastern European countries as a sort of a safety buffer. However, the two countries had entirely different visions of how this buffer ought to be shaped. The political leadership in Poland saw the strenghtening of national security in the strenghtening of the Ukrainian buffer through the Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the EU, whereas for the political leadership in Russia, the strenghtening of national security through Ukrainian buffer meant preserving its outside NATO status, or incorporating it in the the security system built under the aegis of Russia on the area of CIS.A characteristic of the Polish-Russian relations in that period was a great imbalance to Poland’s disadvantage, resulting from the differences in broadly understood physical potential of the two countries and, consequently, their international roles (Poland being a medium-size country situated in Central Europe and Russia being a superpower in Central Eurasia). The capacities of Poland to shape the situation in Eastern Europe on its own were incomparably lower than Russia’s. Therefore, Poland was trying to make use of European and Euro-Atlantic multirateral structures, mainly through the Eastern Dimension realized by the EU and NATO, to have as much influence as possible, on the desired developments in Eastern Europe. The eastern policy under successive RP governments was characterized by their overrating, frequently, of their own capacities, lack of objectivity in assessment of the situation across our eastern border, and application of double standards, particularly in the policy towards Russia.Polish-Russian political relations throughout the post-Cold War period were critical, and improvements were relatively short-lasting. Not only Russia, but also Poland is to blame for such a state of events. The Polish side, due to historical reasons and imbalance of potential, expected Russia to take more initiative in coming to an agreement with Poland. However, it has to be admitted that in many activities undertaken by Poland with regard to European security, in particular Eastern European subregion, the interests of Russia were completly disregarded, although they did not have to be accepted fully. An example of this was Polish diplomacy in the second half of 2013 intended not to allow Russia to be included in the negotiations on the EU association agreement with the Ukraine about issues that had economic implications for Russia’s interests. In their policy towards Russia, foreign policy-makers in Poland, forgot, all too often, or, were unwilling to remember, about the principle that in order to meet the security needs of one’s own country, one should also consider the security needs of other countries, the neighbouring ones in the first place. Analyzing the policies under succesive III RP governments on European security and relations with the post-Soviet countries, it is hard to share the view prevailing in our country that Poland did its best to develop partnership and good neighbourly relations with Russia. Among politicians, publicists and the Polish society, there was a large group of people who took a stance, though it was not always formally articulated, that Poland has a right, or even a duty to remain hostile towards Russia. On the other hand, Russia should not act unfavourably towards Poland, regardless of Poland’s anti-Russian policy, although, obviously, it was declared otherwise.One of the few stages showing a distinct improvement in Poland’s policy towards Russia and a mutual willingness to normalize our political relations, was the one between 2008 and 2010, when an unsuccesful attempt was made at pragmatizing foreign policy towards Russia. Since the end of 2007, this new foreign policy, gradually encompassing other areas, led to a greater or lesser modification of the policy to date towards Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia by basing it on the so-called positive realism. These new trends increased cooperation between Poland and Russia and, eventually, a considerable progress was achieved in normalizing our relations. Between 2008 and 2010, Polish policy towards the East not only changed in practice, it was also a conceptual change. The crash of the presidential plane at Smoleńsk (April 10th, 2010), in which 96 peple were killed, including President of RP Lech Kaczyński and His Spouse, was a major, if not primary reason why the normalization process (2008–2010) was seriously hampered to the point of a standstill between 2011 and 2013. The Smoleńsk air disaster, and conflicting stands over its causes in particular, exacerbateddivisions in the Polish society and strenghtened reluctance, if not hostility, towards Russia.A large part of the Polish political class and society did not accept a version of an inadvertent air disaster (plane crash), whose causes, like not following correct procedures, lay on both Poles and Russians. The surveys conducted during the years following the Smoleńsk air disaster showed that over 30% of the Polish society were convinced that it had been an attempt on the life of the Polish delegation en route to a commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Katyn Forrest massacre, and that the Russian government and secret services had been involved. After the Smoleńsk air disaster, foreign policy towards Russia and Polish-Russian relations became a ground for political struggle in our country. For many politicians and conservatist right-wing journalists, a demonstrated degree of anti-Russian sentiment became the main criterion of patriotism. In a large part of the Polish society, a belief was strenghtened that actions should be taken to weaken and isolate Russia, and to minimize, rather than increase cooperation between the two countries. This meant that internal conditions within our country, which could possibly motivate the foreign policy-makers to stop viewing Russia as the main threat and encourage a breakthrough in thinking about that issue, deteriorated markedly. Consequently, Polish-Russian relations between2011 and 2013 remained in a state of deadlock. In the foreign policy of Poland between 1992 and 2015, Russia played the leading role. This, however, stemmed from Russia being perceived by the policy-makers as the main threat to our national security, not a recognized partner in pursuing this security. Throughout that period, in all successive stages of Polish security policy, Russia was regarded as the main threat. Each political leadership in Poland, especially since the mid 1990s, treated Russia in this way, and these were not merelyanti-Russian declarations, but a guiding principle of the foreign policy. Behind it, was a conviction that Russian imperialism was timeless and Russia would never accept the sovereignty of Poland. It was an obvious reference to the classical Polish geopolitical thought about Russia posing main threats to our national security. During the crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine, between 2014 and 2015, the foreign policymakers in Poland revived the stance of a military threat on the part of Russia. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, such loud voices were heard about a possible military attack on Poland. Unlike the earlier periods, when there was an informal presumption that Russia was a threat to the security of Poland, in 2014, for the first time, in III RP’s security policy, Russia was formallypointed to as a direct military threat. It was articulated in official state documents, including Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej from November, 2014, and in addresses delivered by the Polish government officials (for instance in exposé of Foreign Minister R. Sikorski and his follower G. Schetyna).The crisis and conflict in south-eastern Ukraine did not substantially change Poland’s policytowards Russia. What did change between 2014 and 2015, however, was that much more emphasis than ever was placed on Russia being a threat to our national security, and there being a serious risk of a Russian direct invasion of Poland. During 2014 and 2015, the process of politicizing fear (policy of fear) of Russia was at its height. For Poland, a major outcome of the Ukrainian conflict and crisis was decreased national security and growing fears, among them the fear of Russian invasion, which does not mean that such a threat was real. During the years 2014 and 2015, Polish-Russian political relations at the highest level came almost to the point of being frozen. Important direct implications of the Ukrainian conflict forPoland’s security were, apart from a growing fear of Russia, increased desires towards strengthening its own defense capability, strenghtening NATO cohesion, increased involvement of NATO in our sub-region’s security and closer bilateral Polish-American cooperation regarding military security. Resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine as quickly as possible was in the interests of Poland. However, Polish diplomacy did not engage much in the conflict deescalation. They were very skeptical about the successive agreements aimed at ending the military operations negotiated within the frames of the so-called Normandy format (Mińsk I and Mińsk II). It seems that, considering the geopolitical situation in the Ukraine and divisions of the Ukrainian society, this country should remain a buffer state. Alternatively, coming out of this role should occur gradually, through a simultaneous Europeization of the Ukraine and Russia. Poland should not be interested in the „revolutionary” speeding up of the processes occuring in the Ukrainian society. Responsible politicians willing to serve the best interests of their nation should be aware of the limitations in pursuing even the most support worthy goals. The policy of every country, the foreign policy of Poland and the Ukraine included, should be founded on a realistic assessment of one’s own capabilities so that aspirations would not outgrow the real possibilities of their attainment. Poland, aspiring to the role of the EU main expert in Russian and the post-Soviet area affairs, through insisting in the EU on the earliest possible Ukraine association with the EU, contributed in a way to the situation when the Ukraine had to choose between the EU and Russia. Polish politicians did not anticpate the negative outcomes of such acceleration for the Ukraine itself (including theloss of Crimea and strong separatist tendencies in the East of the Ukraine), as well as for Russian-Ukrainian relations and the security of Poland. Therefore, the firm support and involvement of the Polish political class in the so-called democratic revolution in the Ukraine during 2013 and 2014, can hardly be regarded as a succcess. Polish policy towards the East ended in yet another failure, which was shown as confirmation when Poland was not included in the talks aimed at resolving the Ukrainian crisis, which were held by officials from the Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France since the middle of 2014.The Ukrainian crisis and conflict was a turning point in Polish security policy and Polish-Russian relations. The Polish government officially began to treat Russia as the largest threat to the national and international security. A considerable part of the political elites in Poland did not see the threat in excessive dependence of Polish economy on Russian energy resources or other economic threats, but in a direct military attack. Generally speaking, it is unknown to what extent the Ukrainian crisis and conflict will, in the long run, have an impact on changes in Polish policy towards the East, particularly towards Russia and the Ukraine. It exposed the ineffectiveness of our foreign policy to date towards the East. In this context, a question arises: What will be mid- and long-term implications of the Ukrainian conflict forthe modification or a radical alteration to Polish foreign policy towards the East? Another fundamental question pertains to Polish-Russian relations: What policy should Poland pursue towards Russia now and in the future? Will the foreign policy and security policy be directed,like in 2014 and 2015, at instransigence and confrontation, or will the normalization tendency prevail as regards Russia, and will the relations with the Ukraine be redefined? However, at the end of 2015, nothing implied that the foreign and security policy-makers intended to transform in any way the policy towards Russia and the Ukraine to date. It does not mean that changes will not be implemented in the years to come. It will be closely connected with the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the modification of the policy of Germany and the entire European Union as well as the policy of the United States on the post-Soviet area.The crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine strenghtened the legitimacy of argumentation thatthe main player in the post-Soviet area is Russia. None of the serious problems in this area can be resolved without the participation of Russia, and all the more, against Russia, which obviously, does not mean that the proponents of this stance overrate the capabilities of Russia in terms of shaping the closer and farther international environment. On this account, Polish policy will be hardly effective if at least some of Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet area, especially in Eastern Europe, are taken into consideration, as was proven to date. Bearing in mind long-term consquences, the strategic conceptions of the Polish policy towards the East, should opt for the closest possible ties of Russia with political and economic structures of the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures (Europeization of Russia). This, in turn, should result in the evolution of the economic-political system of Russia into liberal democracy.The Ukrainian crisis and conflict classified the effectiveness of the Polish conception aimed atoccidentalizing the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova without simultaneously occidentalizing Russia. As was indicated by the proponents of this conception, its implementation assumed an inevitable cost such as a political conflict with Russia. The crisis and conflict in the Ukraine between 2014 and 2015 should be a good reason to change this stance. The biggest price for its implementation was paid by the Ukraininas themselves. Therefore, in the context of these experiences, Poland should support such conceptions and actions in the Ukraine which attempt at Ukraine’s integration with the West not in opposition to Russia, but together with Russia, which does not imply that this process has to be fully synchronized. The direction of actions in this matter is of key importance. Despite the many contentious issues in Polish-Russian relations and different historical memory of Poles and Russians, in the long-term interests of Poland’s security, lies implementing a cooperative and integrating, not a confrontational conception. For the normalization of Polish-Russian relations, it is essential that the successive governemnets of Poland and Russia should have a political will to a less confrontational approach towards disputable issues and resolve emerging problems in a compromising way, which is one of the „scarcest commodities” in the Polish-Russian relations. A compromise should not be treated as a failure, as is often believed, also by the Poles. It also requires changes in mutual perception. A true normalization of mutual relations between Poland and Russia will not be possible if the majority of political elites, media and society in both countries will see the other not even as a difficult partner of rival, but an enemy. The divergence of interests does not have to lead to hostility. The governing groups inPoland and Russia face a challenge in improving Polish-Russian relations. They can either attempt to broaden the area of common interests or to highlight the discrepancies and divergence of interests, and thus strenghten social attitudes prone to either cooperation or confrontation.

20 godina od razbijanja SFRJ

Author(s): / Language(s): Russian,Serbian

Jedan vrhovni sud za BiH?

Author(s): / Language(s): Bosnian,Croatian,Serbian

Pitanje iz naslova bi se u svakoj evropskoj državi shvatilo kao lakrdijaška pravna dosjetka. U Bosni ono ne stvara reflekse osmijeha; pitanje je ozbiljno i prate ga dramatična upozorenja. Tema je unekoliko izlizana političkim parolama i medijskim eskponiranjem političkih pozicija. No, stručni krugovi (sudije, tužioci, advokati i državni službenici) i akademska zajednica (saradnici univerzitetskih insitucija i naučno-istraživačkih instituta) imaju jasno artikulirine stavove o ovom pitanju. Oni nisu apodiktičke prirode, nego počivaju na analizi pravnog ustrojstva BiH i iznalaze argumente u uporednom pravu, jursidikciji Ustavnog suda BiH i u pozitivnom ustavnom pravu.

Владе Краљевине Југославије у Другом светском рату 1941–1945

Author(s): Kosta Nikolić / Language(s): Serbian

The Yugoslav Royal Government, having gone abroad, was accepted by the Allies as the only constitutional representative of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The reputation acquired by the events of March 27th additionally helped the Government and King Petar to be regarded as the holders of the national continuity of the Yugoslav state. With the recognition of the Government, the integrity of the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was acknowledged. The Royal Government was in favour of continuing the struggle against the occupying forces and therefore was accepted as a government of an Allied state. In a statement issued at the end of June 1941, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill confirmed that the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia retained all the attributes of the sovereign power.

"Нико не сме да вас бије" Слободан Милошевић у Косову Пољу 24-25. април 1987. Историја и мит

Author(s): Kosta Nikolić / Language(s): Serbian

Srbija na Orijentu

Author(s): Sonja Biserko / Language(s): Serbian

1945. Kpaj или нови почетак?

Author(s): / Language(s): English,Croatian,Serbian

In 2015, the world celebrated its 70th anniversary since the end of World War II. On the initiative of Dr Dragan Aleksić, the Institute for Contemporary History of Serbia decided to join the commemoration of this significant date by publishing a collection of scientific papers that would not only be of a suitable character but would also represent a scientific contribution to the anniversary. It was an honor for me to be the editor of this collection, and my idea of ​​what it should look like revolved around 1945 as a turning point: a time when the war was ending and a new era was beginning. The end of World War II, to a much greater extent than the end of World War I, also marked the end of an old, pre-war world. After World War I, three empires disappeared, a series of new states emerged, democracy and the right of peoples to self-determination became generally accepted ... The end of World War I sowed, however, the seeds of the next world slaughter. It was incomparably greater than the previous or any other war in history, and its end created a world that people who lived in 1914 would never recognize. Europe was devastated, effectively divided between the two victorious superpowers, while the old European powers were losers or mere formal victors: soon after World War II, and in large part thanks to it, the colonial empires of Great Britain and France began to crumble rapidly, giving birth mainly during the first two postwar decades the world as we know it today. [...]

Срби и Југославија. Држава, друштво, политика

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian

Скоро вековно егзистирање Србије у заједничкој југословенској држави намеће потребу дугорочног и мултидисци пли нарног истраживања положаја Србије, а онда и српског народа у осталим деловима заједничке државе. Сарадници Института за новију историју Србије, прво радом на пројекту Историја српског народа, а затим и на пројекту Срби и распад Југославије извршили су бројна истраживања друштвених, економских, кул турних, просветних, верских и политичких прилика у Србији за време југословенске државе. Рeзултат тога су бројни чланци, ра справе и студије у домаћим и страним часописима и зборни ци ма, као и велики број монографских издања, од којих се већина налази и у најреномиранијим европским библиотекама. [...]

Tito - Viđenja i tumačenja

Author(s): / Language(s): English,Slovenian,Serbian

Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije je, u saradnji sa Arhivom Jugoslavije i Südost Institutom iz Regenzburga, u maju 2010. godine u Beogradu organizovao međunarodni naučni skup pod nazivom „TITO: viđenja i tumačenja". Tokom tri dana više od sedamdeset učesnika iz petnaest zemalja (Bosne i Hercegovine, Bugaske, Crne Gore, Češke, Francuske, Hrvatske, Indije, Makedonije, Nemačke, Rusije, SAD-a, Slovenije, Srbije, Švajcarske, Velike Britanije) je izlagalo svoja istraživanja i zaključke i polemisalo o različitim aspektima političke i ideološke delatnosti Josipa Broza Tita, kao i o brojnim interpretacijama Tita kao simbola koji je korišćen u procesima (de)konstrukcije jugoslovenkog društva. Bio je to prvi pokušaj okupljanja akademske i šire društvene zajednice kroz razgovor o delatnosti složene političke i istorijske ličnosti kakva je bio Josip Broz Tito. Skup je bio podeljen u četiri panela, koji su segmentirani na uže programske celine: Josip Broz i Tito u javnom prostoru; Napuštanje margine: jugoslovenska spoljna politika i Josip Broz Tito; Tito, Jugoslavija i Jugosloveni: unutrašnjopolitički i kulturni kontekst; Kultura sećanja. Organizatori su pošli od stava da se o Josipu Brozu Titu može govoriti kao o jednoj od ključnih političkih ličnosti iz vremena hladnog rata, ali i kao o intrigantnom fenomenu snažno prisutnom u javnom polju posle pada Berlinskog zida. Složena politička figura je dobila snagu kompleksnog simbola koji je, međutim, najčešće simlifikovan i jednostrano prezentovan. Veliki broj publicističkih radova stvarao je uprošćenu sliku prošlosti Jugoslavije, koja je unosila dodatne teškoće pri definisanju sistema vrednosti u sadašnjosti. Od nekritične glorifikacije do brutalne banalizacije i satanizacije, Tito je bio predmet brojnih pokušaja (zlo)upotrebe prošlosti. [...]

Organizirana prisilna iseljavanja Srba iz NDH

Author(s): Filip Škiljan / Language(s): Croatian

Imperijalne težnje Trećeg Reicha i Italije bile su pokretač Drugog svjetskog rata, a ideološku orkestraciju činili su rasna teorija, »evolucijski opravdavana« borba za životni prostor i anti-boljševizam. Emocionalni naboj davali su osvetoljubivost i želja za revanšizmom prema pobjednicima iz Prvog svjetskog rata te tradicionalni kršćanski antisemitizam. Europa se politički trebala vrtiti oko osovine Berlin–Rim, a činile bi je još neutralne i profašističke države te satelitske države ograničenog suvereniteta. Pored Židova i Roma, u Europi su rasno inferiornima smatrani i Slaveni općenito, posebno Česi, Poljaci, Rusi i Slovenci jer su ujedno bili i smetnja realizaciji njemačkog Lebensrauma. Rusi i Poljaci su tako, uz Židove, brojčano najveće žrtve nacističke projekcije Trećeg Reicha. Svima njima sudbinu je određivala nacistička genocidna ideologija superiornog arijevstva kao pogonskog goriva njemačkog imperijalističkog plana koji je u njima vidio samo biološki potencijal za ropsku eksploataciju.

Ratni zločini nad Srbima u Hrvatskoj 91 — 95

Author(s): Saša Milošević / Language(s): English,Croatian

Throughout the whole history of state, people and individuals were faced, to different extent, with war, destruction, violence and war crimes. The greatest difficulty after the conflicts, in addition to reconstruction of demolished houses and re-establishing relationship, was facing war crimes, in particular those committed by members of the so-called ‘Us’. This ‘patriotic narrowing of the mind’, as the philosophy professor Žarko Puhovski once said, at the time when one should confess the guilt of human also becomes a moral drama that has been haunting human kind since ever. It is related to the ontological evil as Hannah Arendt said, as well as with insisting upon ‘our truth’, which villains of modern age like to use in court rooms and claim it to the grave.

Slike povratka: Dalmacija

Author(s): Vaska Radulović / Language(s): English,Croatian

Although each of these stories relates to different experiences and misfortunes, the stories of Serb refugees from Dalmatia are not very different from the destiny of the Serb population, who were forced to leave their homes during the last war. New environment and people gave them just enough to stop fearing for their lives. But as the time passed, the feeling of not belonging to the new environment would not leave them. The feeling of longing for their ancestral homes and a piece of land they could call their own with certainty kept attracting them towards a new beginning.

Języki milczenia. Literatura o traumie i postpamięci Zagłady

Author(s): / Language(s): Polish,German

The book presents various aspects of literary representations of post-Holocaust trauma in texts of Polish and German literature. The phenomena of transgenerational memory transmission or – as Marianne Hirsh puts it – "postmemory" are an important element of the author’s reflections.

“Slavonijo, triput si gorila...” Kotar Podravska Slatina u Drugom svetskom ratu 1941–1945.

Author(s): Milan Radanović / Language(s): Serbian

Knjiga koja je pred čitaocima obuhvata istoriju slatinske Podravine i Brđanske tokom Drugog svetskog rata. Reč je o teritoriji koje je uoči i tokom rata obuhvatalo područje kotara Podravska Slatina, a nakon rata područje istoimene općine. Granice predratnog i ratnog kotara Podravska Slatina i posleratne općine Podravska Slatina nisu u potpunosti podudarne. Kotar je obuhvatao i pojedina sela koja su nakon rata postala deo općine Orahovica, a pre rata su bila deo seoskih općina Slatinski Drenovac i Nova Bukovica u sastavu kotara Podravska Slatina (Slatinski Drenovac, Prekoračani, Pušina, Krasković, Humljani, Krajna, Četekovac, Čojlug, Mikleuš). S druge strane, nakon rata u sastav općine Podravska Slatina uvršteno je područje nekadašnje seoske općine Čađavica koja je pre rata bila u sastavu kotara Donji Miholjac (Čađavica, Čađavički Lug, Ilmin Dvor). Sva ostala naselja, njih oko 60, koja su pre i tokom rata bila u sastavu kotara, nakon rata našla su se u sastavu općine Podravska Slatina. Knjiga obuhvata događaje koji su se odigrali od 1941. do 1945. na širem području slatinske Podravine i Brđanske, uključujući ne samo delove kotara Podravska Slatina kasnije pripojene općini Orahovica i delove kotara Donji Miholjac kasnije pripojene općini Podravska Slatina, već i rubna područja kotara Virovitica, Daruvar, Našice, Donji Miholjac i Slavonska Požega koja se naslanjaju na slatinsko-voćinski kraj. [...]

Złe kobiety czy zła sława? Negatywne wizerunki kobiet na przestrzeni dziejów

Author(s): / Language(s): Polish

The books presents the results of research on negative images of women in different historical periods. The authors deliberate whether the attitudes associated with “evil” women change throughout history and if the same actions taken by men and women are judged in the same way. The research is based on the variety of sources: from ancient philosophy to contemporary press.

Genocid nad Bošnjacima, Srebrenica 1995–2020: Uzroci, razmjere i posljedice. Zbornik radova s Međunarodne naučne konferencije održane 19. oktobra 2020. u Sarajevu

Author(s): / Language(s): Bosnian

Povodom obilježavanja dvadeset pete godišnjice genocida nad Bošnjacima u „sigurnoj zoni“ Ujedinjenih nacija Srebrenica i oko nje, 19. oktobra 2020. godine u Sarajevu (Vijećnica) održana je Međunarodna naučna konferencija pod nazivom “GENOCID NAD BOŠNJACIMA, SREBRENICA 1995–2020: Uzroci, razmjere i posljedice“ u organizaciji četiri obrazovno-naučne institucije: Univerziteta u Sarajevu, Univerziteta u Tuzli, Instituta za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu i Instituta za historiju Univerziteta u Sarajevu. Događaji u Srebrenici i oko nje od 6. do 19. jula 1995. godine, bez obzira na mnogobrojne pokušaje, neprevodivi su na jezik stvarnosti koju poznajemo. Kao čovječanstvo naivno smo vjerovali da se poslije Aušvica i holokausta nigdje, nikada i nikome ne može dogoditi genocid takvih razmjera, da su za samo nekoliko dana ugašena nasilnom smrću 8372 ljudska života, a ugašena su samo zato što su imala drugačiji etnički i vjerski identitet. To nam govori da ljudski rod kroz historiju u moralnom pogledu od Drugog svjetskog rata i pobjede nad fašizmom nije nimalo napredovao. [...]

Szukając trzeciego wyjścia

Author(s): Jan Kieniewicz / Language(s): Polish

The book is devoted to modernization of Poland from a historical perspective, with particular emphasis on the post-1989 transformation process. It is an attempt at a theoretical, interdisciplinary approach developed within the author’s own theory of social system (the concept of a meeting). It also contains reflections on the possibility of opening the way to a new identity of the Poles and the search for Poland’s exit from the state known as the periphery of the world.